Towards a Unified Methodology: Reframing PCIA

Manuela Leonhardt

The debate between Mark Hoffman and Kenneth Bush has brought up a range of issues regarding the politics and practicalities of PCIA, which to date have not yet been comprehensively discussed. Instead of rephrasing the exchange, I will briefly introduce five issues with extensive reference to Bush’s and Hoffman’s work.

First, the debate on PCIA should give greater consideration to the needs of aid agencies, particularly as their interest in reflection and institutional learning has largely been overlooked. Second, generic peacebuilding frameworks for evaluation are likely to be flawed due to the variety of conflict situations, peacebuilding approaches and processes. Third, PCIA has not yet developed convincing approaches to tackle the issues of causality and attribution, which constitute the main reservation of the PCIA sceptics. Fourth, the PCIA methodology is not empowering in itself but has a critical potential that should be pursued. Finally, to assess its potential, PCIA must be placed in the wider context of instruments that aid agencies use for mainstreaming peacebuilding.

Much of the unease expressed by both Hoffman and Bush concerning the present state-of-the-play in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) can be attributed to the lack of consensus in the field about the purposes and ownership of the approach. As long as these are not clarified, there remains much scope for complaints about the lack of conceptual coherence or worries about the appropriation, alienation and distortion of the original idea. What, then, is the practical usage of PCIA? Who should, and moreover who is actually employing it?

Hoffman’s article represents the quest for a unified theory and practice of PCIA: a single methodology that serves the needs of “donors, implementing agencies and end-users” (Hoffman, in this volume, p. 13). Hence, he identifies partiality as the major shortcoming of the IDRC, INTRAC/DFID and ARIA approaches. In this view, DFID’s strategic conflict assessment runs the risk of focusing too much on the macro-context of conflict, thus only being of use for donors. Rothman and Ross’ action evaluation approach remains too much tied to the
effects of a single NGO activity (e.g. a conflict resolution workshop). This call for a theoretically sound, universally applicable methodology for assessing and evaluating the conflict impact of development interventions does certainly have its merits. Such a methodology would go some way towards basic scientific tenets such as intersubjectivity, compatibility between different locations and types of projects, and perhaps a better chance to systematically accumulate knowledge. I wonder, however, whether such a project is realistic. Despite Hoffman’s valid observations on the above-mentioned approaches, they neglect the fact that the respective methodologies were developed with and for specific end-users. His detailed analysis shows very clearly just how much the three approaches have been tailed towards the specific interests and ways of working of donors (INTRAC), implementing agencies (IDRC) and civil society organisations (ARIA). Are they therefore less valid? Is this not rather a necessary step for making PCIA attractive and applicable for its intended users?

Who are the intended users? Kenneth Bush, who was one of the first to promote the idea of conflict impact assessment, claims that PCIA originally was meant to be an emancipatory tool for Southerners, which was subsequently appropriated by donors and their entourage of NGOs hoping to gain money and reputation by taking up a promising idea. He even describes this as the “mechanistic, Northern” quest for mainstreamable products replacing and obfuscating the original “organic, Southern learning process” (Bush, in this volume, p. 39) upon which PCIA was based. I do not want to comment on the question of whether a paper prepared for an OECD/DAC committee is not also part of the mechanistic, Northern processes. I myself still recall the period when these questions of PCIA ownership were a real issue. With the increasing differentiation and sophistication of the field, luckily, this made way for more open and cooperative approaches. Yet Bush’s issue remains: Who should be using PCIA, and what are the implications? As it is so eminently mainstreamable into the tool-oriented logic of donors and many implementing agencies, there is a justifiable worry that it will become a fig leaf for agencies that in the end are not prepared to change any of their basic ways of operation.

I suggest an empirical approach to answering this question. It is good development practice to start any type of activity with a needs assessment among the intended beneficiaries. In the course of these assessments, it often becomes evident that there are different stakeholder groups, who all have their own set of interests and needs. A good agency will customise its products and services according to the specific needs of each group. Who are then the actual users of PCIA? What are their expectations and purposes? Let us first look at the methodologies that agencies have developed over the last years called
PCIA (CIDA/IDRC), Conflict Impact Assessment Systems (CIAS) (Reychler & EC), peace and conflict analysis (Oxfam), conflict prognosis (Clingendael), conflict vulnerability analysis (USAID), strategic conflict assessment (DFID), benefit-harms analysis (CARE), and Do No Harm (LCPP) among others.

What all these approaches have in common is the idea of providing non-specialist donors, aid agencies and local organisations with accurate, yet user-friendly methodologies to integrate a conflict perspective into the planning, monitoring and management of development and humanitarian assistance in the context of armed conflict. Many of them have been tailor-made or customised from more general approaches (usually the Do No Harm framework) to the specific information needs and ways of operation of the particular agency. In general, donors are more interested in countrywide, strategic approaches, while international and local implementing agencies require methodologies allowing a more fine-grained, situation-specific analysis. The closer to the grassroots, the more participatory elements are usually included. Lastly, the term “impact assessment” is actually misleading. Most of the tools mentioned above are not about projecting programme impact on conflict or about evaluation, but support country or project-level conflict analysis and strategic planning. Impact assessment, monitoring and evaluation tools are still the minority. This may be partly due to the conceptual difficulties linked to evaluating peacebuilding, but probably more to organisational cultures that emphasise doing over reflection and learning.

The following table provides an overview of the different levels and purposes of PCIA tools to date:

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<th>Planning</th>
<th>Monitoring/Evaluation</th>
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<td><strong>Country level</strong></td>
<td>DFID, EC, USAID,</td>
<td>CIDA, Clingendael</td>
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<td><strong>Programme/Project level</strong></td>
<td>Oxfam, CARE, GTZ,</td>
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We can still go a step beyond the simple distinction between conflict analysis/planning, monitoring/evaluation and advocacy purposes. By focusing on the area of evaluation, which is the central topic in this
debate, we can explore stakeholder interests in evaluation in even more detail. In general, there are four basic functions of evaluation: control and legitimisation (by demanding or demonstrating visible impact), marketing (by showing success), project/process management (on the basis of new information and reflection), and institutional learning (enhancing effectiveness by learning from experience). Each of these functions has different methodological implications.

Donors’ primary interest is with conflict analysis and strategy at the country level. Where they make a serious commitment to conflict prevention, donors want to know how to manage their aid programmes in order to maximize their positive influence on the conflict. This also includes evaluative studies about the performance of the present programme and project portfolio. Towards the implementing agencies, donors need to know whether taxpayers’ money has been spent effectively and efficiently. Therefore, their interest focuses on output and impact orientated legitimisation (and control). Institutional learning, which is reflecting on the lessons learned from particular programmes, is undertaken on a irregular basis.

Implementing agencies and their partners are also interested in demonstrating impact for the sake of legitimating and marketing their activities. Yet they also know that on the ground things are often not so clear-cut. Changes tend to be more qualitative than quantitative, effect attitudes and relations rather than concrete structures, and usually bear fruits only in the long-term. Therefore, their focus usually concerns process management and institutional learning: Agencies require information for the conflict-sensitive day-to-day management of their projects as well as for critical feedback and reflection. In this regard, evaluation is expected to provide the space to step out of the daily routines and reflect on the own reaction to the evolving conflict situation. This can serve as a basis for improving future work (learning).

For civil society organisations and affected communities, evaluation can represent an opportunity to provide critical feedback on the agency's work in the region both in terms of process and impact. It can also provide the basis for advocacy initiatives targeted at decision-makers in their own country and abroad.

From this brief overview, I would conclude that the debate on PCIA so far has focused too much on issues of legitimisation/impact at the expense of process management and institutional learning on working in conflict situations, which are of greater interest to many agencies.
No evaluation methodology can do without a clear set of parameters that allows for the structuring and assessment of the multiple elements of local reality. If it refrains from setting these parameters beforehand, the methodology should at least contain a process for reaching an agreement on these parameters. For PCIA, this means that we need a peacebuilding framework that aids us to operationalise peace and conflict impact and the tracing of the peacebuilding process. This is one of Hoffman’s major points. His prophecy is that if PCIA cannot provide a series of widely applicable evaluation criteria and indicators, it will have no chance to establish itself in the toolboxes of development agencies (Hoffman, in this volume, p. 34). Although this may be true, I nevertheless wish to give three reasons why the development of such a generic peacebuilding framework seems unrealistic at the moment. These are: the contested role of aid agencies in peacebuilding, the contested nature of peace itself, differing ‘theories of action’, and the dynamics of the peacebuilding process itself.

II. Towards a Unified Framework for Evaluation

II.1 What can be the role of aid agencies in peacebuilding?

In order to set evaluation criteria and indicators, agencies need to be clear about what they want and realistically can achieve. Yet the debate on these issues has just started. First of all, there is the question of the role of aid agencies in conflict situations. In various contributions, Jonathan Goodhand and others have framed this debate as the question of whether agencies should try working in or on conflict (see Goodhand & Lewer 2001). Working in conflict signifies that development and humanitarian organisations retain their original mandate, but take care to deliver their services in ways that do not further exacerbate the conflict. When agencies work on conflict, they broaden their mandate to address political and conflict issues, thereby consciously compromising humanitarian principles such as neutrality and the priority of saving lives and livelihoods. Even if these positions rarely exist in their pure form, aid agencies need to take decisions about how far they are prepared to go in their political engagement. Do they want to limit themselves to “do no harm”, work on structural conflict issues, empower peace constituencies, engage in mediation and Track II diplomacy, or dedicate themselves to international advocacy on the conflict? Each choice will have implications for the scope of the evaluation, the evaluation criteria and the evaluation process itself.

The next question concerns the definition of peacebuilding. The challenge is to translate terms such as “conflict-sensitivity”, “avoiding negative impact” and “promoting positive peace” into agencies’
strategies and practice. Recently (2001), George Wachira of the Nairobi Peace Initiative outlined the dilemma of his organisation towards donors: some donors expected from their investment a demonstrable contribution to the cessation of conflict or violence. NPI themselves, however, understood peacebuilding as “qualitative, liberating and humanizing change” (Wachira 2001, p. 5) that involved empowering people “to fully engage with and understand better all aspects of social, economic and political structures that give rise to violence and how they could be changed” (Wachira 2001, p. 5). Both positions involve very different evaluation criteria and time-frames. These are certainly two extreme views with much ground to cover in-between. The example shows, however, that there are not only different ways to define peacebuilding, but that stakeholders to the same initiative may hold widely varying expectations and approaches to it. Therefore, part of the PCIA process should involve bringing these expectations into the open and help stakeholders to find a shared approach.

This does not yet exhaust the issue of peacebuilding. Agencies operate within a highly politicised environment, in which the conflict parties will have differing opinions of the type of peace they wish for the future. While, for example, the conservative elite of the country may regard peace as the successful ‘pacification’ of the rebel areas, the uprising peasant groups may expect major political and economic reforms from the peace process. An aid agency seeking to become involved in conflict resolution and peacebuilding work will not be able to avoid finding its own position within this debate. Impartiality is rarely an option. The agency’s position will be largely determined by its own values and mandate, which therefore should be clearly articulated and understood among staff and other stakeholders.

II.2 How does the agency want to engage in peacebuilding? What are the explicit or implicit theories of action?

Aid agencies, their partners and other stakeholders hold specific views on how they can bring about change to the conflict situation. These theories of action are usually implicit rather than explicit, but, as Hoffman (in this volume, p. 34) notes, they strongly influence indicators of process and success. Just to illustrate the variety of approaches one can find, I will here give three examples: root causes, attitudes and relations, and political economy.

The root causes approach is based on the assumption that people fight because they have suffered material and political grievances. These usually include socio-economic inequality, cultural discrimination, marginalisation, lack of political participation and also
general poverty. The idea is that conflicts will end when these root causes are addressed or people are empowered to address them in non-violent ways. This approach is sometimes associated with the notion of *just war* and an emphasis on the transformative powers of conflict. The favoured instruments are development aid, political and economic reform, and different forms of political advocacy.

The second approach focuses on individuals, their attitudes and relations. It assumes that violence occurs when relationships have been disturbed by prejudice, past experience and lack of communication. Consequently, building trust, enhancing personal relations and fostering communication between the conflict protagonists is considered priority. Popular methods are active mediation and facilitation, problem-solving workshops, dialogue programmes, joint study trips, media work and joint action projects.

A recent newcomer is the *political economy approach* (LeBillon et al. 2000), which highlights the factors prolonging the violence. Inspired by the *greed and grievance* debate, it tries to affect the incentive systems, which motivate politicians, warlords and others to continue with the war effort against the objective interest of their group as a whole. Methods to achieve this range from supporting internal opposition to the war and cutting the arms supply to changing international trade regimes such as the case of the ‘blood diamonds’.

It is clear that each of these approaches have different criteria of progress or even success. Therefore, a good evaluation process should try to elicit the often unconscious, underlying assumptions or theories of action from the participants in order to generate shared indicators.

### II.3 What are the characteristics of the peacebuilding process? What does this mean for evaluation?

Peacebuilding is not the same as building wells or equipping hospitals. Peacebuilding is always long-term! It is about building trust and relationships, about hope and empowerment, about incremental change, about discovery, unpredictability, flexibility and serendipity. Faced with the adversities of many short-term setbacks, peacebuilding still maintains the hope of having a positive impact in the long-term. Certainly, it is not a linear process that external Track II and III actors can influence to any large degree. There are times when it may even be more important to sustain the process than to prematurely insist on concrete results. All this moves against conventional project management logic, which assumes a clear hierarchy of goals, a
demonstrable relationship between inputs and outputs, and a defined timetable. It also challenges traditional evaluation with its relatively short-term timeframes and search for 'objectively verifiable indicators'. There are no simple solutions to this issue. Peacebuilding frameworks, however, should be able to make a clear distinction between short-term, mid-term and long-term impact, allowing for a set of indicators that is evolving with the intervention, and pay particular attention to the dynamics of the process itself.

**Box 1: Principles of Good Process Design**

1. Good process requires careful thought, consultation and planning.
2. Good process asks “Who should be involved?” not “What are we going to do?”
3. Good process calls for joint information gathering, joint education and joint problem definition.
4. Good process is conducted under auspices acceptable to all.
5. Good process involves key parties (or their representatives) not only in the process of negotiation and decision-making but also in the design of the process itself.
6. Good process offers more than one kind of forum for those people affected to express and evaluate problem-solving options.
7. Good process maintains trust through careful reporting back to the people affected.

Source: Ron Kraybill 2001

How do we recognize good process, and how can process be integrated into a peacebuilding framework? Here, we can learn from the experience of many dedicated peacebuilding organisations, which have engaged in reflecting on their own practice in the last years (see Galama & van Tongeren 2001).

**III. Causality and Attribution**

Both Hoffman’s and Bush’s contributions to the methodological PCIA debate focus on the issues of evaluation criteria and indicators as well as, importantly, on the role of the context in shaping particular impacts. They fail, however, to address the main reservation of many PCIA sceptics: the difficulty of establishing and attributing the peace and conflict impact. Indeed, most recent evaluations of peacebuilding initiatives do not only conclude that their impact was relatively small; they also stress the hypothetical nature of this conclusion (see Goodhand 2000, Lund et al. 2001). Due to the importance of this
argument, it is worth examining it in more detail and briefly reviewing
the major responses evaluation science has been able to provide.

PCIA methodologies need to be able to answer (most of) the
following questions:

1. How to relate individual peacebuilding projects to the wider
   conflict context? What are the appropriate levels of evaluation?
   What are the micro-macro linkages?
2. How to attribute observable changes in the conflict situation to
   third-party interventions?
3. How to monitor the unintended, positive and negative, effects
   of the intervention?

*How to relate individual peacebuilding projects to the wider conflict context?* The equation peacebuilding = reduced violence raises expectations that by far exceed the actual potential of a single initiative. This lesson has already been learned in other sectors: no development project would nowadays claim to be able to prevent desertification, change gender relations or reduce poverty in a country. Similarly, we need to develop a sense of proportion in the peacebuilding field. Projects can only be evaluated for what is realistically possible to achieve given their resources, scope and level of intervention. For this, it helps breaking the conflict down in its different dimensions, levels, issues and actors as well as identifying actors and capacities promoting peace. Then it is possible to separately examine the initiative’s short-term and long-term impact on them. An even more demanding problem is to piece the micro-impacts of various initiatives together and trace their synergetic effects on macro changes.

*How to attribute observable changes in the conflict situation to third-party interventions?* Conflicts change over time. General factors influencing the course of conflict include geopolitical dynamics, regional and global market forces, changing perceptions and priorities among the main conflict sponsors, pressure from inside the conflicting groups, economic and physical exhaustion among many others. The methodological challenge consists in establishing plausible linkages between particular changes in the conflict situation, general factors and particular third-party interventions. Then, it is necessary to ascertain how far these interventions were decisive in the light of other conditions that may have facilitated the change. A critical problem here is the lack of counterfactual: We do not know what would have happened without the intervention.

*How to monitor unintended, positive and negative, effects?* Lastly, there is the issue of unintended impacts. Conventional monitoring methods
are geared towards tracking an intervention’s impact according to its original objectives. For this purpose, they compare the intended objectives such as laid out in the logical framework with a set of indicators designed to measure their achievement. Yet in conflict situations, it is equally important to be aware of and monitor the unintended and sometimes negative consequences of one’s work. These consequences are often more the result of the details of the project organisation and its way of operation than its actual activities. To monitor unintended impact, it is important to clarify what types of impact should be looked for, where they may be found and how far should be the scope of the analysis. The Logframe is of little help in this regard. A comprehensive stakeholder analysis, openness and sensitivity to the unexpected seem to be more promising approaches.

**Approaches to evaluating peacebuilding**

Drawing on the work of Michael Lund (2000, 2001) and others, there are a number of ways for dealing with these challenges. None of them will provide a final answer, but applying them in combination certainly improves results.

*Sequential analysis* is a way of addressing the problem of attribution. It consists in analysing the temporal relationship between an intervention x (e.g. a high-level seminar on a particular conflict issue organised by a foreign think tank) and an event y with importance for the course of the conflict (e.g. adoption of progressive legislation concerning this issue). The aim is to find out whether the intervention had any effect on this, and if yes, how it happened. For this purpose, sequential analysis further looks for alternative explanations and examines the particular circumstances, which allowed x to have certain effects (e.g. high donor pressure for political reform). It refrains, however, from stating that y happened because of x.

The *matching method* involves “comparing the types and scope of the intervention responses that are applied to a conflict to the various kinds of causes and peace capabilities that have been identified in the diagnosis of the conflict” (Lund 2000, p. 81). As such, it tries to establish a relationship between individual initiatives at the micro-level and the broad conflict issues at the macro-level. Matching “needs” and “responses” with each other allows conclusions to be drawn on the relevance and potential of single projects, probe for possible synergies and identify areas, which have so far been neglected by the international response.
Meanings and perceptions: sometimes, it is more important to know how people explain an event than what actually caused it. This often happens in conflict situations where information sources are unreliable and even insiders tend to act on partial information only. Therefore, if ordinary people, rebel leaders or politicians believe that something occurred because of a certain intervention, this intervention may have already been effective, even if the real causes of the event can possibly never be established. Local people's perceptions are also important to double-check one's own assumptions about certain conflict dynamics.

Logical plausibility: applying the principles of logical plausibility and comparing with previous experience allows the formulation of hypotheses about the impact of certain initiatives. This method is widely used among development practitioners under the headings of the problem-tree or flow-diagram. It is indispensable, however, to double-check these hypotheses with more empirical methods.

I now wish to address Bush’s issue of whether a methodology itself can be empowering. Bush (in this volume, p. 43) eloquently demonstrates that politics is rarely made on the basis of the best available information only and is even less orientated towards some rational (peacebuilding) logic. “Methodology is perforated by politics” says Bush (in this volume, p. 45). Yet he maintains that there is an emancipatory potential in the PCIA approach that needs to be defended.

These words strongly remind me of the discussion on the PRA (participatory rural appraisal) methodologies. In the 1980s, still called RRA (rapid rural appraisal), they were marketed to development agencies as a more accurate and cost-effective way of data collection than the then prevailing large-scale surveys. More and more, however, the emphasis shifted from this traditional top-down data collection logic towards empowering communities to take their own decisions on important development issues. PRA methodologies were meant to rationalise this decision-making process, to make it more open, inclusive, transparent and based on objective evidence collected by the participants themselves. The assumption was that this would lead to pro-poor community decisions, who under PRA conditions were expected to set aside their usual family, clan, political and other allegiances.
There is no doubt that PRA has revolutionised development practice in many areas and led to major improvements. However, there are also clear shortcomings. We know very little about the community processes, which really determine the outcome of a PRA planning session, particularly how far the traditional elites find ways of protecting their own interests. Development agencies regret that the result of a five-day exercise occupying various staff and 20-40 villagers is often a rather unspecified ‘shopping list’ of improvements to village life. To avoid this, some agencies have begun to offer villagers a menu of the options or services they are able to provide. Yet this leaves the whole exercise as a ritual to choose between goat and chicken projects. Are the results of this really the empowerment of communities and further providing them with real choices? The most important argument, however, is that the best PRA cannot replace real democracy in a country where it does not exist. Only institutionalized and living structures of political participation and democratic control give people a chance to influence decisions affecting their lives.

What does this mean for PCIA? I do not wish to deny the empowering potential of a methodology, but rather to sharpen our view to the circumstances under which it is applied. To remain with the example above, PRA could be empowering in the hands of a democratically elected local government as a way to prepare a decision on the location of communal infrastructure. Equally, PCIA could be empowering if it offers people living in conflict with the chance to voice their concerns on the conflict impact of certain development plans and jointly develop alternatives. In this sense, it can even become an exercise in local conflict resolution. However, the conditions under which PCIA is usually applied are all the more trying than the usual PRA experience. Conflicts break apart communities and impose silences as people will rarely dare to openly oppose those carrying the weapons. Consequently, I regard the empowering potential of PCIA under the conditions of conflict as rather low.

Having said this, we nevertheless need to safeguard the critical potential of PCIA. Section two showed that PCIA tools are mostly used for those types of top-down planning, management and control processes that are still common within most international assistance efforts. In such a context, we cannot expect revolutionising insights. Yet PCIA does provide an opportunity to promote reflection as well as strategic thinking regarding the conflict issues that agencies face in their daily work in war-torn countries. In the long-run, this may lead to changes in institutional practice and structures. Beyond this, many possibilities still remain unexplored. More could be done, for example, to hand over PCIA to civil society organisations, particularly those from the South, as a part of capacity building in management and advocacy.
We do need more independent voices, who critically accompany the policies and practices of their own governments as well as those of donors in terms of their impact on conflict. We also need more channels for communicating these messages and ways of making them reverberate in policy-making circles.

Bush expresses strong misgivings about what he calls the “commodification” of PCIA and its mainstreaming into conventional development assistance. He worries that in the hand of development administrations PCIA could be reduced to another technocratic exercise in box-checking. This will not only have little impact on the way aid is delivered, but also dangerously depoliticise conflict prevention. Although I sympathise with Bush’s concerns, I suggest putting PCIA into the wider picture of introducing a conflict perspective into development assistance. If we see it as only one of several instruments available for mainstreaming conflict prevention, Bush’s doubts about possible distortions lose some of their relevance. To my mind, it is more pertinent to ask questions of how agencies define their role in conflict situations and how far they are able and willing to implement a coherent and effective set of measures to establish conflict-sensitive policies within the organisation.

Jonathan Goodhand and Nick Lewer (forthcoming) have shown a number of reasons why agencies should be cautious of unquestioningly adopting the peacebuilding agenda. They range from the risk of compromising the humanitarian space through openly political agendas to avoiding instrumentalisation and becoming a fig-leaf for political inaction. Yet while it is critical for development organisations to maintain their own political analysis, the current emphasis on conflict prevention and peacebuilding also offers an opportunity to introduce real improvements in the way aid is provided in conflict situations. How far agencies will decide to work in or on conflict then depends on the values, mandate and political judgement of the individual organisation.

What are the skills and capacities required for mainstreaming peacebuilding? They include policies, institutional structures, training and capacity building, tools, analysis and learning, and actual programmes or projects (see CPN 2001). A comprehensive approach to mainstreaming would involve: formulating a peacebuilding policy; creating institutional structures such as conflict advisors, task forces or exchange programmes to sustain the policy; providing training in conflict analysis and conflict management to staff and partners; developing and using analytical and learning tools such as PCIA; and, last but not least, actually implementing programmes and projects with
an explicit peacebuilding focus as well as demonstrating the consideration of conflict issues in a large number of 'conventional' initiatives. In addition, such activities should not only include the different levels within the agency (especially headquarters and field staff), but also its donors, partners and beneficiaries. PCIA is only one step in this direction.