Berghof Glossary on Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding
20 essays on theory and practice
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Berghof Foundation (ed.)
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Abbreviations

ANC  African National Congress, South Africa
CPN-M  Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist
ETA  Basque separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
EU  European Union
GRIT  Graduated Reciprocal Reductions in Tension
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
i4p  Infrastructure(s) for Peace
IGAD  Intergovernmental Authority on Development
KLA  Kosovo Liberation Army
M-19  Movimiento 19 de Abril, Colombia
M & E  Monitoring and evaluation
NGO  Non-governmental organisation
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC  Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SIPRI  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UGTT  Tunisian General Labour Union (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail)
UN  United Nations
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
US(A)  United States (of America)
USD  US Dollar
Introduction

“People need hope and inspiration desperately. But hope and inspiration are only sustained by work.”
Tarana Burke

The Berghof Glossary on Conflict Transformation presents the main principles and approaches that we use in our work, which supports people and conflict parties around the world in creating a more peaceful future.

For a second time, the team at the Berghof Foundation has embarked on a joint exploration in order to chart a shared understanding of what it takes to create “space for conflict transformation”. It has been seven years since we first published this small and compact booklet as a guide to our interpretation of the cornerstones of peacebuilding and conflict transformation (Berghof Foundation 2012). The organisation, and the world around us, has changed considerably in these seven years since 2012 (illustrated, for example, by the Annual Reports for 2013 and 2017, and Sheriff et al. 2018).

Nationally and internationally, the space for inclusive and constructive peacebuilding has begun to shrink measurably. The use of force, polarisation and oppression are gaining ground again, despite having proven to be less effective and more costly, as is argued, for example, by Lisa Schirch. The proponents of the inclusive and constructive approach must therefore get their “ducks in a row” and their message clear. (A need underlined by a 2018 report on the topic of supporting peacebuilding in times of change). We can take courage and strength from a number of countervailing trends, such as the opening of new spaces and partnerships, and the willingness of international bodies and national governments to endorse, sometimes on paper first, a strong peacebuilding rhetoric and agenda.
At the Berghof Foundation, we remain convinced that conflict transformation can succeed. It will not do so, however, without the dedication and hard work of actors across all levels and sectors. Importantly, conflict transformation and peacebuilding must be led (and wanted) by the actors involved in violent conflict and escalation, who control the drivers and duration of the conflicts. Both the involved parties and their transformation-orientated supporters must also take seriously the emerging uncertainties and challenges, which require new approaches and realistic risk assessment.

For peacebuilding proponents, there are numerous worrying trends which, at the time of writing, have started to point towards an emerging crisis of the entire international order. One visible expression of this crisis is the weakening of existing multilateral regimes governing areas such as arms control, international trade and regional cooperation. Some national conflicts have become proxy wars – as in Yemen, Syria or Eastern Ukraine, to mention only a few – primarily at the expense of a suffering local population. Other conflicts have increasingly spilled violence over national boundaries, thereby creating zones of regional instability, particularly in parts of the Middle East and Africa.

Another worrying development, related to manifold social grievances, is the sharpening political polarisation in a number of democratic states, which – in domestic and in international contexts – appears to make strategies based on political paternalism and exclusion more attractive to many people than cooperative approaches. Many countries in the Global South rely on the support provided by democratic donor countries. If this support is vanishing, millions of people in these countries may lose hope that building peace will benefit them at all.

However, if there is one tangible lesson to be learned from the past, it is that neither power politics nor exclusion will ever lead to sustainable peace. Rather than being discouraged by the uncertainties and frictions in the international political en-
vironment, we take them as a call for analysis and action. We are convinced that inclusive and participatory spaces for conflict transformation have become even more important in preventing fragile peace processes from losing momentum or breaking down.

Credibly holding on to our values is of utmost importance in this context. We must undertake more efforts to anticipate the implications of these changes for our work, to adapt to new challenges and/or to seize new opportunities in a timely and convincing manner. New political constellations – nationally and internationally – may create risks but also new opportunities for communication and exchange.

In light of this, some of the 20 notions in the previous edition of this booklet remain cornerstones of our understanding and practice: we understand conflict to be a necessary and useful force for change, rather than a danger to be suppressed or managed. We strongly believe that principles of (local) ownership and responsibility, empowerment, non-violence, participation and inclusivity must guide our work. We take guidance from those in conflict and are multipartial towards those experiencing sometimes violent strife. We shape dialogue and facilitate negotiation processes in the role of a supporting actor. We know that the legacies of a violent past must be addressed in contemporary peacebuilding processes. And we believe that human security, dignity and trust are important values to uphold. While these approaches remain central to our work, with this edition of the Glossary we are also reviewing the ways in which they needed to adjust given the new trends in our peacebuilding environment.

Some notions have already gained new prominence in our understanding and practice in response to these trends: the creation of innovative and locally designed infrastructures for peace, or the re-focusing of attention also on our home country of Germany, where our peace education team has adopted conflict-sensitive approaches to the integration of refugees. These areas highlight
needs and new spaces of engagement to which we enthusiastically bring our curiosity and experience.

From in between these notions, “the Berghof approach” or the “Berghof spirit” emerges. Like the best aspirations in life, it sometimes remains elusive, but continues to be the organisational method we are aspiring to and working towards. First and foremost, the Berghof approach emphasises the importance of

- Relationships and long-term relationship-building
- Working with local partners and conflict parties
- Multi-faceted designs and peer learning, also and importantly from “south to south”
- Weaving together research and practice
- Allowing for the transformative power of conflict

Our approach builds on the principles of *multipartiality*, by which we take the legitimate concerns and interests of all parties involved in – or affected by – a (violent) conflict into account (for more information, see our Annual Report 2017). In the following, we reflect on conflict transformation and peacebuilding in theory and practice in more detail, by adding examples as well as challenges arising in our daily work. We hope you will discover and be enticed by these definitions and nuances in equal measure.

This collection of essays would not have been possible without the engagement of our colleagues in Germany and beyond. They have made time, beyond their demanding work in peace education, peace process support and conflict transformation research, to sit together in novel constellations across the entire organisation to debate and work out what it means, for example, to facilitate dialogue between conflict parties. Or to meaningfully integrate youth. Or to deal with the past.

Our thanks go to all of these colleagues, and the ones who have before them showed the same dedication to the first edition of the Glossary. Our essays stand, sometimes quite “literally”, on the shoulders of those contributing to the first edition of this
booklet: namely Beatrix Austin, Anna Bernhard, Véronique Dudouet, Martina Fischer, Hans J. Giessmann, Günther Gugel, Javaid Hayat, Amy Hunter, Uli Jäger, Daniela Körppen, Ljubinka Petrovic-Ziemer, Katrin Planta, Nadine Ritzi, Anne Romund, Norbert Ropers, Barbara Unger, Luxshi Vimalarajah, Oliver Wils, Oliver Wolleh and Johannes Zundel. Some of these colleagues have since left to go on to work with other organisations that foster peace and conflict transformation. We hope they will read this new edition with interest and inspiration.

We continue to be grateful for the support of the Berghof Foundation’s shareholders and management who have seen the usefulness of such a broad-based process of developing a shared understanding of the notions we operate with in the conflict world. Thanks go, last but by no means least, to the local teams and partners with whom we work in many demanding settings and who are the judges of our engagement, by our deeds as much as our words.

*Berlin, December 2018*

References


1 Addressing Social Grievances

Sara Abbas, Matteo Dressler and Nicole Rieber

“Nonviolence does not always work – but violence never does.”
Madge Micheels-Cyrus

Many current violent conflicts are rooted in group-based grievances arising from inequality, exclusion, lack of opportunities to satisfy basic needs (food, healthcare, education), poor governance or feelings of injustice. When an aggrieved group is mobilised and assigns blame to others (to an ethnic or religious group or to an authority or state) for its perceived political, economic or social problems, those grievances can cross the tipping point into social upheaval and violence. However, there are numerous non-violent ways for those in-
**SOCIAL GRIEVANCE** | the perception of a socially defined group that it suffers from systematic inequality, exclusion, lack of opportunity to satisfy basic needs, and other disadvantage. Social grievance is often at the root of conflict. When groups mobilise, they may take violent or non-violent action to address social grievance. Conflict transformation and peacebuilding support groups and mobilisers in choosing non-violent means while taking grievances seriously.

**NON-VIOLENCE** | a philosophy and practice that holds the use of force to be morally and politically illegitimate or counter-productive and strives to find non-violent expressions of resistance to oppression.

**VIOLENCE** | harmful and damaging behaviour of a physical, structural or cultural nature, which prevents human beings from reaching their full potential.

Drivers of social grievances

To turn into social grievances, latent inequalities have to be politicised. Three factors stand out in this process. First, there needs to be a perception of clearly distinguishable “groups” in society. Second, groups must be able to compare each other’s objective or perceived characteristics. Third, inequality or exclusion must be seen as unjust and another group must be blamed for this unfairness (as argued by Lars-Erik Cederman and his colleagues in 2013). These “groups” are not fixed in time; rather, identities are fluid and constantly being shaped and reshaped.

Many social grievances are rooted in exclusion and oppression, which can serve as a basis for collective mobilisation and therefore become drivers of conflict. Perceptions of exclusion can also...
play an important role in turning grievances into violence. As noted by the United Nations and World Bank (2018, 122, with reference to research by Ted Gurr), “perceptions of exclusion and inequality” appear to be central for building up grievances, even when these perceptions do not align with objective inequalities.

Before exclusion patterns and grievances turn into outright violence, they often foment over a long period. In Lebanon, for instance, Lebanese young people and the Syrian and Palestinian refugee communities feel particularly marginalised and deprived due to their political, social and economic exclusion. The resulting disenfranchisement may be the same; the drivers, however, are different. In the case of the Lebanese youth, who face high levels of unemployment, the issue is primarily about state-society cleavages. In the case of the refugee communities, it is mainly about the lack of legal and political recognition: for example, Palestinian refugees are legally excluded from the job market. This combination of factors has led to a wave of radicalisation. In the 2010s, this resulted in an increase in local clashes between supporters of extremist groups and the security forces.

For example ...

Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta provides an example of how inequalities and social grievances can drive people to support violence against the state. Past decades in the Delta have seen an increase in violence and insecurity, fuelled by income inequality, poverty and frustrated expectations. A lack of political rights, the socio-economic discrimination based on religion or ethnicity, and the experience of injustice are examples of vertical and horizontal inequalities (United Nations and World Bank 2018). In the Niger Delta, unfair distribution of oil revenue and destroyed livelihood opportunities have resulted in social grievances.
In situations of protracted conflict, there is also a high risk of violence becoming a vicious cycle, for those exposed to violence, especially at a young age, are more likely to turn to violence themselves. (An example is the recruitment and abuse of minors by adults who were child soldiers themselves, aided by a degree of habituation to violence as normality). This is particularly true if groups or whole communities are exposed to violence over time, a connection underlined by a 2016 Berghof Handbook Dialogue on post-war healing and dealing with the past.

Addressing social grievances through violence: social upheaval
Addressing horizontal and vertical inequalities and social grievances is key to preventing conflicts from turning violent (→ Preventing Violence). Yet in societies where the root causes of social grievances remain unaddressed, or where avenues for non-violent collective mobilisation are few, groups that are excluded socially, politically or economically may begin to view violence as the only viable option for redress. One factor that heavily influences this dynamic is the use of repression, for example by state security agencies against aggrieved groups’ non-violent dissent, since repression tends to create a cycle of violence.

Peace and conflict research has tried to elucidate the origins of violence, especially the phenomenon of escalation from latent to violent conflict through ethnopolitical mobilisation of aggrieved groups (→ Working on Conflict Dynamics). As Johan Galtung argued back in 1969, systematic inequality, generated by allowing some groups access to resources while denying it to others, is a pervasive, normalised and largely invisible form of violence. Cultural violence, driven by differences over religion, ideology, language, art or science, generates abuse against “others”. Taking these prevalent but non-physical forms of violence in consideration, Simon Fisher and his colleagues (2000) offered a definition of violence as “actions, words, attitudes, structures or systems that cause physical, psychological, social or environmental damage and/or prevent people from reaching their full human potential”.

Addressing Social Grievances
Strategies to deal with such multifaceted violence need to focus on individual factors, structural factors and the enabling environment – often simultaneously (→ Preventing Violence).

Since 2006, through its work on resistance and liberation movements, the Berghof Foundation has striven to understand why these groups, which draw on the social grievances of parts of the population, shift from non-violent to violent conflict strategies and vice versa. Participatory studies on the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19) in Colombia, the Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), among others, show that these groups viewed armed action as a last resort in the face of state repression of non-violent protest. These resistance and liberation movements considered violence (e.g. through guerrilla warfare) as a legitimate form of political action and as one means of self-defence and struggle (among others) in the face of human rights violations. These means, violent and non-violent, were employed, sometimes simultaneously, by the groups in response to a changing political environment. Our approach aims at enabling such groups to overcome grievances through means of non-violent conflict transformation rather than the use of force.

**Addressing social grievances through non-violence**

Non-violence can provide an alternative strategy for aggrieved social groups to seek redress against inequality or oppression. Rooted in the conviction that use of force is morally illegitimate and/or strategically counterproductive, non-violent resistance aims to achieve social change and to resist oppression and violence in all its forms.

Historically, non-violence has included various methods of direct action. Gene Sharp detailed actions ranging from symbolic protest and persuasion to social, political and economic non-cooperation, civil disobedience, confrontation without violence, and the building of alternative institutions. Non-violent methods
have achieved change through the productive demonstration of “people power” against autocratic or repressive regimes and human rights abuses in many places across the globe, for example Tunisia in 2011 and Armenia in 2018.

Although non-violent resistance magnifies existing social and political tensions by imposing greater costs on those who want to maintain their advantages under an existing system, it can be described as a precursor to conflict transformation. Non-violent techniques can enable minorities or dominated groups (“the underdogs”) to address their grievances and to mobilise and take action towards empowerment and a restructuring of relations with their powerful opponents (power-holders or pro-status quo forces, “the elites” or “top dogs”). The aim is both dialogue and resistance: dialogue with the people on the other side to persuade them, and resistance to oppressive structures to compel change (→ Empowerment and Ownership).

Building on its track record of investigating non-violence, the Berghof Foundation’s current research aims to paint a more comprehensive picture of the social and political processes which connect non-violent methods to democratic consolidation, in order to foster constructive social change.

**Challenges and ways forward**

The success of non-violent approaches can only be judged by carefully assessing their outcomes and effects over the long term.

A new area of critical inquiry in this context is social media. Social media have proven to be a double-edged sword: on the one hand, they offer new avenues for expressing grievances and engaging in constructive dialogue. On the other hand, they can become a platform where grievances are actually channelled toward violence, for example by extremist organisations intent on fomenting hate, fear and mistrust and exploiting local grievances to recruit globally.
Moreover, non-violence may not always work to overcome social grievances, for example in highly polarised conflicts involving seemingly non-negotiable issues. If power structures and practices do not allow for non-violent transformation, parties to a conflict may stick to violent options, out of despair or because of a lack of other opportunities. In some of these cases, dialogue and conflict mitigation methods may successfully complement non-violent tactics, emphasising the prevention of violence while striving to redress the structural inequalities which led aggrieved groups to resist in the first place. Moreover, conflict resolution methods can help turn achievements of civil resistance into commonly accepted, negotiated agreements, mending polarised relationships through non-violent conflict (Dudouet 2017). All methods need to be applied within conflict parties and violent groupings as well as across divides. Third parties, such as the Berghof Foundation, can be helpful in creating spaces for dialogue, negotiation and mediation for non-violent interaction among the conflict parties.

References and Further Reading


Online Resources


“The road to peace is paved with dignity.”
Donna Hicks

Dignity, trust and justice – as well as their opposites, humiliation, distrust and injustice – do not feature prominently in reflections on peace projects. But they are very much present among and within the people involved in the conflicts. It is therefore all the more important that all who wish to support those projects are sensitive to these dimensions and develop the respect and empathy that are essential for work in this field.
DIGNITY | the state or quality of being worthy of honour or respect. Peace rests, among other aspects, on upholding the value and principle of dignity for all regardless of their origin.

HUMILIATION | the introduction of a hierarchy between persons with superior and inferior status, by which some are “put down and held down”.

Dignity, trust and justice

Dignity is a term used to indicate that all human beings have an inalienable right to respectful and ethical treatment. Dignity became a key term in the Age of Enlightenment and in the human rights movement of the 20th century. It culminated in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, which states:

“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”

Trust is a term that signifies that people have, in principle, positive expectations of the intentions and behaviour of other persons. These positive expectations can be based on close face-to-face interactions and bonding, for example in a family or among friends, or on joint membership in groups and communities with well-established social and cultural norms. The type and level of trust raise highly complex issues, but it is generally assumed that there is a significant difference in the trust that exists within identity groups and between them, be they ethno-national, religious or other culturally defined groups.

While there is no commonly agreed definition of justice, its principle suum cuique – everyone should have what he or she is en-

1 More gender-sensitive wording has yet to be adopted
titled to – appears to be universal in reach. Accordingly, justice is understood as “a state of affairs where actors obtain what they are entitled to” (Müller 2013, 45). Yet who is entitled to what is highly contested and depends on the actors’ perspective. Such perspectives are shaped by both cultural norms and personal experiences, and can thus be highly subjective. Justice is thus about the allocation of goods or benefits, be they in the economic realm of distribution, the cultural realm of recognition or the political realm of representation.

The experience of being treated fairly and justly is important for a person’s sense of dignity as well as their ability to trust. This in turn plays a crucial role in the transformation of inter-personal and collective conflicts and enhances the prospects for → Building and Sustaining Peace.

**The high price of humiliation, distrust and injustice**

The vital role of dignity, trust and justice can be vividly demonstrated by contrasting them with their absences: humiliation, distrust and injustice, and their contributions to the escalation and protracted nature of violent conflicts.

*Injustice* is a state of affairs in which actors perceive a discrepancy between entitlements and benefits. ‘Striving for justice’ seeks to correct this perceived discrepancy and is a basic driver of (violent as well as nonviolent) action. Transformation places justice at the core, supposing a normative drive of constructive social change towards a just peace. Justice, here, is both an end and a practical principle guiding the means by which social change is pursued. Examples of this can be found within the sub-field of peace mediation, where empirical findings stress the importance of procedural and distributive justice for the sustainability of peace agreements, or the sub-field of reconciliation studies. David Bloomfield, based on his own experience in and beyond Northern Ireland, has argued for the centrality of “a systematised definition of social right and wrong, from which grows an
underlying shared value: that the justice system applies to all of us, that it acts fairly, that we can trust it”.

The term “humiliation” indicates that instead of acknowledging the equal dignity of all human beings, a hierarchy is introduced between persons with superior and inferior status (the most extreme example being the German words “Übermensch” and “Untermensch” used by the Nazis). Accordingly, Evelin Lindner defines the essence of humiliation as being “about putting down and holding down”. Looking at history from this angle, humiliation was interpreted in most societies of the world as part of a “natural order” of superiors and inferiors, at least until the Enlightenment. Tragically, there are many countries in which this fundamentally unequal “natural order” is still in place today. There is also often a temptation to impose “top-down solutions” as a simplifying method to deal with the complexity of conflicts.

In conflicts, the close relationship between collective political violence and humiliation is evident when fighting not only aims to achieve the physical destruction or “neutralisation” of the enemy, but also targets their symbols of identity, respect and dignity, and their honour and collective achievements. Often, the first acts of violence are directed against these symbols, such as when the Nazis destroyed and burned down more than 1500 synagogues during the Night of Broken Glass in November 1938, marking the start of the Holocaust. In many protracted conflicts, the violence against the opposing side’s symbols, such as places of worship and cultural pride (libraries, museums), and violence against people are closely connected. This is dramatically expressed in collective sexual violence, which aims to degrade the physical and moral integrity of the enemy.

Tragically, collective humiliation in the context of war and violence has the systemic tendency to reproduce itself, particularly if the victorious side makes no efforts to acknowledge the painful narratives of the past, to address issues of transitional justice
and to engage in some kind of genuine process of reconciliation (→ Dealing with the Past and Transitional Justice). For effective conflict transformation, it is therefore crucial to overcome the cycle of humiliation and counter-humiliation and to work towards a comprehensive understanding of human dignity.

The central role of building trust
The main challenge in transforming conflicts shaped and driven by humiliation by one side or by sequences of mutual humiliation is to find ways to overcome the deep distrust that this engenders. Particularly in the case of protracted conflicts, the distrust is so deeply ingrained in the emotions and attitudes of the parties that even occasional gestures of conciliation are often perceived by the recipients as a ploy to undermine their position. To initiate genuine processes of conflict transformation, it is therefore crucial to develop strategies of trust and confidence-building, and ultimately to find ways of gradually building more just, dignified and trustworthy relationships. The Berghof Foundation’s work in Abkhazia, for example, is proving that this principle is highly relevant by slowly, relationship by relationship, enabling more and more public debate of highly contentious issues.

During the East-West conflict until 1989, investigating measures of confidence-building was one of the key areas of peace research and practical peace initiatives. A remarkable contribution on trust building in this context was developed by the psychologist Charles Osgood in 1962 with his strategy for “graduated reciprocal reductions in tension” (GRIT). His argument was that single de-escalatory measures in protracted conflicts will be of little value because they can easily be rejected as public relation stunts. Instead, one side should take the initiative and generate a series of small conciliatory gestures, which are publicly announced and implemented step-by-step, independently of the response of the other side. If the latter party reciprocates with similar measures, more significant steps should be taken. The core idea is to trigger a cycle of de-escalation with a long-term
perspective by means of unilateral initiatives and to accompany this process with some kind of dialogue to promote mutual understanding and foster joint analyses.

Whether this approach can be applied to internal conflicts involving internationally recognised states and non-state armed groups (or liberation and resistance movements) is an open question. The problem in these cases is that there is not only deep mistrust between the parties, but often fundamental disagreement on the legitimacy of the existing political order as well. The general understanding is that trust building is a multi-dimensional process in which elements of rationally defined common interests, transparency and predictability play an important role, as do emotional and relationship factors. Also, the perception that a more just and hence more legitimate political system is being built is of great importance here. Trust cannot be imposed on conflicting parties, nor can it grow without empathy and cooperation, which is why procedural justice becomes imperative as it fosters positive attitudes, cooperative behaviour, participation possibilities and ultimately conflict reduction.

In cases of humiliation and traumatic experiences of violence, trust building means addressing issues of transitional justice and reconciliation. At a minimum, it requires some kind of acknowledgement of the painful past. And even in the best cases, trust to engage in conflict transformation needs opportunities, time and spaces for relationship-building.
References and Further Reading


Online Resources


Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies Network, www.humiliationstudies.org


One of the basic insights from protracted conflicts is that it takes time – not only years, but often decades – to overcome the risk of relapse into violence. In many cases, protracted conflicts move through long and painful phases of “no war, no peace”. Peace processes that do not also transform the conflict at hand by addressing root causes will hardly be sustainable. Based on this recognition, the Berghof Foundation, along with many activists,
peacebuilding practitioners and international actors is focusing attention on advancing sustainable peace support efforts.

**Mechanisms and actors**

National and local actors are key in initiating, driving and supporting peace processes. The discussion around national peace support structures or → Establishing Infrastructures for Peace emphasises the importance of establishing formal, semi-formal and informal mechanisms for cooperation among the conflict parties and more permanent networks and institutions to support peace processes over time.

Peace support structures in many contexts also receive external assistance, often in the form of financial support but also including capacity-building, advice, process support and assistance with organisational development. One strand of discussion has thus focused on comprehensive, coherent and effective peace support strategies by external actors through long-term development of national, local and organisational capacities, using leverage to encourage conflict parties to engage in peace processes and coordinating with influencers in a multilateral support strategy.
Deadlocks: how they occur

Peace processes to end protracted conflicts remain fragile and are continuously at risk of being blocked or stalled. These deadlocks can be caused by a number of factors.

Contentious issues and positions: Peace processes can accentuate existing ideological incompatibilities or bring forward new contentious issues. This can prompt the conflict parties to reject talks and stop the process, fearing that negotiating would mean abandoning their beliefs. In such cases, the parties often see either too few or too many favourable outcomes of the negotiations. With too few options, they hope the other party will be the one to shift position in their favour. With too many favourable options and in an attempt to get the best possible outcome for themselves, they fear that being satisfied with several options might be perceived as a sign of weakness. They therefore block the process altogether.

From peace support to peace process support: evolution of a term ...

Initially, peace support operations were introduced to complement or replace traditional concepts of peacekeeping as third-party military interventions based on the consent of the conflict parties. Peace support operations came to encompass more robust mandates for peace enforcement, but they also shifted towards recognising the importance of civilian support for UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Since then, the focus of “peace support” efforts has increasingly evolved to include more medium- and long-term efforts by internal and external actors, ranging from process-oriented support such as dialogue and mediation to establishing more institutionalised infrastructures promoting human rights, rule of law or multiparty democracy.
Frictions around trust, interests and relationships: Peace talks touch upon the vested, if not existential interests of the conflict parties in a situation where relations between parties and social groups more broadly are characterised by deep divisions, grievances, atrocities and violence – in many cases directly blamed on the other sides involved in the negotiations. Often, experiences of unfulfilled commitments in previous rounds of negotiations or doubts about the other parties’ intentions and seriousness prevail. Certain actors may continue to benefit from the status quo and are therefore interested in sustaining deadlocks and seeking to undermine efforts to reach a settlement. These benefits may be financial and economic, such as access to resources, rents or the profits of war economies. However, they may also be political, with parties justifying a continued grip on power and strengthening their support bases by inciting against other groups or portraying themselves as a protective shield or guarantor of certain group rights or privileges.

Shortcomings in process design: Deadlocks can also result from procedural shortcomings in the design of a peace process. An example is insufficient preparation of the process or the parties themselves, leading to uncertainty among key actors or lack of trust in the process – sometimes caused by a desire or pressure to achieve quick results. Shortcomings may also arise from the lack of support structures for problem-solving (in informal and formal settings) or for the development of safety nets or alternative options to generate and sustain broader support for the process. The process architecture may also be negatively affected by the exclusion of key actors or lack of mechanisms to deal with elite or popular resistance. In third party-mediated processes, perceptions relating to the impartiality, competence or commitment of the mediating party may also lead to deadlocks until trust can be restored or, more often, the mediating party is replaced.
Deadlocks: how to break them
Peace support actors can help in preventing deadlocks through elements of process design or safety nets or can support efforts to overcome deadlocks in order to prevent and avoid a complete breakdown of the process.

The Berghof Foundation investigated many other mechanisms for deadlock-breaking while preparing a National Dialogue Handbook in 2017. They include:

- **Formal and semi-formal structures and mechanisms, informal and ad hoc mechanisms**
  When deadlocks hinder the continuation of talks, it may be helpful to bring together a small deadlock-breaking team comprising problem-solving-oriented individuals from each side who may find it easier to reach agreement on the contentious issues in this more concentrated setting. Depending on the context and process, these mechanisms can either be integrated in the design of the process as a formal or semi-formal structure or the process itself can be organised in an informal or ad hoc manner.

For example ...
During the National Dialogue Conference in Yemen, the participants quickly realised that the working groups needed a way to overcome deadlocks in their discussions. A deadlock-breaking mechanism was therefore put into place in the shape of a Consensus Committee. Whenever the plenary was unable to reach consensus on an issue, it was taken to the Committee. The composition of the Committee mirrored that of the Conference, consisting of the heads of all decision-making bodies, and was tasked with proposing adjustments that made an agreement in the working groups possible. In this way, the contentious issues could be dealt with individually by a representative group able to reach a solution.
Public consultations/referenda and reference to wider audiences and third parties
Experience has repeatedly shown that connecting all tracks in an inclusive process offers the greatest potential for a transformation towards sustainable peace. Peace support actors engaged in process design thus aim to establish processes that actively include not only the elite but also the broader public down to the grassroots (→Inclusivity and Participation). Inclusive processes not only bring parties closer to an agreement but also help prevent and address deadlocks, since public opinion is often a contributory factor to processes stalling. On the other hand, public opinions and perceptions of the negotiations can give the conflict parties the necessary impetus to move the peace process forward.

For example ...
In the context of the Abkhaz-Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, the Berghof Foundation’s Caucasus Programme focuses on building bridges between estranged communities through local history dialogues. Implementing a “three-tiered gearwheel approach”, the team found that constructive and self-critical reflections on the past, involving individuals and groups, and upscaling these discussions to the public debate level can achieve the greatest possible inclusivity in the process and spark collective reflection processes. In a first step, “gearwheel one”, project groups collected their perspectives on the conflict, escalation of violence and war in an interview format. “Gearwheel two”, consisting of intergenerational discussion rounds, gave space to people from different age groups to come together and reflect on their experiences and listen to others. “Gearwheel three” then took the dialogue up to a public level using TV talkshow or radio formats. This initiated a wider process of public reflection.
Collective strategic thinking processes
In situations of intractable conflict, where parties refuse encounters with others or lack internal cohesion, a new model by the Oxford Research Group (2017) proposes intra-party “collective strategic thinking”. These structured thinking processes within the parties on their identity, the conflict context, their own strategic goals and alternative means of achieving them and an exploration of the opponent’s perspective lay the ground for (re-)kindling constructive inter-party engagement.

While some of the mechanisms mentioned above aim to respond to an existing situation and are utilised to address deadlocks in a specific process, others, like long-term process support, safety nets and common spaces, have a broader function. They can serve as sustainable mechanisms to protect a process from collapsing or to prevent deadlocks from occurring. In the long term, safety nets can be seen as an important part of the → Establishing Infrastructure for Peace. They include continuous dialogue initiatives, common spaces, local dialogues, and other civil society and expert engagement in formal peace processes. The Berghof Foundation continues to support the creation of such spaces in many conflict arenas around the world.
References and Further Reading


Online Resources


4 Building and Sustaining Peace

Sebastian Sönsken, Anne Kruck and Zina El-Nahel

“The beauty of peace is in trying to find solutions together.”

Dekha Ibrahim Abdi

What is peace? In debates about peace definitions, the distinction between negative and positive peace put forward by Johan Galtung has gained broad acceptance. Negative peace describes peace as the absence of war or direct physical violence. A positive notion of peace includes the increase in social justice and the creation of a culture of peace among people within and across societies. This is the understanding of peace that informs the Berghof Foundation’s approach.
A frequent criticism of positive peace is that it lacks conceptual clarity. Nonetheless, most scholars agree that peace is a complex, long-term and multi-layered process, in which it is possible to identify steps towards peace and measure the decrease of violence and increase of justice. The multi-layered character of peace means that not only governments but also stakeholders at all levels of societies are responsible for it.

**Steps for peace**

Working toward peace requires at least three fundamental steps: First, a vision of peace must be articulated. Peace on an individual level obviously differs from international peace; researchers, politicians and artists all use the term “peace” in different ways, and interpretations vary according to culture. In some societies the word “peace” may even cause resentment due to experiences of oppression inflicted in the name of peace. Peace definitions are therefore context-specific. Developing common peace visions is an important aspect of peace work.
Second, it is crucial to specify the conditions for peace in or between societies, with a view to establishing these conditions. In his analysis of the historical emergence of peace within western societies, Dieter Senghaas identified six crucial conditions and put them together as a “civilisatory hexagon”: power monopoly, rule of law, interdependence and affect control, democratic participation, social justice and a constructive culture of conflict (see → Educating for Peace).

Third, comparing the current realities in a given society with the peace vision, it is essential to find out what peace-supporting structures, institutions or attitudes need to be created or strengthened. A wide range of strategies and methods are used to make, keep, build or sustain peace on different actor levels (often also referred to as tracks). Peace efforts can be undertaken by actors on all levels and across several levels and tracks (see Figure 1).

**From peacebuilding to sustaining peace**

In his *Agenda for Peace*, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) described peacebuilding as a major instrument for securing peace in post-war situations. This narrowly-defined approach was criticised by the Advisory Group of Experts who reviewed the peacebuilding architecture of the UN in 2015. The group called for the broader concept of “sustaining peace” which puts more emphasis on the prevention of violent conflict to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” as stated in the UN Charter. They see “sustaining peace” as an overarching term including prevention, peacemaking and peacekeeping, as well as peacebuilding, post-war recovery and reconstruction. This paradigm shift within the UN has come about in the course of the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals. Although only Goal 16 relates directly to peace – “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” – all 17 Goals are interconnected and
relevant for the achievement of positive peace, such as quality of education, access to food and clean water or health services.

Although the term “sustaining peace” might be new, comprehensive understandings of peacebuilding are not. Scholars and civil society organisations have long promoted peacebuilding approaches which include preventative measures. These can be applied in all stages of conflict and are also needed in relatively peaceful societies. Peacebuilding covers all activities aimed at promoting peace and overcoming violence in a society.
Although most activities on track 2 and 3 are carried out by civil society actors, the establishment of links to track 1 is considered essential for sustainable transformation of societies. While external agents can facilitate and support peacebuilding, ultimately it must be driven by local actors, often called agents of peaceful change. It cannot be imposed from the outside. Some peacebuilding work done by international organisations is criticised for being too bureaucratic, orientated towards short-term timeframes, and financially dependent on governmental donors and therefore accountable to them but not to the people on the ground. It thus seems to reinforce the status quo instead of calling for a deep transformation of structural injustices. Transformative peacebuilding needs to address social justice issues and should respect the principles of partnership, multipartiality and inclusivity (→ Transforming Conflict).

Peacebuilding, which seeks to sustain positive peace, is not a rapid response tool but a long-term process of ongoing work for all societies in the following three dimensions:

1. *Altering structural injustices* is widely regarded as essential for lasting peace. Important elements are state-building and democratisation measures, the reform of structures that reproduce the conflict (e.g. the education system), economic and sustainable development, social justice and human rights, empowerment of civil society and constructive media (→ Establishing Infrastructures for Peace; → Addressing Social Grievances; → Empowerment and Ownership).

2. *Improving relations between the conflict parties* is an integral part of peacebuilding to reduce the effects of war-related hostility and disrupted communication between the conflict parties. Programmes of reconciliation, trust building and dealing with the past aim to transform damaged relationships (→ Dealing with the Past and Transitional Justice). They deal with the non-material effects of violent conflict.
3. *Changing individual attitudes and behaviour* is the third dimension of peacebuilding. It means strengthening individual peace capacities, breaking stereotypes, empowering formerly disadvantaged groups, and healing trauma and psychological wounds of war. One frequently used measure for strengthening individual peace capacities is training people in non-violent action and conflict resolution (→ Educating for Peace).

Many peacebuilding measures seek to have a greater impact by combining strategies, which encompass all three dimensions (e.g. bringing former conflict parties together to work on improving their economic situation and thus changing individual attitudes). Yet peacebuilding actors and organisations are still struggling to make their work more effective and to generate “collective impact” (see Woodrow 2017). Given the wide variety of peacebuilding approaches, it is therefore important to identify, cluster and publish best-practice examples to create learning opportunities for all present and future peacebuilders.

### Sustaining peace as an overarching term

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prevention</th>
<th>Peacemaking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fulfilment of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals: no poverty, good health, quality education, gender equality, etc.</td>
<td>Diplomatic efforts to end violence and to achieve a peace agreement, e.g. negotiation, mediation, arbitration and judicial settlement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1, source: Berghof Foundation
Peacekeeping

For example, deployment of armed forces to enforce a ceasefire agreement and monitor peace processes in post-war societies

Peacebuilding

Includes post-war recovery and reconstruction. For example, demobilising and reintegrating combatants; assisting the return of refugees; supporting justice and security sector reform; fostering reconciliation

References and Further Reading


Online Resources


5. Dealing with the Past and Transitional Justice

Victoria Cochrane-Buchmüller, Priscilla Megalaa, Rebecca Davis and Beatrix Austin

“Unreconciled issues from past violence never disappear simply by default.”
David Bloomfield

For those who have lived, researched or supported people in post-war societies that have suffered a history of (mass) violence, addressing the legacies of past violence is of crucial importance. In its many forms, it will help shape both the present and the future. Different ways of doing this have emerged over the past decades, among them transitional justice, reconciliation and dealing with the past. Each of these fields is defined in a slightly
different and somewhat overlapping way, and each has its followers and detractors. Lately, the new paradigm of transformative justice has gained increasing attention from scholars and practitioners alike.

**Transitional justice, reconciliation, and dealing with the past**

As it is now understood, *transitional justice* refers to a broad range of processes by which countries emerging from periods of conflict and repression address large-scale or systematic human rights violations for which the normal justice system would not be able to provide an adequate response.

Legal experts have extensively published on the development and capacities of international, hybrid or domestic courts, the
most prominent being the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the hybrid courts for Sierra Leone and Lebanon and in more recent years, the use of universal jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes in national jurisdictions. While its focus remains largely on accountability, and the domestic and international legal mechanisms for achieving this, attention is increasingly being paid to the role of other disciplines, such as social sciences and history, as well as fields of practice, such as support services for victims of violence. In addition, conventional forms of justice, memory work, reconciliation initiatives and education reform have been incorporated into the field. These additional practices have broadened the variety of transitional justice approaches that go beyond legal and institutional mechanisms in order to respond to wider political and social processes, without transforming its core.

Local traditions of justice are a valuable addition to the national transitional justice framework. However, these practices should be incorporated and applied with care, as some community-based justice processes may amplify existing discriminatory or abusive practices. An effective example of employing the traditional customs of transitional justice can be found in Mozambique, where “cleansing ceremonies offered ex-combatants a way to reintegrate into communities by renouncing violence, acknowledging wrong-doing and providing victims, or families of victims, with some kind of compensation” (ICTJ and DPKO 2009, 13).

Reconciliation is based on the acknowledgement of past injustice, the acceptance of responsibility and steps towards (re-)building trust. It is often understood as going beyond formal conflict resolution to changing the nature of the relationship between the conflicting parties as part of a long-term communal relationship-(re-)building process.

Confronting the past in a reconciliatory way may include a variety of approaches. David Bloomfield and his colleagues acknowledge that while political and national reconciliation may
be achieved through truth-telling (e.g. truth commissions), individual reconciliation is a more personal process that is difficult to achieve. Although the concept is ambivalent and difficult to measure, as Alexander Boraine argues, there is a need to achieve at least a measure of reconciliation by creating a “common memory” that can be acknowledged by those who have implemented an unjust system, those who fought against it, and those who were bystanders. More than an end goal, reconciliation processes provide a common frame of reference for societies to acknowledge the past, creating space for individual/national restoration and healing.

As with other terminology, there is no codified understanding of the phrase “dealing with the past”. At the Berghof Foundation, the term is used as an overarching umbrella that refers to a set of measures carried out in relation to past injustice and harm which at the same time create a fair society in the present and better prospects for sustainable peace and development in the future. Dealing with the past has an open “repertoire”, into which both transitional justice and reconciliation mechanisms may fall. It is a holistic process, which may span generations and requires analysis and action on many different levels; both personal and public elements must be addressed along with integration of victims, perpetrators and bystanders. Additionally, feminist research has revealed that a better understanding of the gendered experience of violence and justice, culture and power structures is needed to appropriately analyse the causes, dynamics and consequences of conflict and violence.

**Transformative justice as a new paradigm?**
The discussions surrounding transitional justice, reconciliation and dealing with the past have embraced a forward-looking agenda in the form of transformative justice. A transformative approach attempts to address a society’s grievances and drive a transformation of structural inequalities to promote social justice and sustainable peace. The trend marks a shift towards comple-
mentarity through integrating official top-down mechanisms with unofficial local initiatives. Paul Gready and Simon Robins suggest that this broadening of transitional justice provides connections with wider notions of peacebuilding and contributes to a holistic approach that is context-driven. It also strengthens local ownership, including that of survivors in an active role, and sustainability as key requirements for less top-down engagement on working through the legacies of past mass violence. A transformative approach also moves away from what Palmer terms the “international orientation” of courts and the impact that this has on the effectiveness and longevity of the “justice” that is achieved.

**Critical issues in working on the past**
The Berghof Foundation has been active in the Western Balkans for many years. In 2013, a comparative study was conducted which looked at initiatives for reconciliation and “dealing with the past” undertaken by international organisations, legal institutions and local civil society actors in response to the wars of the 1990s. Among the many avenues of exploration, the study found that advancement in justice and truth recovery is aided by close cooperation with civil society actors and local communities. Although rule of law and functioning institutions for its implementation are essential for creating a sense of fairness and justice, retributive approaches need to be complemented with restorative, community-centred strategies from the very beginning. Often this includes both victims/survivors and perpetrators. Also, our work in the Caucasus has shown the importance of storytelling and exploring biographical story-sharing across divides after violent conflict.

The Berghof Foundation’s long-standing work with Resistance and Liberation Movements engaged in peace processes has also touched upon the issue of transitional justice and the role of victims. Our work focuses on enabling peer exchange and providing tailor-made input and capacity building on various topics, including transitional justice.
A 2017 meeting of Resistance and Liberation Movements focused on transitional justice in the field, the link between justice, stability of peace and long-term reconciliation, and possible models/designs, key tools and practical measures. The meeting enabled discussions on the advantages and disadvantages of participating in transitional justice processes as well as on how inclusivity may be broadened through participation by victims. Discussions also considered the role of prisoners in dealing with the past, and that of strategic communication on all sides of the peace process. Crucial aspects highlighted by the participating groups were strategic communication, sequencing and connecting the national-international and the traditional-universal approaches to transitional justice.

While there is growing critical analysis of transitional justice theory and its practical implementation, the tendency is still to focus on the long-debated dichotomies of peace vs. justice, and accountability vs. reconciliation, as well as the debates on the place of transitional justice in peace processes. We suggest that instead, greater attention should be paid to the practical application of transitional justice and its integration into peace processes for the benefit of those most affected by the outcomes.

References and Further Reading


Online Resources


Peace education is the process of acquiring the values and knowledge and developing the attitudes, skills and behaviour to live in harmony with oneself, with others, and with the natural environment. It aims to reduce violence, support the transformation of conflicts, and advance the peace capabilities of individuals, groups, societies and institutions.

Peace education builds on people’s capacities to learn and helps to establish a global and sustainable culture of peace. It is context-specific, but is essential and feasible in every world region.
and during all stages of conflict. Peace education takes place in many settings, whether formal or informal: in every-day learning and education, in the preparation, implementation and evaluation of professional projects with selected target groups, and in the support provided for conflict-sensitive education systems.

There is no uniform concept of what peace education should include and the international discourse on this topic is still in its infancy. Various social, political, economic, historical and cultural contexts must be taken into account, along with the different traditions and levels of intensity in the systematic debate and practice of peace education nationally.

Recent UN documents, such as the UNESCO concept of “Education for All” and the Sustainable Development Goals (Goal 4), underline the importance of peace education. The key prerequisite for success is the renunciation of all forms of corporal punishment, violence and psychological pressure as a means of delivering education.

**Objectives of peace education**

Peace education has four core and interdependent objectives:

- recognition of conflicts as an opportunity for positive change, which means developing the skills for the constructive management of conflicts and a respectful relationship with those who are “other”;

**PEACE EDUCATION** | the process of acquiring the values and knowledge and developing the attitudes, skills and behaviour to live in harmony with oneself, with others, and with the natural environment. It aims to reduce violence, support the transformation of conflicts, and advance the peace capabilities of individuals, groups, societies and institutions.
recognition of different individual, social and political forms of (everyday) violence and the “fascination of violence”, which means promoting analysis of individual and collective experiences of violence, both past and present (→ Preventing Violence; → Dealing with the Past and Transitional Justice);

- analysis of the causes, impacts and after-effects of war, which means looking at possible mechanisms against and alternatives to war at the individual, social and international level;
- the development of visions of peace and community life and ways of translating these visions into practical action.

To implement these goals, it is necessary to create spaces in which learning processes can develop. These learning spaces for peace are based on the concept and implementation of “learning arrangements”: context-specific, bespoke settings that take account of factors such as learning objectives, target groups, methods, timeframes and available facilities. Learning arrangements do not prescribe any form of instruction or use manipulation. They encourage an ethical, political and practical focus and open-ended dialogue (→ Facilitating Dialogue and Negotiation).

**Essentials of peace education**

Peace education deals systematically with major challenges to peace, such as conflict, hostility and enemy images, violence and war. By considering the many facets of violence in detail, we can develop a better understanding of violence and identify risk factors and prevention measures.

Peace is not perceived as a static condition but as a process of decreasing violence and increasing justice (→ Building and Sustaining Peace). Peace is also not seen as an exception to the rule, but as the preferred rule. It thus serves as both a normative aim and a pragmatic orientation for action.

Models such as the “civilisatory hexagon” can provide a basis for reflection, offering guidance and facilitating the visualisation of linkages between normative aims. In this sense, peace education
has significant overlaps with other approaches such as civics or human rights education.

Peace education *initiates and supports social and political learning processes*, in which positive social behaviour, empathy and capacities for non-violent communication can evolve (peace capacity); knowledge about peace and war, conflict and violence can be acquired (peace competence); and the willingness to show civil courage and engage for peace is fostered (peace action). Peace education offers practical advice for education in family and preschool settings, in school and in the non-formal education sector. Conflicts within society must not be concealed but should be made visible within the framework of peace education.

People all over the world need *spaces to learn and experience peace* – at the micro level of the family and in daily life as well.
as at the macro level of society and international politics. People learn from experience and benefit from inspiring learning environments with appropriate multimedia-based and interactive methods. All the senses and emotions play an important role and need to be integrated in designing learning arrangements. Humour is an element not to be underestimated. The real-life encounter with “the other”, be it members of conflicting parties in post-war societies, minorities and majorities or locals and migrants, is indispensable.

**Delivering peace education**

The way in which peace education is delivered has an important role to play in convincing people of its benefits, as do the substance and credibility of the peace message. Education methods must be adapted to a changing social and technological environment. Nowadays, the widespread use of social media offers new opportunities for education models. While the use and dissemination of elements like hate speech or fake news may pose threats to peaceful coexistence, social media also facilitate participation, knowledge-sharing and freedom of speech and information.

Peace education should capitalise on this opportunity by using different kinds of media intensively for its purposes, making online materials and media accessible and creating networks. For example, a youth council advises one Berghof Foundation project (Culture of Conflict 3.0: Learning Spaces and Media for Young People to Deal with Internet Violence and Hate), which is essential for understanding young people’s positive and negative experiences with social media. The youth council is involved, among other things, in developing target-group-oriented comic films – a joint effort which brings both great fun and great success.

A proven peace education approach discusses examples of successful peacebuilding and its protagonists. Authentic role
models who promote the principles of non-violence are helpful. Outstanding educators and advocates of non-violence (Maria Montessori, Paolo Freire, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King) have long been sources of inspiration for the theory and practice of peace education. They have shaped the concept and image of peace education in their respective world regions in a distinctive way.

**Methods of peace education**

Peace education methods are based on the following practices:

*Exemplary learning*: reality is very complex, as are conflicts or peace processes. Case studies exemplify and make the backgrounds and the variety of (visible and less visible) relationships more concrete.

*Contrasting and emphasising*: focus attention on specific or determining viewpoints and problematical aspects.

*Change of perspective*: empathy is promoted by expanding the learners’ own standpoint, which can be inflexible and deeply rooted, to allow a plurality of views.

*Clarity and ability to perceive linkages*: using techniques such as visualisation, problematical issues are relocated from the realm of the abstract and related to learners’ own experiences.

*Action-orientated*: themes and issues are made accessible through activity and experience-based learning.

*Peer-orientated*: shared learning is encouraged through group work and mutual support.

*Empowerment*: building skills promotes self-confidence and autonomy.
**Types of peace education**

Due to the complexity of protracted violent conflicts and the resulting need for transformation efforts at various levels, a comprehensive approach is required. This must bring together two fundamental types of peace education.

1. **Direct peace education**: Key elements of this approach are about encounter, inspiration and training. It could also be described as peace education for empowerment, with a focus on personal capacity development or identity-building.

2. **Structural peace education**: This approach brings together elements that, with the aid of pilot projects, aim to develop learning modules, media and curricula, focusing on the sustainable delivery of peace education in the formal and non-formal education systems. The objective is to bring about a positive change in the structural conditions for peace.

The two types are closely linked. We regard the interaction between them as an essential prerequisite for sustainable peace education and its contribution to conflict transformation. In the Berghof Foundation’s project Civic and Nonviolent Education in Jordan we combine training courses and dialogue workshops for multipliers on the one hand with implementing a curriculum at universities on the other. Both processes take place in cooperation with the Ministries of Education and Higher Education.

**Evaluating peace education**

Does peace education make the difference? Measuring the effects of peace education is a challenging task given the complexity and long-term nature of learning processes. Often, there is a lack of resources to conduct long-term studies, and there is a lack of systematic experience in how evaluation projects can be developed and applied in a conflict-sensitive and context-related manner (→ Learning Together). Nevertheless, there is an impressive variety of evaluation approaches, which mirror the diversity of peace education practices. In recent years, studies and evaluations have also demonstrated empirical evidence of peace education benefits.
References and Further Reading


Online Resources


Global Campaign for Peace Education (GCPE), http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org
7 Empowerment and Ownership

Feras Kheirallah and Barbara Unger

“Power properly understood is nothing but the ability to achieve purpose. It is the strength required to bring about social, political and economic change.”

Martin Luther King, Jr.

We know that inequality and limited access to opportunity are key drivers of conflict. Groups that perceive themselves to be disadvantaged try to change their situation, and may use nonviolent (or violent) means (→ Addressing Social Grievances). When actors need to change their behaviour, attitudes and relationships in order to engage with each other differently, a certain degree of horizontality and symmetry – of information, capacities, access
and power – is required. Consequently, asymmetry of power must be dealt with: “Empowerment is a process through which individuals or organised groups increase their power and autonomy to achieve certain outcomes they need and desire” (Eyben, cited in Combaz & Mcloughlin 2014, 4). Conflict transformation and peacebuilding need to consider this.

Empowerment is a concept stemming from community sociology and has been widely explored with regard to gender relations. It happens at several levels. Individuals who are enabled to identify and articulate their own interests can help achieve social change, just as persons who have confidence in their own skills and strength can contribute, for example as responsible citizens, to collective processes. Groups, at the next level, are key to self-empowerment. A shared notion of their own situation, of collective interests and of the means of achieving them creates scope for self-reliance and for engagement with the “dominant” group(s). In this way, relations and interactions can change at the societal level as well.

**Conflict transformation, empowerment and ownership**

In conflict transformation, Diana Francis has made the point that in order to bring structural and cultural violence, such as injustice and inequality, out of the latent stage, the disadvantaged (and ideally those who “innocently” gain from the status quo)
must increase their consciousness of their situation and gain “power” to challenge it.

Conflict transformation and empowerment share the notion that only the actors affected can build peace, and that all actors involved have resources to build on. The main role and responsibility for conflict transformation hence lie with those who are affected by conflict. A careful balance must be struck between helpful and catalytic (outside) intervention and nurturing (local) ownership.
The issues of ownership, power and agency are at the core of what we need to discuss when we look at empowerment in conflict transformation. When we opt for empowerment measures as an (external) intervention, we need to be very careful of how these interventions can play out. “Do no harm” (Educating for Peace; Providing Conflict-Sensitive Refugee Assistance) must be a guiding principle.

**Working with individuals, groups and institutions towards social change**

Some approaches to empowerment focus on supporting individuals and certain previously marginalised groups to have better access to resources, information and services, or to influence decision-makers and legislation and hence improve their living conditions and situation in a given society. The empowerment of women can serve as an example. Its purpose is to enable women first to gain a different understanding of their potential and the context, and also to access and play an active role in influencing (if not shaping) policy. New consciousness and a desire for change do not mean that the empowered women have sufficient capacities to effect changes in the face of the resistance that their empowered stance may encounter in society. Therefore, it is crucial in conflict transformation to understand and enable empowerment by working at different levels: the individual, the group, the institutional and finally the societal level.

While only persons and groups can be empowered, they act within an institutional and societal environment. Thus, working with existing institutions to entice the people within them to play a positive role in transforming conflicts begins with understanding the institutions’ history and importance within society. Ideally, this happens through a joint analysis of the stakeholders. Making these institutions more responsive to the whole of society – for example by strengthening their capacities, enhancing their internal strategies, enabling exchange with other institutions, supporting knowledge production and transfer,
and sharing experience through mediation and dialogue techniques – can contribute to transforming conflicts, provided that the political will is there.

Supporting empowerment as an external actor

The role of outsiders may be to support actors in a multipartial manner by creating spaces and changing perceptions of roles and resources. While there is a close connection between self-empowerment and what externals can contribute for this conscientisation and change to happen, somewhat paradoxically, “to empower” has also been used as a transitive verb to describe interventions, especially in development cooperation and often in relation to gender issues, which aim to support a certain group. As Alan Sharland has rightly observed, “It is a self-contradiction to state on someone’s behalf, without their explicit consent, that they have ‘been empowered’, or, worse that ‘we have empowered them’, as in the very act of saying so, we are speaking for them and assuming the right and power to do so.”

At the individual and group level, participatory analysis of issues, factors and actors can help, as can exchanges with other groups or with experts. Training, workshops, coaching and other measures provide spaces for connection and reflection, which can lead to a change in attitude and behaviour. If, as said above, this is not sufficient to effect change, the groups might look for other mechanisms to support their cause. In Jordan, for example, independent trade unions were established to protest against the dysfunctional state-controlled unions. In such situations, one may need to ask: What institutions are there, how would they need to change? Are new ones needed? A strategy aimed at institutional change can start from various angles, depending, for example, on whether the institution has a mandate to represent a certain group, or responds to all groups’ demands, but has not fulfilled that task. It is crucial that these institutions have a mandate to influence the relationship between decision-makers at a macro level and those subject to policies at a micro level.
If an external actor wants to support such a process, the need to work with core institutions (for example parliament), power-holders (for example men) and traditions (for example masculinity) will most likely come up (→ Gender and Youth). So what might support for empowerment look like in practice?

External actors can best provide support by enabling internal self-reflection and a (gradual but sustainable) transformation process towards a collective understanding and willingness to play a role in transforming conflicts. In response to ownership issues, our main task as externals should lie in creating the space needed for these institutions to develop their own strategies and tools. In Lebanon, the Berghof Foundation performs this role by supporting the official religious institutions in their efforts to foster coexistence and tolerance. Transformative external intervention should then support these institutions in better understanding or even (re-)defining their actual role and original mandate and identifying their potential (strengths) as a collective unit representing a certain group of society in conflict.

Our organisation’s mission, “creating space”, here means providing a level playing field, as far as possible, so that all actors can participate. Addressing power asymmetries is at the core of that work in many conflict settings. Empowerment and clear local ownership of the empowerment agenda are our preferred approach for doing just that.

References and Further Reading


Online Resources


“There is much to be done.”
Georg Zundel

Ending violent conflicts and building peace require the engagement and resources of a broad alliance of actors. Building such alliances, as well as building and sustaining peace together, demands investment: of dedication, capacity and skill, of patience and experience, and of financial resources and joint value-based advocacy. At the Berghof Foundation, we have worked hard over the years to cultivate a relationship with our private and public donors in which we all are partners in shifting public attention and discourse towards the societal and political issues necessary to transform conflicts. We have often succeeded, yet we still face many challenges. As Stephen Heintz, the President of
Donor | persons or institutions giving support – financial as well as otherwise – to a certain cause or charity. While peacebuilding relies on creativity and dedication as much as material resources, engaging donors in this field is indispensable for peacebuilding work to be scaled up.

The Rockefeller Brothers Fund notes in its 2017 Annual Review, “social change does not happen overnight. It does not happen quickly, and it does not happen as a result of a fixed set of strategies. Change happens over time; it happens because you are nimble and flexible, but it also happens because you stick with your goals while finding new ways to make progress even after experiencing setbacks”.

Total funding for non-violent conflict transformation is still miniscule compared to the world’s military budgets. In 2018, SIPRI estimated world military expenditure at USD 1739 billion, of which the United States government accounts for by far the largest share, with a military budget of USD 630 billion. By contrast, the budget of the United Nations and all its agencies is about USD 40 billion per year, according to the Global Policy Forum – a mere 2.3 per cent of global military expenditure. Similarly, funds allocated to development assistance by OECD countries in 2016 amounted to USD 142.6 billion, less than 8.2 per cent of global military spending, only a small part of which is for peacebuilding. One estimate puts the global funding for peacebuilding in 2016 at 3.4 billion (ECDPM 2018). These figures remind us that when it comes to protecting their international interests, states are determined to maintain their ability to use military means if necessary. Yet while the development of non-violent alternatives to a military security paradigm may not be at the top of governments’ list of priorities, there can be no doubt that states have a role to play in building peace. They are stakeholders in the majority of conflicts, and they also control an overwhelming...
amount of the resources needed for their resolution. Sometimes, they are also gatekeepers to the transformation of conflicts.

However modest the amount of public funding for peacebuilding may appear, the contrast to private funding is even greater. The Peace and Security Funding Index compiles data on grants awarded by foundations for peace and security issues globally. The latest year for complete data, 2015, identified a total of USD 351 million for peace and security issues, with roughly USD 188 million (54 per cent) being spent on conflict prevention, resolution, and peacebuilding. That peace-related issues play at best a minor role in the philanthropic world is no surprise, given the challenges, which the peace and security environment presents. Conflict transformation stands out as being particularly hard to approach.

**High risk, high reward**

With many states and private donors cutting budgets at a time of growing global needs, there is an increasing interest in ensuring the cost-effectiveness and impact of new projects. While successful violence prevention and conflict transformation are more cost-effective than humanitarian relief, the impact of conflict transformation is notoriously more difficult to measure, especially in the short term. Conflict situations are highly complex and follow a non-linear and long-term timeframe, as researchers have pointed out over and over again, not least in several books co-edited by Berghof Foundation staff. In addition, the environments where conflict transformation is necessary often face access and security challenges, which reduce scope for monitoring and evaluation. Governments are major stakeholders in most conflicts, and shifting geopolitical dynamics and relations beyond the control of any organisation can limit the short-term impact of projects. These dynamics are at odds with most available project-based funding, which is primarily short-term and requires measurable steps forward and an attainable outcome at the end. Conflict transformation is, therefore, perceived as a
riskier investment, even if it has the potential for much greater outcomes.

Secondly, conflict transformation, if it aspires to be inclusive, often involves working with actors who are publicly stigmatised, such as proscribed groups. This is often highly controversial in public and political debate. For organisations engaged in this field, there may also be legal constraints on engaging with such actors, especially in the post 9/11 world. Legal uncertainty is not an attractive environment for either non-governmental organisations or funders to work in. They have to be prepared to deal with accusations and the possibility of negative public relations fall-out, a risk that private foundations in particular have tended to shy away from. However, Rob Reich, Co-Director of the Stanford Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society, argues that providing “risk capital” is the raison d’être of the philanthropic sector. To cite Stephen Heintz once again, “if we aren’t taking risks and assuming the possibility of failure some of the time, we aren’t doing our jobs”.

**Balancing interests**

As seen in global military expenditure figures, states and international institutions have access to massive amounts of resources relative to private foundations. In addition to these resources, states and international institutions have the potential to engage diplomatically, increasing leverage on certain stakeholders by offering ‘sticks’ or ‘carrots’. In this area, close coordination with peacebuilding actors (international NGOs as well as local initiatives, which have a thorough understanding of local conflict dynamics) can therefore be of great value. This coordination is also beneficial to other actors interested in conflict transformation and building peace, including the private sector. That said, public funding or working closely with states or international bodies can also undermine the efficacy of conflict transformation. States, in particular, follow a different set of priorities, which are centred on their own interests and standards.
National interests, even in more benign forms such as publicity for support, can pose a direct risk to any project’s potential. In a very geopolitically competitive landscape, government funding is often perceived as having secondary motivations, such as increasing political influence or promoting a particular ideology. Much public funding comes with strings attached – publicity for the donor country – which can be tricky in contexts requiring a high degree of confidentiality and trust building, including “behind the scenes”. A clear balance needs to be reached between the greater financial support and potential diplomatic leverage of government funding, and the risks that potentially come with being associated with the state.

**Private funding**

Private funding for conflict transformation can offer enormous benefits. Again, these benefits are manifold: they offer an increase in the material resources required for some of the work, but just as importantly, they establish a circle of like-minded individuals who serve as ‘ambassadors’ and multipliers. Being driven by principles that focus on stakeholders and their relationships, private funders can credibly interact with non-state actors and civil society in general. These principles may be hard to reconcile with conflict realities on the ground, putting non-state conflict stakeholders at a critical disadvantage. Were it not for privately funded initiatives, these actors would often be left to themselves or fall under the influence of the stronger conflict party. Finding it easier to reach out and build bridges to a broad range of actors, privately funded initiatives can help to create the inclusive peace processes required to tackle today’s ethno-political conflicts, tapping peacebuilding potential which is otherwise hard to reach. While this means that private funding does indeed have an important role to play, ultimately the success of all private initiatives will remain primarily dependent on their ability to leverage scarce resources by reaching out to states or international institutions.
To do so, they have a spectrum of activities at hand, ranging from the provision of research, education and information to the direct engagement of people through non-governmental organisations and private diplomacy. When these levers are employed adequately and in a coordinated way, even small-scale initiatives have the potential to bring about change on a large scale. Non-governmental organisations must make sure that their principles – in the Berghof Foundation’s case, these are long-term engagement, partnership and multipartiality, to name a few – are in alignment with those of both public and private donors. The advantage of private (or philanthropic) resources remains that these funds can be particularly effective in cases where states and governments cannot or are not willing to provide support.

Lots to do

There is a clear need for further dialogue between implementers and donors on how to build on their shared interests and needs. Peacebuilding institutions need to better understand how available funding is created, such as through government budgets and election cycles, and what drives private philanthropists to invest in certain areas. Peacebuilders also need to better demonstrate clear results and effective investment. In turn donors should recognise the desire by implementers for more flexible, low-profile and long-term funding. There are no simple solutions, but improved communication and education are necessary to ensure that the needs of donors, both private and public, and conflict transformation institutions can be met. More stories about the successes achieved, often with minimal to modest financial investment (but with intense personal and creative engagement by insider and outsider actors), should be told – by us, our peers and our donors. The potential impact that such initiatives can achieve is enormous. Answering the challenge of violent conflict does not only relieve human suffering; it can also free up vast resources that can be put to more beneficial use.
References and Further Reading


Online Resources


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9 Establishing Infrastructures for Peace

Mir Mubashir, Rebecca Davis and Radwa Salah

“Giving peace an address.”
Ulrike Hopp-Nishanka

We are familiar with the term ‘infrastructure’ in relation to the social, economic and technical infrastructure of a country or an organisation. There, it refers to the underlying foundation and the basic physical and organisational framework, structures, services and facilities such as buildings, transport systems and power supplies, which an entity needs and uses in order to work effectively. What infrastructures does peace need? A burgeoning term in the peacebuilding field, *infrastructures for peace – i4p* (or *peace infrastructures*) constitute a multitude of tangible and
intangible elements that contribute to sustaining peace through (re)building constructive social and political relationships and transforming conflict. i4p also constitute the resources, structures and mechanisms for enhancing societal resilience – the ability to recover from setbacks, overcome trauma and build the resources to adapt to change and adversity. All these constituents are networked and interdependent and are kept alive through dynamic communication and interaction.

i4p may constitute entities and processes at various levels of formality: formal, non-formal and semi-formal, and may accordingly encompass national, subnational and local/community levels. In some cases, they are established top-down, while in others they evolve more organically bottom-up. They may be formal national institutions, such as peace ministries, which are ideally connected to local mechanisms for dealing with conflict, such as local peace committees. They may respond to political crisis, stimulate fundamental change or address transitional issues (e.g. National Dialogue and truth and reconciliation commissions). They may be informal networks at the community level for early warning/action. Some i4p evolve as temporary mechanisms for addressing short-term triggers of violence, e.g. during election periods, and then eventually wind up. In many cases, however, permanent institutions and mechanism are established to address long-term socio-economic structural violence and the socio-cultural discourses that legitimise it. These
i4p may need to change and evolve over time to address the conflict dynamics.

A fluid and "networked" model of i4p can ensure horizontal and vertical coordination: formal political settlement efforts by state actors can be bridged to grassroots peacebuilding efforts of insider peacebuilders/mediators. Engaging with insider mediators has been a focus of the Berghof Foundation for many years.
Considerations for establishing i4p

There is still a lot to be done to exhaustively map, identify and understand existing i4p. While it has been popular since the mid-1990s to speak of local capacities and approaches, much more could be done to share experience and improve collaboration to strengthen this local expertise. Some points to keep in mind, based on lessons learned in the practice of establishing i4p:

Letting i4p organically evolve and become sustainable

i4p need to evolve organically, according to the needs of the specific conflict context; they cannot be prescribed or result from international pressure. International actors must avoid a “one size fits all” approach of transporting blueprints between contexts. They should instead be willing to learn from the local cultural, ethnic and religious contexts and help to shape the evolution of i4p, if asked to do so. They must be seen as legitimate and trustworthy by all conflict stakeholders. This may even open up opportunities for insider funding of i4p, perhaps with local and national entrepreneurs earmarking financial resources to support them. If i4p are primarily created with international donors’ project funding, it is important to ensure that they are able to continue functioning when the funding runs out.

Managing inclusivity

Being inclusive and participatory is a challenging endeavour in governance and peacebuilding with regard to scope, quality and ‘will’ (→ Inclusivity and Participation). While at the local/community level – such as local peace committees or community policing mechanisms – scope and quality may be manageable, in many contexts inclusivity is a challenge. Especially in traditional, patriarchal and gerontocratic societies i4p tend to be exclusionary of women, young people and marginalised groups. Managing scope and quality is more challenging for i4p at the subnational and national level. Incremental and iterative inclusion mechanisms (as in peace processes and National Dialogues) may prove beneficial in this regard. It is important to energise the
“networking engine” of i4p. This “engine” is made up of entities and individuals, especially insider mediators, who can keep the communication alive between various i4p constituents, and also deal with “spoilers” who attempt to render i4p ineffective and disrupt communication flows.

**Keeping networking and communication alive**
Managing local-subnational-national-international connections and coordination is easier said than done. In particular, the crucial subnational links between the local and national layers of i4p are often neglected or under-resourced. Insider mediators usually play a key role in keeping an overview of the linkages (and the lack thereof), and raise awareness and mobilise resources accordingly. The state sometimes plays a coordinating role, albeit to a limited degree.

**Handling exploitation**
The permanence of certain i4p as state institutions may make them vulnerable to corruption and abuse by political parties. International actors may also exploit certain i4p for their own agendas. All i4p constituents should contain an accountability and integrity mechanism, which can re-evaluate their mandate, and staffing, and dissolve the institution if need be.

**Rethinking dependency**
i4p should not entirely depend on the support and political will of state or international actors. As mentioned above, they should be seen as embedded in the ‘everyday’ notions of peace in the different layers of social and political life. i4p are, however, more effective if there is a political commitment from the state and conflict parties to contribute to their functions.
Background knowledge ...

First of its kind in the development of the i4p concept
One of the first instances of i4p emerged in South Africa: a National Peace Secretariat, and Peace Committees at several levels – local, regional and national – were established to supervise the implementation of the 1991 Peace Accord. Building on joint and inclusive ownership, these institutions were part of a comprehensive framework for peacebuilding. The Peace Committees, for example, are thought to have helped to determine South Africa’s political future by bringing apartheid to a halt in 1994. The South African i4p were successful in containing violence and preparing the ground for peaceful elections.

A top-down i4p
To ensure the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2006 and to coordinate national peace efforts, Nepal established the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. The ministry linked government institutions with local peace councils and mediation centres. The Nepalese i4p’s service functions included negotiation support, advice to political parties, and access to justice through community mediation.

A bottom-up i4p
Local initiatives to address resource and political conflict in Wajir County in Northern Kenya in the early 1990s were such a great source of inspiration that they became institutionalised in national policy. The National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management now coordinates the work of peacebuilders and institutions on a national scale.

An institutionalised i4p
The National Peace Council of Ghana institutionalised the efforts of networks of insider mediators to prevent and address
election-related violence in particular. The state created a Peace-building Support Unit to coordinate with other government agencies, and also appointed Peace Promotion Officers at subnational levels.

The power of multi-layered regional i4p
Early warning and response systems used by the African regional organisations ECOWAS and IGAD rely on networks of local monitors who also act as first response teams, exploring and mediating local tensions while also alerting and involving governmental and regional actors.

i4p responding to crisis and transition
Tunisia’s Quartet (a coalition of non-state actors led by the General Labour Union, UGTT) played a crucial role in creating a political space for dialogue and cooperation, mediating tensions and ensuring the political transition after the ‘Arab Spring’. The Quartet was not a governmental body, but as the members were influential and considered credible actors across constituencies, it proved to be a critical component of the Tunisian national infrastructures for peace.

i4p mechanisms for dealing with the past
Truth and reconciliation commissions are an important component of transitional justice. The commissions enable society to understand and reflect on the painful past and to build a new national identity. Truth commissions in El Salvador proved essential in instigating a review of the legal system and improving the protection of human rights in the country.
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10 Facilitating Negotiation and Dialogue

Theresa Breitmaier and Frans Schram

“Nobody is as wise as we all together.”
African proverb

When working to overcome differences on a political and societal level in order to transform violent conflicts, the facilitation of dialogues and negotiations is a key tool for peacebuilders. Over time, the applications of facilitation as a peacebuilding tool have diversified. Facilitated processes are now implemented with a broad range of participants such as decision-makers in their private capacity (informal track 1 processes), influential individuals and analysts from civil society (track 2 processes), or mixtures of civil society and decision-makers (track 1.5 processes).
**Facilitating Negotiation and Dialogue**

**Facilitation** | the assistance of an accepted “third party” to ease the management of communication and process of dialogue, negotiation or other encounters. Facilitation happens before, during and after meetings.

**Dialogue** | a face-to-face interaction between people with different backgrounds, convictions and opinions, in which they respect each other as human beings and are prepared to listen to – and learn from – each other deeply enough to inspire a change of attitudes.

**Negotiation** | back-and-forth communication designed to reach an agreement in a situation where parties on different sides of the situation in question have a number of interests in common and others that are conflicting.

All three are central to peacemaking as well as peacebuilding and play a role in all peace processes.

The different terms used to describe the communicative aspects of third-party (or occasionally insider-peacebuilder) involvement in a peace process have significant conceptual and practical overlaps.

**Facilitating transformative dialogue**

**Dialogue methods and benefits**

Dialogue, face-to-face interaction between people with different backgrounds, convictions and opinions, in which they respect each other as human beings and are prepared to listen to each other deeply enough to inspire change of attitudes or learning, is one central means – if not the classical one – of dealing with conflicts in a constructive way. As the saying goes, ‘as long as you’re talking, you can’t be shooting’. What better method is there of resolving a dispute – according to another common-
On terminology ...

Facilitation is characterised by the presence of an accepted “third party”, who assists the negotiating (or conflict) parties in managing key elements of the communication and/or negotiation process. While mediation (→ Mediation and Mediation Support), a semi-directive type of facilitation, emphasises the need to reach a mutually accepted agreement, many facilitators focus more on improving the relationship and general communication between the parties. Facilitators and mediators both help the group to communicate more effectively and improve their mutual understanding. Their responsibilities relate to the process rather than the content but facilitators can also act to some extent as creative content providers for enriching the discussion.

Dialogue, as Norbert Ropers defines it in “Basics of Dialogue Facilitation”, is the meaningful and meaning-creating exchange of perceptions and opinions and is one of the methods people most frequently turn to when addressing conflictive issues peacefully.

Negotiation can be broadly defined as a communication process between two or more actors, who are mutually interdependent, for the ostensible purpose of reaching an agreement on a situation perceived as a problem or conflict. In many ways, negotiation is a basic means of getting what you want from others. It is back-and-forth communication designed to reach an agreement in a situation where parties on different sides of the situation in question have a number of interests in common and others that are conflicting.

sense observation – than through an honest exchange of views? In contrast to the terms “discussion” and “debate”, which focus primarily on the content of a conversation, the word “dialogue” places equal emphasis on the relationship between the persons
involved and avoids the usual element of “competition” as much as possible. The central goal is to try to create a different kind of communication and a deeper understanding of one’s own needs and interests as well as those of the other side. This paves the way to exploring better ways of preventing, managing, resolving or even transforming conflict.

Some of the elements widely regarded as hallmarks of constructive dialogue are:

- demonstrating respect for and acknowledging the equality of all dialogue participants with their unique background and opinions;
- developing active listening skills and empathy for the contributions from all dialogue partners;
- suspending one’s own assumptions, ideas, emotions, and opinions for some time to allow new impulses to emerge;
- speaking from the heart and expressing one’s own truth in a genuine manner, emphasising the process, which has influenced one’s own position, rather than the result;
- slowing down the process of communication and interaction, opening up to new insights, and exploring opportunities for joint learning.

While dialogues are important to help transform relationships, promote empathy, and inspire problem-solving, they are, of course, no substitute for efforts to address structural causes and engage with the power-political aspects of the conflict. The ideal requirements will rarely be achieved in the context of highly escalated conflicts. There, the affected persons may be reluctant even to meet each other face-to-face, for example, when the political escalation has created “moral”, legal, and/or physical barriers to encounters with the “enemy”. The main challenges, however, are rooted much more deeply, in the participants’ concepts of identity and their perceptions, fears (for example of losing face or being seen as weak), and feelings about each other. One fundamental requirement for any promising dialogue is therefore the creation of “safe spaces” for these meetings.
Some dialogues are one-off events, but most peace professionals are convinced that it is necessary to envision effective dialogues as long-term processes with a relatively continuous group of participants.

A broad spectrum of dialogue methods and tools has been developed to promote social change and to develop creative modes of participatory learning. Some of the approaches at the disposal of a facilitator are:

- inspiring participants to engage with each other in a variety of settings (e.g. using open-space techniques or the World Café approach);
- encouraging participants to speak about their conflict-related experiences, grievances, and expectations in a manner which enables more constructive interaction (e.g. through story-telling or biographical work, an approach explored and honed by the Berghof Foundation, for example in the South Caucasus);
- making use of creative methods to promote empathy and a change of perspectives (e.g. theatre work, change laboratories, or role reversals);
- generating alternative visions of the future (scenario-building, future workshops, and the like, another area that the Berghof Foundation is investigating both in its research and in its practical engagement).

**Criticism of dialogue projects**

Criticism of dialogue projects in the peacebuilding and conflict transformation field has focused mainly on the strategic deficits of dialogues and the difficulties in assessing their impact. Many dialogue initiatives seem to be based on the simple assumption that just bringing together representatives of conflicting parties will do some good and cannot do harm. This assumption can no longer be justified in light of various cases in which participants were attacked by hardliners from their constituency because of their encounters with the “enemy”. At the same time, there is no doubt that many dialogue projects at the grassroots and middle levels have contributed significantly to creating islands
and cultures of peace – even if these efforts often fail to translate into a macro-political impact (→ Establishing Infrastructures for Peace).

Another criticism is that dialogues can be harmful in highly asymmetric conflicts if they conceal the inherent inequalities on the ground by creating the formal impression of a “symmetrical dialogue”. While the more powerful representatives then may glorify their openness to dialogue on “difficult” issues, representatives of the less powerful party often perceive these encounters as a waste of time, a fig leaf or, even worse, as reinforcing the unequal status quo.

In the Berghof Foundation’s experience, as with all other tools of peacebuilding and conflict transformation it is crucial to conceptualise dialogue work within a strategic context and an explicit theory of change and to be prepared for a long-term process with parallel efforts to address the structural drivers of conflict.

**Facilitating negotiation as a tool for peace support work**

Transformation models build on the assumption that a conflict develops from its latent phase towards a manifest phase. This is because conflict parties evolve and mature over time: a “party to the conflict” develops, at a later stage when the situation is ‘ripe’, into a “party to the negotiations”. In other words, (meaningful) negotiation and mediation can only take place and succeed when the parties acknowledge that there is indeed a conflict and when they accept the other party’s relevance in achieving some form of (re)solution.

Due to its open-ended character and flexible selection of participants, facilitation can be a good tool in creating spaces for encounters, exchange, and (possibly, preparatory) dialogue in situations where negotiation is impossible, either because parties do not accept its necessity or because official negotiation formats exist but the process is not dynamic and shows signs of
a stalemate. (See also → Mediation and Mediation Support and → Breaking Deadlocks.)

Outside of working with two or more warring parties, facilitation can also be directed towards social and political reform on one side only. The facilitated process empowers participants to advocate reforms that are also influenced by the views, hopes, and problems of the “other side” (→ Empowerment and Ownership). Mutual understanding, respect and recognition create the framework for people to define their own issues.

References and Further Reading


Online Resources


11 Fostering Human Security

Hans J. Giessmann, Andreas Schädel and Basir Feda

“Peace, to have meaning for many who have known only suffering in both peace and war, must be translated into bread or rice, shelter, health, and education, as well as freedom and human dignity – a steadily better life.”

Ralph J. Bunche

Security, in the literal sense of the word, means a state free from care (lat. *se cura*). Since the first nation-states emerged in the mid-16th century up until the end of World War II, security was commonly understood as the primary concern of states to maintain external sovereignty and to avert any threats from the outside, particularly military threats from other states. This understanding has changed fundamentally in recent decades.
The erosion of the traditional understanding of security
There are countless examples throughout history where seeking “security” has served to justify wars and raids, conquering colonies and oppressing peoples. Security policy was a zero-sum game played according to the law of the strongest, with security of the powerful being based on the insecurity of the less powerful. This narrow understanding of security – sovereignty and protection of states – was called into question when humankind entered the nuclear age.

Since any use of nuclear weapons harbours the risk of uncontrollable devastation, it was the interdependence of security, between the “haves” and the “have-nots”, which became a political issue. A deep understanding of this new dimension of threat, and of the responsibility of social and natural scientists to work together to find ways of better dealing with conflict than weaponised security, was an important impulse for the founding of the Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies in the 1970s.

Growing awareness of nuclear interdependence has also helped to carve out a growing consciousness that security is no longer just a military issue or privilege only of states. Rather, structural interdependences may also exist because of other – non-military – risks or threats to physical existence and between unequally powerful social actors in conflict, such as between dysfunctional governments and an organised opposition in fragile states. Structural interdependence and power asymmetries may thus become a strong driver of interests in → Conflict Transformation.

HUMAN SECURITY | a comprehensive, people-centred and prevention-oriented concept that includes protection from threats in the area of economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security.
A broader concept of security
In the 1970s and 1980s, an originally small-scale expert debate reached public attention when it considered non-military “global risks” such as climate change, resource scarcity, under-development and modern epidemics to be triggers for armed conflict, posing a threat to the security of states and peoples that is almost equal to war. The hitherto undisputed traditional security focus on military threats became contested. As the Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Report) stated in 1987:

“Conflicts may arise not only because of political and military threats to national sovereignty; they may derive also from environmental degradation and the pre-emption of development options. … Action to reduce environmental threats to security requires a redefinition of priorities, nationally and globally. Such a redefinition could evolve through the widespread acceptance of broader forms of security assessment and embrace military, political, environmental, and other sources of conflict.”

A security policy that cares about non-military risks and threats needs different tools and approaches than military defence. Moreover, risks which have a global scope by nature can hardly be mitigated, let alone resolved, by nation-state-based policies. International, and in most cases transnational, collaboration is required. Yet the political dominance of traditional security thinking has remained an obstacle to the constructive enlargement of security perspectives. Negotiations on global risks such as climate change, water scarcity and threats to biodiversity demonstrate both a growing sense of the need for global cooperation and the difficulty of nation-states in reaching compromise over competing interests.

In their effort to maintain the upper hand, the more powerful states in particular tend to “securitise” their policies, i.e. to defend their own interests rather than to seek fair arrangements, as
the current migration regime of the European Union illustrates. The issue area of preventing violent extremism shows similar ill effects of “securitisation”, as one of our most recent Berghof Handbook Dialogues made clear. Pursuing security policy at the cost of others, however, will sooner or later turn interdependence into more insecurity for all.

**From enlarged security to human security**

The worldwide cascade of radical political and societal changes after the end of the Cold War influenced the manner in which security concepts were viewed across the globe. The political and social changes, in combination with the impact of global risks, affected everyone’s lives. Against this background, the 1994 Annual Report of the United Nations Development Programme coined the term “human security”, defined as the freedom from fear (i.e. protection from violence) and the freedom from want (i.e. a more holistic approach to security that includes protection from hunger, diseases and natural disasters) for each individual.

Human security was designed as a comprehensive, people-centred and prevention-oriented concept that includes protection from threats in the area of economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. The revolutionary aspect was not only that it reconfigured the traditional security paradigm and advocated a holistic concept that combined security and development policy as mutually reinforcing; it also linked the idea of human security to the responsibility of states to provide the necessary conditions.

Japan and Canada were among the first states to adopt the concept of human security in their national policies. Canada focused mainly on protection from a variety of threats, whereas Japan adopted a mix reflected in the UN debates, with a stronger focus on education, health and the environment to “change lifestyles” in order to fulfil every human’s potential.
For the first time, the sovereignty of states to act domestically as they see fit was challenged in cases where governments flagrantly disregarded universal human rights and freedoms. The concept of the “responsibility to protect” was developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001 and it pushed the issue further, by stating that governments should not be allowed to threaten their own citizens and if found to be doing so should be duly sanctioned with a mandate from the international community.

Of course, the legitimacy and the accountability of states to act under the auspices of responsibility to protect remain a matter of concern, due to the possible inclination of major powers to in-
tervene for selfish reasons under the banner of “responsibility”. But the new interpretation of human security and the protection of populations against arbitrary state behaviour are important positive reference points for conflict transformation.

If states are held accountable for guaranteeing human security – and since sustainable development and just peace are intrinsic prerequisites for human security, and vice versa – the chances increase of making social and political relationship patterns more peaceful. The concept of human security addresses the underlying causes of violent conflict, which are of primary concern for conflict transformation, and directs attention to the sustained prevention of violence. Conversely, conflict transfor-
mation is a promising approach to support the goal of human security because it aims to transform the security sector and others and to change patterns of security behaviour, contributing to turning structural and inter-personal conflicts into constructive relationships.

References and Further Reading


Online Resources


“Youth [and women] should not be on the table, but around the table.”

UN Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security

Thinking in images is a useful exercise to understand how deeply gendered our associations with war and peace are and how none of us can escape “doing gender”, and indeed, “doing stereotypes”, as part of our everyday thinking and actions. Because habitual thoughts are the ones we question least, gender studies are a helpful tool in making us aware of how individual identities are shaped. They also help to critically analyse the social
GENDER | the fact of being male or female, especially when considered with reference to social and cultural differences, not differences in biology

YOUTH | a transitional phase from childhood to adolescence

Both can be seen as socially constructed categories that are associated with assigned roles, statuses, duties and responsibilities. Transformative approaches broaden our view to acknowledge the positive contributions by all, but also highlight the constricting consequences of certain roles and ascriptions.

The construction of “masculinities” and “femininities” and the gendered organisation of public and private life in war- and peacetime, as Cordula Reimann has pointed out. In contrast to gender, which continuously shapes individuals’ (self-)perception, youth is a transitional phase from childhood to adolescence. It is associated with certain milestones within socio-economic and cultural contexts and, therefore, does not allow for a universally agreed numerical definition.

Turning to the numerous commonalities between gender and youth, both can be seen as socially constructed categories that are associated with assigned roles, statuses, duties and responsibilities. It is commonly acknowledged that both women and youth are disproportionately affected by violence and conflict. However, both groups are often overlooked and marginalised in peace processes. The international women, peace, and security and the youth, peace, and security communities therefore have complementary agendas, which seek to shed light on women and youth not only as victims of violence during times of conflict, but also as positive change agents in transforming conflicts. Ultimately, it is essential to look at (young) women’s and young men’s unique experiences of conflict and violence in order to meaningfully include their voices and change perspectives.
Imagine ...
When you close your eyes and think about “war”, what do you see? If you see a person, is it a man or a woman, and is she old or young? Do you see a raped man lying dead on the ground with his crying children around him? Do you see a young girl with a grimy face pointing her AK-47 at you? What about the people at the conference shaking hands as they sign a peace agreement? Do you imagine them as women or men, young or old?

Conflict transformation through a gender and youth lens
While often neglected, gender- and youth-sensitive perspectives constitute important analytical dimensions of conflict transformation, both in terms of understanding causes and effects of (violent) conflict and in identifying means for their transformation.

On a macro level, such perspectives consider patriarchal and gerontocratic structures and the resulting (in)equality to be root causes of conflict. Women and young people tend to be excluded from formal and informal socio-political and economic spaces. Often, traditional and cultural norms lend (advanced) age and (male) gender power and authority, thereby establishing hierarchies that prevent youth or women from entering political spheres and decision-making arenas.

This structural exclusion is most vivid in formal peace processes, which tend to be the preserve of older males. Prevailing simplistic stereotypes – such as the youth-bulge-violence nexus, conflating young male populations with violence, or viewing women as passive victims – further hinder their active engagement in peace processes. In turn, this violence of exclusion fosters the very negative stereotypes that lead to their marginalisation in the first place, which risks certain groups resorting to violence as a means of resolving conflict.
On a micro level, the perspectives on women and youth in contexts of violent conflict have long focused on the role of women as victims and young men as perpetrators of violence and spoilers of peace. These stereotypical views may be internalised and projected onto peers, further strengthening negative perspectives and fuelling destructive spirals of violence. Certainly, young men represent the majority of fighters and consequently the majority of casualties in armed violence and young women suffer most from gender-based violence (UNFPA 2015, 21). Yet these tendencies mask multifaceted experiences. Men too become victims of gender-based violence. The role of female combatants is increasingly being explored, with the Berghof Foundation at the forefront of action research on female ex-combatants’ post-war leadership roles.

Finally, it is essential not to overlook the fact that the vast majority of young people are not involved in violence. For a long time, the predominance of stereotypical victim and perpetrator perspectives neglected the key roles of women and young people in preventing violence, transforming conflict and sustaining peace. In recent years, interest has slowly turned towards these missing pieces and more differentiated analysis, by highlighting the various ways in which these actors have exerted their positive agency in formal and informal peace processes. Although their full potential remains poorly understood, recent studies indicate the positive contributions of women’s participation in peace processes, especially when they influence decision-making (O’Reilly 2015). Likewise, anecdotal evidence of young people’s activities in peace processes – ranging from raising awareness of peace and justice to facilitating dialogue or even negotiations with armed groups on behalf of their communities – sketch a promising youth space of conflict transformation, which has been overlooked for too long.
The practitioner’s perspective
Emphasising the moral and pragmatic imperative of taking women and youth into account, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security and then Resolution 2250 on youth, peace, and security have boosted the production of policy guidelines, planning toolboxes and lessons learned reports. Gender and youth mainstreaming are increasingly understood as important instruments for planning and implementing inclusive and effective peacebuilding interventions. However, there are still many conceptual and methodological challenges to address in order to make conflict transformation a truly gender-sensitive and youth-inclusive endeavour. These range from the conception of gender analysis as primarily concerned with “women’s issues” and gender experts as necessarily being women, to the perception of gender and youth mainstreaming as an annoying “must” and additional workload instead of a helpful tool to improve planning and enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of interventions. Despite it being an obviously heterogeneous group, definitions of youth tend to be overly simplistic and gender-equal, missing the specific needs, interests and positions of young people in peace processes and therefore hampering efforts aimed at meaningful inclusion. Even when they are included in peace processes, this inclusion is very restricted, tokenistic and limited to “youth issues” such as education or employment, instead of providing or strengthening existing spaces where they interact and engage with other stakeholders, perhaps eventually transforming existing power hierarchies.

Changing perspectives ... but a long way to go
The peacebuilding field in general has come a long way in developing policy frameworks that reflect a mature perspective on actors, processes, causes and transformation of conflicts (→ Building and Sustaining Peace; → Transforming Conflict). The United Nations Secretary-General’s prevention and sustaining peace agendas and the associated women, peace, and security and youth, peace, and security agendas are prominent examples
in this respect that emphasise the important role that traditionally marginalised actors like women and young people play in conflict transformation. However, in order to translate these norms into practices that would foster genuine, context-specific and therefore meaningful inclusion of women and young people in formal and informal peace processes, interventions need to be based on a complex understanding about their unique roles and qualities to shape peace processes as well as the specific challenges to their inclusion. Applying a gender and youth lens unveils spaces of the everyday where these actors work for peace – as explored, for example, by Mir Mubashir and Irena Grizelj. Strengthening these efforts and encouraging others to engage will help in overcoming prevailing negative stereotypes and render the positive agency of women and young people more visible, doing justice to the multitude of roles they can play – so that one day we might close our eyes and think about war as something that women and men, young and old together are able to prevent.

References and Further Reading


Online Resources


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Gender and Youth: Changing Perspective
Inclusivity and participation have been steadily gaining traction as “buzzwords” within the peacebuilding community. But what might inclusive and participatory processes look like in practice in deeply divided and war-torn societies when trust is low and competition for power is high? What are the options for meaningful inclusivity and participation when there are major obstacles to working together but, at the same time, broad agreement is indispensable to avoid a relapse into violence? Different, context-
specific models will be needed when negotiating ceasefires and when conducting National Dialogues (→ Breaking Deadlocks). It is helpful for the debate to disentangle the key concepts, challenges, opportunities and potential limitations of inclusivity and participation at different stages in peace processes. In the following, we also offer some reflections on which elements might facilitate the creation of participatory and inclusive peace processes beyond norms and principles.

**On terminology ...**
Inclusivity and participation are two keywords that are often lumped together in one sentence, or used interchangeably. Although closely related, there is a difference in nuance between the two. Broadly defined, *inclusivity* in peace processes refers to the degree of access to important decision-making areas for all levels and sectors of state and society. Inclusivity is thus a principle or a norm that can be streamlined into a process and acted on. *Participation*, on the other hand, goes beyond norms and principles and involves indirect or direct active engagement by either a group or an individual in a process.
Inclusivity and participation: principles and practices

There are two axes along which inclusivity and participation in peace processes can be “measured”. *Horizontal inclusivity* refers to the degree to which a process is inclusive towards main power holders or elites in a society. *Vertical inclusivity*, on the other hand, refers to the degree to which various sectors and segments of society are included (e.g. marginalised groups such as women, youth, and ethnic and religious minorities). The degree of horizontal and vertical inclusivity can, among other things, be an indicator for the level of local ownership in a peace process.

That being said, inclusivity is and always will be understood and defined differently in different contexts and cultures and by different actors within the same context. In some contexts, merely to consult youth groups during peace negotiations can be seen as inclusive and participatory. In other contexts, anything other than a 50 per cent gender quota at the main negotiating table can be seen as exclusionary and non-participatory. Defining the scope and depth of inclusivity also depends on reconciling different views on what the conflict is about, who the relevant stakeholders are, and who may be potential spoilers. Often, some hold (or claim) the power to decide who has the right to be included and to participate, while others have to actively fight for their right to be included or to participate. Inclusivity and participation in peace processes, in other words, are often political (and politicised) and raise a host of questions around power (→ Empowerment and Ownership).

Coming to a broad agreement on what inclusivity and participation are and how they can be practised in a given peace process is thus an issue in itself that often needs specific attention at the start of a process, especially from international actors who can easily fall into the trap of oversimplifying and misunderstanding conflict and stakeholder dynamics. Consequently, inclusivity and participation are not only a question of going beyond norms and principles; they also involve moving beyond mere “box-ticking” and simple headcounts of representatives.
What are the different forms of inclusivity and participation?

Armed conflicts tend to reflect deep structural patterns of (real or perceived) social, political or cultural exclusion. Collective mobilisation in violent rebellion often results from shared grievances among marginalised social and political actors demanding greater participation and inclusivity in social, political and cultural arenas (→ Addressing Social Grievances). It is therefore imperative that a peace process brings about a more inclusive state and society beyond a negotiated peace agreement, as continued political, social and cultural exclusion is often fertile ground for violence relapse and re-mobilisation.

In general, inclusivity can be enacted in three different arenas in two ways. The arenas are *negotiation arenas* (such as ceasefire negotiations, peace agreement negotiations, National Dialogues and Constituent Assemblies), *codification arenas* (such as peace agreements, constitutional reform, bill of rights, legal reforms), and *materialisation arenas* (such as reformed institutions, land reforms, political party reforms and policy implementation).
The first way is *process inclusivity*, which describes the extent to which a peacemaking or peacebuilding forum such as ceasefire or peace negotiations is inclusive not only to the horizontal elite, but also to the vertical makeup of society. The second is *outcome inclusivity*, which describes the levels of responsiveness and representativeness of a peace agreement, new constitution or institution to all levels and sectors of society.

**What are the possible formulas for inclusivity and participation?**

There are different models that can be used for participation at different levels of peacemaking and peacebuilding. Some models include *incremental inclusivity*, which denotes a step-by-step process where the ceasefire might be negotiated by a small circle of actors due to security and/or trust constraints, with the level of inclusivity and participation increasing when, for example, a peace agreement or new constitution is being negotiated and implemented. A second model is *thematic multi-arena inclusivity*, where, for example, land reform might be negotiated at the main (semi-exclusionary) table, but simultaneously more inclusively organised roundtables identify broader needs and grievances, or broader cross-sectoral consensus is built by civil society outside of the formal negotiations. A third model is *parallel consultation forums with built-in mechanisms*, where different channels are utilised to influence the formal negotiations. These parallel forums can include consultation forums, public surveys to show the people’s will on a particular matter, or petitions. These forums are intended to feed directly into the formal negotiation forum, to the mediators, or to the negotiators. The last model is *informal deadlock-breaking mechanisms within inclusive formal arenas*, such as smaller circles of trust-building processes between polarised actors within wider National Dialogues and Constitution Assembly negotiations (e.g. establishing deadlock-breaking committees within the Yemeni National Dialogue process, see → Breaking Deadlocks).
Challenges and ways forward

Process inclusivity and participation come with ingrained tensions, obstacles and challenges. Some issues often faced in peace processes are: the dilemma between inclusivity and efficiency, cosmetic participation (box-ticking) as opposed to meaningful participation, and deliberate refusal of some actors to participate; some may even attempt to spoil the process. The Berghof Foundation has been engaged in proposing ways of resolving the inclusivity-efficiency dilemma through its research project on post-war inclusive political settlements. In some contexts, the subjective perception that non-elite interests are being considered may be sufficient; it may even be more important than the objective inclusion of stakeholders in the process itself. In others, including one non-state armed group may lead to increased violence by non-participating groups. Alternatively, it may demonstrate the benefits of a negotiated settlement, thus challenging the rationale for violence.

Apart from overcoming process-oriented challenges, there may be a lack of capacity or funds to support outcome inclusivity, for example in implementation of peace agreements or state reform. There may also be a lack of genuine political and social will to meaningfully transform the root causes of conflict; agreed mechanisms and/or procedures for implementation may also be absent or could not be agreed upon.

International actors should consider the long-term impact of efforts to support peace processes or provide development aid, both of which entail decisions on inclusivity vs efficiency and elite consensus vs broader buy in and (often in conjunction with other actors’ programming) can inadvertently but significantly influence the power balance and overall direction of the process. There is no single blueprint for addressing the dilemmas and challenges regarding inclusivity and participation in peace processes. Planning and sequencing mechanisms for inclusivity is key, and various models may be needed at different stages of the process. Process design should therefore be based on a solid
understanding of the context and conflict dynamics, and the process itself should remain flexible enough to adapt to changes in local conditions.

References and Further Reading


Online Resources


Why reflect when there is so much to do? In complex settings, such as a protracted conflict, we as practitioners trying to improve the situation must reduce complexity and identify key dynamics. This is challenging, and we often find in hindsight that we could have done better. Our own ability to adapt to the challenges we face is therefore of key importance. One way is to learn from what we did in the past and how well that worked,
and by observing current activities and assessing their scope for improvement. Other ways might be more transformative, such as scenario and futures work or a review of organisational theories of change and assumptions of success.

For individuals and organisations working on conflict and peace, the failure to reflect and learn could lead to errors being repeated and opportunities being ignored. Learning relates to us as persons, at the individual level, and as an organisation. It calls for open-mindedness and a readiness for change, and requires time, structures, tools and methods.

“M & E” – monitoring and evaluation – is an essential element of reflection and learning processes and is intrinsic to project management in conflict transformation.

**Monitoring** refers to the regular examination of and reflection on the “gap” between the expected outcome of an intervention and the actual outcome, with activities and agendas being adapted on the basis of this “incremental learning”. It therefore largely depends on explicit objectives and clear plans showing how they are to be accomplished and reviewed. In conflict settings, projects and programmes must also include an environmental monitoring component to detect any negative impacts of the project.
on the context, as well as any risks the conflict setting may pose to the project. A conflict-sensitive monitoring system, as well as a conflict transformation monitoring system, would therefore need indicators for the effects, both intended and unintended, and changing risks.

*Evaluation* is complementary to continuous project monitoring and takes place at various intervals after the implementation of a project or project component. It may be internal (self-evaluation) or external (evaluation by others combined with relevant feedback from/to stakeholders). Often, a mixture of the two is used. Evaluation can be categorised by the desired aims, interaction between evaluator and team (internal, external, joint), or focus/timing. Formative evaluations look at progress to date and recommend improvements, while summative evaluations measure overall achievement, mostly after an intervention. Impact evaluations take place sometime after the intervention and focus on the changes the project produced in the conflict context.

**Monitoring and evaluation: results chains and theories of change**

Reflection, and especially monitoring and evaluation, relies on clarity. Monitoring and evaluation is aided when assumptions and hypotheses are identified in the planning phase of a project and clearly stated in documents, for example as results chains and indicators. Another popular method is the use of explicit theories of change. This quest for clarity is even more important in polarised settings, where shared understandings cannot be assumed: communication must cross the divides of culture, language and distance.

This leads to a constant questioning of self and partners: do we have a shared understanding of our goals and how we hope to reach them? How helpful explicit hypotheses are for better conflict transformation can be illustrated by the Berghof Foundation’s work on the education system in Bolivia. There, we for-
mulated the following results chain: an activity (e.g. a problem-solving workshop) facilitates outputs (the ability to understand multiple perspectives), which in turn result in outcomes (a change in the way people relate to one another). In the long run, this develops more far-reaching impact (such as a reduction in violence in a polarised community).

Everyone’s perception of reality is limited. That being the case, it is essential to assess the accuracy of any linear hypothesis: “action A results in outcome B”. We must be open to the possibility that other important factors have been missed or ignored. While working in Bolivia, it became clear to the project team that it was necessary to maintain contact with the Ministry of Education, even after the integration of the Peace Culture programme in the Constitution and sectoral law, in order to monitor how the Ministry intended to anchor Peace Culture in its own regulations.

Criteria for assessing activities in conflict transformation and peacebuilding have been set out by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC). According to these criteria, it is essential to ask “are we doing it / did we do it right?” and to look at efficiency (balancing means and ends) and effectiveness (“did we reach the objectives”?) We should also consider whether the changes effected are likely to be sustainable. An important indicator of success is the assessed impact of the project, i.e. whether the project contributes to goals beyond its sphere of influence. Coherence refers to whether the intervention contributes to or counteracts other interventions. Moreover, it is important that an organisation reflects on the relevance of any activity (“did we do the right thing?”) Reflection on the relevance of an intervention in any given context goes beyond common reflective practice and is thus absent from many monitoring frameworks. There is a danger, particularly in the field of conflict transformation, that practitioners implement projects or programmes, which, despite being exciting, interesting and seemingly conducive to peace, lack the organisational structure or coherence with other pro-
jects required for genuine contextual change beyond a limited number of participants.

**Beyond monitoring and evaluation: loops of reflection and learning**

Learning and change can be based on various levels of reflection. The easiest and most common one is changing actions: we can then try to change the input to get another result. But, and this is the second level, maybe things are not so linear, and our assumptions have been flawed? And, more complex still, how can we as a team or organisation overcome such a blind spot in the future?

The deepest level of reflection, known as “transformational learning”, is aimed at changing underlying patterns and designing new learning processes. Here, the interest centres less on what the field still has to learn with regard to content – “what to do” – and more on how to create the best possible conditions to learn on different levels and adjust actions accordingly, which is especially important in the field of peacebuilding and conflict transformation. This “learning about learning” is crucial, since even the best efforts at transformative peace work may be ineffective if we fail to learn the lessons available to us. Reflection should cover all elements, such as access, language skills, funding sources, personnel and effective organisational structures: a successful combination of all of these is necessary for effective and sustainable change.

**Continuing to improve**

One main challenge in practice is that the logic of responding quickly in an ever-changing environment, such as intervening in a violent conflict, is not conducive to simultaneous reflection. It seems that sometimes there needs to be an impulse from the outside, from a person or group specifically tasked with prompting reflection, in order to create the required space in a hectic schedule, and to encourage a shift of emphasis from the practical to the reflective.
An organisational culture conducive to reflection and learning, in the peacebuilding field and elsewhere, entails the allocation of specific time slots, incentives, mechanisms and responsibilities to reflective practice, whilst also recognising the value of ad hoc meetings, even those as informal as a cup of tea with colleagues or an after-work ride home with the project partner. Organisations can benefit greatly from events outside the usual routine,
such as retreats or visits from headquarters or external evaluators. Within the field of conflict transformation, more methods of developing an internalised culture of reflection and learning (about failures and successes) must be identified. It goes without saying that the commitment of the leadership in any setting is vital to this development.
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Online Resources

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In 2016, “more countries experienced violent conflict than at any time in nearly 30 years“ (World Bank Group and United Nations 2018, iii, quoting UCDP 2017). Today’s conflicts are complex, multifaceted and fragmented. They often require a mixture of tools and approaches to manage and resolve them in a sustainable manner. Increasingly, the international trend seems to be moving in the direction of repressive or violent responses to conflict. The statistical
evidence, however, shows that military intervention in conflicts that are often driven by unmet ethnic, social, economic or political grievances does not contribute to the resolution of conflicts. On the contrary, such interventions exacerbate them and even create new fault-lines and grievances (→ Addressing Social Grievances).

In this context, non-violent third-party-assisted peacemaking tools become all the more important. Alongside dialogue (facilitation), mediation and mediation support have become essential pillars in the gamut of peacemaking tools. The main difference between negotiation and mediation lies in the role of the third party. The negotiation process can be broadly defined as one in which the conflict parties engage with each other to reach

Continuum of conflict management approaches

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<tr>
<th>Informal decision-making by conflict parties</th>
<th>Informal third-party decision-making</th>
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<td>Conflict avoidance</td>
<td>Negotiation</td>
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Figure 7, source: Christopher Moore, 2003
an agreement mostly without the assistance of a third party (although some backchannel facilitation may take place, see Facilitating Dialogue and Negotiation). The central defining feature of a mediation process is the presence of a third-party mediator to organise the flow of communication. This role may also be taken by insider mediators.

Although mediation is defined in a variety of ways, in essence all of the definitions agree on a few core fundamentals: the voluntary and confidential nature of the process, the impartiality of the mediator, and that the solutions are generated by the parties themselves, rather than being imposed by the mediator. Mediation, in its essence, can therefore be defined as assisted negotiation.

**Actors and styles**

As the number of conflicts increases, so too does the number of third-party mediation actors involved in the international field: traditional peacemakers such as the UN, single states, regional organisations, non-governmental organisations and individuals...
(eminent persons) all play a role in mediating conflict with varying degrees of success.

These actors may employ different styles of mediation: formulative, facilitative or directive/power-based mediation, and transformative mediation. In reality, mediation processes exhibit features of all of these different styles in one single mediation process in order to be more effective.

- In **formulative** mediation processes, the mediator acts as a formulator of ideas, devising and proposing new solutions to the disputants.
- The **facilitative** style of mediation focuses on the relationship between the parties; here, the aim is to increase mutual understanding between the parties in order to help them reach a mutually acceptable agreement.
- State-based mediators usually resort to **power-based** mediation where the mediator uses his/her leverage and power to influence the negotiation process, its content and its outcomes. A common approach in such processes is to use “carrots and sticks” to induce parties to pursue a specific trajectory.
- **Transformative** mediation is aimed at empowering conflict parties to recognise each other’s needs, interests, values and points of view, so that their relationships may be transformed during the mediation process. It supports the parties in determining the direction of their own process: they structure both the process and the outcome of mediation, and the mediator follows their lead.

A point of contention for all is the level of multipartiality, impartiality or neutrality a mediator must possess. We find in our practice at the Berghof Foundation that multipartiality is a beneficial stance in working with conflict parties.

**Insider mediators**
Rootedness/embeddedness in the conflict context give insider mediators heightened credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of
many. Additionally, the influence and authority that insider mediators bring to a process may provide them access to conflict actors who would be unavailable to others (e.g. radical or “hard to reach actors”). Insider mediators are affiliated to one or the other conflict party either by ethnicity or by some other link, and therefore cannot be expected to be impartial or neutral, yet are considered fair and trustworthy by the conflict parties. Insiders are intrinsic to the conflict context, i.e. they are part of the social fabric of the conflict. Their lives are directly affected by it. They may have a stake in the conflict but will not be swayed by it, and prefer non-violent means of addressing the conflict. They draw on tradition, religion, spirituality and also secularism, pluralism or multiculturalism to mediate conflicts. The legitimacy of insider mediators, depending on the dynamics of the conflict context, may, however, be in constant flux and thus call for outsider involvement. In traditional, patriarchal societies, certain insider mediators may also be less inclusive in their mediation processes.

In practice, the distinction between mediation, negotiation and National Dialogues is fluid. National Dialogues may at times involve bi/multiparty negotiations and third-party mediation where there is a political deadlock or the breakdown of dialogue. Concerns to protect national sovereignty and preserve national ownership of the processes make insider mediators the ideal bridge-builders and go-betweens to convene the process, with external actors present in a purely supporting role.

**External assistance**

External actors are best suited in their function as mediation support actors. Mediation support covers a range of activities, from assistance to professionalisation of the mediation practice. Broadly speaking, mediation support services include:

1. Technical and operational support for peace processes (e.g. advice on thematic issues, conflict analysis support, technical process design questions, and mediation strategy development);
2. Capacity-building (e.g. coaching for mediators, training for mediation teams and conflict parties on negotiation/dialogue skills and topics);
3. Research and knowledge management (e.g. knowledge products such as fact sheets, manuals, handbooks on process design options, legality and wording of contracts and agreements, developing a repository of knowledge on lessons learned and good practice).

For example …
The Berghof Foundation assists the citizens of HirShabelle State in Somalia to build or restore constructive relationships with each other. We take the knowledge base and experience present in the communities and add practical skills in mediation and dialogue facilitation through training and joint learning with important stakeholders and chosen multipliers.

The bulk of the Berghof Foundation’s work in the area of mediation is related to mediation support.

The practice of mediation has come a long way since the 1960s and 70s from a craft mastered by a few senior special envoys and (former) heads of state. Specialised mediation units now exist within regional organisations, foreign ministries and non-governmental organisations. This professionalisation of the field has led to the belief that formal mediation processes can be managed well if the mediators have the technical capacity (such as communication microskills, for example asking meaningful questions, conflict analysis expertise and knowledge of process design) to steer the process. Often the human dimension – empathy, intuition, creativity, the ability to build trust, cultural sensitivity, and humanity – is undervalued (→ Averting Humiliation). Yet these intangible factors sometimes determine the success or
failure of a mediation process. In the end, both the science and the art of mediation matter.

While mediation is definitely the more cost-effective way to resolve conflicts when compared to military intervention, it is also true that many peace agreements collapse during the early stages. Further research is needed to determine the effectiveness of mediation alongside other more coercive peacemaking efforts such as the use of sanctions, threats of war crimes prosecution or the use of military force. We have to ask which styles of mediation, and in combination with which other measures, are most effective. There is currently little guidance on how to decide the balance between political sensitivity, inclusivity and transparency; moreover, the extent to which mediators can be held accountable for such decisions and the consequences that ensue from them is still unclear.

Questions related to when mediation is appropriate, what the limitations of mediation are, and how to assess the effectiveness of mediation, have yet to be answered. Today’s multi-layered and complex conflicts need multi-layered complex third-party responses that draw on the experience, strengths and added value of the various mediation actors on each of the tracks. In some contexts, conflicts have continued despite many decades of peacemaking attempts (Israel-Palestine, Cyprus, etc.) or have proven resilient to any settlement. Mediation, National Dialogues and mediation support are no silver bullets for solving conflict in isolation but need to be complemented by other tools and approaches to nurture the culture of dialogue, trust and confidence-building among the belligerents. This requires long-term commitment, resources, experience, innovative thinking and persistence by mediators and those who support the process.
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Violence prevention has become an integral element of almost every peacebuilding document, placing it high on the international agenda. In the context of conflict transformation, violence includes much more than the use of physical force by persons to commit destructive acts against others’ physical or psychological integrity or property. Structural conditions such as unjust and oppressive political systems, social inequality or malnutrition, as well as their cultural or ideological justifications, are further, often overlooked, major sources of violence and war (see also → Addressing Social Grievances). Since violence is caused by multiple factors, prevention measures should not focus
merely on the perpetrator and the victim of violence but involve
the whole environment affecting them – the relevant causes and
drivers, the systemic connections as well as the sometimes hid-
den implications.

Dimensions of violence prevention: an array of approaches
Conflict may be a necessary – even formative – part of human ex-
istence, but we can avoid conflict turning into violence. With vio-
ence understood in a broad sense, the task of violence preven-
tion necessarily becomes multi-faceted, involving many fields
and actors. While prevention should ideally be undertaken pro-
actively and early on, attention often only focuses on a conflict
after violence has occurred. For example, peacebuilding efforts
in post-war settings often prioritise prevention, in order to coun-
ter or pre-empt a renewed outbreak of fighting, or to safeguard
sensitive de-escalation processes during transition phases. Typi-
cal tools and methods include early warning, confidence- and
security-building measures, preventive diplomacy and peace-
keeping, and peace education.

The prevention of violence is a key responsibility of any na-
tion-state, for it bears the exclusive right to the legitimate use
of force within its borders. It is the responsibility of states and
their authorities to provide all necessary legislation, institutions
and strategies to prevent violent attacks on any of their citizens.
States also need to deal with root causes of violence (such as discrimination and other grievances). However, state action alone is rarely enough. Often, a state’s citizens or (international) social movements must become active in raising public awareness and advocating a need for change. One example is the anti-gun protests after the Florida school massacre in 2018: #Neveragain, #Onemillionmarch. State authorities remain slow to act on more restrictive gun laws in the US, however.

Preventing direct violence (domestic and international)

(Legitimate) law enforcement describes the basic role, usually of police and other security personnel, in preventing (further) violence. Yet this strand of prevention carries a risk of excessively heavy-handed tactics and responses, especially in repressive regimes, which counter-productively may cause further grievances and even violence. In every case, a community needs to strike a balance between its need for security and the rights of its citizens.

Curbing the means of violence: Research suggests that more guns do not contribute to more security and peace, but may lead to more fatal incidents and increase the risks of violent conflict. Locally, there are movements to restrict private gun use. Nationally, there are campaigns aiming to reduce the availability of small arms. Globally, there are efforts to strengthen international organisations and regimes to prevent further arms races, proliferation and weapons transfers to conflict zones.

Background knowledge …

Prevention happens at different stages. Primary violence or conflict prevention targets anybody, whereas secondary prevention strategies focus on conflict and violence potential within a particular group or individual. Tertiary prevention targets people who are radicalised or who have been involved in violent actions (→ Working on Conflict Dynamics).
- *Strengthening legislation:* Most acts of violence are crimes that are liable to prosecution as retribution and deterrence. Much progress has been made under domestic and international framework conventions (e.g. concerning children’s rights, increasing criminalisation of sexual violence, and in the burgeoning area of → Dealing with the Past and Transitional Justice). Yet many acts of violence are still legal under international humanitarian law (e.g. the killing of combatants) and the protection of civilians in modern warfare remains inadequate.

**Preventing structural and cultural violence**

Beyond dealing with the symptoms, it is important to address the root causes that may lead to violent behaviour. Improving socio-economic conditions, fostering human rights and partici-

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**For example ...**

In recent years, an additional area of violence prevention has been discussed widely: preventing violent extremism. Violent extremism describes a current form of seemingly uncompromising political violence. Although it is today usually associated with certain religious groups, it is by no means confined to one group, religion or region, and it is certainly not new. Those now justifying violence ‘in the name of ...’ as legitimate action see themselves as oppressed by structural/cultural violence (e.g. military interventions, political-cultural-economic dominance of ‘the West’ or ‘the impertinence’ of liberal societies). In that ideological rhetoric, fighting ‘evil’ without compromise is the only way, even if this may involve brutal acts against civilians. In several research projects, teams at the Berghof Foundation are currently exploring whether and how (more) effective prevention of violent extremism can be achieved by focusing on local experiences and group processes of mobilisation and demobilisation (see also → Working on Conflict Dynamics).
pation, development and livelihood are the baseline for violence prevention (→ Fostering Human Security). However, attitudes and values also need to change.

‡  **Diminishing acceptance of violence and promoting a ‘culture of peace’**: In many settings, violence is encouraged by the silence of the majority or unquestioned norms. For example, ‘school yard violence’, such as bullying, is often present in a social setting where perpetrators feel unchallenged in inflicting harm on someone they consider weaker and not worthy of being part of a core group. Besides the perpetrator(s) and a victim, there are other pupils and maybe even teachers who do not intervene. Due to their behaviour, their lack of action, the situation may continue. In such a setting, peace education can be a relevant form of prevention, especially if raising awareness is combined with pointing out alternative actions.

‡  **Promoting ‘good examples’ of nonviolent action**: On an individual and collective level, highlighting alternative ways of protest and resistance for change is essential (there are many more examples than Mahatma Gandhi or Martin Luther King). “Peace Counts on Tour”, for instance, is an exhibition supported by the Berghof Foundation in cooperation with media reporters who go to conflict zones to highlight the work of successful contemporary peacebuilders. The pictures and stories collected are used to spread positive examples or models of how to build peace and prevent or counteract violence locally.

‡  **Resilience and mobilisation against the ‘logic of violence’**: In an environment of escalating conflict, there may be a fierce struggle between violence-promoting ‘extremists’ and those insisting on peaceful strategies. However, the logic of violent struggle can also be challenged from within a community. As violent groups often claim to act on behalf of marginalised communities, they rely on the acceptance of their actions by (at least sections of) their community. The dissolution of the Basque ETA and its disarmament by civil society actors in 2017 show that groups that
used to rely on violent tactics may eventually adapt their strategy due to a loss of public support, moving instead to non-violent action. The #MeToo movement highlights another area in which social mobilisation openly challenged long-ingrained patterns of (socially tolerated) sexual violence.

**Strengthening norms and institutions**
Another important aim for successful prevention of violence is to strengthen norms, mobilise political support for prevention and develop institutional capacities.

- **Operationalising norms:** Public debate influences the perception of norms, which may change over time. Public awareness of sexual violence, for example, has increased tremendously over recent years. While rape has been used as a weapon and war tactic for centuries, UN Resolution 1820, codifying a normative shift, finally recognised this practice as a war crime in 2016.

- **Developing structures and capacities:** Effective structures of violence prevention have to involve all actors (potential perpetrators, victims and bystanders), persons of influence (informal or formal) and relevant institutions. As violence is often the result of dysfunctional power relations, prevention strategies may first have to improve the flexibility of the (political) system so it is more able to cope with demands and grievances and accommodate change. In a war-torn society, this may involve political reforms to enhance power sharing, participation and inclusion (→ Mediation and Mediation Support; → Participation and Inclusivity), as well as initiating necessary social or economic reforms.

**Violence prevention as a joint effort in need of mobilisation**
In sum, prevention of violence is a political responsibility as well as a social challenge. Rules and regulations can help to set normative frameworks and create pressure, but social mobilisation remains necessary to control the use of power, whether in political, cultural or social settings. The prevention of violence depends on social awareness, capacity building, adoption of new
norms and attitudes, including incentivising non-violence from an early age, and calling attention to system(at)ic violent abuse. It also continues to depend on the willingness and capacity of actors at all levels to close the gap between early warning and action.

References and Further Reading


Online Resources


Imagine that in your hometown, several volunteers have organised an afternoon event for refugees who have been arriving from Afghanistan and Syria. The volunteers have been baking all morning, decorating the assembly room of the Catholic Church and are getting excited about introducing the new arrivals to their traditions. One of them has even made a poster inviting the refugees to the afternoon with the address and exact time in German – this has been put up in the gym where most of the refugees
Providing Conflict-Sensitive Refugee Assistance

are staying. The time comes, but only a few people slowly trickle in. To the volunteers’ disappointment, the guests’ enthusiasm remains rather low.

Does this sound familiar? It is a perfect example of a well-intended initiative that did not turn out as expected. This is how we could make it better: Together with the refugees, the volunteers meet to discuss ideas of how together they could make the new arrivals and the people in the town feel more connected. Jointly, they decide to use the next sunny weekend for a get-together in the park. Everyone can bring food or drinks typical of their home country and tell each other one remarkable story about the place they come from. An invitation in several languages will be put up across town, in shops and at the gym.

Derived from daily practice of actual hands-on refugee assistance in Germany, these two examples are almost of textbook character when it comes to visualising the relevance of conflict sensitivity in the context of displacement, migration and refugee assistance.

What is conflict sensitivity?
Conflict sensitivity is the ability, for example of an organisation to understand the conflict it is operating in, and to understand the interaction between its own operations and the conflict, and to use this understanding to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts on the conflict. It requires a solid conflict analysis.

CONFLICT SENSITIVITY | the ability to understand the conflict one is operating in, to understand the interaction between own actions and the conflict, and to use this understanding to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts on the conflict.

REFUGEE | someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war or violence.
Conflict-sensitive approaches were originally developed for work in conflict regions, yet are relevant to all activities relating to conflict, including refugee assistance. Conflict-sensitive initiatives ensure, for example, that they do not inadvertently create new or increase existing socio-political tensions but strengthen social cohesion. In situations where there is a high risk that well-intended actions will result in misperceptions, frustrations and might even reproduce or perpetuate discriminating structures – which could in turn culminate in the use of violence – conflict-sensitive approaches can make a huge difference, as the example at the beginning illustrates.

“Do no harm” is one of the best-known principles in this area and has become a core tool for project planning, monitoring and evaluation (e.g. CDA 2016 and others; see also → Learning Together). It seeks to analyse how an intervention may be implemented in a way that supports local communities in addressing the underlying causes of conflict rather than exacerbating the conflict. Conflict sensitivity approaches go beyond do no harm. Today, governmental and nongovernmental actors alike

Conflict-sensitive refugee assistance as conflict transformation and peacebuilding

Figure 8, source: Berghof Foundation
increasingly recognise the need for conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding to strengthen the contextual understanding of actors and their settings. Conflict sensitivity is now well-established in the fields of education and journalism.

Nevertheless, conflict-sensitive approaches have yet to be incorporated and mainstreamed beyond situations of fragility and conflict despite their potential in other areas. A glance at the literature suggests that the Berghof Foundation is among the few organisations that apply the concept to the field of professional and voluntary refugee assistance in Germany.

How to apply conflict sensitivity to refugee assistance abroad

As in any other space of human interaction, in contexts where refugees and “locals” meet, conflict may arise. Conflict may also arise for refugees from many different backgrounds meeting in precarious conditions. While many people understand conflict as a normal occurrence, they often find it exhausting to expe-
rience and deal with it in their daily lives, as conflict indicates fundamental, yet often unconscious, differences in feelings, understandings and wants. These differences and their manifold causes need a productive space. However, refugees and others have few opportunities to meet as equals (namely as human beings with dignity and a desire to live a fulfilled life; → Averting Humiliation). We believe that creating spaces for conflict-sensitive, non-discriminatory and trauma-sensitive encounters (e.g. GIZ 2016) is an important contribution to peacebuilding (see Figure 8).

An example of the above-mentioned spaces for encounter are peace education workshops on conflict sensitivity in refugee assistance, as conceptualised by the Berghof Foundation. They move beyond transmitting the concept itself towards providing input and impetus on the three dimensions of peace education: (1) competences, (2) capacities and (3) behaviour. The overall aim is to contribute to peoples’ ability to live together peacefully. (See also → Educating for Peace.)

At the Berghof Foundation, we have developed the following ten propositions for conflict-sensitive refugee assistance:

- Conflict is a chance to grow, if we strengthen capacities for dealing with conflict constructively.
- We try to be mindful of our own attitudes towards conflict, our behaviour in conflict and the (cultural) norms and experiences that may shape them.
- It is important to be aware that any action can exacerbate or escalate conflict, but can also foster peaceful coexistence between people.
- We strive to include all interested stakeholders early on, following the principle of multipartiality, and meet each other as equals while aiming to overcome all forms of discrimination and racism.
- We need to be aware of our own needs, wishes, goals and limitations in any interaction and reach out to understand the needs, wishes and goals of our fellow human beings as well as the specific limitations they face.
It is important to understand and critically reflect on the context and conditions we come from and currently live in, and the (historically evolved) power structures and dependencies associated with them.

It is necessary to develop an understanding of the effects of psychological trauma in someone’s life and how in turn this may affect others, e.g. through secondary traumatisation caused by memories of the events.

Dedicating time to exploring one’s emotional resources and replenishing them on a regular basis is essential for one’s capacity to act in a sensitive and empathetic manner in challenging circumstances.

The current situation of refugees and their continuing arrival require a change of mindset and changes in behaviour – in the receiving societies and among the people arriving.

It is important to acknowledge and learn about the global consequences of our own localised actions, and to begin to act accordingly.

Following these principles, conflict sensitivity raises awareness of the need of critical (self-)reflection. It helps to answer the question: “Do we really do good when we mean to do good?” In order to answer this question, it is important to understand the (historically evolved) structures and dependencies often underlying assistance, as it can otherwise reproduce and strengthen these injustices despite being well-intentioned. Thomas Gebauer describes the prevalent discourse: “A world that only knows helpers and helped appears a lot more peaceful than a world split into privileged and humiliated, into might and plight. Might and plight appal, but who could possibly take offence at help?” In the context of conflict-sensitive refugee assistance, it is thus important to identify and overcome differences in opportunities for political and social participation (e.g. access to the job market), inequalities in living conditions and resource distribution (e.g. land ownership), and economic power, as well as all forms of discrimination and racism. In that sense, conflict sensitivity not only helps to analyse current and past
situations in order to better understand the factors underlying their conflictual dynamics. It also provides a framework and empowerment to foresee and manage potential future challenges by encouraging a change of perspectives and real dialogue with “the other”, be it the beneficiary of assistance or all other actors in the field.

**Dealing with difficulties and dilemmas**

Adding conflict sensitivity to the already demanding work in professional and voluntary refugee assistance can appear to be a daunting proposition. However, implementation (even if only partial) can help to reduce stress on all actors as opportunities within conflicts come to the forefront and frustration, coercion and other escalating dynamics can be avoided. The Berghof Foundation’s experience shows that learning and applying conflict sensitivity is a process that itself includes progress as well as setbacks.

In public and academic discourse, the role of culture, intercultural communication and so-called cultural conflicts are topics of heated debate. Our conflict-sensitive approach does acknowledge differences and similarities between people, in their socio-cultural backgrounds and in their behaviour in conflicts. However, attributing conflicts to cultural differences is often an attempt to find a quick and easy solution to a difficult situation. Instead of efforts being made to analyse and deal constructively with the root causes of the conflict, perceived cultural differences are either brushed away with calls for tolerance or are exploited to delegitimise the other person or group.

Many fundamental approaches to managing conflict between different groups are similar, e.g. dialogue, mediation and negotiation. Training people to become more “literate” in reading common situations and finding more creative ways to deal with them can help in addressing and resolving some of the root causes of conflict. Knowledge of cultural particularities is useful in
In this context, as is any other knowledge about the conflict context or parties.

Everyone – regardless of their socialisation, circumstances or legal status – has capacities for constructive conflict transformation, which can be developed (further). These capacities, together with the interdependence of all people provide an ideal ground for societies to move towards more justice, tolerance, cohesion and, indeed, peace.

References and Further Reading


Online Resources

Resources on conflict sensitivity, www.conflictsensitivity.org


kontext.flucht [in German], https://www.ida-nrw.de/fileadmin/user_upload/brosch_flyer/IDA-NRW_Reader_kontext.flucht.pdf
Researching Conflict Transformation

Véronique Dudouet and Andreas Schädel

“Research that produces nothing but books will not suffice.”
Kurt Lewin

Conflicts are inevitable components of human development and social change (→ Addressing Social Grievances). Violence in conflict, however, is not inevitable. Conflict transformation research seeks to explore conditions, strategies and policies for sustaining patterns of non-violent behaviour among conflict parties, particularly in protracted social and ethnopolitical conflicts. It aims to support conflict parties in building, restoring and maintaining constructive, just relations in order to abolish the use of force as a means of interaction. In this context,
conflicts and their management should not be looked upon as simplistic linear phenomena that start, escalate and stop for all actors and all sectors in the same way (→ Working on Conflict Dynamics). The interdependent and systemic dimensions, as well as the dynamic nature of conflict therefore need to be more fully understood.

Research and practice informing each other
Conflict transformation research does not encompass a grand theory, but generates theory elements from field research and from close interaction with practitioners and the conflicting parties themselves. Nevertheless, it is theory-guided. Of particular importance is theorising that addresses the differences between inter-personal and inter-group → Conflict Transformation, and between symmetrical and asymmetrical conflicts. Moreover, research on conflict transformation incorporates knowledge of various disciplines (political science, sociology and social psychology, history, anthropology, ethnology, law, communication, education and more).

Conflict transformation research can be considered a specific strand of peace and conflict research which pays particular attention to bringing about supportive conditions for practical progress in peacemaking and peacebuilding. It starts from the premise that concepts and theory must evolve in a continuous, reflec-
tive and critical exchange with practice, which involves putting concepts to the test in practical settings and debating their validity with practitioners from many backgrounds and in many localities. Strong links to the field of policy are also required, by consulting national and international decision-makers during the research design stage, and feeding the results back to them in the form of targeted recommendations. In brief: theoretical approaches should contribute to developing new political and social strategies, and conflict transformation practice should inspire ideas on theory.

Whenever conflicting parties, practitioners and policy-makers are involved in research, it is essential to consider the diversity of actors’ interests. By bringing the actors to the fore, deeper socio-cultural and behavioural aspects of action and decision-making can be explored in the context of change. Following this methodology, the research agenda is influenced and shaped increasingly by those who are immediately affected by its results. The growing interest of practitioners in becoming involved in inclusive patterns of research has begun to narrow the gap by reconciling the communities of research and practice, by motivating both towards collective learning and by encouraging researchers to collaborate with practitioners to create reflective feedback loops. Collaborative research in joint teams, aimed at supporting conflict transformation, increases the knowledge of how different actors, processes and structures contribute (or not) to peace-building processes. The Berghof Foundation considers inclusive, bottom-up, participatory and reflective methods of research – of which action research elements are an important part – a great opportunity for generating the knowledge and support necessary for sustained conflict transformation.

**Action research: participatory, inclusive and change-oriented**

Action research can be useful in this context as one of several research methods. The first projects evolved in the 1970s, mainly in the university sector and in work with marginalised groups and
urban districts, but also in community projects in Latin America, most often led by social psychologists. The purpose of action research is to undertake studies into the conditions and impacts of various forms of social action. It also aspires to influence social action; in other words, it is normative in focus. Its agenda concentrates on specific social grievances.

The main objective of the research is not to test theoretical hypotheses but to bring about practical change in the problematic situation which is the subject of study. This is viewed as a holistic social process: individual variables are not isolated and collected as “objective data”; instead, data collection itself is interpreted as part of the social process. Action research involves the use of qualitative approaches based on empirical social research, including the evaluation of project reports, participatory monitoring, individual or group interviews with project participants and members of the target groups, and surveys, but also ethnographic methods and creative forms of investigation such as theatre. The methods aim to exert direct influence on events within society. The researcher temporarily abandons his or her distance to the research object and is intensively involved, during certain phases, in the process being studied. The subjects being observed and studied are not cast in a passive role but participate actively in the debate about objectives and in data collection and evaluation. For the researchers, a precise definition of roles and ongoing self-reflection are essential.

Action research therefore not only attempts to accumulate knowledge and enhance understanding of how social interactions function; it intervenes in a direct and practical way. In order to ensure ownership and inclusiveness, it involves the actors being studied in the process on an ongoing basis. Academic findings are thus translated into practice, and research concepts and theoretical constructs are subjected to practical testing at the same time. The continuous feedback of results to project participants, through workshops and discussion of interim and final reports, is essential. Designed for a longer timeframe, action research
can provide valuable information about the opportunities for, and limits to, peacebuilding strategies. For instance, the Berghof Foundation trains female ex-combatants in four countries to collect video testimonies from their peers in order to document and analyse the challenges and opportunities faced by female members of armed movements in the wake of post-war political transitions. This knowledge produced by insider experts will then be integrated into training and capacity-building programmes for resistance and liberation movements and shared with international peacebuilding agencies.
Practical needs determine appropriate research methods

It is certainly true that not every peacebuilding measure can be accompanied by a comprehensive research project, as in most cases those who fund peace practice will finance short-term evaluations at best. Nor can action research be considered the one and only approach or method – in partnership with others, the Berghof Foundation implements a multi-method approach integrating qualitative, quantitative and experimental methods.

As described above, substantial action research requires long-term field research, which does not usually correspond with the budgets and funding lines of academic (or other) donor agencies. Furthermore, not all practical engagement lends itself to being the object of research, especially given the discreet confidential settings required for effective peace processes. Nevertheless, in order to improve knowledge of peace practice, the underlying ideas of action research can help in designing and implementing projects that aim to support the creation of inclusive structures and sustained practices of non-violent interaction. These include, above all: respect towards those who are subjects of the study, clarification of the roles and aims of those who conduct the research, involvement of the stakeholders in the development of research questions and hypotheses, and transparency of results through the use of feedback loops.

References and Further Reading


Online Resources


In the face of violent conflict, there are three main impulses. The first is immediate: to stop it. The second is a medium-term one and focuses on dealing with the wounds resulting from the violence. The third, a long-term one, is to change the underlying conditions that have led, and may lead again, to violence. We understand conflict transformation as a comprehensive approach that attempts to achieve the last of these three goals, without neglecting the others.

There is a considerable range of approaches to working on conflict. At the Berghof Foundation, conflict transformation was chosen as
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION | a complex process of constructively changing relationships, attitudes, behaviours, interests and discourses in violence-prone conflict settings. Importantly, conflict transformation addresses and changes underlying structures, cultures and institutions that encourage and condition violent political and social conflict over the long term.

The concept of transformation
We define conflict transformation as a complex process of constructively changing relationships, attitudes, behaviours, interests and discourses in violence-prone conflict settings. Importantly, conflict transformation addresses and changes underlying structures, cultures and institutions that encourage and condition violent political and social conflict over the long term.

On terminology ...
Conflict transformation is often contrasted with several other approaches: conflict management (activities undertaken to limit, mitigate and contain open conflict), conflict resolution (activities undertaken over the short term and medium term dealing with, and aiming at overcoming, the deep-rooted causes of conflict, including the structural, behavioural, or attitudinal aspects of the conflict), and conflict settlement (achievement of an agreement between the conflict parties on a political level which enables them to end an armed conflict). Proactive prevention of violent conflict is also an important aspect of the conflict transformation repertoire (→ Preventing Violence).
condition violent political and social conflict. The term is used in the works of several “founding figures” in peace and conflict studies (among them Adam Curle, Johan Galtung, Louis Kriesberg, Kumar Rupesinghe and Raimo Väyrynen), but it has been elaborated most specifically in the works of John Paul Lederach and Diana Francis.

Conflict transformation is a non-linear and unpredictable process, involving many different actors in moving from “latent and overt violence to structural and cultural peace” (Dudouet 2006). This long-term process requires transformative changes on many levels and dimensions, as outlined in the table overleaf:

What does this mean in practical terms? Take, for example, Kenya and the violence and political crisis it experienced in the wake of contested general elections in 2007/2008. On the one hand, the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation Process, initiated by the African Union, was tasked to take immediate measures to stop the violence. On the other hand, the mandate also included reconciliation and social justice issues in the medium term and constitutional, legal and institutional reform in the long run to address the root causes. And while initially the process focused on the ruling and opposition parties, it later included people at the local and community level as well. (The 2017 flares of election violence in the country, however, also remind us that transformative change is rarely quick or all-encompassing. It needs to be defended and re-asserted, and result in change that shifts citizens’ trust in their institutions.)

**Third-party engagement**

While in any violent conflict-setting there are people committing violence and others benefiting from the conflict, we also always find people working towards peace and peaceful change from within society – the agents of peaceful transformation. They are able to embrace one of the central principles of conflict transformation: that conflict is not a bad thing in itself; indeed, it is often
a driver of necessary change. It is the violence in waging conflict that brings harm.

External experts, such as policy-makers, researchers and non-governmental workers, can support these agents of change, e.g. by connecting them, or offering ideas, expertise or negotiation
support. However, external engagers should not only support the agents of peaceful transformation. They also need to understand the motivations of the so-called “spoilers”. As Dekha Ibrahim Abdi puts it when referring to the violent actions of the youth in Kenya: “You don’t see them as a problem, but you see them as people needing to be understood […] and then they become part of the strategy development.”

Moreover, it has become clear that conflict transformation efforts need to encompass many levels, tracks and sectors: governments and non-state actors; women and men; youth; conflict parties and peace envoys; and representatives of diaspora and business. External engagement can play an important role in supporting and connecting the different actors and levels.

The engagement of external actors rests on specific principles, which form a code of conduct. One important set of principles describes the respect for local capacities and ownership, inclusivity and multipartiality of processes, and fair play. A second set describes the personal qualities that are needed in engagement for conflict transformation and peacebuilding: empathy, humility, self-reflection, and the tenacity and perseverance to achieve incremental change over the long run, often in the face of serious setbacks.

**Systemic conflict transformation**

Systemic approaches to conflict transformation have been explored under different “labels”: some call this type of work holistic, some multidimensional. Building on family therapy and systems analysis, at the Berghof Foundation, we have chosen the term “systemic” to describe a particular and important set of approaches to managing the complexity and challenges of conflict transformation engagement. Its basic principles (developed by Daniela Körppen and Norbert Ropers, among others) are:

- thinking in network structures
- thinking in dynamic frames and in terms of relationships
Emphasising solutions which already exist within the (conflict) system rather than just focusing on identifying problems

Accepting ambivalence and contingency as well as acknowledging perspective dependency

Concentrating on human beings and their learning processes

These principles translate into practical mindsets, attitudes and procedures: working closely with key stakeholders, mobilising key agents of peaceful and creative change, putting an emphasis on system-wide conflict analysis and conflict monitoring, investing in strategic planning of systemic interventions and pursuing creativity in solutions. Any systemic engagement is an ongoing cycle. First, there is observation, which has to be longer-term and include a change of perspectives. Then follows work with and within the conflict/conflict transformation system, which leads to change and the evolution of all involved. This, in turn, requires renewed observation to reflect on theories of change and impacts observed, but importantly also on mistakes made and misunderstandings that have arisen (See Figure 10, see also Learning Together). Any intervention should in this way focus on the complexity of the conflict system and embrace both internal and external factors and actors.

Critique and open questions

Conflict transformation is not without its challenges and critics. It calls, some will argue, for such wide-ranging and deep-reaching change in the social fabric that it seems far-fetched or naïve. Some argue that it may actually intensify conflict in the short run by proposing a disturbing process of change which touches (and threatens) beliefs, relationships, power, positions and status. Some claim that it can only be a guiding notion, a distant vision, rather than a fully implemented programme. But the Berghof Foundation believes it is vital for achieving sustainable peace that lasts generations. In any case, (systemic) conflict transformation cannot be planned and implemented by one actor alone – it takes many different contributions. How these
contributions can be elicited, connected and made to add up to “peace writ large” is a serious challenge. Currently, the Berghof Foundation is exploring scenario planning and process design as one inclusive, creative and tangible approach (Bojer 2018). An important area of improvement highlighted in the evaluation of conflict transformation practice is that effective, long-term work requires some form of institutionalisation (and resourcing), a topic discussed often under the heading of Infrastructures for Peace.

The systemic engagement cycle

![Image of the systemic engagement cycle](image)

Figure 10, source: Barbara Unger and Oliver Wils, 2006
References and Further Reading


Online Resources


If we look at conflicts closely, different dynamics, layers, purposes, stakeholders and interests become visible. In-depth conflict analysis is indispensable for understanding the dynamics between conflict actors and engaging them in conflict transformation. As a USAID conflict assessment framework points out,
“armed conflict is driven by key actors in society – individuals, but also organisational actors of all sorts – who actively mobilize people and resources to engage in acts of violence on the basis of grievance, such as a group’s perception that it has been excluded from political and economic life. Key mobilisers may have different means and incentives that affect the methods they employ to achieve their objectives; violence is only one tactic among many.”

(See also → Addressing Social Grievances.)

**Escalation and radicalisation in conflict**
The dynamics of actors confronting each other in (protracted) conflict are usually described as steps towards escalation. In recent
debates on violent extremism, the term radicalisation has also gained prominence. These two terms have different meanings, although they are used interchangeably at times, as no commonly accepted definitions exist.

*Escalation*, as understood by Friedrich Glasl (1999), focuses on the dynamics of groups or individuals in a conflict setting (see Table 4 below). Understanding its stages is key to figuring out the appropriate time and style of intervention to halt the worsening of a conflict. *Radicalisation* is most often understood as an intrapersonal and highly individual process. As such, although by no means independent of context, it is not necessarily related to a conflict setting. A large set of push and pull factors have been identified that influence each person individually and can – but do not have to! – lead to radicalisation.

It is important to stress this: radicalisation and escalation can lead to violence but there is no automatic “stairway”. Rather, escalation and radicalisation are processes that can stop and stabilise at any level and point in time or even reverse into de-escalation and de-radicalisation. In current debates around violent extremism, radicalisation is often used in reference to violence but there is no constitutive link between the two (cf. figure 11).

**The central role of education**

Approaches to influence these dynamics focus either on preventing escalation or radicalisation from starting or intensifying, or on supporting de-escalation and de-radicalisation after they have happened. The two approaches are not clear-cut. Significant overlap exists in the work of conflict de-escalation/de-radicalisation and violence prevention. Both approaches use dialogue-based methods that aim to address the existing or potential root causes of a conflict or a radicalisation process. Understanding the feelings and motives of actors leading to a particular (violent) action or behaviour is at the core of both approaches.
Interventions can address individuals directly or indirectly via their communities and institutions. They can also work simultaneously on the individual and community or institutional level. In the Berghof Foundation’s experience, this is the most effective way. Some institutions, for instance religious institutions, have a mandate over individuals’ de-radicalisation, such as returned foreign fighters, as well as over their constituency as a whole. Understanding the (conflict) context, the conflictual issue and relevant actors is therefore essential for any attempt to influence actor dynamics and achieve conflict transformation.

Figure 11, based on P. Neumann
One of the main avenues in the long-term prevention of radicalisation and violent escalation is quality education. For example, education plays a crucial role in strengthening young people’s resilience by enhancing skills such as reflective and critical thinking, communication, and the ability to adopt different perspectives. These skills help young people to better understand and evaluate complex situations, including conflicts. They also support the identification of better and workable solutions. The specific field of peace education is critical to our work and aims to strengthen people’s capacities to deal constructively with various types of conflict. It does so by developing a comprehensive programme that teaches people how to interact with others and avoid unnecessary aggression (see also → Empowerment and Ownership).

Challenges and lessons learned in de-radicalisation and de-escalation

Supporting or starting de-radicalisation and de-escalation processes encounters several hurdles. One of them is often intense in-group/out-group perceptions that limit access to the group (or individual) and hence the scope to start any kind of dialogue. Individuals are often radicalised by peer-to-peer influence and motivated by group belonging; this may disconnect them from mainstream institutions and official groups, often also as a result of perceived marginalisation and oppression, and makes them difficult to reach.

De-radicalisation efforts for individuals may take the form of exit strategies that encourage radicalised individuals to leave a group, or may involve working with those individuals once they have been removed from their group. The latter often happens in programmes conducted in prisons, for example, where access is possible. Indirect approaches to de-radicalisation via communities and institutions include supporting capacity- and strategy-building to either change the context and reduce possible push and pull factors’ impact or to weaken narratives that are typical of radicalisation processes, such as victimisation narratives.
In addition, a degree of context-sensitivity and adaptation are necessary. A “one size fits all approach” can do more harm than good, perhaps by not using language sensitively and by stereotypical targeting of communities, which can create resentment, for example when Muslim communities are broadly

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**The Nine Levels of Conflict Escalation by Friedrich Glasl**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Concretisation</td>
<td>The points of view become more rigid and clash with each other. However, there is still a belief that conflict can be resolved through discussion. No intransigent parties or positions yet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Images, Coalitions</td>
<td>The different parties manoeuvre each other into negative roles and engage in open warfare. They recruit supporters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4, source: Berghof Foundation
targeted for de-radicalisation projects. One solution to this is to work with civil society actors who have insights into the local context.
De-escalation efforts that address groups vary depending on the level of escalation in relation to the use of violence and the general conflict context. Security and military-based strategies are often used in “countering violent extremism”. However, if the context allows and there is a window of opportunity, engaging a non-state armed actor in dialogue for de-escalation can be much more effective. This, however, depends much on the actor itself. Véronique Dudouet has identified factors that facilitate or constrain dialogue with non-state or proscribed armed groups. Her study highlights a combination of factors that need to align, such as leadership, organisational structure and social legitimacy.

While most attention is on groups that have escalated to the level of using violence, de-escalation efforts can and ideally should start before the outbreak of violence. Here again, the role of relevant communities, of respected traditional or religious leaders, the business community but also of youth and women should be considered. They may well have the access, resources and trust required for creating space to engage groups in dialogue. Once this space is established, a de-escalation process can start to address the means by which the conflict is conducted – i.e. ending violence through a ceasefire agreement – as well as addressing the core conflict issues (see → Mediation and Mediation Support and → Facilitating Negotiation and Dialogue). Inclusivity (and participation) are crucial in de-escalation (as well as in de-radicalisation and prevention). They can help to avoid (re-) escalation by supporting legitimacy in a locally driven process, for example in National Dialogue processes.

A way forward ...
Robert Frost, the poet, once wrote, “More than once I should have lost my soul to radicalism if it had been the originality it was mistaken for by its young converts.” For dialogue, mediation and conflict transformation practitioners, it is crucial to acknowledge that anyone may be susceptible to radicalisation and violence in today’s world, and hence to refrain from stigma-
tisation and overgeneralisation, while having a broad and alert approach to the dynamics and the ever-changing setting of the conflict. At the Berghof Foundation, we therefore engage in research that focuses on areas less well understood: the patterns of resilience and vulnerability in communities, or the dynamics within groups that either mobilise towards violence or incentivise non-violence. With this approach, we aim to promote a holistic approach that is inclusive and constructive in nature.

References and Further Reading


Online Resources


ANNEX

About the Berghof Foundation
The Berghof Foundation is an independent, non-governmental and non-profit organisation that supports efforts to prevent political and social violence, and to achieve sustainable peace through conflict transformation.

Our vision is a world in which people maintain peaceful relations and overcome violence as a means of political and social change. While we consider conflict to be an integral and often necessary part of political and social life, we believe that violence in conflict is not inevitable. We are convinced that protracted violent conflicts can be transformed into sustained collaboration, when spaces for conflict transformation allow drivers of change to prosper and constructively engage with one another.

“Creating space for conflict transformation.” We work with like-minded partners in selected regions to enable conflict stakeholders and actors to develop non-violent responses in the face of conflict-related challenges. In doing so, we rely on the knowledge, skills and resources available in the areas of conflict research, peace support and peace education. By combining our regional experience with a thematic focus on cutting-edge issues, we aim to be a learning organisation capable of supporting sustained efforts for conflict transformation.

To fulfil our mission and achieve our vision, we work closely with partners and networks. The Berghof Foundation staff maintain close contact with local partners, representatives of international NGOs, political parties, members of parliament and ministries, and also with international organisations such as the United Nations and the European Union.

The Berghof Foundation’s headquarters are located in Berlin, Germany. In addition, the Foundation maintains
offices in Tübingen (Georg Zundel House for Peace Education) and Beirut.

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**11 Milestones**

Established during the height of the Cold War by Professor Dr. Georg Zundel, the Berghof Foundation can look back at a history of success. Over the past forty years peacebuilding has become firmly rooted in research, practice and education in Germany (and internationally). By supporting hundreds of projects and helping to establish several institutions, the Foundation has become a defining part of that history.

**1971**

The Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies is founded by Georg Zundel as a private limited company with charitable tax exempt status under German law. Initial support provided for critical analyses of the arms race during the Cold War.
1977
Beginning of support for the Association (later Institute) for Peace Education Tübingen.

1989
The Foundation establishes a research facility in Berlin, the Research Institute of the Berghof Foundation. Its emphasis is on altering the dynamics of the arms race. In 1993, it becomes the Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management (later Berghof Conflict Research), shifting its focus to the resolution of ethnopolitical conflict.

1998
Groundwork is laid for the Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation. Practical and theoretical research takes place in the Balkans and the Caucasus.

1999
The Association for Peace Education Tübingen is awarded the UNESCO Prize for Peace Education.

2001
The Resource Network for Conflict Studies and Transformation begins its sustained programme of local work with the conflict parties in Sri Lanka.

2004
The Berghof Foundation for Peace Support (later Berghof Peace Support) is established to provide globally-oriented support for peace processes.

2005
Project work is extended to resistance and liberation movements and former non-state armed groups. The network now spans 20 countries.
2007
Founder Georg Zundel dies. His family resolves to carry on the Foundation’s work.

2012
Three areas that had been operating independently – conflict research, peace support and peace education – are integrated into a new entity: the Berghof Foundation.

2019
The Berghof Foundation, grown to over 80 staff, moves to its new Berlin headquarters in Lindenstrasse 34.

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