"What’s actually needed is to invent new terms"
A Conversation about Radical Religious Norms and Experiences from the Balkans

Rudine Jakupi, Garentina Kraja, Rrona Kamberi, Redion Qirjazi, Sefer Selimi, Romario Shehu, Sead Turcalo, Nejra Veljan with Beatrix Austin (interviewer)

This is an edited conversation with a team of researchers from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia who are researching issues of radicalisation, violent extremism and prevention in the region and their respective countries (for further information on their background see About the Authors and Interviewees). The interview was recorded in Sarajevo on 27 March 2018 and edited for brevity and clarity.

Berghof Foundation works with the researchers interviewed here in the context of the participatory research project “Opportunities for Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) in the Western Balkans”.

I’d like to start by asking whether there were aspects or propositions in the lead article that you found particularly convincing, or that you really disagreed with?

Romario Shehu, Albania: The most interesting aspect of this paper for me was the importance given to the state-building process, specifically strengthening democracy, human rights and rule of law. Violent extremism is a symptom of deficiencies in these areas, which are the root causes of the problems. So instead of making C/PVE a pillar in itself, it is better to integrate it into the main process of state-building. This approach is very appealing to me, and reading the author’s views made it more persuasive.

Rudine Jakupi, Kosovo: I found Mohammed Abu-Nimer’s proposal to involve local imams in PVE approaches very convincing, because I think this is the only way forward when we talk about religious extremism in this sense. It is important to include the main actors who can actually provide some sort of counter-narrative to the extremist narratives.

Sefer Selimi, Macedonia: I found it very interesting when he talked about the lack of tools to maintain everybody’s credibility in terms of their engagement in these activities: “clear strategies and toolkits on how best to build mutual engagement on PVE/CVE without threatening each other’s [...] identity and constituencies are lacking” (Abu-Nimer 2018, 9). That makes a lot of sense, because many politicians, policy-makers and NGOs want to maintain their secularity, their reputation and their adherence to the principles of a secular state, and at the same time the imams’ credibility should not be in question because of their engagement with policy-makers in CVE and PVE.

Sead Turcalo, Bosnia: The entire article resonates strongly with the way I am thinking about PVE and CVE activities, starting from the point that most of us, not just in the region but throughout the world, are still at this first stage (Abu-Nimer 2018, 3ff.). So even if we speak about PVE and CVE activities, we
are mostly just countering terrorism. In a way, the entire violent extremism issue has overshadowed peacebuilding processes for quite a few years. Another important point applicable to our region is a sort of instrumentalisation of religious communities, especially Islamic communities. They are not really brought into the process as actors; they are just like tools that are used in the process. What I found most impressive and important about the article is Abu-Nimer’s call for a change in the terminology used, so that we do not fall into the trap of “Islamising” all of the PVE activities. Most of these PVE or deradicalisation programmes that he mentions – I remember the programme from the United Kingdom (Abu-Nimer 2018, 5) but it is not the only one – fail because they are set up in a way that addresses just one community. Then this community is afraid of even taking part in this project because it feels oppressed and put on the spot, stigmatised. We really do have this securitisation of the entire process and we should bring it around to communal politics and local politics.

Nejra Veljan, Bosnia: What I liked the most, beyond including imams as peace actors and not only as ‘rhetorical weapons’, was the idea of including interreligious dialogue (Abu-Nimer 2018, 10), because the potential for violent extremism exists in all countries. It can be manifested in different forms, as a right wing or left wing extremism, separatism or religiously motivated extremism, but bloodshed and the scars are what it leaves on society. I think that the problem with radicalization and violent extremism is a global problem. In Bosnia, though, it is painted as this big threat that is coming from the Muslim community. For example, right-wing political rhetoric in the country keeps overblowing the alleged threat to Serbs and Croats (i.e. Christians), not only by Salafist, but by Muslims in general. I think interreligious dialogue would have a great influence, so you can tackle it from different sides.

Garentina Kraja, Kosovo: In one of his guidelines for interreligious programmes, Abu-Nimer mentions an institutional approach, so as not to create “star” imams who you “put on show” and instrumentalise (ibid.). However, the nuances within these institutions are left aside. I think the general assumption is that these institutions are homogeneous, yet we are finding that they are not. So you take an institutional approach, you want to involve ‘the Islamic community’ in the work, for example, of the peacebuilding programmes. But this Islamic community is not even a formed body that thinks the same way and acts the same way everywhere: one day they call for contributions to support the people in the Land of Sham,¹ and the next day, they ask the members of their community to distance themselves from these same people. People leave based on that first statement, they join Al-Musra initially and then IS, and then the next day, under pressure from various players, including state actors, those who have encouraged them have to withdraw their statement. I agree that we see the Islamic communities holding a lot of weight in our societies, especially through local imams – but I don't think we have a complete picture unless we account for the nuances inside these institutions. These are not homogeneous, top-down, ‘orderly’ institutions. Within these institutions, you have very different schools of thought, very different opinions about what an interreligious dialogue is, or how or what Muslims should or should not be like within a country.

Sead Turcalo: Yes, involvement of the Islamic community should definitely be tailored to specific countries and localities. For example, we have differences in the region: I know that the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina has a wider reach than is the case in other countries, because it never had the kind of corruption scandals that some of the others had. However, I also wanted to express concern that some of the things proposed are not feasible. We speak about state-building – Romario mentioned it – and it’s true that without state-building it’s very hard to implement peacebuilding initiatives. But on the other hand, starting from state-building is not a feasible idea in implementing any programmes in the region right now. We have been in state-building processes for 20 years. And we are not able to re-start the entire state-building process. We should actually take smaller steps and then, as Garentina mentioned, through many small steps build the institutional approach which in the end is needed to deal with the issue of violent extremism.

¹ The “Land of Sham” is a term which the Islamic Community in Kosovo uses to refer to Syria and Iraq (an Arabic notion for the Levant).
Sefer Selimi: I would say politicians, states and societies are somehow afraid of a scenario in which the religious communities were involved in every aspect of life, because they are often seen as elements that can be manipulated. Even I have a lot of suspicion regarding how much or at what point religious leaders should be involved in everyday life. I think there should be a clear distinction between the state and religious life.

Rudine Jakupi: In the case of Kosovo, we were talking about how the national strategy was drafted without the inclusion of the people on the ground, without having people express their opinions. You’re talking about religious communities, about youth, you’re talking about women – you are talking about a very local community, you’re talking about very small communities. But that’s what the national strategy in Kosovo is about. So how can you draft policies without including the people whom they are meant for? Without addressing their needs, without knowing what their needs are and what kind of problems their communities face? And whether we like it or not, religious communities are an important actor and factor in addressing violent extremism. Unless you include them in the discussion and in drafting policies that are meant for them, you won’t have sustainable solutions, in my opinion. That’s why the article really resonated with me. There is one box which says: “Asking Muslim leaders for a blessing or to issue a fatwa in support of a policy and not including them in policy-making is not community engagement.” (Abu-Nimer 2018, 15) I agree with that.

Sefer Selimi: Just to clarify, I totally agree with that. That’s why I emphasised what Abu-Nimer said: we need clear strategies and toolkits that show how to keep everybody’s credibility within a society. We should include them, but to what extent should be discussed.

Rudine Jakupi: I also wanted to talk about the role of international organisations. Abu-Nimer talks about it in the part about integration and the interreligious programmes, and he says that the international organisations have completely missed the point. And I have to agree with that as well. International organisations took a very Westernised perspective, especially in the Balkans, with the grants and the programmes that they structured. But when you have civil society organisations that rely on grants and look actively for donors, they write project proposals that actually fit what the international organisation is looking for. So even the projects implemented by the local CSOs don’t necessarily fit the local context and the needs of the communities.

The interesting point that Sefer also raises is that it has to be okay for both sides to want to keep their identities – so somebody who feels that secularism, or gender equality, or human rights standards are really important has to find their space to express that. That’s the tension, or the balance that is difficult to strike, because for some the fear may be that by bringing the faith-based organisations back in, they would have to give up what to them defines their identity.

Redion Qirjazi, Albania: I wanted to focus on inclusiveness (of imams, marginalised communities, etc.) and unpack that a bit. Yes, it is important to include the policy-makers at the different levels, or any other community leaders – they could be imams, they could be organisations or the new municipality – but I think this raises the question of strategy. And in my opinion, such a strategy should be very adaptive and multi-layered. Because not all problems are community problems, some are also policy-related and at the national level; that’s where you need the laws, and you need the general framework that enables community leaders to operate. At the same time, it is important that the structures and processes are well-defined, meaning who can contribute to what: what can imams, religious leaders do; what can schools do, what can organisations, CSOs do, all that. If we have that multi-layered approach to strategy, then it can be more effective: the state has its role, policy-makers are included in that part, they listen to the local problems, they transform them, they convert the policy so they get feedback, and so on.

Who would steer this type of strategy? Who would be the lead or the driver?

Redion Qirjazi: Again, the multi-layered approach also applies here. We do have to address the issue, which is violent extremism. And in our countries, we have a national coordinator for countering violent extremism.

extremism, and a national strategy. The problem with the national strategy3 is that it does not fit many of the issues that we are facing in our communities, from what I have seen so far. It is almost a 'copy and paste model'. I mean, it’s a great model, but it does not fit the context. Again, you need to unpack that and bring it to the local level. You need to have different layers, and basically any solution should be context-oriented. So it might be the national coordinator who coordinates the whole process, while being involved in local communities at the same time. In many cases, the reason why the coordinator is not particularly effective is that the institution does not have the ability to direct policy. It is not proactive, it is reactive. And it is reactive because, first, government does not set up any budget for it, and second, much of the steer comes from the international donors. Recently, they have been worried about the foreign fighters who are returning. So I am betting that in the next six months or year or so, there are going to be a lot of projects focusing on how we are going to deal with the returnees.

Garentina Kraja: Well I hope so, because I feel no one’s thinking about them...

Redion Qirjazi: Right, but what I am saying is that for certain countries that might not be a problem – for Montenegro, for example. However, they are going to be dealing with the same projects in Montenegro as, say, in Kosovo or Macedonia because that is what the donors are pushing. They’re setting the agenda.

Rrona Kamberi, Macedonia: I wanted to point out something else related to the imams. In Macedonia, based on my experiences and interviews, my dilemma is about the educational background of the imams in the country. My impression is that they do not focus strongly on the psychological and social fields in their education; they are more firmly trained in the spiritual. And I don’t know if they could offer the right ‘products’ to deal with these problems.

Nejra Veljan: We need to accept the fact that even though we are aiming to live in a much more democratic and secular society, not all of the people are aiming for that. A lot of the people who are turning to this form of radicalism are the ones who were searching for guidance in their lives, religious guidance because it is easier for them to be told how to behave and to be given all of the answers. It’s much easier to behave in a certain way and not think about the outcomes. So I think the imams, at the local level, can help a lot, because, for the vulnerable persons who are looking for guidance, imams from the Islamic Community can have a sustainable role in preventing them from searching answers from Youtube imams.

Rudine Jakupi: Or have the state offer an alternative, so you have two alternatives to choose from: increase critical thinking within your educational curricula, or offer some type of alternative that comes from the state as well, not only from the religious communities.

Garentina Kraja: There are two contradictions in the recommendations that Abu-Nimer makes (Abu-Nimer 2018, 16ff.). He talks about how we should not shy away from interreligious controversies, so when we are having an inter-faith dialogue, not to gloss over the differences, because this is usually what happens. It’s true, in every interreligious dialogue you have the stakeholders come out and talk about cultural harmony and co-existence and tolerance. So he says, do not gloss over the controversies. But then he emphasises that in these processes you need to adopt a “culture of peace”, a discourse of peace. So do we gloss over these differences, and sweep them under the carpet, for the higher goal of peace, or do we actually tackle them? He makes a similar argument when he is talking about the educational programmes, or the Quranic peace-makers and the schools in Chad and in Nigeria, I think, where he says it’s good to emphasise positive values of Islam, but steer clear of the theological debates. Can we do that, actually? I mean, that is almost like talking about peace in the abstract in our peacebuilding initiatives, in our state-building: talk about our common future together, but let’s not talk about the fact that different ethnic groups use veto powers to undermine the state … it kind of undermines the whole idea of open debate, so I am not sure how realistic a proposition that is if you have that contradiction built in.

Sead Turcalo: I would argue that we lack a legal culture and political culture in all of our societies and only when we have developed these cultures can we speak of a culture of peace. And some of the ideas
that Abu-Nimer proposes are not really feasible. First, the international community never learned from the region why our state-building processes produced fragile states and not consolidated, democratic states. It's because there has never been any sort of local ownership. And as for PVE programmes, it's good that they are in their infancy: maybe we could change them at some point so that more local ownership exists in these cases, that's one idea. Second, too much of the burden is placed on the shoulders of the Islamic community. The Islamic community – and Redion mentioned it – should have their role, but there are many points where some of these vulnerable groups are outside of the reach of the Islamic community. For example, most of the young converts to these radical ideas have just left high school, and when they leave high school they are out of reach for the Islamic community. That's the point where the rest of society and the state and the public institutions come into play, to offer some alternative. Finally, it is important, as Abu-Nimer highlights, that those who create policies and PVE programmes actually understand theories. Abu-Nimer speaks about realism, idealism (Abu-Nimer 2018, 14), and it's very important. I know that my students are sometimes bored when I speak about how important theories are, but they are really important. If you build a PVE programme only on this realist paradigm, you are just bringing in the security dimension. As he pointed out, peacebuilding activists are almost too eager to accept these types of programmes, even if they counter all of the ideas they promote in peacebuilding initiatives. These donor-directed programmes are not limited to the Western Balkans, it happens in many places: nobody in the US seems able to get any funds without describing peacebuilding initiatives in terms of countering violent extremism (Abu-Nimer 2018, 2). You see, the state is not doing anything to understand what the problems are.

Rudine Jakupi: I just wanted to add to what Sead was saying because, for me, that was one of the most interesting parts of the article. CVE just kind of restores security. For example, the referral mechanism in Kosovo is based on that idea, but the idealist would say it undermines basic human rights, because people feel like they are under constant surveillance. Which they are in a way. The aim of the referral mechanism is to identify people who are at risk. And how do you do that? You have indicators for what an individual at risk may look like, right? So you have people aiming at, in the worst case, girls who wear hijabs, for example, you have people aiming at boys with a long beard and short trousers, which then breaches their basic human rights. It's really a clash of theories in this case. And practitioners don't really see that, they don't really understand.

Theory and paradigms – in our discussion, we have also talked several times about how fraught terminology is. I wanted to invite you to share some of your thoughts about the kinds of terms that are applied in your countries and in the region. When might they become problematic?

Redion Qirjazi: Starting from the state institutions, they really see it from a very security-focused perspective. Just to mention one example, I was at a workshop with former foreign fighters in Kosovo in February, with members of the security services, intelligence services, the police and counter-terrorism force present. Their view of the issue is quite exclusively through a lens of (legal) deterrence: “he’s a terrorist”, “he’s an extremist”, that’s the terminology ... We were discussing what happens when this foreign fighter took a ten-year-old kid with him and the kid's still in Syria, and the answer was, “We’ll put him in jail”. A lot of the civil society people there asked: “What do you mean, he was 10 when he left, he is now 15, maybe...,” to which the response is: “Well, he is of age, so you can do that.” But when you go down to the local level, they are much more careful, they don't want to make it an “Islamic” issue because they know it has actually been leaning quite a lot in that direction. So they are much more careful in saying: we engage with different communities, religious communities, we have activities here and there. And then when you go talk to the religious leaders, they generally do have this fatigue with constantly being asked, having to explain, “Listen, this is not really the way of Islam”. So they try to push it away a little bit ...

What are other people’s thoughts?

Romario Shehu: Due to the numerous terrorist incidents, there is a growing number of people who prefer not to show that they are practising Muslims, because they want to avoid possible prejudices. This was reflected in our focus groups; when I invited some practising Muslim to participate in our focus group with Muslim practitioners, they asked me not to invite them because they did not want others to take note that they were
practising Muslims. This is a common reaction and it mainly derives from the fear of being stereotyped by state or society. There is another problem to be mentioned, and that is the national security services’ approach toward the families of foreign terrorist fighters [FTFs]. During our interview with a representative of the Muslim Community of Albania [MCA], he told us the story of a father in Pogradec (one of the three cities in Albania with the highest number of FTFs) whose son travelled to Syria. This father was under constant surveillance by the security services and that was detrimental to his mental health. He asked the MCA representative to talk to the security services and tell them he has no contacts with his son, so they would leave him alone. He said, “I’m suffering because my son is not here. Please tell them to not make it harder for me. If they do not have information about him, how can I?” Our interviewee said that after a couple of months this father passed away as a result of depression. So it is very important for the security services to apply a better approach when dealing with the families of FTFs. Pressuring them does not solve the problem; it just makes matters worse.

Nejra Veljan: The problem that I have is with the media and how they portray this problem. Sensationalist reporting about the foreign fighters and on alleged terrorist threats in BiH really make it much more difficult to do field research. It is an overly politicized question, and the other two main parties (Bosnian Croatian and Bosnian Serbian) want to portray it as a „Muslim problem“. Recently a leading Bosnian Croat politician sent a letter to all NATO countries where he raised his concerns about the foreign fighters and Islamic radicalism, however when it comes to ethnic-national radicalism which stems from the leading political parties – there are no mentions anywhere. That is just one issue, where the media presents „Islamic radicalism“ as the only problem.

Garentina Kraja: In the article, Abu-Nimer says that you should use faith language for the CVE/PVE programmes. I disagree with that. I think it is part of the problem if you start to lace the language of the programmes and the projects in the community with the religious. We’re from secular states, all of us here, so you would already be making an assumption that the people who these programmes are directed at are religious people. However, if our interviews with foreign fighters are a guide, they are recent converts who have only scratched the surface. I mean, they may call themselves religious but they are not religious most of the time. Then what the people who are going to write these projects will actually end up doing is calling foreign fighters “jihadists”, and with that you are actually helping their cause. This is what media called them in Kosovo, this is what policy-makers called them in Kosovo, “jihadists”, this is what they want to call themselves – when in fact, they are no more than terrorist fighters, and I am talking specifically about people who have joined IS in this case. So why afford them this credibility?

Sead Turcalo: First, I agree with what Garentina said: I also disagree with the use of faith-based terminology in these programmes, for similar reasons. The first is the lack of knowledge on the part of the people who write these programmes and the fact that it is just putting on the “label” of one of the religions. And for a few weeks now, I have also been thinking about changing many of the terms I have been using in my writing. For example, I talked about “radical norms” instead of “radical interpretations of Islam”.

**Could you explain the difference?**

Sead Turcalo: These are norms that are not the mainstream in a community. In the case of Islam as a religion, there are even hadiths, sayings of the Prophet, stating “nobody of my umma will be wrong if he agrees to the majority” – and by majority he meant the majority at one location and one time. And that’s it: people we call ‘radicals’ don't really agree with the majority views, and we can call them adherents to radical norms. Then we have ‘neutralised’ this problematic way of understanding what ‘radical’ is. It does not always have to do with really religious people, as Garentina mentioned: these people are really young, they are converts, they don’t really know anything, not one of them ... I have this group of 40 people who follow a radical Salafi preacher, and he made it possible for me to ask them why they turned to these radical norms. None of them has ever before visited a maktab... they had no idea about Islam, about the religion. They only know about the form: how to perform the daily prayers. They are just attending intensive courses,

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“Maktab” is an Arabic word meaning elementary school, primarily used for teaching children in reading, writing, grammar and Islamic studies such Quranic recitation, as well as other practical and theoretical subjects.
and so “Islamic” anything – that’s the wrong term. What’s actually needed is to invent new terms. We can keep words like radicalisation and violent extremism, but we may have to use “ISIL-inspired” ideology rather than “Islamic” ideology. This way, we open the space to differentiate from other types or varieties of radicalism, radicalisation and violent extremism, and to ‘free’ the terms from being equated to Islam. That’s something that’s really important and this article’s contribution, and our own, could be to start a discussion about re-inventing the terms used in preparing and making policies in PVE and CVE.

One of the most interesting concepts that has struck me in your previous work is the idea of “reciprocal extremism”. I think that also goes some way to debunking the equation between Islamic faith and extremism. Could you just very briefly for the readers of this dialogue put into words what this means in the Western Balkans and how it actually adds to the dynamic, and to our analysis and understanding of the problem?

Sefer Selimi: In Macedonia, for instance, we are dealing with three different extremisms, I would say. We have both Albanian and Macedonian national extremism, and we have the radical – how did you say it, Sead – the radical religious norms. We see that especially in terms of narratives, they thrive on the opposite extremism.

Rudine Jakupi: I have been following extremist groups in Telegram, and what they post is very interesting. We have, I think, three extremist lines of thinking in Kosovo as well: the radical religious norms or the religious extremists, then we have the secular extremists, and then we have the national extremists – and all of them feed into each other. The ‘best’ ones at using this type of propaganda to their advantage are the religious extremists. For example, online or in Telegram, on Kosovo’s independence day, they posted a picture of the north of Mitrovica, where Serbian ethnic groups had put out big Serbian flags everywhere in the streets and had written “Kosovo is Serbia” and all of that. And so they posted that picture and wrote, “See what the Serbs are doing to us Muslim Albanians”. They use the narrative of these national extremists for their propaganda purposes (“they are discriminating against us”, “this is what they call us”, “they are calling us all terrorists, all violent extremists”, and so on), to sort of offer a sense of belonging and community to the others who are more vulnerable, offering a very simple narrative. It’s either “us” or “them” – but this doesn’t only happen to “us as Albanians”, it is not that simple; it is “us as Muslims, then Albanians”, so it is as though we are being attacked by two groups: by the Serbs and by Albanians who are secular – they use this dynamic very well.

Sefer Selimi: Exactly, and the same is used by the other groups. They attack both of the opposite groups to deepen the divide. And lately, we have also seen a rise of Orthodox extremism in Macedonia.

Garentina Kraja: Throughout the Balkans!

Sead Turcalo: What we must not forget here is that these radical religious norms emerged from an enormous political radicalisation in the region, which actually escalated in our country – at least in Bosnia and in Kosovo – into war. That’s how all of this reciprocal or cumulative radicalisation actually was and is fed. Just a small detail how it works: recently, we had a story about a radical Serbian group Srpska Cast (“Serb Honour”). Everywhere, they posted photos from training camps, etc. A few days afterwards, one of the Salafi groups posted their video about a camp where they actually train children – not in military skills, they are taught about Salafist thinking – with men with long beards in the background and so on. That’s how it actually happens. And it happens constantly, all the time.

Nejra Veljan: And people are fed with this kind of information all the time.

Can you tackle extremism in any form when you just focus on one?

Nejra Veljan: No. Violent extremism is not – and has never been — limited to one set of political views or ideologies.

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5 Telegram is an instant messaging service.
You always have to focus on the dynamic between them?

Nejra Veljan: Yes. We will always have a problem with some forms of radicalism, but it is up to stakeholders, together with society to make the process of deradicalisation sustainable. If you focus only on one form of extremism, when is obvious that some other forms of extremism are much more serious security threat, that in itself can be one of the drivers of radicalisation.

References


About the interviewees

Rudine Jakupi is a researcher with the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies. She holds a Master’s in International and European Relations from Linköping University, Sweden. Her research interests include countering violent extremism and radicalisation, human rights, gender and security.

Maral Jekta is a Research Associate with the Berlin-based organisation ufuq e.V, and works in the project “Bildmachen”, an online prevention project focused on civic and media education. Prior to joining ufuq.de, she worked as a Project Director for Media in Cooperation and Transition (MICT), a German media development NGO working on the interplay between conflict, media coverage and reconciliation in crisis regions. In this role, Maral Jekta has gained extensive work and field experience in the MENA region with a focus on strengthening conflict-sensitive and impartial reporting in Iraq to counterbalance propaganda. Her current research areas include the role of narratives in radicalisation processes and anti-discrimination work in education. Maral holds a degree in Philosophy and German Studies. She co-authored the study In Defense of the Iraqi Media: Between Fueling Conflict and Healthy Pluralism (2017).

Rrona Kamberi is a researcher at Democracy Lab, Macedonia. She holds a BSc in Business Informatics from South East European University (SEEU) and is currently pursuing her MBA.

Garentina Kraja is a researcher, policy consultant and lecturer. She served as foreign policy and security adviser to Kosovo’s President Atifete Jahjaga from 2011 to 2016. Previously, she worked as the Associated Press correspondent in Kosovo from 2000 to 2007. She graduated cum laude with BA and MA degrees in political science from Yale University.

Redion Qirjazi is a researcher at the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) in Albania. Previously, he was an officer in the Albanian Army for over seven years, a cultural negotiator on behalf of NATO teams, and leader in various security and development projects, as well as working in various other roles. His research focuses on national security, defence, terrorism, conflict resolution, violent extremism, Western Balkans and development at both the strategic and operational level.

Sefer Selimi is the Founder and CEO of Democracy Lab, Macedonia. He holds a BA in Business Administration from South East European University (SEEU) and a MSc in Diplomacy and International Relations from the International University of Struga. He is a 2016 alumnus of the Community Solutions Program, a U.S. Department of State leadership programme implemented by IREX.

Romario Shehu is a junior researcher and project assistant at the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) in Albania. He has a BA degree in Political Science and International Relations and is completing his MSc degree in International Relations. His main areas of research interest are security issues and EU Integration.

Sead Turcalo is a Senior Associate at Atlantic Initiative and an Assistant Professor and Vice Dean for Research in the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Sarajevo, where he received his PhD in Security Studies. He lectures on geopolitics, international security and international conflict management, and also researches state-building and international security issues.

Nejra Veljan is a legal researcher and advisor with Atlantic Initiative, Bosnia and Herzegovina. She has a Bachelor of Law degree, a Master’s in Criminal Law (LL.M) and a Master’s from the Faculty of Criminal Science (MA Security Studies) at the University of Sarajevo. Her focus is on gender-based crimes, radicalisation and violent extremism.