Evaluation of the Mediation Support Unit Standby Team of Mediation Experts

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Standby Team of Mediation Experts

Final Report

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Executive Summary

In April 2009, the UN Secretary General underlined the centrality of the UN in providing mediation and mediation support in his report on enhancing mediation and its support activities. The Mediation Support Unit (MSU) within the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) serves as a central pillar to enhance and guide mediation efforts.

Background of the MSU SBT

The Mediation Support Unit (MSU) Standby Team of Mediation Experts (SBT) project was established in April 2007. The project was originally solely funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and based upon a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the United Nations and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). In the second year of the project, the European Commission also provided financial support to the team.

The Standby Team of Mediation Experts is a specialised resource which can be rapidly deployed to the field upon a temporary basis in order to provide technical advice to UN officials and others leading mediation and conflict prevention efforts. The SBT is managed by both the UN MSU and the NRC to allow for flexible and rapid deployment, as well as to provide a degree of autonomy to the experts. SBT members are contracted full-time for a period of 12 months, thus at disposal fully and at all times, and on standby to be deployed within 72 hours for up to one month (renewable) to a specific location.

Purpose and Methodology of the Evaluation

NRC initiated the external evaluation in consultation with MSU. After a tender was published in summer 2010, Dr Oliver Wils (Berghof Peace Support) and Dr Antje Herrberg (MediatEuR) were chosen for this task.

The evaluation aimed at contributing to the improvement of mediation support services through taking stock of the lessons learned of the SBT project and recommendations for improved practice. The evaluation was based upon the OECD criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability and focused upon three main areas:

1) Management and support of the SBT project including co-operation and co-ordination between the NRC and the MSU/UNDPA.
2) Outcome of the mediation support to a mediation effort provided by the members of the Standby Team when deployed to the field.
3) Conceptual development of the SBT project.

During September and October 2010, the evaluation team conducted extensive desk research of background material provided by the NRC including all end-of-mission reports, statistics, contractual documents, relevant notes, memoranda and written communication as well as management documents from the MSU. The team conducted 40 background discussions and interviews with key stakeholders to the SBT project in Oslo and New York as well as by telephone and Skype. A draft evaluation report was submitted at the end of November and the findings were presented to NRC and MSU in Oslo on 15 December 2010.

Main Findings

Mediation Support in the UN System

To date, there is no single definition of mediation support. We consider UN mediation support to consist of two interrelated but also distinct areas of support which are a) support to a mediation team in the field; and b) support to a broader mediated peace process (advisory, logistical, financial and or assistance to the parties).

The recent establishment of the MSU was accompanied by a number of organisational challenges in a complex political environment. For this
reason, the MSU had to proceed carefully in inserting itself within the DPA system. Its main challenge was to show that mediation support does not compete with but complements and supports existing capacities within the DPA, thus providing value added to the already existing work. As a result, the MSU took a cautious approach in deploying members of the Standby Team based upon clear requests from “clients.” This approach followed the rationale of providing first-class technical or process related advice to the envoy or the SRSG but not necessarily work outside of this framework.

This more “technical” understanding of mediation support (i.e., support to the mediation team/field mission) can be viewed in contrast with a more “political” understanding of the concept (i.e., support to the process/direct engagement with the parties) which was shared by the first SBT and the NRC. This latter attitude was influenced by the press statements and articles such as “Top UN Mediation Team Now Calls for Crises around the World.” These two different concepts of mediation support help to understand the considerable gap in the expectations between the first SBT (and the NRC) and the MSU as to how the team was going to work. They also explain why the NRC emphasised the need for a team which has a certain independence from the UN system whilst the MSU was, at least in the beginning, very keen to have clear control over SBT activities as well as restricting them. Three years into the project, with a firmly established MSU, these tensions have eased considerably.

Relevance of the MSU SBT

To October 2010, the SBT team has been deployed 77 times in close to 30 countries (mainly Africa and Central Asia) and serving at least 18 clients of which approximately half were non-UN actors, mainly in the form of regional organisations on the African continent (but also foreign ministries and non-governmental organisations).

The two teams differed in type of thematic expertise and in structure: The first SBT (2008-2009) was composed of a core team of five experts (Team Leader/Process Expert, Power-sharing, Constitution-making, Transitional Justice and Human Rights and Security Arrangements) whilst a further position was divided into two areas of expertise; that is, Water-sharing and Housing, Land and Property (hired for a period of four months in a second recruitment process). The second SBT part 2 (2009-2011) includes four members within Constitutional Issues, Power-sharing Issues and Security Arrangements (two positions). In addition to the SBT administered jointly with the NRC, three further experts on Gender and Water and a part-time land consultant work directly under the MSU.

Based upon the interviews and statistics, the thematic expertise in the SBT is relevant for the mediation processes and the field missions alike. According to MSU statistics, process support was by far the most relevant expertise which the SBT was requested to provide (followed by security and water).

The SBT is also of high relevance for the positioning and profiling of the MSU within the DPA as well as for the DPA to concretely implement its new operational remit. As underlined by many interviewees, the SBT is the most important instrument to which the MSU can refer for offering support services.

The SBT’s work for developing a conceptual approach to mediation support is relevant although the potential of the experts has hitherto not been tapped sufficiently. Although the MSU has grown in its number of staff, it still seems to be under heavy human resources constraints. In order to use the privileged access to the senior experts and their related experiences (also on mission), a more systematised internal learning approach is required.
With regard to the implementation of UN SCR 1325 (inclusion of women into peace processes) and the enhancement of gender sensitivity into mediation processes, the relevance of the SBT is mixed. Both teams had substantial gender expertise (the team leader in the first team and the gender expert in the second team both offered advice on gender-related issues on several occasions). Most of the SBT, however, did not feel confident enough to use their knowledge in a more pro-active way nor did the field missions request gender-related advice from the mediation experts.

MSU has developed a training module for the SBT induction week and is active in developing a conceptual framework on gender and mediation in co-operation with UNIFEM (now UN Women). In addition, it is expected that the number of women in the SBT will also increase (one woman in the first, two in the second team); the third team will also have a gender expert who will serve as a thematic focal point as well as resource for internal mainstreaming.

Effectiveness of the MSU SBT

The SBT was assessed in terms of its effectiveness by taking into account the direct outcomes of the mediation support activities. These records have been largely encouraging but also include some critical lessons learned. As one prime example, the deployment of an expert to Kosovo in 2008, who initiated negotiations for a political dialogue between the Serbian and the Kosovar governments, paved the way to the downsizing of the UNMIK from 4,000 to 500 people and a takeover of responsibilities by EULEX. An overview of deployment cases clearly showed that the SBT could provide for effective mediation support. Often, the right expertise was on the spot at the right time.

In some cases, deployments were not effective. Most often this was due to a lack of adequate logistics, unclear terms of reference and lack of understanding (or even trust) from the field mission or, indeed, the wrong chemistry of a standby team member with other UN staff. The interface management between the mission and the external expert is pivotal to the effective deployment of the SBT. This has improved considerably since its first year of operation as deployment procedures are more systematised and knowledge about the SBT is spread within the UN system.

Personality matters. In some cases, the most effective advice is provided by a solid and modest advisor who works behind the scene with the field missions and within given TORs. In other cases, a strong personality with a broad skills-set is needed which is able to capture the opportunities of the moment. An effective SBT, therefore, needs not only a diversity of regional and thematic background and gender-balance but also a set of diverse characters and egos. Substantial process and mediation skills are a must for every SBT member. These personalities need a framework in which their strengths are maximised and potential risks are minimised. To this end, a code of conduct for the SBT members, especially for those who have not been previously exposed to mediation processes, would be of benefit.

Efficiency of the MSU SBT

The efficiency of the SBT team in terms of value for money or input versus results has been assessed in a both quantitative and qualitative way. It is important to consider that a meaningful contribution to one peace process could lead to enormous savings not only in financial terms but also in terms of the human costs of conflict.

The initial benchmark of a deployment rate of 75% created a considerable amount of pressure for the MSU and the NRC. Whereas the average
deployment rate of the first team was 36%, the second team had an average rate of 53%. This deployment included support to peace processes, workshops and seminars, induction meetings, visa acquisition and remote support. The initial lower number was to a large extent due to the fact that the SBT was not only a new instrument but also managed by the newly created MSU. Today, senior UNDP staff considers a 50-60% deployment rate as an adequate benchmark.

Efficiency also relates to the existence of an enabling environment which allows for the creation of impact. This entails the preparation of the deployments (briefings) and the logistical and information-related needs of the experts.

To allow SBT members to operate from their home bases appears to be an ideal solution for the SBT members although ‘real’ contact time in headquarters are considered as highly beneficial to both the MSU and the SBT.

Sustainability and Organisational Learning

The sustainability of the SBT requires—in the long run—that the mediation support experts are funded through the regular UN budget. It is likely, however, that an early integration would affect the flexibility and independence of the SBT which are its main assets.

In the medium-term, a diversification of donors might be of an advantage. The semi-autonomous way of operations, administered by the NRC, could, as such, be a successful business model.

The one-year contract for mediation experts is deemed as effective and efficient also taking into account UN rules which restrict the employment of ‘gratis’ personnel to one year. One shortcoming of this approach is the relative high sunk cost in induction. An advantage is that it attracts also experts who can take a year sabbatical from their workplace (universities/NGOs). This needs to be considered against the background of the considerably stressful work environment. Through the UN mediation roster, the possibility for further engagement is given which allows the retaining of key expertise.

In order not lose knowledge and improve the handing over of experiences between the (teams of) mediation experts, the MSU as an institution as well as the MSU staff members, play a crucial role.

In the busy and hectic work environment of the MSU, little opportunities exist for genuine reflective learning. The MSU could possibly outsource some of this learning opportunity to specialised actors (e.g., strategic partners of MSU).

Management of the SBT and Co-operation Between NRC and MSU

In terms of management and evaluation against existing agreements between the NRC and the UN regarding the provision of mediation experts, the NRC has, to the full satisfaction of all interview partners, fulfilled its responsibilities and obligations. The experts were hired, contracted, accompanied and administered in an efficient fashion.

One area which has possibly been underestimated is the challenge of responding to the complexity of deployments. It is obvious that this will continue to require a considerable amount of human resources within the MSU.

For the partnership between MSU and NRC, it would be of value added to further enhance procedures for deployment (under the framework of a deployment strategy) and sharpen individual roles and responsibilities. In order to ensure the necessary level of communication (with SBT members,
UNDPA regional divisions, NRC, etc.) and to organise institutional learning processes, it would be favourable that a SBT team leader is based within the MSU as a regular staff member.

The evaluation team considers the joint management of the Standby Team by the UNDPA/MSU and the NRC as an added value to mediation support. The semi-autonomous management allows for a maximum of flexibility of mediation support. It also builds on the complementary strengths of the two partners.

The SBT project requires a high degree of confidence and close links with the mediation experts and a substantial level of trust between the two managing partners. The different working environments and working cultures of the UN and the NRC present challenges to the partnership, as well as diverse expectations about the principles of the partnership. Diverse efforts to improve the communication have been undertaken but there is still scope for improvement at the strategic level.

**Recommendations**

1. Continue the semi-autonomous operation of the SBT with full ownership of the UN.
2. Diversify donor support to ensure sustainability.
3. Continue the one-year model and allow for further deployment of the roster.
4. Adapt the benchmarks for deployment and introduce a less quantitative and more qualitative system.
5. Allow for sufficient real contact opportunity between the UNDPA and the SBT.
6. Provide the experts with the sufficient amount of resources to guarantee their efficiency.
7. Establish a further full-time senior level position at the MSU which will be in charge of the SBT.
8. Develop a policy or standard procedure and a code of conduct.
10. Ensure sustainability by exploring possibilities for outsourcing.
11. Clarify principles of the partnership and role distribution.
Introduction: Mediation Support in a Changing UN Environment

Many societies across the globe refer to mediation practices to resolve violent conflicts within or between communities and conflict parties. In the international arena, peace mediation efforts have also effectively contributed to a decline of international and intra-state wars.\(^1\) More than 60 armed conflicts and wars, however, are still being waged around the world and which pose a serious challenge for international security. Helping to prevent and resolve deadly conflicts is a major responsibility for the United Nations and the international community alike.

In April 2009, the UN Secretary General published his ground-breaking report on enhancing mediation and its support activities. In this report, the relevance of mediation for the UN is outlined and substantiated. Whilst the report rightly recognises that the UN does not have a monopoly on mediation, the UN mandate provides it with the possibilities to globally engage and support conflict resolution processes. The UN Charter provides for a normative framework for UN-led or supported mediation efforts whilst Article 2, paragraph 3 and Article 33, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter require member states to seek peaceful means to a dispute if the dispute could endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

The setting up of the Mediation Support Unit (MSU) within the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) is a critical element towards enhancing the UN's potential in mediation. Within the context of peace mediation, mediation support comprises a number of actions and services to different actors, both within the United Nations (i.e., by supporting a field mission led by a Special Representative of the Secretary General or a UN envoy) and outside (i.e., a regional organisation, a member state or a non-governmental organisation). Moreover, it also encompasses support to peace processes and the parties in conflict in order to bolster their capacity to find suitable and sustainable solutions to the conflict at hand.

Whilst there are clear advantages of the United Nations to provide mediation and mediation support services, one must recognise a number of challenges which influence its way of supporting mediation efforts globally. In some regions of the world, for example, the UN is perceived as an organisation which tends to ‘internationalise’ an intra-state conflict and or opens the door to heavy UN bureaucracy, including other UN agencies. In other regions, UN engagement might be challenged by local or regional actors opposing UN interventions within their “sphere of influence.” Finally, the UN has to deal with a rapidly changing mediation environment which is characterised by a range of emerging new mediation actors comprising regional organisations such as the African Union, UN member states such as Switzerland, Norway, Turkey, Finland and Qatar and or international and local NGOs which provide a whole range of mediation services.

Against this background, a number of key questions emerge regarding the conceptual and operational framework for mediation processes and mediation support:

- How can the UN continue to demonstrate its value added for mediation support in relation to regional organisations, member states and parties to a conflict?
- In order to do so, how can the UN best capture and internalise lessons learned globally in order to advance and enhance its supporting role to contribute to the peaceful resolution of conflicts?
- Given its set up, how can the UN provide for flexible ways of supporting peace processes without being constrained by administrative and logistical burdens?

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In light of rising demand, what are the required resources for the UN to be able to manage the complex task of mediation support?

It seems to be evident that in order to continue providing leadership in, guidance for and effective support to mediation processes, the UN needs innovative, flexible and pragmatic approaches regardless of whether or not it is the lead actor in the mediation process.

The UN Standby Team of Mediation Experts (SBT) offers such an innovative, flexible and pragmatic approach. Deployable within 72 hours, world renowned experts in thematic issues such as power and wealth sharing, constitution-making, security arrangements, gender and transitional justice are supporting UN and UN-supported mediation processes worldwide. Such an innovative support structure has provided additional visibility and recognition of the UN as a peacemaker and it has sensitised and enriched the UNDPA with know-how and knowledge of different mediation processes. It both challenges and supports the UN’s ways of managing mediation processes. To this date, the SBT is a hybrid structure managed jointly by the MSU and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) which allows for flexible and rapid deployment and provides a degree of autonomy of the experts. With the creative thinking of UNDPA staff, with the support of the Norwegian Government and with a consequent contribution from the European Union, the UN continues to keep the leading edge in the craft of conflict resolution.

This evaluation report of the MSU Standby Team aims at contributing to the improvement of UN-led mediation support services through taking stock of the (conceptual and organisational) lessons learned of the joint MSU – NRC SBT project and recommendations for possible improvement.
2 Background of the MSU SBT

The Mediation Support Unit (MSU) Standby Team of Mediation Experts (SBT) project was established in April 2007. The project is funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and based upon a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the United Nations and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC).

Pursuant to the decision in 2005 by member states to support strengthened good offices capacity, including in the mediation of disputes (paragraph 76 of the Outcome Document), the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) established a small Mediation Support Unit (MSU) in 2006-2007. With the financial support of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MSU Standby Team of Mediation Experts (SBT) was established in order to strengthen the UN's capacity in mediation of disputes and to enhance the quality of support and expertise available to UN and UN-supported mediation endeavours. The Standby Team of Mediation Experts is a specialised resource which can be rapidly deployed to the field upon a temporary basis in order to provide technical advice to UN officials and others leading mediation and conflict prevention efforts. The Team's services are available to current United Nation envoys, political and peacekeeping missions and country teams as well as to regional organisations, member states, and non-governmental organisations with which the United Nations works closely in conflict mediation and good offices worldwide.

Team members can be deployed in any configuration, either as individuals, in a small group or as an entire Team.

This standby model was established in order to provide high-level and specialised expertise which is not readily available within the UN system or for deployment in the field. The standby arrangement for the SBT differs from other NRC standby rosters. SBT members are contracted full-time for a period of 12 months, thus at disposal fully and at all times, on standby to be deployed within 72 hours for up to one month (renewable) to a specific location. Peace mediation processes take place in extremely complex contexts and are characterised by a high degree of political sensitivity and volatility requiring specialised and timely support. In addition to the NRC operated model described above, the MSU is operating two other full-time standby arrangements: one with financial support from the EU where two experts are recruited by the MSU and are based in New York and another model where one (interim) gender expert is seconded by UNIFEM (now UN Women) to the MSU. These two additional arrangements have only been operating since March 2010 but are part of the multiple platforms for the current Standby Team arrangements within the MSU.

The core elements of the joint MSU-NRC project are the members of the SBT; namely, senior technical experts with mediation expertise. The SBT part 1 (2008-2009) has been composed of a core team of five experts (Team Leader, Power-sharing, Constitutional, Transitional Justice and Human Rights and Security Arrangements) whilst a further position was divided into two areas of expertise; Water-sharing and Housing and Land and Property, respectively. These two positions have been recruited in a second recruitment process and were hired for a period of four months (with a one month extension). The SBT part 2 (2009-2011) includes four members within Constitutional Issues, Power-sharing Issues and Security Arrangements (two positions). In addition to the SBT administered jointly with the NRC, three further experts on Gender, Water and Land work directly under the DPA (since March 2010).

According to a joint agreement between the UN and the NRC, the NRC is the employer of the SBT and is responsible for recruiting and hiring the members of the SBT (the selection is carried out in close cooperation and consultation with the MSU), organising the deployment in accordance with the request from the UN, paying monthly salary, allowances and benefits; providing insurance, reimbursing travel costs, establishing personal files, keeping copies of performance evaluation reports and providing SBT members with personal computers and
mobile telephones. The role of the UN and the Mediation Support Unit includes planning the place of deployment of the individual expert and the preparation of the experts. This preparation includes providing background information on the process and making all necessary information and documents available to the Mediation Expert in advance of his arrival in the field.

The principal operational role of the Standby Team is to provide expert advice to senior UN officials or other partners, upon request. This is usually done by deploying the expert to the field (although analysis and advice on specific questions is also remotely provided). This support mechanism is designed to be flexible and agile and respond to the needs of the requesting entity. Although acting through the provision of expertise, the Standby Team also, at times, provides advice on procedural and agenda-setting issues and technical analysis of party positions including the identification of potential points of convergence as well as possible gaps or stumbling blocks, drafting of peace agreement texts, leading workshops for parties on substantive or process issues and giving general technical assistance. The MSU is its global service provider (to the UN, regional organisations, member states, etc.) and is in charge of offering the Standby Team as a part of its mediation support services. In this way, the Standby Team is one of the key tools which allow the MSU to respond to a demand when there is a need and perceived value added to bring in relevant and specific expertise at the service of a specific process.
3 Purpose and Methodology of the Evaluation

In the fall of 2009, the NRC initiated discussions regarding an external evaluation of the MSU Standby Team. Terms of Reference were agreed upon between the NRC and the MSU and finalised on 14 June 2010 after which a tender was placed on the ALNAP website. On 7 July 2010, Dr Antje Herrberg, European Forum for International Mediation and Dialogue (MediatEUR), and Dr Oliver Wils (team leader), Berghof Peace Support (BPS), were asked to conduct the evaluation based upon a written proposal submitted on 6 July 2010.

Objective of the Evaluation
The overall aim of our evaluation was to contribute to the improvement of mediation support services through a) taking stock of the (conceptual and organisational) lessons learned of the joint MSU – NRC SBT project and b) recommendations for enhancing its relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability (with respect to the provision and usage of mediation support services as well as to the system of (joint) learning).

We would like to emphasise that we conducted our evaluation study in a solution-oriented manner to allow for the advancement of the practice of mediation support through the use of the Standby Team. In order to ensure the necessary confidentiality, we consider the evaluation in the first place as an internal learning paper. The results of the interviews were used for the report but without referring to names and persons. Following the final version of the report, the NRC will initiate a discussion with the MSU on options for publications and dissemination strategies.

Focal Areas of Evaluation
The evaluation team focused upon three main areas:
Focus 1: Management and support of the SBT project including co-operation and co-ordination between the NRC and the MSU/UNDPA.
Focus 2: Outcome of the mediation support to a mediation effort provided by the members of the Standby Team when deployed to the field. Because we did not have the opportunity to engage with the main clients in the field, these are insights coming from the SBT (through end-of-trip reports and interviews) or interviews with the UNDPA. These capture qualitative perceptions.
Focus 3: Conceptual development of the SBT project including reflection of practice and joint learning.

Methodology of Evaluation
We employed a three-pronged approach within this evaluation based upon the SG’s Report on Mediation outlined earlier; specifically 1) conceptual development of the SBT project including reflection upon practice and joint learning, 2) lessons learned during deployments and 3) management and support of the SBT project including co-operation between the NRC/MSU. These three focal areas are placed within the OECD criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability as well as expanded criteria of co-operation/management.

The evaluation made use of following approaches:
- **Extensive desk research** of background material provided by the NRC and the MSU including all end of mission reports of the SBT members, contractual documents, notes and memoranda and written communication and statistics as well as management documents from the MSU.
- **Structured interviews** conducted with SBT members, NRC staff, MSU and DPA staff (focal points and directors when and where relevant) and DPKO. Our interviews were guided by the questions presented in Annex 2.
- **Informal discussions**: In some cases, we considered unstructured qualitative interviews as instructive to better understand the overall context and perceptions.
of the performance of the SBT team. Some informal discussions were conducted with personalities and individuals who are not direct stakeholders of the SBT project but who have a good understanding of the UN mediation activities.

- **Context analysis:** We were aware that the overall policy and institutional context in which the MSU and the MSU SBT operates is very important and needed to be properly reflected. This helped us to suggest realistic recommendations for specific challenges related to the provision and organisation of mediation support.

- **Regular feedback:** We had the opportunity to have a wider range of discussions with the NRC and the UN and to check with them on a number of critical questions.

**Time table/Work plan**

In the presentation of this work plan there are two main changes which need to be considered.

- Due to a mediation deployment to the Maldives (MSU/BCPR) of Antje Herrberg, the evaluation started later than originally foreseen.
- We did not undertake field trips as originally foreseen but spent one week in New York which allowed us to make full use of feedback from the MSU, the DPA and the beneficiaries of the mediation support services through the Standby Team. The reason was that we considered that most of the processes are in fact on-going and highly paced where mediators and their teams find it difficult to spend time on interviews. Secondly, the time and resources which we had at our disposal did not allow us to spend sufficient time in the field for a representative sample. Finally, it seems to us that the most valuable information was within the Mediation Support Unit, the mediation focal points of the UNDPA's regional divisions, the Envoys and Special Representatives and other agencies which have requested the services of the SBT. We had no opportunity to speak to envoys or SRSG's but had an opportunity to meet the USG for Political Affairs, Mr Lynn Pascoe.

**Phase I: Desk Research [Duration: 19.9. – 22.9.2010]**

Following the signature of the evaluation contract, the evaluation team obtained access to most project-related documents (end of mission reports, notes and project reports) which were (and continue to be) studied in an intensive period of desk research. The desk research helped to modify evaluation criteria and interview questions. In this phase, some discussions and telephone conversations with a SBT member as well as the MSU did occur in order to inform our approach and methodologies.

From 20 to 22 September 2010, Dr Wils and Dr Herrberg undertook a trip to Oslo to acquire the necessary documentation and to conduct intensive discussions with the NRC staff responsible for the SBT. A telephone call with one SBT member for initial discussions also took place. We were not able to involve the Evaluation Steering Committee, however, as a means of further focusing and prioritising the evaluation approach.

Results: Refined evaluation criteria, draft interviewing guiding templates.

**Phase II: Inception Report and Feedback [Duration: 27.9. – 9.10.2010]**

A first inception report was sent to the NRC and MSU on 29 September following Phase I. After we had received feedback from the Evaluation Steering Committee we submitted our second version on 9 October.

Results: Inception Report, final approval from MSU of inception report and modified TOR.

**Phase III: Data Collection, Mission to New York [Duration: 10.10. – 15.10.2010]**

This phase utilised the frameworks, interview guidelines and evaluation criteria. Largely, the
interviewing process was to be qualitative and participatory based upon a set of guiding questions (see Annex 2) although also following the flow of discussions so that each interview has a similar structure but is responsive to the person interviewed. Whenever useful and possible, we reflected upon the overall system in which the SBT is operating; i.e., by using a holistic approach and by using interview techniques such as open circular questioning which helped us to better understand the context of the SBT and the relationships of the main stakeholders. Some follow-up to the interviews occurred through e-mailing (limited) and having additional conversations. The two evaluation experts conducted interviews and discussions with the MSU and UNDPA staff in New York and telephone or Skype interviews with past and current members of the SBT.

Results: interviews providing qualitative data collection for the authoring of the report.

*Phase IV: Draft Report and Presentation [Duration: 15.10. – 15.12.2010]*

In this phase, the evaluation experts conducted final interviews and writing of the final report. This phase required some telephone interviews to confirm findings and an additional consideration of written material, etc. Antje Herrberg and Oliver Wils met in Berlin to discuss the findings and the structure the report on 18-19 November. The report is to be submitted on 26 November. The further timelines communicated to the evaluation team are:

- 03 December: Feedback Steering Committee (MSU and NRC) on Draft 1
- 10 December: Submission of Draft Evaluation Report
- 15 December: Presentation of Draft Evaluation Report to the NRC and MSU

Results: Draft Report, Presentation

*Final Report: Submitted on 20.01.2011*
4 Main Findings

4.1 Mediation Support in the UN System

The evaluation team took into account the organisational environment and positioning of mediation support within the UN system in order to have a better understanding of the potential and limitations of the usage of the SBT. For that purpose, we will briefly outline the history and mandate of the MSU within the DPA and reflect upon the overall concept of mediation support.

Establishment of the Mediation Support Unit

Pursuant to the decision in 2005 by member states to support strengthened good offices capacity, including in the mediation of disputes (paragraph 76 of Outcome Document), in 2006-2007, the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) established a small Mediation Support Unit (MSU).

Based in the DPA, the MSU describes itself as a system-wide asset which supports mediation initiatives of the United Nations, its member states, regional and sub-regional organisations and other relevant partners. For this purpose, the MSU delivers services in three key areas:

a) Operational support (analytical support, deployment of experts and limited start-up financial support) to peace processes.

b) Strengthening mediation capacity of the United Nations, its member states, regional and sub-regional organisations and national actors to be effective in mediation and its support activities.

c) Capture, develop and share mediation knowledge, policy and guidance, lessons learned and best practices.

As we learned during our evaluation in New York, the establishment of the MSU was accompanied by organisational challenges in a complex political environment. Within the UNDPA, for example, which is mainly structured according to regional responsibilities, there were a number of reservations with respect to the usefulness and necessity of establishing a separate unit dealing with mediation issues. Many staff members of the regional divisions within the DPA considered mediation issues and mediation support as part of their core business. The fact that the UNDPA is reportedly an under-resourced and under-staffed organisation contributed to the perception that the MSU could be perceived as a potential competitor for scarce but urgently needed resources.

For this reason, the MSU had to proceed carefully in inserting itself within the DPA system. Its main challenge was to show that mediation support does not compete with but complements and supports existing capacities within the DPA, thus providing value added to the already existing work. The MSU was under pressure to prove to the DPA that the services which it provides were in fact useful for the regional divisions and their respective country teams/field missions. In that sense, the beginning of the MSU was marked by a need for confidence building, networking and diplomacy within its own system.

The insecurity felt by some UNDPA staff members can also be related to the fact that the UNDPA itself which, according to a UN senior official was “traditionally a department of thinkers,” has been undergoing rapid organisational change in the last few years towards a more operational entity which involved substantive role clarification with other UN agencies, especially the UNDPKO and the UNDP.
**MSU as Part of the New PMD**
Senior and mid-level officials within the UNDPA acknowledged in our discussions that the relationship between the MSU and the regional division has been considerably changed and consolidated. Whilst some natural tensions remain as part of the daily operations, the MSU is viewed as a recognised source for mediation support and has a firm identity within the UNDPA. Possibly as a result of its success and continued attention to the DPA to provide essential conflict prevention and peacemaking functions, the division plan is to be upgraded with more senior staff. The challenge to continue to prove its relevance remains within its new upgraded position. As one senior official commented to us, a substantial part of the DPA is “still suspicious” of the MSU and its work.

The UNDPA is a competitive and challenging environment to work in and with. Information sharing and communication have some obstacles due to the fact that reportedly “everything is classified information,” colleagues are protective about their networks and contacts and sharing and co-operation with others are often countered with issues of control and authority.

This challenging environment can be exemplified by the fact that a request from the MSU to become more proactive and to obtain the authority to directly contact actors and/or UN field missions on the ground was turned down by a UNDPA directors meeting at the end of summer 2010.

**MSU Standby Team**
The establishment of the MSU SBT in April 2007 was a generous contribution in providing a powerful resource to the MSU. Due to the sensitivities of the establishment of the MSU within the DPA and a change in MSU leadership in 2008, the further development and deployment of the SBT did not take place as fast as the NRC, the Norwegian Government and the team members had wished and expected. MSU staff members describe the establishment of the MSU as a very challenging and difficult process with a great deal of in-house pressure. Added to this were the high expectations regarding the effective deployment of the SBT all of which created a challenging working environment for everyone involved.

**Professionalisation of SBT Deployment**
Although the MSU initially faced a number of challenges in deploying the SBT team (we will cover this in more detail in sub-chapters 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4), all of our interview partners (UNDPA, SBT, NRC) acknowledged that there were very clear advantages of using the SBT as a value added resource at an operational and conceptual level in terms of mediation. This was particularly visible with the second team. The MSU has managed to gradually but substantially professionalise its support function by being able to rely upon SBT related services.

**UN Ownership of the SBT**
MSU staff members mentioned that UNDPA divisions initially used the Norwegian funding and co-management of the SBT as an argument to disqualify the team by referring to confidentiality of information and process and by questioning the loyalty of the team members (“academics who will later write a book about their experiences with UN”). During our interviews, however, we got the impression that the UNDPA has now developed a strong sense of ownership of the SBT. Regional divisions seemed to be aware of the resources offered by the SBT and are requesting its support.

**SBT as One of Several Options for Operational Support**
Within its three years of existence, the MSU has developed a range of service options which it can offer to its clients (mostly requesting UN agencies). In terms of operational support, the MSU offers input from different sources including from the Standby Team. In addition to the SBT, the MSU has also developed a roster of mediation experts and is also suggesting in-house experiences when appropriate (see Box 1). As in its first year of operations, the MSU
needed to establish itself as a valued service provider to the UN which it did by means of carefully introducing its services, such as the SBT, to its clients. A ‘soft marketing’ approach was taken rather than anything strong and proactive. It appears that the MSU is now more confident and proactive in terms of its recommendations and guidance towards its clients.

Despite the MSU’s obvious need to establish itself internally and externally as a provider of a range of services, the evaluation team realised through reports and interviews that the SBT is by far the most important resource for the MSU and that it is an effective tool for operational support, also in terms of positioning the MSU within the DPA. A further operational tool, the Emergency Response Fund, which used to be administered by the MSU, is now managed by USG Pascoe’s office.

Box 1: MSU Operational Support

The evaluation team considers the four layers of support (in-house experience, SBT, experts from the mediation roster and partners) as relevant and complementary but would like to emphasise that this concept (and the respective strategies for staff development, roster management and partnership development) needs further elaboration (strategy) and support.

**Concept and Understanding of Mediation Support within the UN**

By searching for an overall UN definition of mediation support, the evaluation team realised that no such single definition exists. Even in the UN SG’s report on enhancing mediation and its support activities of April 2009, no definition is offered. The following definition is taken from the UNDPA’s website:

“A support system providing envoys with the proper staff assistance and advice and ensuring that the talks have the needed logistical and financial resources.”

www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/mediation_support [20.9.2010]

This definition is fairly narrow and would exclude direct work with those parties which are in fact part of the MSU’s mandate. We are suggesting, therefore, that a UN mediation support concept consists at least of two interrelated areas: a) support to a mediation team in the field (headed by an envoy, Special Representative, etc.) and b) support to a broader mediated
peace process which could be logistical, financial or through assistance to the parties of a process (see Box 2).

Box 2: The Two Aspects of Mediation Support

Whilst both aspects of mediation support are closely interrelated, it is important to emphasise that support to a field mission/mediation team might differ substantially from support to a mediation process (in terms of mandate, required expertise, independence and attitude of expert, flexibility, timing and sequencing).

We think that part of the challenge with the first piloting of the SBT can be understood against the background of these two different aspects of mediation support. Because of the specific situation surrounding the MSU’s establishment (as described above), the MSU understood mediation support more as a service to the UNDPA’s field missions. It is for this reason that the MSU took a more reactive and careful approach based upon receiving a clear request from the “client” with an emphasis upon strong client ownership. According to this rationale, any deployed expert was expected to provide first-class technical or process-related advice to the envoy or SRSG but should not necessarily work outside of this framework. In this perspective, the SBT member was to be a ‘plumber’ for a mediation process, to support an architect (the chief mediator) in the building of peace. The members of the first SBT and the NRC, on the other hand, had a different understanding. Being publicly promoted as a new and innovative tool of the UN, or as members of a “new UN mediation team,” they were willing and motivated to pursue a very pro-active role to help set up, design and accompany UN mediation processes. Being labelled as a team, equipped with a team leader, they were hoping to contribute to mediation processes with their combined and impressive expertise. In the eyes of some SBT members lending mediation support, field missions are often seen as bureaucratic and narrow-minded. The team was eager to be pro-active, to be engaged in early preventive action or at an early stage of designing the mediation process. This second narrative was influenced by press statements and ensuing articles entitled “UN Launches Experts Team to Mediate Crisis Talks” or “Top UN Mediation Team Now Calls for Crises around the World.”

Although these descriptions are oversimplified, they help to understand why there was such a substantial expectation gap between the first SBT (and the NRC) and the MSU. They also explain why the NRC emphasises the need for a team which has a certain independence from the UN system whilst the MSU was, at least in the beginning, very keen to have clear control over SBT activities as well as restricting them.

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2 www.chinaview.cn, 06.3.2008.
3 www.un.org, 05.03.2008.
Both approaches in mediation support have their relevance and value added. As such, they can be reconciled and interlinked. This has been realised by the MSU which—almost three years after its inception and with a firmly established identity—has become self-confident enough that there also seems to be a more pragmatic approach from the MSU which has more realistic expectations regarding the second SBT. Hence, as we will point out, the initial pilot project of the SBT has the potential to develop into a sustainable resource. This situation creates a solid basis to develop a meaningful realistic relationship based upon the value added between the two parties.

4.2 Relevance of the MSU SBT

In this sub-chapter we look at the relevance of the MSU SBT approach. As relevance is a very subjective factor, we are asking the following four questions:

- How relevant is the SBT for the field missions/mediation teams?
- How relevant is the SBT for the mediation/peace process?
- How relevant is the SBT for the UNDPA/MSU?
- How relevant is SBT for the development of a conceptual approach to mediation support, including a gender-sensitive approach?

Relevance of the SBT for the Field Missions/Mediation Teams

Despite the fact that the SBT is a very new tool within the UN, several field missions have requested its services. UNDPA field missions were the most important clients of the SBT.

Besides the UNDPA (regional divisions and decolonisation unit), there is an impressive account of other ‘client’ agencies requesting the services of the SBT as follows: UNDP, DPKO, UNIFEM (now UN Women), UN Office in West Africa (UNOWA), UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA), African Union (AU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Central African States Economic Community (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), City of The Hague, two Foreign Ministries, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre), Chatham House and the Carter Center.

In several cases, field missions requested the services of the SBT on more than one occasion (for example, the UN field missions in Cyprus, Nepal, Darfur, Djibouti and Central Asia) and in a more sustained fashion.

Amongst the reasons given by our interviewees regarding why and how the SBT services are relevant to the field missions, we received the following explanations:

- The SBT matches the requested expertise (see Box 3).
- The quick deployment within 72 hours which allows for responding to an urgent request in a timely manner.
- The SBT is fully funded, no additional and time-consuming fund-raising is requested.
- The SBT experts have the right profile, not too high-ranking (as this would pose a threat to the envoys, SRSGs), but sufficient thematic expertise (to impress the mediator).
- The field missions need experts who could give independent advice. There is an advantage if mediation support advisors are not tied to the UN system and able to consider innovative advice outside UN frameworks. They will not have to take decisions.
- SBT members could take risks whereby envoys or SRSG tend to be overly cautious.
Thus, the expertise within the SBT was always available and deployable within a short span of time (less than 72 hours). The question remains of whether or not the thematic expertise was relevant to the requesting field missions/agencies.

The thematic/process expertise of the SBT includes the following (see Box 3): The first SBT (2008-2009) was composed of a core team of five experts (Team Leader/Process Expert, Power-sharing, Constitution-making, Transitional Justice and Human Rights and Security Arrangements) whilst a further position was divided into two areas of expertise; that is, Water-sharing and Housing, Land and Property. These two positions were recruited in a second recruitment process and were hired for a period of four months (with a one month extension). The second SBT part 2 (2009-2011) includes four members within Constitutional Issues, Power-sharing Issues and Security Arrangements (two positions). In addition to the SBT administered jointly with the NRC, three further experts on Gender and Water (and Land; MSU has hired a part-time land consultant since September 2010 to support mediation processes) work directly under the MSU (since March 2010). For the coming SBT (2011-2012), the following positions have been announced: Security Arrangements, Power-sharing, Constitutional Issues, Gender, Natural Resources, Mediation, Facilitation and Dialogue (Process Design) (two positions) (see also chapter 4.6 on recruitment).

Box 3: Overview of Thematic Expertise of SBT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic Expertise of SBT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Team (2008-9)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Leader; Process Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Sharing Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional Justice /HR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Housing, Land and Property]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is interesting to note that the coming SBT (2011-2012) will involve two process experts. This reflects the opinion of some of our interviewees who strongly recommended that SBT members should have stronger process skills as there is an enormous need to further develop mediation capacities within the UN and the field missions. It also reflects, however, the demand from the field. Process support was by far the most important/relevant expertise
which the SBT was requested to provide. According to MSU’s own statistics, process expertise was requested and provided in 21 out of a total of 77 deployments during 2008-2010 (see Box 4).

Box 4: Overview of SBT Deployments by Theme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Security Arrangements</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Process Support</th>
<th>Constitution</th>
<th>Power Sharing</th>
<th>Transitional Justice/HR</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MSU Statistics

Linking the thematic and process-related expertise of the SBT to the actual requests and deployments—and to subsequently take the obvious decisions—is a good way to keep the relevance of the SBT in line with the demands from the field. Such a monitoring tool could, of course, be fine-tuned and developed further as part of a further systematisation of methodologies for mediation support concerning both the SBT and the MSU roster.

**Relevance of the SBT for the Mediation/Peace Process**

It is difficult for the evaluation team to answer the question of how relevant the SBT expertise and services are for mediation and peace processes as we did not have the opportunity to talk directly to the conflict parties which whom the SBT had worked in the past. It is also generally difficult to link the outcomes of a mediation/peace process to the mediation support services (attribution gap).

SBT members were deployed in close to 30 countries and contributed support to mediation and peace processes either through support to a mission and through direct support service to the conflicting parties (thematic advice, training). (For more details see Box 5.)
Box 5: Geographic Involvement of SBT Services (Support to Field Missions and Peace Processes)

- Central African Republic
- Central Asia (Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan)
- Comoros
- Cyprus
- Darfur
- Democratic Republic of Congo
- Fiji
- Gabon and Equatorial Guinea
- Honduras
- Iraq
- Kenya
- Kosovo
- Kyrgyzstan
- Liberia
- Madagascar
- Moldova
- Nepal
- Philippines
- Solomon Islands
- Somalia
- Sudan
- Uganda

Source: based NRC and MSU statistics. List includes remote deployments.

A quick assessment of the geographic distribution of SBT expertise underlines the diversity of mediation support as the specific characteristics of all those processes differ vastly. We could not further qualify this list (number of deployments to the respective processes, lengths of stay, type of mediation or peace process, type of mediation support). It appears that there is a strong focus upon Africa, followed by Central Asia. It is notable that some crisis-prone regions such as Latin America and the Middle East are sparsely covered. As no further analysis is available to us, we cannot further qualify if this relates to a limited scope for UN-led or supported mediation in those regions, if these regions are sufficiently equipped with mediation support expertise, if indeed it is a lack of understanding of the value added of the support which the SBT can offer from the respective field missions or if the situation simply does not seem ‘ripe’ for such mediation support functions.

In general terms, however, the evaluation team considers the SBT to be relevant to the peace and mediation processes with which they have engaged. We consider that the thematic expertise which is on offer is equally relevant to mediation and peace processes as it is to the respective field missions. The same is true for the need of one-stop rapid deployments where specific expertise is needed on very short-notice.

In addition to those qualities, the independence of the SBT (deployed by the UN as Experts on UN Mission but not as UN staff members) allows for a level of flexibility which is often necessary and thus very relevant for supporting mediation processes. This holds, for example, when experts do work which the mediation team, owing to reasons of impartiality cannot do, such as, for example, with the conflicting parties. Here, experts can offer and
reflect upon different options within their respective field of expertise or by advising the conflicting parties on mediation process design, agendas etc. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that they can act as independent experts in certain situations and are perceived as such and not representing the positions or the interests of the UN. In other situations—and this is the advantage of having a flexible arrangement—the linkage to UN missions is crucial as it provides them with the necessary legitimacy and helps to gain access to the parties. This flexibility—and sometimes ambivalence—is needed and adds value to the current set-up of the SBT.

There is little real experience to date to determine whether or not the work of the SBT could also be relevant for preventive action. Some interviewees have raised this issue and this was also explicitly requested by the first SBT. As part of the overall MSU effort, we indeed believe that SBT members would add value and contribute to early fact finding, conflict analysis and facilitation at an early stage in order to prevent crises from breaking out. We cannot elaborate on this further within this evaluation study, however, as there is a lack of practical lessons learned (one of the few opportunities was a conflict analysis mission to Kyrgyzstan).

**Relevance of the SBT for the UNDPA/MSU**
The SBT is of high relevance for the positioning and profiling of the MSU within the DPA as well as for the DPA to concretely implement its new operational remit. As already stated and underlined by many interviewees, the SBT is the most important instrument to which the MSU can refer for offering support services.

With the SBT, the MSU possesses a powerful resource to prove to the DPA's regional divisions that it can deliver mediation support and that its services are complementary to the DPA's work. UNDPA senior officials provided very positive feedback regarding the SBT. One senior official stated, for example: “The services of the SBT are amongst the most useful services within the UN.” Another senior official said: “The SBT belongs to us.” Although this enthusiasm might probably not be shared by everyone within the DPA, the SBT has certainly found its way into the UN and helped to build up a joint mediation support profile.

**Relevance of the SBT for the Development of a Conceptual Approach to Mediation Support**
The SBT's work for developing a conceptual approach to mediation support is relevant although the potential of the experts has hitherto not been tapped sufficiently. Although the MSU has grown in its number of staff, it still seems to be under heavy human resources constraints. MSU staff members informed us about heavy workloads and a multitude of tasks. Rather than viewing the SBT team as an additional burden, it is our view that the MSU could take advantage of its privileged access to the senior experts in mediation support and the related thematic expertise which they have in the SBT. This will help to strategise their approach for mediation support and will further develop the MSU’s institutional learning system (we will cover this point in more detail in chapter 4.5).

The MSU has tried, in the past, to build upon the knowledge of the SBT by asking them to contribute to the production of guidance notes for mediators. The first team, in particular, contributed to quite a number of operational guidance notes. This experience, however, fell victim to the lack of human resources of the MSU to work with the SBT team to produce such notes and, finally, a consequent decision not to publish them. In the meantime, the increasing systematic usage of the SBT within the MSU, on the one hand, and more realistic expectations within the SBT, on the other, might offer better opportunities to use the SBT resources for the further conceptual development of the UN's mediation support.

On a related but not so much UN-focused level, the SBT (especially the first team) participated as experts in a number of seminars and assisted regional and UN organisations (e.g., AU, SADC, UNOWA, OHCHR) in developing their mediation capacity. Again, however,
these activities and the related knowledge generated were not used for the development of a more strategic concept for mediation support.

*Relevance of the SBT for the Development of a Gender-Sensitive Approach to Mediation and Peacebuilding*

The UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on “Women, Peace and Security” calls for the stronger participation of women in peacebuilding, the prevention of gender-based violence and protection of the rights and needs of women and girls during and after armed conflicts alongside a gender-sensitive approach to peacebuilding in general. In this context, and as the UN has a clear leading role in implementing SC Resolution 1325, it is important to ask how the inclusion of women into peacebuilding—and especially into mediation and negotiation processes—is reflected within the SBT and furthered by its support activities.

In terms of gender balance within the SBT, the equation is not very encouraging as only one woman served in the first SBT although she was the team leader. In the second team, the balance is slightly better as there was one female SBT member and a gender expert seconded by UNIFEM (now UN Women) who joined the team only for six months. The reason behind this is related to the fact that the number of women applying for the SBT is considerably lower than the number of men. Whilst MSU and NRC both put strong emphasis upon the necessity of including women into the SBT, they also consider the areas of technical advice, experience, mediation skills and geographical background as important factors. In order to match all those skills, MSU and NRC would need to better understand the reasons behind the low number of women applications in order to improve this ratio.

It should also be noted, however, that MSU is building up its roster of mediation experts which includes a growing number of women. A senior MSU official considers it just a question of time until there are enough experienced women applying for mediation support. In addition, the equation of women into the SBT is a simple, but insufficient, indicator for measuring the capacity of the SBT to provide for gender-related advice to mediation processes.

As we learned during our interviews, the majority of mediation experts were not requested to offer gender-related advice nor did they themselves pro-actively offer this support. Gender issues were often not a main pre-occupation of field missions. The reason behind this is at least twofold: on the one hand, we were told that the integration of women did in fact play a role in the respective mediation process (and the mediation experts were not seen as bringing an additional value to this aspect of the peace process); on the other hand, most mediation experts did not really feel confident and sufficiently equipped to include gender-related issues proactively into their support services.

This is not to say that the SBT as a team was a blank in this respect. On the contrary, the Team Leader of the first SBT, for example, was not only a process expert, but also considered and used as a gender expert. She contributed to this topic on several occasions either at the request of UNIFEM (now UN Women) and UNDP (on UNSCR 1325 and 1820) or at specific UN field missions or workshops. As the level of gender sensitivity has been very different amongst the SBT members, however, we could not identify a pro-active approach in mainstreaming gender sensitivity within the technical expertise offered.

As already stated, the second SBT was complemented by a gender specialist seconded to the MSU by UNIFEM (now UN Women) from March to September 2010. Although the specialist was only requested for two deployments (both by UNOWA), she was active in helping the MSU draft a training package and a guidance note on gender-based sexual violence. She also worked closely with the gender focal person within MSU in order to improve the conceptual framework on gender and mediation and to implement a joint
UNIFEM (now UN Women)-UNDPA strategy to improve the integration of women into peacebuilding.

The topic of gender-based sexual violence and its relevance to peace processes was also included in the induction week for the second SBT. Our interviews with members of the second SBT would suggest that more sensitisation for this topic is necessary. As a consequence of the relevance of gender sensitivity to promote the quality of peace processes, and because of its relevance for the UN, it has also been decided to integrate a gender expert into the third SBT. Although it is important to have a reference point for gender in the team, the sensitisation and mainstreaming of gender sensitivity to the other SBT members is key to raising their expertise on how best to enhance the integration of women and gender aspects into all segments of peace and mediation processes. It is very powerful, for example, if a (male) expert on security arrangements can address gender aspects.

4.3 Effectiveness of the MSU SBT

An effective deployment of the SBT would mean that the right skills were available to the mediation team or to the conflicting parties at the right time and at the right place. How can we assess whether or not this was the case? The MSU has no monitoring mechanisms which would help us in answering this question. Indeed, it is not easy to find the answers.

In order to get a better sense of the effectiveness of the SBT, we have three options at hand: first, by taking into account the direct outcomes of the mediation support activity; second, by identifying some (qualitative) indicators which help to assess the quality of mediation support and third, by asking the field missions/requesting agencies (client feedback). Due to a lack of possibilities to talk to the requesting agencies (besides interviews with DPA regional divisions), we will focus upon the first two options:

**Outcomes of Mediation Support Services**

If we look at tangible outcomes of those processes where SBT members were involved, we find some interesting lessons learned. We do not make reference to all end-of-mission reports, training notes and interviews as they are of different quality and, of course, very subjective. In order to get a better understanding of the potential and range of the SBT instruments, however, it is useful to capture some positive and critical examples as we can draw some lessons which—with some caution—can be generalised:

**Deployment in Kosovo 2008**

A SBT member had been requested to support the SRSG in Kosovo in setting up a negotiations process between the Governments of Serbia and Kosovo. When the SRSG left (due to family reasons), the SBT expert was tasked with initiating those negotiations. During his one-month stay, he succeeded in establishing a framework for negotiations which subsequently paved the way for a political process which led to a downsizing of the UNMIK and a takeover of responsibilities by the EULEX.

This process was not a mediation support but a political negotiation process with a positive outcome to the UN and, in particular, the UNDPKO. According to a public statement of Mr Edmond Mulet, the UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, “The support of the SBT made it possible to downsize the UNMIK from 4,000 to 500 people.”

**Deployment in Madagascar 2009**

The SBT expert for Transitional Justice and Human Rights, with little prior deployment by the MSU, was requested to head a mediation team for the UN Envoy without predefined Terms of References. He provided the UN mediation team and the UN Envoy with a mediation
strategy framework and was able to apply his process skills and work for two months as a peace process supporter rather than within his strict area of expertise.

The expert was later asked by the DPA to continue supporting the process in Madagascar (after his employment with SBT).

Deployment in Cyprus 2008-2009
Two SBT members were initially deployed to Cyprus in order to assist with negotiations and to assist the SASG. When they arrived, they were informed that the SASG was not on the island and they were asked to keep a low profile (they should not speak to anyone outside the UN compound). It allowed them, however, to familiarise themselves with the complexities of the Cypriot conflict and, upon that basis, offer suggestions to the SASG when they met him later in New York. One SBT expert on power sharing followed up with a second deployment a few months later which became very successful in terms of meetings and substance but also in terms of feedback given by the SASG in a code cable to USG Pascoe (where he appreciated the support services to him and to the parties and suggested that the SBT expert would return to Cyprus). Both deployments lasted eight days.

As we learned through the interview, the expert was deployed to Cyprus three times during his contract with the MSU and since then another ten times.

Deployment in CAR 2008
One SBT expert was deployed in order to assist BONUCA and the SRSG with DDR planning for the CAR peace process. After arrival, he learned that the person with whom he was supposed to work was on vacation for a week. In addition, no effort was made to provide him with a dedicated interpreter. One week of a three-week deployment was lost.

Deployment to Ethiopia /AU and Training 2008
One SBT expert was part of larger UNDPA delegation to Addis Ababa in order to assess how the UN can be of more assistance to the peacemaking efforts of the AU and to participate in a dialogue and mediation workshop. According to the end-of-mission report, the mission was poorly orchestrated and overstaffed, logistics were not in place (including transport and hotel) and there was no role for the SBT expert in the mediation workshop.

Deployment Solomon Islands 2010
A SBT expert in security arrangements was deployed for one month to the Solomon Islands in order to provide security-related advice and security assessments to the UN during local elections as election violence was perceived. In the end, the expert also provided general process and political advice which was a new area of work for him.

Conclusions from the Cases
This (to a certain extent arbitrary) overview of deployment cases highlights positive and negative outcomes of the missions as well as potentials and difficulties. Although other cases could be added, the small selection already shows that the SBT as a tool has the potential and, in fact, proved that it could provide for very effective support to mediation and peace processes. In the cases of Kosovo and Cyprus (Nepal and further deployments might be added) the right expertise was provided at the right time.

Other cases show that deployments might also be less effective. Without a clear TOR, a lack of suitable logistics, a lack of trust from the field missions, etc., the provision of services offered by the SBT might be suboptimal and less effective.

In order to complicate matters further, cases which initially seemed to be a “failure” in terms of effectiveness of service provided did turn into success at a later stage. The case of Cyprus demonstrates this clearly (and the more recent deployments in Doha and subsequent training...
with the Darfur rebel movement could point in a similar direction). The first deployment was very difficult and the TOR could not be fulfilled at all. The deployment did, however, set the stage for a long-term and seemingly very effective support to the peace process in Cyprus.

The Solomon Islands engagement is also an interesting case of a unique employment of a security expert in an election process. Whilst this process opened doors for the UNDPA, it proved that there was ample space for providing process support upon the basis of an entry point which was based upon technical expertise. In order to capture those moments, however, the SBT expert needs to have a proper process understanding and sufficient skills.

The cases also show that the “personality factor” is highly important. The requests and the specific demands of the conflict systems and the mediation architecture are so diverse that the SBT personality needs to be as diverse as possible. In some cases, the most effective advice is provided by a solid and modest advisor who works behind the scene with the field missions and within given TORs. In other cases, a strong personality with a broad skills-set is needed which is able to capture the opportunities of the moment. An effective SBT, therefore, needs not only a diversity of regional and thematic background and gender-balance but also a set of diverse characters and egos. Substantial process and mediation skills are a must for every SBT member.

In addition and closely linked to the personality factor, is the question of access to the parties. If mediation support is understood as support to the parties as well as to the mediator, the effectiveness of mediation support is also linked to access to the parties.

Lastly, the management of the interface between the SBT as an outsider to the peace process/field mission and those people who work inside the process is crucial for an effective use of the SBT. The cases mentioned where those interfaces have not worked well made it extremely difficult to provide for meaningful and effective support services. According to some interviewees, the interface management between the SBT and the UNDPA has improved considerably between the two teams. This is partly due to a more systematised deployment methodology offered by the MSU and also to an enhanced understanding that logistics matter as well as much clearer expectations to SBT from the field missions. The end-of-mission reports also reflect that there were considerably less logistical problems with the second team as occurred with the first team. In addition, interface management might also depend upon the personalities of the SBT. Those personalities might also need a framework where their strengths are maximised and potential risks are minimised. A smart team combination between the SBT technical experts and senior mediation specialists with facilitation skills within the field missions could be very effective in this regard.

**Success as Defined by Our Interviewees**

Our interviewees, especially SBT members, had their own set of criteria to assess whether or not their services were perceived as useful. Amongst those criteria were the following:

- Access to and quality of interaction with the lead mediator.
- Access to and quality of interaction with the parties.
- Ideas and suggestions as outlined in draft reports were taken seriously.
- Additional request for deployment.
- Request for remote advice.

Because we did not have the opportunity to interview field missions directly, we can only partially address whether or not specific members of the SBT will again be requested to the same missions. The deployment statistics show, however, that a number of SBT members have again been requested for specific missions to which they have been deployed (for example, Comoros, Cyprus, Madagascar, Nepal, Somalia/Kenya).
4.4 Efficiency of the MSU SBT

The efficiency of the SBT team in terms of value for money, or input versus results, can be assessed both in a quantitative and qualitative way. The average deployment (that is, time away from the home base) of the SBT in the first team was 36%. For the second SBT, the average deployment rate (from October to August) was at 52%. This deployment includes support to peace processes, attending workshops and meetings, the induction meeting and time to acquire visas as well as reported remote support.\(^4\) According to interviews with MSU staff members, the time spent preparing the visit, or time spent to write follow-up reports, are not included but could be substantial.

As this point has been a ‘bone of contention’ for a number of stakeholders in the process, it deserves further discussion.

The initially low (perceived) deployment figure for the first Standby Team needs to be considered against the specific situation of a new service which was introduced and offered to the UN services by the newly established mediation unit and, as such, being perceived as a ‘new’ actor in (UN) peacemaking. It is no surprise that due to the fairly competitive environment in the peacemaking sector, the need for confidence building and ‘soft marketing’ was an important task for the MSU in order to assure its prime support function to existing initiatives. At the same time, because of the high level of expectations raised and the pressure for “having to deploy,” deployments were agreed upon which were not very effective in terms of their outcome. It is broadly agreed by most of our interviewees that the attempt to match such a high level of expectation was not realistic as neither the MSU nor the NRC had experience in deploying mediation teams. Nevertheless, the benchmarking of 75% created a high degree of pressure for the implementing parties, especially the NRC, which became increasingly concerned when initial deployment was low whilst working upon the assumptions that sufficient mediation demand existed if a more proactive stance would be taken. Today, senior UNDPA personnel point out that 50-60% would be a more adequate benchmark for deployment whilst also considering the need for preparation, reporting, remote deployment and the need for some rest.

With this in mind, it is important to consider that a meaningful contribution to one peace process could lead to enormous savings not only in financial terms but also in terms of the human costs of conflict. As one interviewee stated with regards to the deployment of one expert to Kosovo, the support of the SBT made it possible to downsize the UNMIK from 4,000 to 500 people which contributed to savings that by far exceeded the annual budget of the Standby Team. In this sense, efficiency should not only be measured by the number of deployment but also in terms of outcomes of the services provided.

Efficiency also relates to the existence of an enabling environment which allows for the creation of impact. This enabling environment relates to the way in which a deployment is prepared and how the logistical and information-related needs of the experts were responded to. A prominent comment amongst Standby Team members is often that their work could have been rendered more efficient if they had access to a briefing or briefing files prior to their deployment. Whilst this is in some instances difficult due to the high degree of confidentiality of documentation, it would be useful to create a cost effective support (possibly through a JPO or an intern) to provide basic briefing material to the expert in question.

An enabling environment also means to be able to execute the work efficiently on site. The result of this is mixed, depending upon the deployment, as mentioned in chapter 4.3. As a result, the experts are losing important time by establishing the necessary working

\(^4\) It is not clear whether or not all experts have consistently reported their remote support time.
environment. The fact that the requesting mission is treated as a client (and, thus, the MSU as the provider of services) sometimes makes the MSU reliant upon good will. As the MSU has the responsibility for the SBT on mission, however, it should be in a position to ensure that the requesting agencies and field missions provide for the necessary logistics.

There is a division of opinion of whether or not the location of the Standby Team decreased or increased the efficiency of its work. One argument is that if SBT members would be based in New York, they could be used as support staff for the Mediation Support Unit in assisting with advocacy, training, coaching and other activities. Others within the MSU argue that there is a certain advantage to having the SBT as ‘autonomous’ and, thus, not ‘sucked’ into the daily work and operations of the MSU. The argument followed by the SBT was that it would be unrealistic to expect a SBT member to relocate himself (and his family) to New York for one year. The SBT members valued being able to return to their home base.

Another factor impacting upon efficiency relates to the effective preparation of the field mission for the arrival of the SBT member including clarification of roles. Some SBT members have argued that it would have been useful if they could be in direct contact with the field mission or the requesting entity to negotiate/discuss the details of their deployment. Such direct communication could help clarifying the Terms of Reference and, thus, increase the quality of services offered. It should be noted that SBT members of the second team stated in interviews that they repeatedly had the chance to communicate directly with the requesting agencies and field missions whilst it seems that the MSU was much more restrictive in this regard during the first SBT.

Efficiency relates to the question of whether or not activities could have been achieved with fewer inputs. Some members of both of the Standby Teams have commented that some deployments were not necessary although they recognised the need of the MSU to inform about (and ‘market’) the SBT. In lieu of deployment, some SBT members believe that their efficiency would have been increased by providing more support functions within the UN system rather than outside.

Efficiency also relates to the integration of the SBT member into a particular process. Whilst we could not assess this point in more detail, and have only a few anecdotal and written references, there have been issues with certain types of behaviour and consequent negative side effects of a mission. SBT members have no clear guidance of how to act (or not to act) within their assignments. Although highly skilled professionals, some members of the SBT had neither been exposed to mediation processes nor have they received mediation training.

Long and repeated travels impact upon the mental and physical health of the experts. All (except one) expert have repeatedly requested that they can travel in business class for their deployment, in particular for long journeys. Although it seemed obvious to the evaluation team that it is difficult to expect a senior expert, who is on frequent deployment and arrives after a night-flight to be in ‘prime’ condition to provide mediation support, it is a fact which has a reported impact upon the work performance.

### 4.5 Sustainability and Organisational Learning

We have underlined in this report that we consider the structure of the SBT—being a service provided for and owned by the UN but with a certain level of independence in terms of the positioning of the mediation support experts and with an outside management partner— independent as innovative and effective. On the other hand, this model raises the question of sustainability of the overall SBT arrangement as well as of the sustainability of mediation support-related knowledge and expertise within the MSU.
The SBT has been considered as a pilot project but it is gradually consolidating as an instrument which has made up part of the MSU ‘brand.’ A large part of its attraction is that the team is fully funded as this provides not only for the opportunity for quick deployment (the funds do not have to be mobilised or raised for deployments which could otherwise be quite a time-consuming process) but also for a maximum of flexibility concerning the nature and task of the mediation support activity. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has provided the funds for the SBT since its inception in 2007 although this is upon the basis of the understanding that this is a pilot phase to test and, if worthwhile, to establish the SBT. According to our interviews, there is, in principle, a preparedness to continue with support for the next few years but a mid- and long-term strategy is required in order to assure the sustainability of the SBT.

Some senior officials within the UNDPDA suggested that the SBT members should be gradually integrated into the UN. We have little doubt that the sustainability of the SBT requires—in the long run—that the mediation support experts are funded through the regular UN budget. Before the SBT concept has evolved into a stable and reliable instrument and is as such established, accepted and recognised within the UN system, however, it might not be advisable to integrate it. It is likely that an early integration would affect the flexibility and independence of the SBT which are its main assets. This flexibility is further strengthened by the outsourcing of the administration as this releases the UN from the burden of developing the necessary capacity (and culture) for quick deployment administration. We do believe that the model should be maintained in the short- to medium-term.

**Diversification of Donors**

In the medium-term, a diversification of donors might be of an advantage. Since 2009, the European Union has been contributing to two positions of the SBT (which includes the part-time land expert who was hired in September 2010) although the funding is provided directly to the MSU. In addition to EU support, UNIFEM (now UN Women) seconded one team member to the Standby Team (a gender advisor) from March to September 2010. Increased funding contributions make it possible that the team enlarges further. In any case, the support of other donors would contribute to the sustainability of the SBT which would then be a clear indicator of success.

The tacit agreement between the NRC and the MSU that NRC should also take managerial responsibility for the EU funded positions is a right step. It reduces administrative burden for the MSU and guarantees managerial cohesion, thereby also strengthening the Team (which otherwise might be subject to different staff regulations). If diverse donors contribute to the SBT, the MSU might need to set up a donor steering committee which consults regularly with the MSU and its partner NRC. Key to this approach would be that the Standby Team would have full ownership of the UN with donors as key strategic partners for standby operations. The semi-autonomous way of operations, administered by the NRC, could, as such, be a successful business model (as it has been successfully operated in other contexts as, for example, with the Mediation Support Project in Switzerland).

**Organisational Learning**

In order to continue with a model of independent mediation support through this semi-autonomous model, an improvement of the interface management between the UN and the SBT is required in the field and also at headquarters. For that purpose, the evaluation team herein suggests (chapters 4.6 and 6) enhancing human resources and establishing a SBT leader within the MSU.

In this context, three areas are of crucial importance:

- Sustaining the knowledge and experiences of the SBT.
- Handing over from SBT to SBT.
• Learning within the MSU in order to further develop the routines and standards for deployment.

*Sustaining the Knowledge and Experiences of the SBT*

One topic of concern which was raised in a number of interviews is the one-year contract for SBT members. The UN has an internal regulation (stipulated by the General Assembly) which restricts the employment of gratis personnel provided by member states to a one-year period. As a result, the SBT in the first year exited after 15 months (there was an exceptional three-month extension to allow for a new recruitment process) and gave way to a new Standby Team.

In our interviews, MSU staff members and SBT members agree that they need some induction time (most mentioned approximately three months) to adjust and fully understand the UN environment and to get a solid understanding of how best to use their expertise in support of the field missions. Some SBT members suggested expanding the terms of employment for two years. The NRC suggested that the MSU identify pragmatic solutions to this problem.

On the other hand, we heard from SBT members that they would not have been attracted or motivated to join the SBT if the terms would have been longer than one year. It allows some established professionals to take a one-year sabbatical and return to their positions after the assignment. Some SBT members also mentioned that they felt exhausted after deployments which almost always involve long-distance flights, long working days and the need to adjust quickly to new, complex and difficult political environments in the field of conflict resolution.

Assessing the pros and cons of the assignment period of the SBT, we believe that the one year period should be maintained as a principle which allows attracting the best expertise available, keeping the SBT member highly motivated to do his job and bringing in fresh perspectives. In some cases and upon mutual consent, a second employment term (after a short break) might be considered as was the case with one of the experts on security arrangements. In any case, experts could continue to be deployed through the MSU roster on demand if there is a demand from existing processes.

The important aspect is to provide for the best possible induction for SBT members to be deployed within a short-term period and being regularly replaced by other experts. A related aspect to enhance sustainability and allow for a systematic upgrading of quality of the SBT includes a systematic review of lessons learned.

Currently, SBT members have the opportunity to take part in a comprehensive induction meeting which exposes them to the UN system, MSU and DPA staff members, work programmes and other work-related aspects. This one-week programme is well designed and also provides for an opportunity for NRC staff to attend and update themselves with activities within the UN system. It is a useful team-building exercise allowing UN staff to personally meet members of the SBT. In the past, several SBT members could not join this induction week either because they had been sent on mission (which happened to several members in both teams) or because they started their work after the induction week which was unfortunate.

Particularly, during the first standby team period there was little opportunity to organise joint lessons learned meetings beyond the induction meeting. After a number of efforts to allow for a joint MSU/NRC final debriefing meeting, the NRC organised an end-of-mission meeting at the end of 2008. We could not determine whether or not the discussions or lessons learned (which have not been put on paper) were shared orally with other audiences, including the incoming SBT. We believe that for lessons learned, such a final debriefing exercise is of essential value, both for the NRC, the SBT and the MSU. Such a forum should preferably
take place in a conducive atmosphere and possibly facilitated by an outside person who could also write an internal report which could then be handed over to the next incoming team.

When not deployed, the MSU has used the expertise of the Standby Teams to produce draft guidance notes, attend and speak at brown bag lunches hosted by the UNDPA and, on occasions, debrief MSU staff on their specific experiences. These are deemed useful by all of our interviewees.

**Handing Over from SBT to SBT**

Due to the one-year regulation, the question of how to organise debriefing or other forms of information exchange between the “old” and the incoming expert team is relevant.

For practical and administrative reasons, however, the SBT members usually cannot meet their predecessors as there is no overlap between the two teams. Existing knowledge and lessons learned, therefore, are shared indirectly through MSU staff members during the induction week. Thematic briefing packages such as briefing material for the incoming mediation support experts, which would also include some lessons learned, do not exist. In the working contracts of the SBT members, no further reporting requirements besides the end-of-mission report and no other regulations regarding a hand-over to new SBT members are mentioned.

**Learning and Reflective Practice within the MSU**

As mentioned before, the opportunities which are offered by the Standby Team to enhance reflective practice and learning both on peace processes and also on aspects of technical expertise as well as the practice of effective deployment are manifold. Currently, these are only partially and temporarily tapped into. We had no interface with the guidance and learning unit and, as such, could not determine whether or not the lessons learned or the knowledge management of the SBT are part of its terms of reference and remit.

The MSU business plan for 2009-2010 has outlined the need for institutional learning. According to the MSU, this refers to deliver policy instruments for UN mediation approaches, the production of guidance notes, lessons learned and, after action reviews, training and upgrading of the UN Peacemaker website. As lessons learned and after action reviews were already programmed for 2008-2009, it seems to us that they have not been well communicated or have little relevance to the work of the SBT. Interviewees from the MSU and the SBT did not mention that they were aware of any systematic approach to internal lessons learned.

As the MSU is the dedicated UN focal point on operational mediation support and mediation capacity and is the in-house repository of mediation support knowledge, it is, therefore, opportune and important that the unique experiences on key processes and also on approaches used for mediation support should be effectively captured. The end-of-mission reports might be a good entry point to understand the work of the SBT. Such lessons learned material should be produced by mediation and learning specialists.

### 4.6 Management of the SBT and Co-operation Between the NRC and the MSU

The SBT is managed jointly by the UNDPA/MSU and the Norwegian Refugee Council. The co-operation is formalised by the Agreement Between the United Nations and the Norwegian Refugee Council Regarding the Provision of Mediation Experts concluded in New York on 23 August 2007 with the Agreement having been updated in March 2010.
In the following sub-chapters, we will review the division of management tasks, the applied operation procedures and resources as well as questions related to the communication and marketing of the SBT. The chapter will conclude with an assessment of the added value and challenges of the co-operation between the MSU and the NRC.

**Agreement Between the United Nations and the Norwegian Refugee Council Regarding the Provision of Mediation Experts**

This Agreement outlines the roles and responsibilities of the UN and the NRC in the execution of the Standby Team. According to this Agreement, it is the NRC which, “in consultation with the United Nations will establish a standby team (...) available for rapid recruitment and deployment upon selection by the UN.”

The agreement stipulates that the NRC is responsible for the management of the recruitment process (but the candidates for deployment as SBT members are selected by the UN) and the general administration of the SBT covering payments, insurance, organisation of deployment, refund of travel expenses, keeping of personal files, ensuring repayment if required, maintaining records of the SBT members, provision of computers and telephones and to “carry out any out functions as deemed necessary by the Parties in respect of the deployment of the Standby Team members” (see Articles 1.4, 1.5, 1.6 and 2).

The obligation of the United Nations stipulated in this Agreement comprises the provision of all necessary support to the Standby Team members regarding their deployment on the ground including provision of UN certificates, office equipment, consent for deployment, office space, support staff equipment and all other tasks (see Article 3 of the Agreement).

The evaluation team got very strong assurance from our interview partners (both SBT members and UNDP/MSU officials) that the NRC has executed the administrative tasks to the full satisfaction of the SBT and the MSU. The dedication and efficiency of the project manager was mentioned as outstanding.

**Operational Procedures and Processes in SBT Management**

To date, there is not one procedure or process related to the management and deployment of the Mediation Standby Team (a draft DPA Policy Directive on the SBT exists, but needs to be reviewed, modified and endorsed). In particular, during the inception phase of the SBT, the deployment of experts was managed in a rather ad-hoc fashion. As a new instrument of a new unit within the DPA, it has been a learning process to identify which expertise would suit to a specific need as articulated from the field. The evaluation team took note of the fact that substantial learning took place as our interviewees, in general, would agree that the deployment processes have clearly improved for the second SBT. Obtaining a request for deployment involves communication with the UNDP regional divisions and field missions as well as UNDP/UN offices on the ground. Technically, an agency needs to send a request for the deployment of a Standby Team member to the UN Director for Policy Planning and Mediation Support who then, in consultation with the USG, decides upon the request and asks the MSU team to take further steps (selecting/suggesting candidates, etc.). Ideally, such a procedure would work in early consultation and upon the basis of a systematised and sequenced process with the NRC which is to administer the deployment. It is not entirely clear to us whether or not such a systematised communication process has been agreed upon but the MSU Business Plan 2010 points to this direction.

’Marketing’ of the SBT

The creation and existence of a new Team was announced through a press release of the UNDP and a press briefing by USG B. Lynn Pascoe given on 5 March 2008. As far as the evaluation team could assess by reviewing MSU documents, the MSU has communicated the role and functions of the Standby Team in writing and in public statements. A standard two-page document has been produced by the MSU which communicates the purpose and
function of the Standby Team. The Standby Team has been further mentioned by the Secretary General’s Report on Mediation. To what extent the MSU took an effort to communicate and inform all stakeholders, including member states in a proactive manner, could not be established. According to our information, the MSU provides a briefing to all new SRSGs upon their visit in New York as concerns the MSU’s support services, including the SBT. USG Pascoe asserts that he never makes a speech “without mentioning the SBT.”

Providing information about the SBT has a two-fold purpose. It is, on the one hand, a useful feature to achieve further deployments but, on the other, it helps in raising public attention to the need of professional mediation support in conflict regions. Another strategy to ‘market' the Team was suggested by the first SBT; that is, to use the analytic capacities of the SBT by deploying them proactively and at an early stage in conflict regions so that they could help drafting and designing an appropriate mediation approach for the UN. Because of reasons which were related to the MSU’s position within the DPA (and which were outlined in chapter 4.1 of this report), however, this option was never implemented.

Instead, the implicit strategy taken was one of ‘soft’ marketing through exposure. Over the last two years, SBT members were increasingly inserted and exposed to mediation processes, UN envoys, SRSGs and UN resident representatives. Reports show that when SBT members had an opportunity to meet with senior staff engaged within the DPA as well as with envoys or other senior personnel in peace processes, initial thresholds were lowered and UN staff gained a better understanding of the value added by the SBT. This gradual and soft way of building trust and confidence enhances the sustainability of the SBT and ownership of UN stakeholders.

Owing to the same reasons, regular meetings between SBT members and UN personnel are to be encouraged. Whilst in the first phase of the SBT project exposure has been relatively ‘light,' SBT members started to travel to New York upon a more rotational basis in the second phase. Both UN personnel as well as SBT members and the NRC have commented upon the positive results that such direct contact has achieved. The value of informal meetings and contacts should not be understated.

In both teams surveyed, SBT members have also been requested to contribute their expertise at conferences and expert meetings. The evaluation team lacked time and access to relevant information to assess the effectiveness of these types of deployment (see chapter 4.3). In principle, however, these meetings might have contributed to an improved understanding of the wider mediation community on specific issues but they also allowed for introducing and ‘exposing' the work of the SBT which was especially important during its first phase. It is obvious, however, that those conferences and seminars need to be chosen carefully in order to preserve the precious time of the SBT member and to keep the opportunity costs low.

Recruitment
For the first SBT (2008-2009), the NRC advertised six positions. Out of a total of 309 applications, 54 candidates were nominated from member states and 24 persons were interviewed. All candidates were subject to a personality test and final candidates underwent a comprehensive interview.

As part of its commitment and in line with the values of the United Nations, the NRC was tasked to recruit a culturally diverse and gender balanced team. This has been only partly achieved. Whilst the recruitment process was announced both through member states and a public tender (advertisements in the media such as The Economist, Jeune Afrique and through NGO and other professional networks), there have been challenges in hiring specialised staff with the required technical and mediation expertise to allow for a fully multilingual and gender diverse approach. It should be noted that many of the experts
recruited had an anglophile and academic background. In addition, it was difficult to find qualified candidates for the position of a Wealth-Sharing expert (as a result, the position was split and two experts were hired in November 2008 for Water sharing and House, Land, and Tenure issues). The areas of expertise required were formulated together by the MSU and the NRC. Parity in terms of gender or the geographic spread of the team members could not be ensured. There has been a challenge in delivering the best expertise available versus the application of gender or geographic criteria. One reason for the reportedly low number of women who apply to this position could be due to the highly demanding work programme which is a challenge for both men and women but which could especially discourage women with families.

**Strategy of Deployment of SBT Staff**
According to the draft UNDP Policy Directive Standby Team Experts, (Draft from 15 March 2010), requests for deployment from any UN Agency are made in writing to the Director of the Policy-Planning/Mediation Support Unit and the Head of the Mediation Support Unit. The UNSG holds the authority to “ultimately determine when, where and in what configuration the SBT shall be deployed.” In line with the joint Agreement with the NRC, therefore, it is up to the United Nations to devise a methodology and strategy to exploit the SBT to its full potential. To our knowledge, a written strategy or methodology document for deployment hitherto does not exist but is part of the overall MSU strategy as outlined in the MSU business plan. The overall leadership of the Mediation Standby Team is assured by the Director of the Policy Planning and Mediation support with a 15% time allocation for the Head of the Mediation Support Unit.

**Rapid Deployment**
The specialised institutional set-up with substantial experience in deployment of emergency assistance personnel with the appropriate administrative set up provided for by the NRC is extremely well suited to the task of rapid deployment. Most of the time, experts were deployed within 72 hours. Difficulties in deployment were in some instances caused by difficulties to obtain a visa in time. MSU has investigated whether the experts could get a United Nations laissez passer, but concluded that due to regulations that such is not possible. For the second SBT, UN travel certificates were issued, which identify them as UN experts on mission.

**Complexity of Deployment**
The management of a mediation deployment for the MSU involves being in contact with the missions and mediation teams and ensuring rapid and adequate deployment. It demands the formulation of clear terms of reference and preparation on the ground ensuring that the SBT member and the team can formulate and agree with each other’s final terms of references in order to ensure clarity of roles (management of the interface between the SBT member and the field mission). It requires back-office work to ensure that the SBT members have sufficient access to (often very confidential) information, for example, in order to prepare for briefings, background mappings, etc. The deployment task requires regular communication with the SBT members who are often ‘shuttling’ between different assignments and knowing that they cannot always be fully briefed about the situation which they are expected to support. In this context, ongoing communication with the headquarters is especially important when tension or difficulties arise during the deployment (i.e., issues in terms of office support, possible issues with the local head of mission, unclear TOR etc.).

Precisely because each mediation effort has its own idiosyncrasies requiring a certain degree of flexibility, a careful attention to detail is required. No extra formal mechanisms or standard operation procedures hitherto exist to follow a deployment. Support for the SBT members is partly ensured by assigning geographic competences to different staff members of the MSU who are then responsible for the SBT members when on mission in “their” respective regions. On several occasions, respective MSU staff travel with SBT members which is a
good way of improving co-operation and exchanging experiences and knowledge. Care needs to be taken not to duplicate roles (and thus, creating confusions) in such deployments.

According to our interviews, and in consideration of the material at hand, we see a need for the MSU to fine-tune and further develop a clear deployment strategy. In the first and second SBT, the work of the MSU was often part of an effort to build confidence with its partner agencies and clients and to acquaint the UN system with this new tool and, thus, presented an opportunity to create a demand structure. The downside of this, however, was that, firstly, some SBT members felt that they were not always adequately deployed and sometimes deployed to assignments for which they were technically not suited. Secondly, some experts felt that their specific geographic expertise could have been further exploited (the evaluation team could not determine whether or not actual demand existed in those specific geographic areas of expertise). Thirdly, the preparation of SBT members was insufficient in several cases (see chapter 4.3).

Having an overall explicit strategy does not mean having an exact plan for the deployment of the SBT. This would defy the logic of an emergency team. Yet, as the demand for mediation support and the services of the SBT seemed to have grown and will likely continue to do so, the MSU could systematize its deployment logic further and offer different options of deployment.

**Dedicated Human Resources (or lack thereof)**

The MSU Programme of Work 2008 (version 2 January 2008) estimated that in order to support the SBT, the MSU would need the following human resources (staffing needs): one P-5 (15%), one P-4 (80%), one P-3 (35%) and one P2-(15%) as well as one full-time assistant. For the evaluators, it was not entirely clear if the allotted 80% of the P-4 Position, in particular, was fully dedicated to the SBT. Against the background of a rising demand for support services of the MSU, it is our view that the MSU, given its growth in terms of tasking, is not adequately equipped in terms of providing sufficient co-ordination and management for the deployment of SBT members.

Our understanding from discussions is that the daily management of the SBT in relation to the MSU represents only one-third of a P4 Political Officer at the MSU. In order to match the needs for a more strategic deployment of the SBT, the UNDP/MSU will have to increase its respective human resources.

**SBT Leader**

The initial function of the team leader could have been to provide an interface between the MSU and the SBT. Such a team leader could have assumed a leadership function for strategic deployment. In hindsight, the timing was bad for this idea. Setting up the MSU and the SBT nearly at the same time created the suspicion that the SBT might develop into a separate (or even competing) entity rather than being fully integrated within the services of the UN/MSU. Whilst we continue to believe that a team leader for the Standby Team would be an important interface between the Team and the MSU in order to increase strategic coherence and visibility, such a team leader should, however, be an integral member of the MSU team.

**Remuneration**

Several SBT members mentioned to the evaluation team that they regard the remuneration of their work as insufficient and explained that they are earning more money in their previous positions. The evaluation team does not share this position. We think that the remuneration is up to market standards for mediators and, therefore, adequate.
Added Value and Challenges of the Co-operation Between the NRC and the MSU

The evaluation team considers the joint management of the Standby Team by the UNDP/MSU and the NRC as an added value to mediation support servicing its main stakeholders and clients. The reason for this has been partly outlined in the sections 4.2 to 4.5 and shall be summarised in the following:

First, the semi-autonomous management model (the SBT as an instrument used and owned by the UN, but with experts funded, contracted, and administered by the NRC) allows for a maximum of flexibility:

- The SBT is fully funded, no additional and time-consuming fund-raising is requested.
- The quick deployment within 72 hours which allows for responding to an urgent request in a timely.
- The field missions need experts who could give independent advice. There is an advantage if mediation support advisors are outspoken and can think outside the frame of the UN. They will not have to take decisions.
- SBT members could take risks whereby envoys or SRSG tend to be overly cautious.

Second, NRC is a world leader in roster management and deployment of experts. In terms of efficiency of services, they bring in unique know-how and operational strengths in the partnership. This enables the MSU to focus upon the content and the complex political dynamics of deploying the mediation support experts.

Third, NRC has a strong ownership of the SBT, too. The project was initiated with the NRC and the motivation for achieving success is high. As a strategic partner to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the NRC is a reliable partner which is helpful in the securing of external funding, thus enhancing sustainability.

Although both partners complement each other well, the co-operation has not been free of challenges and frustrations. Whilst part of the co-operation challenges have certainly been caused by the different expectations regarding the usage of the Team (as described in chapter 4.1), the evaluation team is of the opinion that the different management cultures of both organisations also played a role. The NRC, as a very professional and efficient organisation in the field of expert roster management and rapid deployment of emergency staff, follows a more linear management style whereas the MSU, which is embedded in a complex decision-making environment of global politics, applies a less-linear and more political approach in its management. These two different management cultures have, at times, created challenges for working with one another.

What both partners have in common is a high level of expectation regarding the performance and success of the Standby Team. This joint interest is not matched by a shared understanding of each organisation's role. The particular importance of this project to the NRC has created the expectation of a close partnership with regular communication, interaction and exchange of opinions in order to allow for input beyond a purely technical and administrative role. The NRC has stated that it would need for more systematic communication in order to enhance the impact of the work of the SBT. As the idea of the Standby Team and its development have been developed in partnership with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the NRC, it was an assumption of the NRC that the initial partnership that was built upon an equal level with the UN/MSU would continue throughout the operation of the Standby Team. Indeed, it is an expectation to be considered as strategic partners for the MSU which, therefore, assumes a corresponding level of communication on all matters of management which pertain to the use of the Standby Team. This has not been the case.
Whilst the MSU has appreciated the co-operation with the NRC, it does not offer the level of intensity of communication which is desired by the NRC. This is, on the one hand, due to human resources constraints (see above), a change in leadership and the need to further define and expand the role of the MSU which all combined make it difficult to allow for more additional engagement. On the other hand, it reflects the MSU’s perceived need to create a clear ownership and leadership of the SBT. The annual report of the MSU (2009) shows that the MSU implements a multitude of tasks. It provided support to 19 peacemaking efforts, has contributed to the building of capacity of regional organisations, it began to develop lessons learned and knowledge management deliverables and it offered and contributed to training as well as to in-house capacity building of various sorts. The Standby Team contributed to some but not all of these efforts. The high workload of the MSU possibly explains the limitations to engage in detailed consultations with the NRC on strategic issues. It seems that the MSU implicitly would prefer a pragmatic, service-oriented relationship as outlined in the joint agreement.

The NRC, in turn, would like to be informed upon a regular basis about developments within the MSU, both as a measure to increase its capacity for effective deployment and also to ensure further the success and sustainability of the project. Without doubt, it is important for the NRC to be well informed about the key challenges concerning deployments and related issues. In order to improve regular communication, the NRC and the MSU started to hold weekly conference calls in May 2009. Other suggestions for improved communication (e.g. quarterly meetings) have hitherto not received approval.

It is not surprising that other suggestions offered by the NRC regarding the management structure of the SBT; namely, to create a Standby Team Secretariat or to establish a UN Interagency Steering Committee, were not considered by the MSU.
5 Conclusions

The increased propensity for and complexity of conflicts in the 21st century requires new and innovative approaches to prevent the outbreak of conflicts as well as to peacefully resolve them. The practice of international peace mediation is more than ever relevant to the United Nations operational work. It has been realised that the United Nations' diplomatic efforts need to be resourced further in order to offer professional, flexible and responsive services. The “good offices” of the UN Secretary General have been in heavy demand and probably prevented more violent conflicts crises than assumed. The need for quickly deployable senior professionals specialised in mediation and corresponding technical expertise on themes where peace processes mostly ‘get stuck’ is an expression of the UN’s willingness to do more in the mediation field.

The SBT project is an innovative and useful mechanism which helps to augment the mediation support capacity of the United Nations. After an initial pilot phase of nearly three years, it shows its relevance to the work of the MSU and the UNDPA system. At present, it is a tool which assists in bringing forward conflict resolution efforts by deploying highly skilled and professional personnel. A UN which can deliver quick and nimble expertise for peace processes without institutional constraints certainly adds to the effectiveness and efficiency of global mediation efforts.

As conflict resolution experts know, it is the entry point and access which matter for a mediation supporter. As the UN system continues to build its capacity in mediation, the demand for professional mediation support at the high-profile level needs to be cultivated further. It requires continuous efforts by the UNDPA to sensitize further high-level mediators and their teams that mediation support complements and enriches their work.

The present entry point of the MSU to support peace processes through the SBT is by means of technical expertise. We have shown in many parts of this report that process and facilitation skills and mediation expertise have been crucially important for many cases and have contributed very positively to mediation and peace processes. It is this so-called ‘nitty gritty’ which we can witness in only a few phrases or annexes to a peace agreement which have required substantial comparative expertise in security issues, power-sharing, constitution making, resource sharing and gender. Bringing into the process this expertise and being able to work—if necessary—with all the parties in the peace process and without the baggage which the UN often has to carry is the prime added value of the SBT.

From a management point of view, the SBT project requires a high degree of confidence and close links with the mediation experts and a substantial level of trust and confidence between the two principal partners, the MSU and the NRC/Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As it also requires continuous resources and back-office support, further partnerships and commitments need to be built.

Only a few women were part of the Standby Team and there is little cultural diversity. As it is a central concern of the UN to advance gender parity and cultural diversity, more insights need to be gained as to the reasons behind these gaps and adequate responses need to be formulated and implemented.

Initial experiences with the SBT have helped to professionalise deployment procedures. The vast richness of experiences leaves ample room for further learning and strategy building. The small MSU unit needs further support from within and outside the UN to tap these lessons and to use them for the further systematisation and conceptualisation of the SBT.

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5 On this point see Center on International Cooperation: Review of Political Missions 2010, CIC, NYU; especially chapter 2.3 written by Teresa Whitfield: Political Missions, Mediation and Good Offices.
approach. The SBT is not just another standby mechanism but one which operates within the complex and highly sensitive world of political negotiation and mediation.
6 Recommendations

Recommendations for the NRC, the Norwegian MFA, the UNDPA and the MSU

**Recommendation 1: Continue the semi-autonomous operation of the SBT with full ownership of the UN.**

We recommend continuing with the semi-autonomous arrangement of the SBT based upon the partnership between the NRC and the MSU. There are key advantages to the operation of such a semi-autonomous model as it provides for:

- The necessary flexibility to offer expert advice and facilitation services to existing UN operations which are sometimes constrained due to restricted mandates.
- The opportunity to send the right person at the right time to the right place within 72 hours.
- The opportunity to augment the good offices function of the UNSG and also provide technical advice on those thematic areas which represents the nuts and bolts of peace arrangements.
- The efficient services of one of the market leaders in roster management.

At the moment, no similar flexible arrangement is available within the UN system.

It is important to note, however, that the SBT belongs to and is part of the UN and its peacemaking efforts. It is also for this reason that it is important to develop a suitable hand-over strategy if the UN so decides. If this would be the case, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the NRC would gain an enormous credit to have funded, created and allowed for the sustainable model of a new and innovative mechanism for providing mediation support services.

**Recommendation 2: Diversify donor support to ensure sustainability.**

In order to ensure medium- and long-term sustainability of the SBT, its support base needs to be diversified. Although additional funding exists, it is not channelled through the NRC arrangement. It is in the interest of all stakeholders to have the most efficient and focused management of the SBT. It is recommended, therefore, that other donor support is to be channelled through the NRC as the prime contractor for the team. In addition, the MSU should take efforts to further diversify donor support. A broadened support base will strengthen UN ownership with the value added of the NRC as a supporting partner.

**Recommendation 3: Continue the one-year model and allow for further deployment through the roster.**

We recommend continuing the hiring of mediation support experts upon the basis of one-year contracts but linking them to the roster of mediation experts. The reason for this is tied to a number of observations:

- The working environment for the SBT members is challenging and the demand for deployment is growing.
- Some professionals were only available because of the limited time span. They could take a one-year break from their workplace but a long-term contract would limit the choice of high-quality experts.
- A two-or-three year employment might affect the fresh and out-of-the-box thinking of the experts or, in some cases, lead to repeated employments by the same mediation team which could be better handled through the roster.
Because the MSU has developed its own roster of mediation experts, former SBT members could be integrated and deployed through this mechanism. The NRC could help the MSU to professionalise the UN’s roster management.

The one-year model would also mean that the home base of the SBT member should be maintained whilst the level of real contact time with the UNDPA needs to be enhanced.

**Recommendation 4: Adapt the benchmarks for deployment and introduce a less quantitative and more qualitative system.**

Given that the demand for mediation support has grown and is expected to grow further, it is important to adjust the assessment system for effective and efficient deployments. We recommend lowering the benchmarks of the deployment rate from 75% to 50%-60% for the days spent away from home. Instead, the system of remote support could be refined and developed further. In addition, we suggest integrating some qualitative indicators into the system in order to improve opportunities for learning and to find ways to better improve the documentation service regarding the demand and deployment of mediation support services. The end-of-mission reports could be easily adjusted to this purpose.

**Recommendation 5: Allow for sufficient real contact opportunities between the UNDPA and the SBT.**

Opportunities for formal and informal contact between the UNDPA and the Standby Team have been beneficial for the SBT members and the MSU alike. The SBT members gain access to the UN system to which they contribute but of which they are not formally a part. Some of the SBT members have not been previously exposed to the UN system and an understanding of the UN working culture is certainly necessary. On the other hand, UNDPA and MSU staff benefit from the rich experiences and knowledge of the SBT members. The informal rotational presence of individual Standby Team members is a useful model to continue. In addition to this, we recommend that the full SBT meets twice at UN headquarters: first, during the induction week and, second, at the end of the assignment for a structured debriefing and lessons learned workshop.

**Recommendation 6: Provide the experts with the sufficient amount of resources to guarantee their efficiency.**

The mediation support experts require adequate briefings and logistical assistance before and during their deployments, which the MSU should ensure.

In order to facilitate travel of the SBT members, we recommend offering business-class travel for long distance flights (upon the basis of UN travel regulations). At the same time, the provision of UN travel documents is especially pertinent if the UN wishes to recruit nationals from those countries who have more difficulties in attaining travel visas.

**Recommendations for the UNDPA and the MSU**

**Recommendation 7: Establish a further full-time senior level position at the MSU who will be in charge**

Taking into account the human resources limitation within the MSU, we recommend establishing a full-time senior level position within the MSU. This position (P5 or D1-level) should be filled with a qualified and experienced mediation expert.

The terms of reference for this position would be:

- To fulfil the role of the SBT team leader.
- To provide strategic leadership to the SBT.
- To create a strategy for deployment.
- To be a resource person to both the MSU and the SBT.
- To co-manage present and future donors relations with the Chief of the MSU.
- To organise lessons learned and debriefing workshops.
- To co-ordinate communication with SBNT members and field offices.
- To liaise with the NRC and other partners.

**Recommendation 8: Develop a policy or standard operating procedure and code of conduct.**

As is emerging practice, the MSU offers a range of different types of deployment: MSU staff members, SBT, mediation roster. We recommend developing further standard operating procedures for the deployment of the SBT and the mediation roster. This should include a monitoring mechanism to ensure the effectiveness of SBT deployments. As the NRC has broad experience in interagency management of such Standby Personnel in its projects such as ProCaP and GenCap, it could assist the MSU in developing a management framework for strategic deployment.

In addition, we recommend elaborating a code of conduct for SBT members. This code of conduct would entail professional ethics and standards for the Standby Team, serving both as guidance and as an operating framework for the experts.

**Recommendation 9: Enhance gender parity and gender sensitivity.**

Although an important element in the UN’s vision and mission in terms of mediation and mediation support, women are under-represented in the SBT. The reasons for this are not entirely clear and should be investigated and responded to.

In addition, we recommend enhancing gender sensitivity within the SBT through extensive training during the induction week. To increase gender awareness, end-of-mission reports should include a section on gender related aspects of the respective mediation and or peace process.

**Recommendation 10: Ensure sustainability by exploring possibilities for outsourcing.**

There is a need for upgrading the capacity for institutional learning from the experiences of the SBT. In addition to establishing a senior position within the MSU as recommended above, we recommend outsourcing parts of the learning activities to outside partner organisations such as academic institutions and think tanks. The services to be outsourced could include: the organisation of lessons learned and debriefing workshops, the production of short case studies and briefing materials (for both DPA regional divisions and new SBT members), the “Peacemaker” website, and regular analyses of end-of-mission reports.

**Recommendations for the UNDPA and the NRC**

**Recommendation 11: Clarify principles of the partnership and role distribution.**

Following the successful implementation of two Standby Teams, it is now time to revisit the partnership principles between the NRC and the UN. A number of issues have been raised by the NRC, which is keen to continue to make a contribution to the future success of the SBT, based on its rich professional expertise in the deployment of Standby Teams for emergency assistance.
**Annex I: Terms of Reference**

*(attached in a separate file)*

**Annex II: List of meetings and interviews, in chronological order**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>Director Emergency Response</td>
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<td>Valerie de Campos Mello</td>
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Annex III: List of Documents Reviewed

NRC documents
Agreement between the UN and the NRC regarding provision of Mediation Experts (MoU)
Amendment to MoU
NOBB0706 Søknad MSU
NOBB0706 tildelingsbrev fra UD for MSU - del 1
NOBB0906 Søknad MSU del 2 2009 – 2010
NOBB0906 tildelingsbrev fra UD for MSU - del 2 2009 – 2010
Press Release 5. March 2008: UNITED NATIONS ANNOUNCES NEW ‘ON-CALL’ MEDIATION TEAM (attached)
Press Release 10. June 2010: “On Call” UN mediation team a valuable resource, UN says
MSU Standby Team handout factsheet 2008-2009
MSU Standby Team handout factsheet 2009-2010
Contract SBT members 2008 – 2009 – TEAM LEADER
Contract SBT members 2008 – 2009 – EXPERTS
Conditions of appointment 2008 – 2009 – TEAM LEADER
Conditions of appointment 2008 – 2009 – EXPERTS
Contract SBT members (part 2) 2009 – 2010 – TEAM LEADER
Contract SBT members (part 2) 2009 – 2010 – EXPERTS
Conditions of appointment (part 2) 2008 – 2009 – TEAM LEADER
Conditions of appointment (part 2) 2008 – 2009 – EXPERTS
MSU SBT deployment list 2008 - 2009 short
MSU Standby Team deployment list 2008 – 2009
MSU Standby Team deployment list (part 2) 2009 – 2010
MSU Standby Team calendar 2008
MSU Standby Team calendar 2009
MSU Standby Team calendar 2010
MSU Standby Team 2008-2009 by numbers (statistics)
MSU Standby Team 2009-2010 (part 2) by numbers (statistics)
MSU SBT PROJECT REPORT 2007 – 2009
MSU SBT policy directive (MSU document)

End of mission reports 2008 – 2009
Compiled after each assignment

End of mission reports 2009 – 2010
Compiled after each assignment

Meetings, minutes and memos
DPA MSU - SBT notat UD besøk MSU Oslo 21. okt
DPA MSU - SBT notat UD High Level Meeting MSU 21 Nov 2008 - FINAL
DPA MSU - SBT High Level Meeting MSU 21 Nov 2008 - notes to SBT
DPA MSU – SBT High Level Meeting MSU Nov 2008 – notat UD follow up
DPA MSU – SBT memo extension contracts – notat til UD
DPA MSU letter from Pascoe MSU part 2 - BLP PR-Norway 13 Jan 09
DPA MSU - SBT letter to DPA on MSU part 2
MSU SBT intern notat - MSU del 2 - 2009-04-01 - partnership with MSU discussion points meeting
MFA 2009-04-02
MSU møte UD og NRC 2009-04-02 referat
MSU SBT intern notat - MSU del 2 - 2009-04-20 - tre scenario fremover
MSU DPA USG minutes memorandum 2009-05-01
MSU part 2 - memorandum 2010-07-01 SBT workplan and NRC

Documents compiled by the SBT members
DPA MSU – SBT letter to MSU July 2008
DPA MSU - SBT High Level Meeting MSU 21 Nov 2008 - notes to SBT

MSU documents
2010-02-10_MFP Draft Agenda (DPA mediation Focal Point) (sample)
090304_UN Mediation Focal Point Meeting (sample)
SBT Policy Directive - 15 May 08 (not approved)
SBT Policy Directive – 15 March 2010 (not approved)
MSU DPA Business Plan 2009 - 2010 FINAL
MSU PROG OF WORK 2008 FINAL [2 Jan 08]
The UN Interagency Framework for Coordination of Preventive Action
Operational Guidance Notes - template (Nov 2008)
Overview of 2008-2009 SBT Support Activities (March 2008-June 2009)
Overview of 2009-2010 SBT Support Activities (July 2009-Sept 2010)
Overview of SBT Deployments by Theme (2008-2010)
Joint Strategy on Gender and Mediation, UNIFEM and UNDPA
DPA pledged SCR 1325 indicators
Action Plan of Sept 2010 on UNSCR 1889
DPA contributions to the technical definition of 1325 indicators (TWGGI), 4. Aug 2010
Mediation Support Unit, Annual Report 2009
Mediation Support Quarterly Update Oct – Dec 2009
Mediation Support Quarterly Update January – March 2010
Mediation Support Quarterly Update April – June 2010