Embedded Peace
Infrastructures for Peace: Approaches and Lessons Learned

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Executive Summary

Sustainable peace emerges from a deep, structural transformation of violent conflict into stable, non-violent social and political relationships. This paper argues that “Infrastructures for Peace”, a concept that entered the political arena recently, can help reconcile tensions that can arise from simultaneously addressing the dynamics of political, social and economic transformation, especially in contexts where the capacities to deal with conflict in a peaceful manner are weak. Infrastructures for Peace (I4P) can be understood as a dynamic network of skills, capacities, resources, tools and institutions that help build constructive relationships and enhance sustainable resilience of societies against the risks of relapse into violence.

The conceptual idea behind I4P arose as the result of engagements in various peacebuilding and peacekeeping projects in countries transitioning from war to peace, and/or from authoritarian regimes to participatory systems of government. The concept is premised on the basic assumption that relying on dysfunctional structures and pursuing peacebuilding objectives in an incoherent manner is likely to result in ineffective and unsustainable outcomes. Sustainable peace and peacebuilding depend not only on political will, but also on the availability of structural capacity for peace support in practice; access to structural capacity is most effective when based on coordinated planning, conscious design of institutions, individual and institutional empowerment as well as transparent implementation.

While the conceptualization of I4P has evolved significantly over the course of the last two decades, systematic efforts to learn lessons from working with I4P in diverse contexts are still scarce. The opportunities offered by the concept and practice of I4P seem to be poorly understood, and would benefit from more consistent nurturing and dissemination. This paper is designed to do just that: it aims to distill learning from the experience of expert practitioners and to draw conclusions on how to make use of generic lessons learned from the practice of working with and within I4P.

Promising entry points for international support exist with regard to drivers of change and the challenges of transformation. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is in a particularly privileged position to harness the concept to support its work at the nexus of development and peacebuilding. UNDP’s large presence on the ground, its capacities for conflict assessment and process support, and the effective network of Peace and Development Advisers (PDAs) combined with the mutually reinforcing collaboration with other actors across the UN system provide a solid basis for furthering work in this area. However, UNDP also faces challenges and potential drawbacks that could hamper its ability to achieve results through I4P, including internal and external, structural and conceptual impediments.

In addition to provide key insights on the concept, design and tailoring of I4P processes to national contexts, this paper also elaborates on recommendations to improve and expand the potential role that UNDP can play in promoting and supporting I4P - both in conceptual terms and in practice. However, this research paper will also be of benefit to other organizations and practitioners involved in implementing and supporting I4P.
1. Background and Objectives

A wealth of literature exists about the nature of armed conflicts; century-long scholarly research has investigated the root causes, catalysts, and structures of armed conflicts. A certain level of knowledge exists on: gun cultures; war economies; the dynamics of conflict escalation dynamics; security dilemmas; arms proliferation; and, the mobilization of populations along ethno-political and religious lines. Identifiable markers such as poor governance, State fragility, autocratic rule, and/or foreign domination contribute to an understanding of why social or political conflicts repeatedly degenerate into armed violence and war.

However, what do we know about the constituent elements of sustainable peace? Our knowledge of the root causes, structures and catalysts of peace seems less robust. Furthermore, what we do know is often insufficiently put into practice. How else can we explain why at least half of all post-conflict countries relapse into armed violence within a decade after conflict (Collier 2004, 2; Mason et. al, 2011), creating repeated “cycles of violence” (World Bank 2011)? Why is the knowledge and skills that we do possess concerning how to resolve conflicts peacefully so often neglected?

This paper is based on the assumption that peacebuilding and sustainable peace can be supported and enhanced if these dynamic processes are embedded in a network of infrastructures – I4P. If armed conflict can be understood as an archetype of a distorted relationship between social actors that is built on certain root causes, drivers and structures, peace must be looked at from the perspective of an alternative archetype, one which also has identifiable root causes, drivers and structures. Starting from this general assumption, this paper – and the I4P concept as a whole - is guided by an underlying hypothesis: the better the intrinsic fabric of peace is understood, the more social and political actors are able to undertake necessary efforts to build supportive structures that help to maintain and strengthen the state of peace.

Evidently, sustainable peace can never be the result of a “one-size-fits-all” approach. The peaceful relationships within a society, as with any other form of social relations, are intrinsically determined by various factors, such as culture, traditions, social organization, economic opportunities and the political context. Therefore, countries suffering from poverty or from a lack of access to resources, for example, may in one context give rise to increased tensions and violence, but not in others. Identical mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes may work well in one case, but completely fail in another. This being said, this paper argues that, despite these important differences, some basic commonalities exist between different cases, which allow one to draw generic conclusions about how to design and implement peacebuilding processes, and to create I4P in practice.

This research was commissioned to the Berghof Foundation by UNDP. The objective of the collaboration is to learn from the expert knowledge and experience of practitioners working with I4P, and to further develop the conceptual and practical framework behind this I4P concept.

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2. Methodology

The research findings presented here are based on three major information sources:

- A desk-based research of scholarly articles, policy documents, field reports, grey papers, and insider expert statements;
- Interviews with researchers, project managers, planners, local experts, as well as governmental and non-governmental practitioners; and,
- Conceptual and contextual knowledge gathered by the Berghof Foundation team over the course of past conflict transformation research and peace support activities in Asia, Europe, and Latin America.

The desk-based research benefitted considerably from an African ACTION Support Centre mapping study, “Strengthening the African Peace and Security Architecture – An Assessment of National Infrastructures for Peace” (2014), commissioned by UNDP. Using insights from over 60 interviews with respondents from 23 countries, this project compared and reflected upon experiences with I4P work across various African regions. The synthesis of lessons learned from those cases has informed this study.

As well as relevant academic work, other relevant sources used for the desk-based study include:

- Conceptual guidelines and guidance notes published by UNDP e.g. “Governance for Peace”, 2012, “Supporting Insider Mediation”, 2015;
- Relevant UN resolutions e.g. General Assembly resolution A/66/291, “Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution”;
- Concept notes and documents from the European Union e.g. such as the findings from the European External Action Service (EEAS) Mediation Support Pilot Project, 2013;
- A wide range of other international, regional, and national documents related to the research e.g. “OECD Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations Report,” 2008; the “OECD Fragile States Principles Monitoring Survey,” 2010, “State of Fragility”, 2015, etc.

Approximately 120 international and national representatives from government, civil society representatives, inter-governmental organizations (IGO) and international non-governmental organizations (INGO) staff, UNDP and the rest of the UN system, regional and resident programme coordinators, PDAs, programme and project staff, academic consultants, and experts took part in this research this research, including through interviews, questionnaires and focus groups. Most engagements were carried out in electronic form through an online questionnaire; through this questionnaire, 56

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1 This included: 56 online questionnaire responses; 19 interviews in Nepal, 8 in South Africa, 5 each in Peru and Tunisia, 4 in the Philippines, 8 in Washington D.C. (interviews and focus group) and 9 interviews in New York (interviews and focus group); and, several interviews and exchanges with further experts on I4P.
respondents from all over the world contributed their insights and assessments. Additionally, another 40 face-to-face interviews were conducted with practitioners and experts in Nepal, Peru, the Philippines, Tunisia, and South Africa. Furthermore, in September 2014 two thematic focus group discussions with international IGO and INGO experts took place in New York and Washington, D.C. An international expert advisory group also provided useful comments on the design and draft results of this report.

Lastly, the Berghof Foundation’s accumulated practical and conceptual knowledge on conflict transformation support structures (Berghof Foundation 2008; Berghof Peace Support 2010; Unger et.al. 2013) also informed the report. Lessons have been learned and captured from various peace support projects, particularly in Sri Lanka, Nepal, Thailand, Afghanistan and Yemen. Unfortunately, the timing of this study did not allow for active field research. Therefore, all comparative findings and conclusions are the result of the analysis and synthesis of opinions and findings compiled and presented by others.
3. Concept and Definition

3.1 An Evolving Concept

Jean Paul Lederach first introduced the concept of “Infrastructures for Peace” in the 1980s. It was based on his assumption that sustainable peace can only be the result of a deep and structural conflict transformation, including a transformation of the socio-economic root causes and political drivers of the conflict (Lederach 2005, 47). This concept entered the political arena, bringing with it a new scholarly discourse about how to carve out and harness I4P in practice, when the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan referred to the term in several statements between 2001 and 2009.

In terms of policy guidance, I4P gained wider attention and intellectual interest only following post-election violence in Kenya (2007) and Ghana (2008), when national governments and civil society organizations began pioneering official implementation of a concept for national I4P in both countries. At the same time the international discourse on the challenges of peacebuilding increasingly focused on the needs for structural transformation to mitigate the risks of crises and State collapse in postwar societies. The five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals (PSGs) of the “New Deal” (2010) provided a guiding framework that fostered deeper understanding of I4P as a supportive concept to reconcile the challenges of the simultaneous political, social and economic stabilization and transformation in a non-violent manner.2

A wide range of practitioners and academics have conceptualised I4P and related concepts in diverse ways. Chetan Kumar, Senior Conflict Prevention Advisor at UNDP, proposed I4P as a network of interdependent systems, resources, values and skills co-owned by government, civil society and community institutions that promote dialogue and consultation, prevent conflict and enable peaceful mediation when violence occurs in a society (Kumar 2011, UNDP 2013). His definition emphasized targeted dialogue and consultation as indispensable tools to prevent violent conflict and enable peaceful mediation. According to this definition, practically everything that could prove useful for establishing the required capabilities for developing and implementing these particular tools (systems, resources, values, skills) could be considered as elements of an I4P. Other definitions, on the other hand, placed different issues centre-stage.

Paul van Tongeren, former Secretary-General of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), defined I4P as “cooperative, problem-solving approaches to conflict” within societies, based on dialogue and non-violence, and he called for the development of “institutional mechanisms, appropriate to each country’s culture, which promote and manage this approach at local, district, and national levels” (van Tongeren 45-55). While, according to van Tongeren, I4P would comprise more tools than just dialogue and consultations, his definition implies that they consist of institutionalised mechanisms. Notwithstanding these differences, it is useful to remind to the reader of Jean Paul Lederach’s reference to the need for “cooperative and engaged relationships beyond immediate offices, projects and mandates” (Lederach 2012, 13). There is good reason to assume that I4P is more than institutions alone, let alone a determined set of institutions.

For Ulrike Hopp-Nishanka, for example, I4P means giving “give peace an address”: i.e. institutions that assist the parties (e.g. through capacity-building or advice); the process (e.g. through mediation between

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2 The five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals are: (1) legitimate politics, (2) security, (3) economic consolidation, (4) justice, and (5) revenues and services. http://www.newdeal4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/new-deal-for-engagement-in-fragile-states-en.pdf
the conflict parties or facilitation of public participation), or the implementation of process results (e.g. through monitoring and coordination of agreement implementation) (Hopp-Nishanka 2013, Unger et al. 2013, 4). James C. Scott, on the other hand, has coined the term ‘infrapolitical’ to capture the non-institutional connective nature of relations within a political system. Sustainable peace is dependent on functioning institutions, but also on intact and constructive social relationships (Scott 1992).

Jeannine Suurmond and Prakash Mani Sharma (2013) as well as Kai Brand-Jacobsen (2013), on the other hand, have drawn an analogy between peace infrastructures and existing and proven infrastructures in health-care, education, and finance. As a systemic network designed for simultaneous prevention, curing, healing, and public education, such a network creates effectiveness through the functional integration and organized interplay between its constitutive parts, each with related skills, capacities, resources, tools, and institutions.

Most interviewees for this research confirmed what the desk research had revealed: variants of I4P can exist at any stage of peacebuilding, even if they are not explicitly branded as Infrastructures for Peace. But in order to match the crucial needs of sustainability, peace infrastructures must be able to flexibly respond to dynamic and systemic challenges in the society in transition. In that, infrastructures for peace interlink efforts on – or within – different tracks and units, as well as areas of peacebuilding and statebuilding.

To conclude, I4P can be defined as a dynamic networking of skills, capacities, resources, tools and institutions that help build constructive social and political relationships and enhance sustainable resilience of societies against relapse into violence.

### 3.1.1 Infrastructures for Peace: Building Constructive Relationships

As previously discussed, building sustainable peace depends on functioning institutions as well as constructive social relationships. Institutions serve little purpose if people working within them do not recognize them as peacebuilding assets, or if they do not have the skills to manage them properly. One interview respondent emphasized that conflict-sensitivity, cultural empathy and intercultural skills are critical and should ideally go hand in hand; these important “soft skills” are, however, often neglected or underestimated when operational staff for peace support is selected.

To understand which structural components – including skills, capacities, resources, tools and institutions – are required at a particular moment in time in order to transform relationships, it helps to explore what seems to be ‘critical’. What is necessary to create daily social and political relationships that help prevent conflict from becoming violent (Brand-Jacobsen 2013)?

Relationships between social actors ultimately break down when conflicts turn violent. However, since conflicts related to statebuilding processes are systemic by nature, it is not easy to predict the tipping points for conflict turning violent. The history of broken relationships is often long and deep rooted, with deteriorating processes of communication and cooperation. Sustainable constructive relations do not result from formally agreed rules of behavior. Restoring, building and maintaining constructive relations start from mutual trust and experiencing the benefits of collaboration. While building relations depends on skills, capacities, resources and supportive institutions, it can only really unfold only if these elements interact in a mutually-reinforcing manner.
3.1.2 Infrastructures for Peace: Enhancing Sustainable Resilience

The institutional capability to respond to any emerging social or political crisis (i.e. resilience) depends on the degree of social cohesion, human security, public order and control, a functioning government, cultivated leadership, and reliable mechanisms for peaceful dispute settlement. It is influenced by the way peacebuilding processes have unfolded and how the emerging I4P have managed the manifold setbacks during the process, especially in its initial stages.

Text Box 1: Resilience

According to UNDP resilience is achieved when the States are able to

- Perform essential State functions;
- Rebuild public administrative capacities;
- Improve strategic and daily service delivery;
- Establish local government authority and functions;
- Empower and engage civil society; and
- Ensure rule of law, access to justice, and protection of human rights (UNDP 2012, 43, 85).

I4P should not aim to substitute for the absence of governance structures, but rather to provide tailor-made subsidiary structures to support existing institutions and mechanisms for political and social governance: they should seek to provide flexible support in the moment as and when required. Translated into the lexicology of peacebuilding and conflict transformation, this means ameliorating society’s capacity and ability to mediate and peacefully transform conflicts of any kind in any sphere, or – in other words – to create a culture of dialogue and behaviour that prioritizes constructive collaboration as the principled approach of social interaction.

Focusing on building resilience is relevant all along the conflict transformation cycle, but it is of particular relevance in volatile environments, when conflict transformation depends upon creating structures that can function in the absence of an effective State and in cases where crises spill over to neighboring countries. UNDP’s resilience-based development response in conflict-affected countries such as Iraq, Lebanon and Syria and their neighbours, such as Jordan and Turkey, provide good examples of how building and strengthening structures for peace and development can be tailored to local needs, and form part of a comprehensive framework (UNDP, 2013). Other cases of relevance include those where power-sharing models are at stake or are being negotiated, which may also include the negotiation of autonomy agreements within a constitutional nation State. If the authority of a government is contested as such, the mandates for governmental responsibility within or vis-à-vis infrastructures for peace must be spelled out particularly carefully (for the Philippines, see Santos 2009).

The distinct features of I4P originate from their intention to provide what is required in a community of social actors (units, states, societies) to allow for a consensual and participatory settlement of disputes.
4. Designing Infrastructures for Peace

The structural groundwork for sustained peace exists in practically all States and societies, even if this groundwork lacks the formal branding of I4P. The conceptual idea behind intentionally creating an I4P arose from the experience of working with various peacebuilding or peacekeeping projects, starting from the basic assumption that pursuing such projects in an incoherent manner would result in ineffective and unsustainable outcomes. If sustainable peace and peacebuilding depend not only on relevant actors’ political will, but also on the availability of structural capacity and the sufficient access to it, this access should be based on coordinated planning, conscious design of institutions, empowerment and transparent implementation. While the conceptualization of I4P has evolved during the last two decades, systematic efforts to learn lessons from working with and designing I4P are still scarce. This is partly due to the enormous challenge of understanding the intrinsic linkages between various components, and of viewing an infrastructure for peace as a functioning network. The following sections shed light on the distinct role of I4P at different stages of peacebuilding processes, with a focus on how to design them to suit different national contexts.

4.1 Infrastructures for Peace in Post-conflict Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding after protracted armed conflict takes place under conditions that usually fall short of a fully-established and functioning State. Moreover, peacebuilding efforts often face challenges from existing economic imbalances, insecurity, lacking rule of law and a disempowered civil society.

I4P in the context of peacebuilding processes are particularly supportive in the early phases of transition because they can buttress insufficiently developed institutional and operational capacities of a State and society; this process helps reveal the intrinsic ability of both the State and society to foster and further their own peacebuilding objectives. I4P can provide, at least temporarily, a platform for inclusion, participation and collaboration, based on the mutual interest of conflicting parties. This platform can be used to explore nonviolent alternatives to the use of force, and to establish a joint roadmap for (re-) creating legitimacy of governance and accountability of government.

It is important to note that, ultimately, I4P constitute a systemic phenomenon, rather than simply being the accumulation of some institutionalized components: it is a process of continued networking, rather than an achievement. In that regard, I4P may comprise several roles within one; they can be seen as a tool to provide participation and collaboration between social actors – or as an incubator for joint learning and a platform for empowerment. They also provide a framework for bringing together collective efforts to deal with challenges of peacebuilding and statebuilding.

4.1.1 Peacebuilding: Elementary Infrastructures for Peace

The need for structural spaces to maintain peace varies over time according to the dynamics of post-conflict state and institution-building. Immediately after an armed conflict’s end, for example, reliable mechanisms to monitor and implement ceasefires or peace accords are instrumental due to the lack of mutual trust. These mechanisms are only the initial steps towards establishing minimum levels of trust required to enter into a sustainable peacebuilding process. A remarkable expression of the confidence-building function of these initial structures and mechanisms is that they are usually agreed to formally, in order to make them mutually verifiable and removable if the agreements are broken or trust is lost.
Text Box 2: Examples of confidence-building structures and mechanisms

- Ceasefire monitoring commissions;
- Peace agreement implementation task forces;
- Mechanisms for emergency communication and clarification of disputed issues;
- A third-party presence on the ground;
- Early-warning and early-response mechanisms;
- Trustworthy information and communication systems;
- Service delivery mechanisms for fulfilling elementary needs (e.g. security, health, food, housing, etc.).

These structures and mechanisms can only initially serve as an elementary I4P. But if applied in a skilful way, with sufficient resources earmarked to guarantee their functionality, and if the staffing is professional and related institutions are sufficiently transparent and accessible to the people who are most in need of them, they can bring about an initial space of trust that can lay the groundwork for an emerging infrastructure of peace.

4.1.2 Peacebuilding: Advanced Infrastructures for Peace

Once basic trust in the viability of post-war security has been established, a gradual building of legitimate institutions - still duly limited in scope and steps - can follow. During the early phase of transformation, the formerly conflicting parties often request additional and more specific guarantees, while also keeping “fallback options” available in order to mitigate any perceived unilateral action and risks. Similarly, those factions of the society affected by the conflict – but who were not necessarily party to it – need support and encouragement to engage actively in the process of post-conflict peacebuilding. Many statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts focus on the conflicting parties and their particular interests or needs, while neglecting the victims of armed violence and turning a blind eye to the erosion of trust within a post-war society as a whole.

Infrastructural components that help foster and improve inclusive participation and ownership are of particular relevance for this stage. Inclusion and participation can temporarily compensate for the lack of both a constitution and the right conditions to hold free and fair elections. Consequently, advanced I4P can buttress functions of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary if legitimate structures of governance do not yet exist (see for example Mason 2009, Ropers 2013).
Text Box 3: Examples of peacebuilding approaches that foster inclusion and participation

- **Insider mediation** (UNDP 2014, see also Mason 2009, Ropers 2013, Huber 2014) can help address the impact of underlying root causes of a conflict from a perspective of cultural or religious affinity and sensitivity (see chapter 6.3).
- **National dialogues** that create a formalized or semi-formalized space within which social and political actors can communicate and explore common interests, visions and aims.
- **Provisional power-sharing structures** that provide a framework for functional governance through the cooperation of the main social and political stakeholders.
- **Donor support** that offers technical assistance and guidance in managing the process of statebuilding, constitution-drafting, economic recovery and transitional justice.
- **Representative commissions** that help engage and empower civil society actors and organizations; they may also provide spaces for public control and oversight.
- **NGO-driven capacity-building** to local civil society actors that help strengthen local skills and ownership.
- **Electoral commissions** that pave the way to install a legitimate, participatory process of free elections by secret ballot.

The role of I4P is subject to change, with increasingly more importance given to the complementary or reinforcing potential of I4P, instead of the purely “buttressing” roles they primarily play in the wake of violent conflict. Advanced I4P are less dependent on determined timescales and pre-defined outcomes; rather, they resonate with the distinct political culture and traditions of a society and their ability to influence peacebuilding processes depends upon how they help balance actors’ interests and reconcile existing conflicts and tensions.

Whereas elementary I4P seek to build basic confidence and are therefore based on negotiated agreements and verifiable outcomes, the components for advanced I4P seek to heal and restore the distorted relationships within the society that gave rise to the conflict in the first place. Unlike elementary I4P therefore, it is not the concrete outcomes but the character of the process that matters most. Conflict and cultural sensitivity play an important role in these processes, as does the willingness to deal constructively and proactively with the past and prepare for a shared future.

Text Box 4: Components for advanced Infrastructures for Peace

- Truth and reconciliation commissions;
- Traditional mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes (e.g. palavers, shuras, gacaca);
- Councils of wise, elders or eminent people;
- Privilege systems for minorities (e.g. election quotas, local representation rules).

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3 The positive impact of power-sharing regimes on peacebuilding is a contentious issue. Hartzell and Hoddie argue that power-sharing may enhance the buy-in of the parties and their interest in maintaining peace (cf. Hartzell/Hoddie 2003). Others hint to the risk of preserving traditional power structures and of impeding the transition to more participatory and heterogeneous societies (cf. Söderberg-Kovacs 2008, Kwan-Jung 2013).
Truth and reconciliation commissions are essential elements of transitional justice, and can help pave the way for a new culture of listening, better mutual understanding of the past, for providing minimum justice to the victims and their families, and for exploring the ground for living together in peace. Traditional mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes are often deeply rooted in the local cultures and customs that can enhance social cohesion. Often rooted in ethnicity, tribe or the historical evolution of a given context, traditional forms of conflict prevention and conflict resolution can be particularly effective within certain cultural frameworks. Since many traditional mechanisms are process-focused and participatory, they seem to foster trust and community-building.\textsuperscript{4} Similarly, Councils of the Wise, for example, can help create resilient social frameworks based on authority and respect. However, as a caveat for both, traditional mechanisms and councils can also create counterproductive results, if they perpetuate traditional structures of inherited power and oppression.

At all stages of peacebuilding, change dynamics rely and depend upon confidence-building through constructive political and social relationships. If peacebuilding aims to restore the legitimacy of State institutions, the ability of the State and society to prevent crises and to resolve conflicts peacefully, then transparency, accessibility and participation are key indicators of success. I4P, if based on these indicators, can provide a space for sustainable collaborative engagement – a dynamic and adaptive safety-net of peace – or, as in Robert Ricigliano’s words, a space for building “networks of effective action” (Ricigliano 2003).

Peacebuilding must be understood as a fluid process with different elements and asymmetric speeds. Therefore, I4P during peacebuilding must be regarded as a “moving target”, dependent on changing needs and challenges and circumstances. Some components may be sustained, while others may adapt to the evolving political, social and cultural transformation. Absolutely key in this stage of peacebuilding are preparatory steps towards elections. Elections and referenda can be a trigger for violence, but they also serve as crucial elements for transitions and peacebuilding. The acceptance of results is of utmost importance for a durable peaceful transition; hence an inclusive and legitimate process is required. Consequently, selecting a legitimate and culturally-sensitive, but also legally consistent and sufficiently inclusive electoral system is important.

\subsection*{4.2 Salient Democracies: Are Infrastructures for Peace still required?}

The need for peaceful, participatory and collaborative settlement of disputes is not confined to peacebuilding endeavours after conflict. Most societies – including salient democracies – are time and again confronted with the challenges of dealing with crises and conflicts. Even a fully-fledged State-society framework does not provide a guarantee for resilience against violence. Moreover, in societies that have functioning social networks, the public interest in engaging the State in all spheres of social life can often be limited. Peace infrastructures can help to complement the governance architecture of a democratic society to prevent conflicts from escalating, and to help foster inclusion and collaboration. Some of these instruments may originate in the preceding process of peacebuilding, while others are inspired and influenced by the nature of the social fabric, the political culture and traditions of a society.

\textsuperscript{4} The reintegration rituals in Polynesia and Hawaii provide a good example for the positive effects of such traditional mechanisms. The so-called Ho`oponopono rituals aim at creating a process of joint and individual catharsis. They require that all people involved directly or indirectly in previous violence confess their share of responsibility and guilt in public. In a subsequent step they declare their readiness to provide a concrete contribution to resolving the conflict, to overcome its root causes and to provide adequate reparation. This comprehensive and mediated approach engages the community as a whole. (Shook 2002).
Text Box 5: Complementary Peace Infrastructures

- Professional or semi-professional mediation – to resolve and settle disputes without resorting to courts;
- Parliamentary bodies designated to support conflict transformation, mediation and civil crisis management – to help create synergies, coherency and reinforcing impact through multi-stakeholder cooperation;
- Impartial ombudspersons – to provide public opportunities to address issues of real or perceived injustice in a conflict-sensitive manner;
- Peace-education related curricula in public schools – to foster a culture of peace starting from childhood.

4.3 National Approaches

Most conceptual approaches to I4P originate from a national perspective: national frameworks, after all, bring about a ‘culture of accountability’ (AIMP 2013). Peace infrastructures on the national level provide support to existing institutions and mechanisms but with a clear mandate within the national political and legal system; they hence offer support where these institutions or mechanisms are dysfunctional or overstrained, where they have no formal powers, or if competitive mandates obstruct immediate conflict resolution endeavours.

At the national level, the design and implementation of I4P are closely related to the acute challenges of statebuilding. They aim to provide legitimacy to political transformation processes and transitional governance structures. Moreover, they seek to bridge the various tracks of governance for the ultimate goal of social cohesion based on a national identity. According to this functional role, national I4P are not necessarily designed and established top-down, and within a national framework they can also be built bottom-up.

4.3.1 Government-initiated Infrastructures for Peace

Ghana developed the first coherent National Peace Architecture at all national governmental levels. Its National Peace Council was responsive to a wide range of challenges and mediated or facilitated dialogues on diverse issues. The infrastructure has interconnected, vertical and horizontal dimensions and functioning peace advisory councils exist at the district, regional, and national level; government-affiliated peace promotion officers are based at the regional and district level; and, a coordinating Peacebuilding Support Unit exists within the Ministry of Interior.

- In Togo, a national platform for political dialogue was established in 2010 to enhance the ability of civic actors to conduct a nonviolent peace campaign. A precautionary pre-poll agreement on a code of conduct in post-election governance, signed by the major political parties, helped inform the design of a national architecture for conflict management, with lessons adopted and adapted from the Ghanaian experience.
- Costa Rica established a Ministry of Justice and Peace mandated to implement a National Peace Plan and to support peacebuilding efforts undertaken by civil society organizations (CSOs).
After the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) was signed in 2006, the Nepali government established a Ministry for Peace and Reconciliation.

Other countries have implemented similar bodies (such as the Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process – OPAPP in the Philippines), appointed special ombudspersons (such as Peru in 1993), or organized national mechanisms or fora on peacebuilding-related issues such as all-party conferences on peacebuilding and reconciliation (e.g. Somalia 1992, Sudan 2009).

The National Commission on Integration and Cohesion in Kenya, formed as a result of the 2008 peace agreement is another good example for such an approach.

The Solomon Islands established a Ministry of National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace as its own national-level coordination institution.

### Table 1: Advantages and challenges associated with “top-down” I4P

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages of top-down designed I4P</th>
<th>Challenges related to top-down designed I4P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized mandate provided by the government.</td>
<td>Political influence of the government and/or ruling actors on the design and implementation of I4P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political and legal accountability of structures and operations.</td>
<td>Risk of bureaucratic procedures and decision-making as well as departmental infighting (mission creep).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest and support of the government to make I4P functioning and successful.</td>
<td>One-sided dependence on permanent governmental interest and support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to funding, staff; premises are provided and budgeted for.</td>
<td>Difficulties for CSO actors to receive sufficient funding, staff support and a fair share of support structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional flow and dissemination of essential information.</td>
<td>Information may be biased and information flow may be controlled by governmental authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media coverage and interest.</td>
<td>Lack of independent and effective public oversight.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.3.2 Society-based Infrastructures for Peace

Bottom-up approaches originate in society-based initiatives, often initiated by civil society organizations such as women movements, insider mediation networks, advocacy groups and/or clerical organizations. In some cases state actors are invited or become involved during the inception phase of institution-building.

The Inter-Religious Council in Uganda, the Public Affairs Committee in Malawi, and the Tunisian Quartet (a coalition of non-state actors led by the General Labor Union, UGTT) provide examples of national bodies that were not governmental, but which were considered influential and credible actors in their own countries. These actors have played a significant role in the recent months and years in mediating tensions, creating a political space for dialogue and cooperation, and ensuring elections or political transitions. These membership-based entities, which provide a caucus for dialogue and cooperation among their members, would not traditionally be considered part of a national governance structure, nor of a formal national peace architecture. However, being granted legitimacy by tens of thousands of members and having equipped themselves with the capacity to convene key actors and to mediate, they have become critical components of national infrastructures for peace.
The Tunisian “Quartet”

The Tunisian Quartet (The Quartet) is a coalition of non-state actors which initiated a National Dialogue to safeguard the political transition process in a time of serious political crisis and deadlock in the mandated structures of the constitutional process. The Quartet was formed by the General Labor Union (UGTT), the employers’ association (UTICA), the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH) and the bar association. This network convened and facilitated multi-party negotiations to re-establish consensus on the implementation and roadmap of the transition process. Whilst the UGTT was the most powerful actor in the network, the Quartet gained credibility due to the participation of a coalition of actors that played a significant role during the revolution.

The UGTT has more than 600,000 members. It has significantly impacted the 2011 revolution and the transition period thereafter. With 150 offices across the country and over 680,000 members it constitutes a credible locus of political activity. Its legitimacy and its political leverage even increased during the “Arabellion” due to its influence on the political agenda, but also due to its presence in the remote hinterland where the revolution began.

Today, The Quartet – led by UGTT – is considered one of the main bodies in the country that is capable and qualified to resolve disputes peacefully. During the transition period, it emerged as key mediator and power-broker, when mediation skills were needed most. It helped to create an institutional and dialogical framework that eventually paved the way towards the free and peaceful parliamentary and presidential elections at the end of 2014. For its enduring efforts to support a peaceful transition the Nobel Prize Committee awarded the 2015 Peace Nobel Prize to the Tunisian Quartet.

Another important strand of CSO-based organizations include movements that are able to support building bridges across potentially contentious perceived “divides”, such as race, religion, ethnicity or class. Women or youth movements, being particularly adept at addressing collective identity, can play an important role within peace infrastructures by combining their own identity with distinct peace support skills, whether as peace ambassadors, peace envoys or as facilitators and resources for empowerment. The DRC, Uganda and Nepal provide examples of how women and youth have accumulated social and political influence as peace ambassadors, capacity-builders or through running special radio programmes.

In Guatemala, for example, government-owned support structures to monitor peace agreement implementation evolved over time, while a separate Civil Society Assembly was established to also allow the public to participate in the peace process (Sarti/Schünemann 2011).
4.3.3 Peace Infrastructure Components – Synopsis (Examples)

I4P take various organizational forms and names, and exercise different functions, as they are shaped by local culture, traditions and the needs of a particular setting. The table below seeks to present common examples of such structures.

Table 2: Advantages and challenges associated with bottom-up designed I4P

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages of bottom-up designed I4P</th>
<th>Challenges related to bottom-up designed I4P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High legitimacy, provided by the drivers and participants of I4P.</td>
<td>Dependence on local power structures and balances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensitivity to cultural conditions due to limited scope and mandate.</td>
<td>Marginalization of minorities and influence of culturally inherited hierarchies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diminished influence by external actors</td>
<td>Limited outreach and impact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence in allotting funds and taking decisions.</td>
<td>Lack of sufficient resources and funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailor-made approaches to conflict resolution and peacebuilding.</td>
<td>Lack of appropriate skills and power to implement decisions and recommendations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective and direct public oversight.</td>
<td>Lack of media coverage and public interest.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Examples of I4P

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Primary Functions</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local peace councils/committees</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Informal or formal</td>
<td>Inclusion, local problem solving, legitimizing local governance</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Peace Shuras, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Village Peace Committees, Kenya, Nepal, Nicaragua, Local Peace Commissions, Serbia, Committees on Inter-Community Relations, Sierra Leone, District Code of Conduct Monitoring Committees, South Africa, Local Peace Committees, South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional, district peace councils/committees</td>
<td>Regional, province, district</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Provincial Peace Committee, District Shuras, FYR Macedonia, Municipal Committees for Inter-Community Relations (CICRs), Ghana, Regional Peace Advisory Councils, Kenya, Wajir Peace and Development Committee, District Peace Committees, Northern Ireland, District Policing Partnerships, Sierra Leone, District Code of Conduct Monitoring Committees, South Africa, Regional Peace Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Mandate</td>
<td>Primary Functions</td>
<td>Examples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| National peace councils/committees      | National    | Formal    | Coordination and support to state-building; offering a framework for political transitions, inclusive elections and drafting of a new constitution | • Afghanistan, High Peace Council  
• Ghana, National Peace Council  
• Kenya, National Peace Council, National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management  
• Nepal, High Level Peace Committee HLPC  
• Solomon Islands, National Peace Council  
• South Africa, National Peace Committee |
| Peace secretariats                      | National    | Formal    | Coordination, facilitate consensus-building, secretarial tasks such as logistical support, communication, liaison, monitoring and implementation of negotiation results (often temporary structures during peace processes) | • Ghana, National Peace Council Secretariat  
• Nepal, Nepal Peace Secretariat  
• Philippines, Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP)  
• South Africa, National Peace Secretariat  
• Sri Lanka, Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP) |
| Government bureaux, departments or Peace ministries | National | Formal    | Coordination                                                                        | • Costa Rica, Ministry of Justice and Peace  
• Ghana  
• Nepal, Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction  
• Peru, National Office for Dialogue and Sustainability (ONDS)  
• Philippines  
• Solomon Islands, Ministry for National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace (MINURP)  
• South Sudan, Ministry for Peace and Comprehensive Peace Agreement Implementation |
| Policy and legislative measures creating I4P | National    | Formal    | Enabler                                                                            | • Ghana, National Peace Council Bill 2011  
• Costa Rica, Law for the Alternative Resolution of Conflicts and Promotion of Peace 1997  
• Kenya, National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management 2011  
• Philippines, Policy Framework for Peace 2001 |
| National Dialogues/conferences and multi-party negotiations | National    | Formal    | Preparatory forum for creating a framework for political transition, drafting a new constitution and elections | • Afghanistan, National Consultative Peace Jirga  
• Bolivia  
• Colombia  
• Eastern Europe, roundtables  
• Ghana  
• Iraq, Iraqi National Conference  
• Lebanon,  
• South Africa, Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP)  
• Sudan  
• Tunisia  
• Yemen, National Dialogue Conference |
| Non-governmental and civil society platforms for peace and dialogue; inter-religious networks, trade-unionist forums, women’s movements, councils of the elderly, wise men etc. | Regional, national | Informal, sometimes formal | Participation and inclusion, advocacy and public pressure | • Ghana  
• Malawi  
• Tunisia  
• Uganda  
• Turkey |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Primary Functions</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Transitional justice mechanisms such as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs), vetting councils, lustration mechanisms | National, local | Formal | Support to political transitions, dealing with the past and reconciliation | • Afghanistan, Traditional Loya Jirga  
• South African, Commission of Truth and Reconciliation 1995, Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence (Goldstone Commission) 1991  
• Cambodia  
• Rwanda, International Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations 1990  
• Guatemala, Commission for Historical Clarification  
• Peru, Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2001  
• Chile, National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation 1990, National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture 2003  
• El Salvador, Commission on the Truth for El Salvador 1992  
• Côte d’Ivoire, Mediation Committee for National Reconciliation 2000  
• Timor-Leste, Commission on Reception Truth and Reconciliation |
| Insider mediation | National, regional, local | Informal, sometimes formal | Mediation, capacity-building, dialogue facilitation | • Burkina Faso  
• Cameroon  
• CAR  
• Ghana  
• Guinea  
• Lesotho  
• Philippines  
• Senegal  
• Swaziland  
• Thailand  
• Togo  
• Tunisia |
| Early-warning and response | National | Formal | Early-warning and response | • Kenya, Uwiano Platform, Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism CEWARN  
• Ghana, GhanaWarn |
| Inter-state governmental or non-governmental forums and networks | Continental sub-continental | Formal | Coordination, capacity-building, advocacy (funds) and advisory functions | • EU and OSCE Mediation Support teams  
• West Africa Network for Peacebuilding,  
• Groups of Friends, a.o. |
| UN affiliated peace and mediation support structures | Global | Formal | Technical support, capacity-building, facilitation and mediation | • UNDP-DPA Peace and Development Advisers  
• Mediation Support Unit, UN Department of Political Affairs  
• Governance and Peacebuilding Cluster, Conflict Prevention Team, UNDP BPPS |
| IGO/CSO based support organizations networks | Global | Informal | Technical support, capacity-building, advocacy | • Mediation Support Network |

4.3.4 External Support

Even though I4P are considered to be national by character, it must be taken into account that transnational and international factors can influence the way in which peace is “built” within a nation and society. This influence can be either negative (“spoiling”) or positive. Negative effects can be prevented or mitigated through protective and collaborative measures, and international organizations can help play a protective role against spoilers by, for example, deploying UN-mandated multinational peacekeepers
on the ground or through measures of diplomatic support or pressure. Collaborative measures mainly include services such as: facilitation; capacity-building; technical assistance; the provision of additional funds; and/or mediation.

International actors can provide support to national I4P upon request, but often they do so following their own initiative and interests. In the latter case (more than in the former) this may reduce national ownership and impose policies on beneficiaries that are neither culturally-sensitive nor sustainable. Multi-actor and multi-track approaches, which bring together international and national as well as governmental and non-governmental initiatives to collaborate in providing tailor-made support to national, regional and local I4P is a practice that merits replication.

Text Box 6: Examples of integrated approaches to I4P

A good example of an integrated approach of international and national actors to support building national I4P on the cross-regional level was provided by the Action for Conflict Transformation adopted in the Liliesleaf Declaration for the African Insider Mediation Platform initiative in 2013 (AIMP 2013). The Liliesleaf Declaration called for:

- Partnerships in support of coherent, credible, and complementary national and local capacities for mediation and national peace architectures by working closely with UNDP, the AU, the Panel of the Wise and the Regional Economic Communities under the auspices of the African Peace and Security architecture;
- Technical support through a resource group of skilled mediators, and the provision of dynamic context and conflict dynamics analysis;
- Capacity-building through training courses on insider mediation and methodology development; and,
- A ‘community of practice’ developed through a platform of knowledge and experience-sharing; case-study dissemination; on-line portal development; and practice-to-theory feedback loops.

On the global level the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) provides a good reference. As an inter-governmental advisory body, the PBC supports peace processes in countries emerging from conflict by:

- Bringing together all of the relevant actors, including international donors, international financial institutions, national governments, and troop-contributing countries;
- Marshalling resources; and
- Advising on and proposing integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery and where appropriate, highlighting any gaps that threaten to undermine peace.

Other instruments which provide external support for peace infrastructures include;

- The Mediation Support Unit (UN Department of Political Affairs);
- The EU Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation Instruments Division, including the Mediation Support Team of the European External Action Service (EEAS); and,
- The new OSCE Mediation Support Team, which was established in 2014 in response to the crisis in the Ukraine.
Text Box 7: The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding

A particularly successful initiative emerged on the sub-continental level in Western Africa. The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) has become the leading peacebuilding support organization in Africa. Since its inception in 1998 it has brought together a collaborative platform of action with over 500 member organizations across Africa and strong national networks in every Member State of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). WANEP works in close partnership with ECOWAS, the UN and UNDP, and is a member of the Peace and Security cluster of the AU. Being more than a platform for knowledge-sharing and coordination, it provides training courses in conflict prevention throughout the region and is engaged on request in mediation and dialogue facilitation.

Text Box 8: The Mediation Support Network

The Mediation Support Network (MSN) is a small, global network of inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations that support mediation in peace negotiations. The mission of the MSN is to promote and improve mediation practice, processes and standards in order to address political tensions and armed conflict. MSN connects different mediation support units and organizations with the intention of:

- Promoting exchange about planned and on-going activities to enable synergies and cumulative impact;
- Providing opportunities for collaboration, initiating and encouraging joint activities; and
- Sharing analysis of trends and ways to address emerging challenges in the field of peace mediation.
5. Infrastructures for Peace: Learning from Cases

The number of countries that have implemented successful and sophisticated elements for I4P is numerous. Only a limited number of countries, however, have framed their approach to support the system of governance within a conceptual approach of I4P. The following five cases provide examples of countries where efforts were made to realize the I4P idea to: build dynamic networks in order to restore constructive relations; create resilience; and, to enhance peace.

5.1 Case Study: South Africa

South Africa’s political transition from an Apartheid regime, based on racial segregation resulting from over 340 years of colonial rule to a power-sharing constitutional State with a legitimate government was remarkable. The secret negotiations between the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Party (NP) in the mid- and late-1980s paved the way for the national transition. The multi-party talks resulted in the National Peace Accord (NPA), signed in September 1991 by 27 political, trade union and government leaders (de Klerk, 2002). South Africa was the first country that developed a comprehensive national framework for peacebuilding that resulted in a national infrastructure for peace.

Infrastructures for Peace in South Africa

Following the National Peace Accord (NPA) in 1991 a three-layered I4P was created in South Africa, which comprised the following main components (Odendaal 2014, 75):

• National Peace Committee
• National Peace Secretariat
• Regional Peace Committees
• Local Peace Committees
• Peace Monitors
**National**

- **National Peace Accord (NPA) - 1991**
  - Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Organizations
  - Code of Conduct for the Security Forces

- **National Peace Committee**
  Composed by the signatories to the NPA.

- **Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence (Goldstone Commission)**
  The five-person independent commission (chaired by Court Judge Richard Goldstone) aimed to investigate the causes of the political violence and intimidation, and provide steps to prevent further conflict.

- **Police Board**
  Established to provide better policing, including through policy change and improved police-community relations.

- **National Peace Secretariat**
  Established as the executive arm of the NPA with representatives of the 5 major parties (African National Congress, National Party, the Inkhata Freedom Party, Democratic Party, and Labour Party) as well as a delegated member each from the legal profession and from the Department of Justice, which was legally and financially responsible for the NPA.

- **Socio-Economic Reconstruction and Development**
  Sub-committee established to respond to post-violence needs of communities and to facilitate post-conflict development.

**Subnational/Regional**

- **Regional Peace Committees**
  Present in all 11 regions (except the so-called independent states of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei, and Venda) consisting of regional representatives of the signatories to the NPA and representatives of relevant regional organizations or institutions (e.g. traditional authorities).

**District/Local**

- **Local Peace Committees**
  Established at all local levels (districts, municipalities, villages) composed of local representatives of the signatories to the NPA as well as of local organizations, movements or personalities relevant to the peace process.

- **Peace Monitors**
  Approximately 15,000 peace monitors across the country, trained in negotiation and conflict resolution techniques.
A few other cross-cutting components were established that helped interconnect the three layers, including:

- A Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation (which was later named the Goldstone-Commission after its chairperson Judge Richard Goldstone);
- A Socioeconomic Reconstruction and Development Section that was in charge of responding to post-violence needs of communities, and of facilitating post-conflict development; and
- A Police Board, designed to provide better policing and police-community relations.

Confidence-building and accountability, which was of utmost importance – particularly for the early phases of transition – became strengthened through the agreement on – and implementation of – two nation-wide Codes of Conduct:

- A Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Organizations through which all signatories agreed to refrain from using violence and intimidation. Moreover the parties agreed on confidence-building measures through the pre-notification of determined activities, better transparency and mutual information;
- A Code of Conduct for the Security Forces. All services were required to collaborate with the signatories to the NPA to allow monitoring of their activities. Police had to wear name-tags, and police cars had to be clearly marked.

The South African I4P was truly innovative and ground-breaking. No rudimentary structures existed, accountability and confidence were not guaranteed, and no legal or procedural structures were in place to lay the ground for a new social contract. According to Andries Odendaal, the contribution of a small number of experienced NGOs became important. The collaboration between NGOs and peace committees, and their joint efforts to provide trainings and build capacity helped make them operational and functional (Odendaal 2014, 74). Most importantly for South Africa, the I4P were based on joint and inclusive ownership. The peace committees were established by their participants, which provided them with sufficient public legitimacy and political support. In places instances where consensus on forming peace committees could not be established, they did not come into being. Finally, Odendaal highlights the fact that the incorporation of police representatives into the peace committees helped to strengthen accountability while improving their buy-in as well as their readiness to cooperate with the police corps. The peace committees in South Africa aimed to address emerging outbreaks of violence through inclusive forums at the community level. Thus, they were tasked with preventing violence from the outset. When establishing an inclusive Local Peace Committee (LPC), the benefit of collaboration and joint problem-solving became immediately obvious to the entire community. The LPC remained operational for three years until the country’s first substantive national elections took place in 1994 (van Tongeren, 2013a). Indeed, the LPC served as the center-piece of this well-designed, multi-track peace infrastructure, not just in institutional terms, but also in light of the fact that they established a new code of conduct and new mode for interacting. However, the LPC did not exist in isolation, but were rather embedded into a nation-wide local and regional peace committee network.

The successful transition in South Africa cannot be explained without taking into account the supportive role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC), which provided a “metaphor for how we [South Africans] wanted to live together as a society” (Interview with a South African activist). Understanding the past was a painful task that resulted from a negotiated agreement on disbanding apartheid, and on restoring a new national identity.

**Assessment**

Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from the South African process is that any inclusive local peacebuilding mechanism can only work well if the most powerful stakeholders – in this case
the Government and ANC – are able to agree on a joint roadmap, remain committed, and provide guarantees that demonstrate commitment. In South Africa the two main conflict parties did not block one another; instead, they understood that a decentralized, nation-wide, local approach to structural peacebuilding could transform society as a whole. Another, if not the single most important public factor in the particular case of South Africa, was the presence of the two personalities – Mandela and de Klerk – who literally incarnated a commitment to the peace process and leadership skills that served as a strong reference to peace in the many moments of crisis during the transition process.

The peace process in South Africa was coordinated at all levels, with distinct but complementary roles for each track, and a countrywide network of similar institutional structures, contributing to what is now considered by other countries a success and role model for I4P. It has demonstrated that even a State and a society which was forcefully torn apart, which experienced a cruel past and began it national transition path with the highest level of mistrust and intolerance can change over time if the process is based on inclusivity, participation and ownership. Over two decades later it should be noted, however, that the peace will not last if the lessons learned from the past are not preserved and continuously applied. This has become even more important following Mandela’s death in 2013, because the integrative power that his personality had for the new South African social contract seems to be increasingly fading away and fragmentation is spreading anew.

5.2 Case Study: Ghana

Ghana is widely considered a case in which I4P were successfully integrated into a national policy. In fact, following the National Peace Council Act of 2011, Ghana has become West Africa’s most stable democracy (Kumar 2012, 389). The initiative for creating peace infrastructures as part of a national policy was designed to help reconcile tensions emerging from the existence of two States within one: a traditional State controlled by tribal chiefs without formal political authority, and a modern State controlled at the local level by a district chief executive. Similar to the South African approach, the guiding idea behind Ghana’s national I4P was to establish institutionalized structures at national, regional, and district levels which were capable of engaging all stakeholders in line with the mandate for dialogue facilitation, problem-solving, and reconciliation promotion (van Tongeran 2011, 406).

I4P in Ghana

Ghana’s national I4P encompasses three levels of government. It was established by decree of the Ministry of the Interior and was embedded into a legal superstructure (Ministry of the Interior 2006). Furthermore, it garnered support from international and regional organizations, such as the AU and ECOWAS, in addition to active non-governmental and civil society organizations. The National Peace Council Act of 2011 established a national I4P that consisted of a National Peace Committee, regional and district peace councils and as an innovative element, government-affiliated peace promotion officers at the regional and district level:
National

Ghana National Peace Council Act of 2011

National Peace Committee
A platform for consultation and cooperation among main stakeholders with the aim of promoting reconciliation, tolerance, trust and confidence-building, mediation and dialogue. According to its mandate the NPC coordinates the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts. It is tasked to provide mediation and mediation support, to monitor the peace process, and to offer indigenous solutions to conflicts. (Van Tongeren 2013a, UNDP 2015)

Peacebuilding Support Unit
Established within the Ministry of Interior, the Unit coordinates the collaboration of government agencies with the infrastructure for peace components and provides technical and administrative support.

Regional/District

Regional and District Councils
Subnational councils first emerged during the Dagbon crisis, when the Northern Region Peace Advocacy Council – a group of some 20 civil society representatives, religious leaders, and local authority representatives – was established. In 2007, when community groups in the suburbs of Tamale, the capital of the Northern Region of Ghana, had clashed over the construction of a water pipeline, the Northern Region Peace Advisory Council intervened successfully – the violence did not escalate and the conflict was settled outside court (Draman et al. 2009). The Council engaged with traditional chiefs and implemented dispute resolution methods around land, religion, social, and political issues, as well as community peacebuilding. The functioning infrastructure for peace, according to insider observers, “saved” the country from becoming plunged into political and social chaos “when it mattered most” (Emmanuel Bombande in: Kumar 2012, p. 389, see also Ojielo 2007, Kotia and Aubyn 2013)

Peace Promotion Officers
The Peace Promotion Officers are nominated by regional governments and appointed by the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) of Ghana to carry out effective coordination and communication between the local and national contexts (for details, see Odendaal 2011). With the help of UNDP, secretariats were established for each of the ten Regional Peace Councils and for four of the District Peace Councils (UNDP 2015).
Assessment
Ghana’s NPC has successfully helped mediate the political transition in Ghana (Kumar 2011). Many interviewees for this research also underscored the way in which the NPC has been particularly successful in preventing election-related violence and in supporting the peaceful transition of government from one political party to another (Questionnaire Respondents, August 2014).

Text Box 9: Understanding the NPC’s success in Ghana

Kotia and Aubyn argue that the NPC’s success can be attributed to several important factors, mainly:

- Inclusive of all relevant stakeholders, represented by respected and trusted individuals with high levels of competence and knowledge in peaceful conflict resolution;
- Independence of the council, whose activities, programmes and decisions are not government-dictated, which in turn has strengthened the NPC’s legitimacy and acceptance;
- Technical, material and financial donor support, including from UNDP, EU, DFID, Swiss FDFA and SIDA (Kotia and Aubyn, 2013, 23-25).

In addition to these factors, questionnaire respondents highlighted the support and buy-in from political leaders from both sides of the “political divide”, which helped prevent the emergence of potential political threats to the newly established structures, and contributed to the strong involvement of civil society. The vibrant and active civil society contributed to Ghana’s success story by rendering the process both inclusive and participatory.

The case of Ghana has shown that establishing active cross-regional and multi-track peacebuilding structures from below (Odendaal 2010, 4-6) can help create momentum that impacts the political level, creating a more productive collaboration on conflict issues across all sectors of society.

In 2012, a UNDP assessment found that when the focus shifted away from top-down to local engagement, peacebuilding efforts became significantly more constructive and sustainable (UNDP 2012, 90). However, as one questionnaire respondent suggested, while Ghana “leads the way regarding [the institutionalization] of an I4P”, it is “not yet certain that it is a model to be replicated everywhere” (Questionnaire Respondent, July 2014). However, the Ghana example demonstrates that investment at the local level that take cultural traditions and the need for local ownership into account cultural traditions are particularly effective and a valuable lesson learned for other countries looking to design I4P.

5.3 Case Study: Tunisia

The mass protests that started the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia in 2011 initiated what became known as the “Arab Spring” and led to the resignation of the president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali after 23 years of authoritarian rule. The call for political reform, socioeconomic change, and respect for human rights set the Tunisian transition in motion. The transition period included an election held in 2011 to “elect a constituent body (the National Constituent Assembly), mandated to deliver a democratic social contract” (Ayoub, 2014). Spanning a period of three years, the transition delivered remarkable results despite many challenges, delays, and obstacles. The first months of 2013 were particularly challenging: the Constituent Assembly (CA), Tunisia’s interim parliament, was slow to make progress due to internal polarization; many contested issues divided the political parties, and a compromise was deeply needed in order to move the transition processes forward. The parties could not agree, for example, on the content of the new Constitution, checks-and-balances, the division of power between the President
and the Head of Government, as well as the role of religion in the State. Discontent with the Troika Government was growing and a highly tense political climate followed the assassination of opposition politician Choukri Belaid in February 2013. The publication of a constitutional draft in June 2013 sparked major controversies and led to a deadlock in the constitutional process with Ennahda being accused of tactical manoeuvring to dominate the constitutional draft. According to the mandate of the CA, a 2/3 majority was needed for the constitutional draft to be adopted or, if the CA could not agree on the draft, it would be put to public referendum. After serious setbacks and various instances of political crisis and deadlock, the new Tunisian constitution was adopted in January 2014 and paved the way for free and peaceful parliamentary and presidential elections between October and December 2014.

Infrastructure for Peace in the Tunisian transition process
The Tunisian transition provides several examples of nationally-owned, institutionalized and non-institutionalized mechanisms that were created to prevent the transition process from derailing, and to mitigate imminent threats of escalation after repeated serious political crises. Some of these mechanisms fostered consensus-building and dialogue to overcome political deadlock i.e. the formation of a Consensus Committee within the CA and the National Dialogue initiated by the so-called Tunisian “Quartet”.

The Consensus Committee, which was made up of all parliamentary groups including some independents, was set up according to the principle of equal representation. Parties designated their representatives based on individual qualification, decisions were taken by consensus and were to be adopted or rejected, but not modified, by the CA (interview notes, November 2014). Deliberations in the 22-member body were led by CA President Ben Jafaar; the work of the Committee was supported by experts and civil society consultations (with support from UNDP Tunisia). The formation of this committee helped to reach a compromise on issues surrounding rights, various freedoms, and specific provisions in the draft Constitution (e.g. Article 48 on “limits to limits”).

In order to find a solution to the deadlock after the assassination of a leading CA member (Mohamed Brahmi), four civil society organizations known as the “Quartet” called for a National Dialogue in order to bring all political parties together. This included the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (General Union of Tunisian Workers, UGTT), the Tunisian Union of Industry, Commerce and Handicrafts (UTICA), the Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights (LTDH), and the National Lawyers Forum (INA). UGTT played a critical role, facilitated by the fact that it has been deeply embedded in society since its founding in 1946 amidst the country’s struggle for independence. Membership of the UGTT encompasses around 5 percent of the population, and it enjoys significant levels influence in society and has a branch in each of the provinces.

The “Quartet” aimed to bridge the gap between majoritarian views inside the CA with opposition views, which wanted governmental decision-making based on consensus. It facilitated negotiations concerning a National Dialogue amongst all 21 parties in the CA. The basis of participation in the Dialogue was one representative per party (Redissi, 2014), and the exceptions were parties that were self-excluded from the process (the Party of Loyalty to Tunisia and the Congress for the Republic). As a result of the dialogue, a political roadmap was developed with three paths: governmental, constitutional, and electoral, and internal committees were created to facilitate this process. The Dialogue was primarily established for two reasons: one, to find a solution to the political stalemate in the CA and to pave the way for the drafting of a new Constitution ahead of national elections; and, two, to help political leaders reach an agreement on the crisis, by providing a forum for electing a new head of government, and an electoral body to help prepare the country for parliamentary and presidential elections.

Assessment
The Quartet managed to diffuse a tense political environment by creating a forum in which political parties could reach an agreement on key transitional processes. The major achievements of the National Dialogue include: bringing together all key political actors, with the exception of those that excluded
themselves (the Party of Loyalty to Tunisia and the Congress for the Republic); forming a caretaker government; forming an Electoral Commission to oversee elections; agenda setting; establishing a calendar for key milestones in the transitional process; getting the parties to sign up to the agreement; and, reaching a compromise between electoral legitimacy and consensual legitimacy (Redissi, 2014). The Dialogue was almost brought to a halt on several occasions due to the intransigence of some groups during the proceedings, and their differences regarding the road-map clauses; other obstacles included deciding whether to implement the three paths in parallel (as the ruling majority was demanding) or each path separately (as the opposition demanded) (Redissi, 2014, pp. 3-4). However, as a result of both the Consensus Committee and the National Dialogue, and the combination of institutionalized and non-institutionalized consensus-building mechanisms, the Dialogue remained on track, and was able to foster a successful constitution-writing process, to build consensus, and to overcome political stalemate. Consequently, the Tunisian transition process succeeded in delivering significant results in a short period of time due to various factors, including the flexibility of the parties to reach compromise and the recognition of the need to complement electoral with consensual legitimacy. Public pressure, civil society actors and insider mediators played a significant role, and repeatedly demonstrated the willingness to step in when there were setbacks amongst the political actors, facilitated by internal mechanisms and nationally-owned processes. Third-party and UNDP support also helped facilitate the crucial role civil society organizations played in providing expertise and organizing consultations on major questions of national concern (the constitutional draft, transitional justice mechanisms) and to complement deliberations within the mandated structures of the CA and the Consensus Commission (interview notes, November 2014). In December 2014, Beji Caid Essebsi, former cabinet minister of Tunisia, defeated Interim President Moncef Marzouki in Tunisia’s first democratic presidential election. This marked an important milestone in the Tunisian transition. President Essebsi and the new parliament face a formidable challenge in reforming the country and adopting subsequent legislation to translate the principles of the constitution into a legal framework and institutional structure. This, in turn, will require a broad-based government and close cooperation with Islamist party Ennahda, which currently holds the second-largest number of seats in parliament. Despite many setbacks, as well as the assassination of political leaders, and delays in the constitutional process, Tunisia’s transition demonstrated that with concerted effort, political will, and nationally-owned mechanisms for consensus-building, transition processes can pave the way for establishing a new social contract under difficult conditions.

5.4 Case Study: Nepal

The young democracy in Nepal was founded on the basis of the 1990 constitution and free parliamentary elections were conducted for the first time in 1991. The new establishment was, however, unable to fulfil expectations for bringing about meaningful social and economic change. Growing frustration eventually resulted in a Maoist insurgency in February 1996. The following armed conflict claimed over 16,000 lives and displaced many Nepalese internally. Following eight-party negotiations, the decade-long armed conflict ended with a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by the government and the Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M) in 2006.

Infrastructures for Peace in Nepal

The Nepali peace process began with the eight-party negotiations that led to the signing of the CPA in November 2006. Following the CPA a whole set of (components for) I4P were established.5

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5 An infrastructure for peace that preceded the CPA was a peace secretariat to the High-Level Peace Committee, mandated by the Nepali government to hold peace talks and cooperate with the government in implementing the outcome of the peace talks and institutionalizing the peace process. Its tasks were the collection, study and analysis of materials related to conflict management, formulation of a peace talk action plan, working for effective implementation of government decisions in connection with the peace process, and maintaining communication and relations with foreign agencies to drive the peace process. http://nepaltimes.com/news.php?id=561#.VOYB8bKAS70
The Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) was formally established and mandated by the CPA. Despite having been an integral element of the Nepali government administration, it can be considered part of an I4P due to its distinct role and tasks with regard to the peace process, including setting up local peace committees, and the management of the Nepal Peace Trust Fund. As Suurmond and Sharma have argued, the MoPR played a double role: an infrastructure for peace on the one hand, and a policy-maker in the peace sector, on the other. Its success has been hampered by several factors, such as insufficient capacity and funds, and a high turnover of staff. In addition, a gradual breakdown in the political consensus and lack of inclusiveness in the consultation process for establishing the MoPR has eroded its legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness (Suurmond and Sharma, 2013).

Local Peace Committees (LPC) have been established in almost all of the 75 districts of Nepal. They are supervised and funded by the MoPR with funds from the Nepal Peace Trust Fund. They are designed

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**Figure 3: Overview of the Peace Infrastructure in Nepal**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National</th>
<th>Local</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nepal Peace Trust Fund</td>
<td>Peace communication and media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR)</td>
<td>Early warning mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Management Division</td>
<td>Community mediation committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Located within the MoPR</td>
<td>Dialogue facilitator pool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other smaller, informal I4Ps</td>
</tr>
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*I4Ps components envisaged but remain to be implemented*
to provide a link between the national peace processes and the communities. Members of the LPC include representatives of the political parties, victims’ family organizations, human rights and other civil society organizations. The LPC serve several functions related to the implementation of the CPA at the local level, such as: data collection on conflict-affected persons and the identification of conflict victims; collection of victim's recommendations and providing them with a voice; running small livelihood programs; organizing conflict prevention programs (e.g. during elections); and awareness-raising and prevention activities related to domestic violence (Interview with Representatives of the Chitwan LPC, October 2014). In the absence of local governance bodies, the LPC also serve substitutive functions: they can issue support letters for people in need of health care services (as observed at the Chitwan LPC in October 2014), for example. According to Odendaal (2010, 11), evaluations of 22 LPC highlighted that only seven actively dealt with communal conflict situations; most others were found to be relatively dysfunctional. Even though successful activities, also with respect to mediation, have been reported, the top-down approach, the high rate of politicization and the widely bureaucratized structures of many LPC have been frequently criticized (Grävingholt et. al. 2013, 40, 42).

Assessment
This research revealed that the success of LPC in Nepal has been mixed. The gap between Maoists, victims and other parts of the society persists, and the widespread need for psycho-social healing has never been sufficiently addressed. The strong need for livelihood programs to reduce poverty, especially in rural areas (Interview, October 2014) has also not been sufficiently addressed. The LPC’s weakness can be attributed to efforts by political parties to dominate other parties, an unclear mandate, miscommunications, low capacity and weak local involvement (Carter Center, 2011 as cited in Suurmond and Sharma, 2013, 7).

The LPC in Nepal were modelled on the South African LPC and, as one questionnaire respondent pointed out, “transplanting the [South African] model was not successful since it became a new venue for political party contestation and was not owned by local civil society”. As Ram Kumar Bhandari noted, the concept of a local peace infrastructure in Nepal was “never discussed with local actors, but was designed top-down, based on political negotiation and donors’ recommendations” (Bhandari 2011, 15). One interviewee mentioned that Nepal provides an example for donor-driven policies that seem to prefer the government taking the lead due to prospects for greater accountability and control. The government was reluctant, however, to allow direct donor engagement with the LPC, possibly because the MoPR wanted to preserve its control over the LPC and thus rejected any form of external technical support (Grävingholt 2013, 44 FN 51).

The legitimacy of LPC has gradually decreased over time. When they were established in 2007, they received a formal mandate for two years, which has now been extended by three additional two-year terms, without proper evaluation.

To sum up, the Nepali I4P – despite their comprehensive design - have not delivered on their mandate. The failure to establish multi-party control over the I4P – as was envisaged by the CPA - resulted in the MoPR taking over the political oversight functions in accordance with the instructions of the sitting Minister, which has meant ruling party control. The peace process became more and more politicized, which hampered the readiness to compromise. In addition, failure can also be attributed to the deficits in funds, administrative support, qualified staff, technical support and vetting mechanisms. In many communities. LPC were formed by ruling elites who were the only parties to be invited by the MoPR. The Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction established its own implementation unit, but the unit itself would have required greater skills and resources to be effective (Odendaal 2010, 61).
5.5 Case Study: Thailand (Deep South)

The conflict in the Deep South of Thailand has its roots in the colonial and post-colonial legacy of Southeast Asia. It spreads over the three southernmost provinces of Thailand, with a majority population of Malay Muslims: Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala, as well as four districts of the Songkla province. The conflict primarily concerns the contested Thai State rule in Muslim residential territories. As result of the conflict, more than 6,000 people have been killed in the last decade.

In February 2013, for the first time, an official Track-1 peace dialogue process was launched. However, this dialogue process was obstructed by the political crisis in Bangkok in November 2013; while violent incidents took place in moderate numbers, the Track-1 process has been in limbo due to the difficulties of the Thai government to respond effectively to the five demands of the militant Patani-Malay movement. Following the military coup in May 2014 the new Thai government agreed with the Malaysian government – the official facilitator – to three basic principles for the negotiation process: renunciation of force, participation of all actors on the militant movement’s sides and a defined set of demands (Ropers/Anuvatudom 2014). It is too early to attribute any I4P impact on the negotiation process, but the institutionalized dialogue may offer an emerging space for building trust and cooperation.

Infrastructures for Peace in the Deep South of Thailand

A bottom-up mechanism for fostering peace has recently come into being that may hold potential for a viable I4P to help support official efforts to build peace in the Deep South. In 2011, a group of activists working on the conflict in the Deep South of Thailand initiated a network of insider mediators, called the “Insider Peacebuilders Platform (IPP),” which is comprised of academic institutions, civil society organizations and a think-tank attached to the Parliament.

The IPP is engaging committed insider peacebuilders and mediators from across the spectrum of conflict actors and opinions, including Thai-Buddhists, Thai-Chinese, Malay-Muslims and people with different political convictions but who share a common interest in the region of Pattani. Common access to IPP fosters the empowerment of community members to influence conflict transformation on the ground. The platform is inclusive and participatory and, by engaging in dialogues and joint initiatives, the members of this network are able to share their knowledge and skills with grassroots communities and leaders (Ropers, 2012). Through mobilizing a space for creative dialogue on peace-related challenges, the creation of a culture of peace is being fostered.

Assessment

Research and experience with the Insider Peacebuilders Platform (IPP) in the Deep South of Thailand has revealed that this initiative is becoming a promising and innovative I4P due to its inclusive approach and its resulting multi-stakeholder legitimacy. Without a formal mandate, the IPP has created a space for dialogue and fostered the exchange of diverse perspectives among activists and leaders from a wide spectrum of constituencies and conflict actors. It is a locally-driven and co-owned initiative and has already provided impetus for the peace process in the Deep South. The IPP is supported externally by international experts and with funding from external donors, including UNDP Thailand. Insider mediation is practiced in very innovative forms in many countries. In Colombia, for example, a series of “national forums” with 1,200 participants from key constituencies have been carried out recently, convened by the UN and the National University to help complement subnational forums. The national forums were designed to balance the restricted Track-1 focus of the Havana negotiations, and to empower motivated individuals to bring the spirit of peace into the local communities and become mediators and change-maker for their home communities as well (Huber 2014, 11).
6. Infrastructures for Peace in Practice

A better understanding of the structures that support and sustain peace within a given cultural, social, economic and political context can help identify what effect certain coordinated efforts are having in terms of strengthening these very infrastructures for peace. To find out which structural components (skills, capacities, resources, tools and institutions) are more relevant at a particular moment in time than others, it is necessary to look at I4P through the lens of their potential to create reinforcing effects – i.e. how they can create synergies as part of a dynamic network of interacting parts.

The following section analyses the impact and interaction of three particular components of I4P that each build on the core principles of participation, inclusion and collaboration. It sheds light on their designs as well as on comparative insights from lessons learned in implementing National Dialogues, Local Peace Committees and Insider Mediation.

6.1 National Dialogues

6.1.1 Definition

National Dialogues are a distinct format of a dialogue, characterized by their national scope and purpose, which imply certain expectations about aims and participation:

- **Scope:** National Dialogues address issues of national relevance e.g. power-sharing during peacebuilding processes, preparation of national elections, elaboration or redrafting of a new constitution, etc.
- **Purpose:** National Dialogues aim to restore broken State-society relations and to work on a viable social contract that allows for participatory State and nation-building.
- **Expectations:** National Dialogues are expected to establish a minimum consensus amongst all relevant stakeholders at a national level on ending armed hostilities, and to pave the way for creating legitimate State structures of governance and institutions accountable to the public.
- **Process:** To achieve these aims National Dialogues are expected to be participatory and to include the main political stakeholders, including the conflicting parties, as well as societal groups such as ethnic and religious minorities, and civil society representatives.

While the inception of a National Dialogue may be brokered or supported by external mediators – such as the UN – the process of a National Dialogue must be convened, owned and driven by its national stakeholders. Consequently, National Dialogues need a “national mandate” and should be conducted under the auspices of a national “authority”, such as the president or an interim parliament, religious authorities or eminent persons from civil society who are accepted by all participants.

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6 This research defines governance with UNDP as “the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a country’s affairs at all levels” (…) by using ‘mechanisms, processes, relations and institutions through which citizens and groups exercise their interests, exercise their rights and obligations, and mediate their differences’ (UNDP 2012, 20).
6.1.2 National Dialogues as I4P

As an I4P, National Dialogues can neither replace legitimate State-based institutions nor are they intended to become permanent platforms. Usually based on a clear mandate, they have only restricted and temporary functions (event- or process-related), and they provide a deadlock breaking mechanism for confidence-building and consensus-finding on selected critical issues defined in their mandates. Historically, National Dialogues have been conceptualized differently, dependent on context and purpose:

**Roundtables**
During the power-transition processes in the former communist bloc, so-called Roundtables were established in several countries. Governments from the region did not participate, but the communist parties and other political groups, trade unions and civil society organizations did participate. Each participating organization had one single vote and the mandates for the Roundtables were formulated and adopted by the participants based on consensus, thereby challenging the claim for a leading role by the communist parties. The Roundtables were facilitated by authorities that were considered as impartial actors by the participants, such as church representatives.

Five main tasks were assigned to the Roundtables, all of which were informed by widespread mistrust in the existing institutions and structures of the State:
(1) The prevention of any use of force by the State;
(2) The dismantling of the existing State security system;
(3) Initial steps to restore the Rule of Law (including amnesty for political prisoners);
(4) Avoiding a power-vacuum in governance by legitimizing consensual votes on contested issues; and,
(5) Preparing for a transition of power through free and fair elections.

Similar Roundtables were established in Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany.

**National Dialogues/Conferences**
National Conferences played an important role particularly in parts of Africa in the early 1990s, for example in Ghana, Kenya, and Malawi (Odendaal 2013, 9).
The National Dialogue in Malawi

In Malawi the National Dialogue originated as a response to political pressure from below and growing unease with the ruling Malawi Congress Party. Pressure on the MCP increased when South Africa stopped supporting the MCP as the only legitimate ruler of Malawi. Following a referendum in 1993 about the future of the political system, seven political parties were legally registered.

Initiated and facilitated by Catholic representatives, the National Dialogue resulted in the establishment of a National Consultative Council (NCC) and a National Executive Committee (NEC), with representatives from all parties.

The National Consultative Council was mandated to oversee changes in the constitution, the rule of law system and the process of defining rules and procedures for the nation-wide elections that were scheduled for May 1994. Under its guidance, parliament took important steps to dismantle one-party rule in Malawi, such as the clause on the life-time presidency of H. Kamuzu Banda; it also adopted a multi-party electoral law as well as a Forfeiture Act.

The National Consultative Council also helped to maintain national cohesion by building a collective identity opposing strong inclinations of regional self-determination. National Dialogue as a tool has since been revitalized, for example in 2012-13 on issues related to economic restructuring.

The constitutional Loya Jirga, established in Afghanistan in 2003 also took the form of a National Conference, although it built on – and was framed by – the indigenous Jirga format – a traditional caucus of the elders in Afghanistan. It established a platform for discussing the needs and options for constitutional change and was given a clear mandate to do so, with a clear task and timeline, while still making use of a culturally-sensitive, traditional format. One-off conferences with a nation-wide participation can also contribute to peace processes, but their statebuilding roles as I4P are less clear than for process-related institutionalized mechanisms. National events were organized, for example, in Togo, Zimbabwe, and more recently also in Yemen, but they are yet to have a sustainable impact.

The National Dialogue Conference in Yemen (NDC), for example, was not able to establish sustainable follow-up structures, and with a de facto coup d’etat by the Houthi rebels, the process broke down. In 2015 Yemen relapsed into violence, and whatever confidence existed amongst the parties has been destroyed.

Lessons Learned

Despite the failure of the National Dialogue process in Yemen, the mandate for the conference can be considered a best practice of how a National Dialogue conference can be designed in order to bring all relevant stakeholders into a dialogue space. The mandate should be comprehensive, inclusive, participatory, vision-driven, and binding for all participants. At the same time, it must leave room for sufficient flexibility to adjust the agenda, timing and technical setting during the duration of the conference, as and when necessary. However, expectations need to be carefully managed: If a National Conference is too outcome-oriented and conducted under too much time pressure, and if a sincere commitment by all parties to achieve a sustainable consensus does not exist, it will most likely fail as an I4P. Similarly, if one or more parties seek to abuse the format to expand their own power and influence to the detriment of other, it may destroy the minimum consensus necessary to run a constructive
dialogue. In the Yemen example, the National Dialogue Conference appeared to be a success because of the results that were achieved on paper, but it turned into a dramatic loss of mutual confidence since the outcomes have not been implemented.

In comparison, the mandate for the National Dialogue in Lebanon, which was agreed to in Doha in 2008, was evidently more process-oriented and the mandate focused on a supportive framework for gradually strengthening the practice of a “national partnership contract” for Lebanon:

### Doha Agreement ‘On the Results of the Lebanese National Dialogue Conference’
#### 21 May 2008

The following agreement was reached:

[...]

“Fourth: Pursuant to the above mentioned Beirut Agreement [...]

Paragraph 5: Initiate a dialogue on promoting the Lebanese state’s authority over all Lebanese territory and its relationship with the various groups on the Lebanese stage in order to ensure the state’s and the citizens’ security.

[...]

- Prohibiting the use of weapons or violence or taking refuge in them in any dispute whatsoever and under any circumstances, in order to ensure respect for the national partnership contract, based on the Lebanese people’s commitment to live with one another within the framework of the Lebanese system, and to restrict the security and military authority over Lebanese nationals and residents to the state alone so as to ensure the continuity of the coexistence formula and civil peace among all the Lebanese; and the parties pledge to all of the above.

- Implementing the law and upholding the sovereignty of the state throughout Lebanon so as not to have regions that serve as safe havens for outlaws, out of respect for the supremacy of the law, and referring all those who commit crimes and contraventions to the Lebanese judiciary.

This dialogue is to be resumed under the aegis of the president as soon as he is elected and a national unity government is formed, and with the participation of the Arab League in such a way as to boost confidence among the Lebanese.”


Process-oriented dialogue structures can be advantageous because: they provide more flexibility; are less dependent on negotiated results and their implementation; and, they can adjust the speed of transition according to needs and opportunities. However, sustainable success cannot be guaranteed. Focusing on the process instead of on binding outcomes can turn the whole dialogue into an endless exercise: in the long run this can devaluate the dialogue, and diminish the investment made by the parties to the process.

To help solve the dilemma of National Dialogues being too process versus outcome, several tracks can be initiated e.g. a high level main track and a set of parallel issue-focused thematic or regional dialogue tracks. This multi-track approach enables attention to be focused on specific issues, helping to balance
different interests amongst the tracks. Issue-based dialogues can also have a national dimension, or be organized as expert forums or regional/local gatherings with representatives from different regions, but within the overall national framework.

The multi-party negotiations in South Africa provide a good example of this approach, especially since they resulted in an agreement on interim mechanisms for South Africa’s constitutional process. Similarly, the eight-party negotiations in Nepal led to an agreement on guiding principles of the Nepali transition, resulting in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2006.

The mandates for national process mechanisms are typically broad and comprehensive since they are often designed to support (and sometimes coordinate) diverse objectives (Odendaal 2013, ibid.). They are often designed to have more flexibility than National Dialogues, and their timelines are shorter than those of National Dialogue Conferences. Flexibility has the advantage of making a dialogue process less vulnerable to short-term failure. However, flexibility may also lead to lower commitment and interest on the part of participants to achieve consensus. Complementary smaller roundtables with a thematic focus may help achieve some initial tangible results in parallel, may thus pave the way for a growing interest in achieving consensus in other roundtables or in the context of the main track.

6.2 Local Peace Committees and Councils

At first glance ‘Local Peace Committees’ or ‘Local Peace Councils’ (LPC) provide a supportive structure that can be compared with National Councils, as they also have limited tasks and scope. However, LPC exercise their influence not only at the communal or district level, but as a network of local bodies; they also help strengthen the national peace infrastructure. Similar to National Councils, LPC are expected to

- Address issues of particular local relevance;
- Provide support to the peaceful settlement of disputes, and to restore broken social and State-society relations at the local level;
- Establish consensus amongst all relevant stakeholders on how to create legitimate governance and institutions; and
- Offer a platform that allows for inclusion and representative participation of all stakeholders, including the conflicting parties, ethnic and religious minorities and civil society.

The range of tasks assigned to LPC depends on the mandate they have been given, but the spectrum of LPC’s daily agenda is often influenced by concrete challenges to peace at the local or sub-regional level. In some cases LPC are formally established on the basis of a State-legitimized mandate. In South Africa, for example, the National Peace Accord established LPCs; similarly, in Serbia, the 2002 Law on Local Self-Government established “Committees of Inter-Community Relations”. In Sierra Leone, the Political Parties Registration Commission established “Conduct Monitoring Committees” as part of its statutory mandate. Furthermore, in Nepal, LPCs were established in the context of the CPA and the process was administered by the MoPR. However, in many other contexts of post-war de-legitimized governance structures, similar interim forms of local multi-stakeholder engagement were established in order to avoid further deterioration as a result of a sudden power vacuum (Odendaal 2010, 15, 32-34). With or without a formal mandate – the effectiveness of LPC ultimately depends on their ability to constructively respond to the daily needs of peace.

LPC enjoy a certain degree of independence from the national context since they focus more on local and day-to-day issues; however, they are influenced, positively or negatively, by changes in the national context. Their agenda is dominated by issues that affect the local community as a whole, such as
uneven access to resources, supply infrastructures, the effects of pastoralist cultures, IDP-related issues, corruption, illicit trafficking of human beings, drugs or arms, gun cultures, etc. (Accord 2013, 40-41).

**Text Box 10: Role of Local Peace Committees**

- Proposing brainstorming, problem-solving, and deadlock-breaking approaches;
- Ensuring legitimacy, community representativeness, and ownership, with processes and outcomes subsequently embedded and driven-forward by communities themselves;
- Defusing local tensions and fostering constructive collaboration;
- Creating space for dialogue and exchange;
- Creating a climate conducive to local security and stability;
- Monitoring and supervision;
- Interpreting early-warning signals;
- Facilitating/convening negotiations over peace agreements and other relevant issues related to disputes and conflict;
- Strengthening local identities and social cohesion;
- Enabling information flow and communication;
- Facilitating efforts towards dealing with the past;
- Preparing elections and empowering people (particularly minority representatives);
- Cultivating “win-win” situations;
- Establishing unified mechanisms for humanitarian service delivery;
- Ensuring that political and financial support from international parties flows in a transparent and equitable manner.

As Andries Odendaal stated, “LPC are appropriate mechanisms to deal with situations of crippling polarization within local communities, and minimal national and local political will to make peace. In these cases ‘soft’ approaches such as dialogue, facilitation and negotiation are appropriate, while any form of coercion or arbitration will likely prove counter-productive” (Odendaal 2010, 12).

Apart from the need for a basic consensus amongst the main political parties, vibrant and active civil society participation is equally required. In Sudan, local peace initiatives were undertaken by local activists who formed inter-communal networks such as The Collaborative in South Kordofan (2008). According to evaluations of the impact of local peace structures, more than 50% of those communities where LPC intervened avoided a relapse into violence (UNDP 2012, 65; van Tongeren 2013a, 108-9). Following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, UNDP helped to establish local and regional institutional structures for addressing short-term peacebuilding needs. Technical support zeroed in on six areas:

1. Executive leadership;
2. Rule of law and law enforcement;
3. Fiduciary management;
4. Public administration;
5. Security; and

To complement these efforts, local agreements between communities and pastoralists were also supported (Accord 2013, 47). Similar achievements took place in the context of LPC in Uganda, particularly in the Karamoja and Acholi regions (van Tongeren 2013a, 109-10), in Ethiopia, and partly in South Sudan.
Between 1998 and 2004, Colombia established hundreds of LPC. However, these LPC were confined to municipal or communal areas (peace zones), and were not linked to upper levels. On a positive note, these LPC enjoyed high legitimacy because they valued inclusivity and a bottom-up approach. They contributed to increased local security and helped to keep power struggles between governmental forces, paramilitary, and rebel groups at least temporarily under control. In the North Kivu region of the DRC, for example, local peace activists initiated LPCs; these contributed to community-led disarmament and reintegration efforts, and helped pave the way for rebel fighters to return from the bush, and for communities to accept them returning to their homes. Similarly, the first local peace and development committees in Kenya were home-grown and locally owned. Later the Kenyan government decided to establish District Peace Committees in all 50 districts.

The potential for LPCs to have a positive impact remains nearly undisputed. In fact, they seem to demonstrate an institutionalized promise that a framework for peaceful cooperation can be created where direct local encounters between conflicting parties take place on a day-to-day basis. However, local I4P may become dysfunctional and counterproductive if they undermine the trust of the people. As the case study on Nepal has revealed, LPC can fall victim to power struggles; this prevents them from delivering on their mandates, and over-centralizing the process can limit the inclusivity and structural responsiveness of LPC to local concerns (Dahal/Chandra 2008).

In conclusion, a third relevant factor of success is a functioning State-society relationship of local, district and national infrastructures for peace. A good example of combining bottom-up local and regional I4P is provided by the Peace and Reconciliation Association (PRA) in Afghanistan.

Local and regional I4P – Afghanistan

“A couple of elements made [the PRA] effective: as a voluntary organization outside the State structure (though working closely with government), the PRA is an example of civil-society involvement in stabilization. […] The PRA is composed of influential individuals from a range of backgrounds who can make use of political […] affiliations, ethnic and qawm influences, and membership of the ulama.”

Although some members have government affiliations, the PRA as a whole is not perceived as acting in favour of one particular faction. Most, if not all, factions are included in the PRA, rendering it much more representative of the political scene in [the province] than the Government. However, while a significant part of the PRA’s success is based on the status and influence embodied in its individual members, this can be a liability. Different political agendas are present within the PRA and whereas members get along on a personal level with a great deal of apparent mutual respect, external developments in [the province’s] volatile socio-political context can put severe strains on their working relationships. This is especially risky since the political scene in [the province] has a limited number of players, but loyalties and allegiances are dynamic. Furthermore, locally rooted civil society organizations such as the PRA understand how to use culturally appropriate modes of communication to reach workable agreements.”

The key difference with the Western legal code, though, is that there are no winners and losers in such a settlement. The main aim is to reach a workable agreement, not dogmatic adherence to a specific set of

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7 A Qawm is social unit based on kinship, residence, or occupation. Sometimes it is falsely called a tribe, but a qawm can span across different tribes. Ulama refers to the body of Muslim scholars recognized as having specialist knowledge of Islamic sacred law and theology.
rules. Settlements brokered by the PRA have so far resulted in better solutions acceptable to all parties in the conflict. The inclusion of important members of the [provincial] ulama adds to the (religious) legitimacy of the association and facilitates the use of an Islamic discourse that can work as a unifying factor.“

Another important model for integrating development and peacebuilding goals was created by the Afghanistan National Solidarity Programme. This programme nurtured local peace councils that worked alongside the Community Development Councils.

Source: All quotes are from the online questionnaire

Local spaces for collaborative action and consensus-building seem to be particularly critical in early transformation stages, when the support of impartial and respectful actors is critical to local ownership. One positive example that lends credence to this notion comes from Somalia: The UN Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralized Delivery was designed to foster early recovery and local development through combined technical and financial support. These were directed towards establishing local institutions in remote areas with targeted capacity-building, such as radio-based trainings and all-party workshops on development issues (UNDP 2012, 53). But LPCs should not be overburdened with unrealistic expectations. As a forum for dialogue, consensus-building and balancing day-to-day interests in intra-communal settings, LPC cannot realistically be responsible for:

- Preventing mass violence;
- Enforcing security and peace;
- Dealing with the structural root causes of a conflict (especially if conflict suffers from national drivers);
- Encountering and overriding national political imperatives (Odendaal 2010, 12).

To summarize, LPCs in their function as I4P can provide a framework for multi-stakeholder collaboration and consensus-building if they are designed and implemented as inclusive and participatory platforms that enjoy the buy-in of all the main local stakeholder groups. A formal mandate, either extended at the level of action (based on consensus) or top-down (based on delegated responsibility), can be helpful to create agendas and define responsibilities, but such a formality is not mandatory. At the local level especially, and in the context of insider mediation processes (see next section) informal settings can be just as effective as or even more effective than formal processes. Regardless of whether the structures/processes are formal or informal, what matters is a degree of responsiveness to the challenges that all participants consider crucial in the context of supporting peace. Liaising with other LPC and linking local structures to upper levels can bring about positive effects in both directions, helping to underpin governmental legitimacy at other levels. Finally, local settings provide opportunities for marginalized groups of a community to contribute to peacebuilding on equal terms (Odendaal 2010, 22; UNDP 2012, 55).
6.3 Insider Mediation

Mediation should restore broken relationships between or within communities, ethnic and social groups, and/or nations. It is a specialized endeavour, "encompassing a body of knowledge and set of strategies, tactics, skills and techniques" (Nathan 2009) that seek to alter the motivation behind behaviour and to strengthen mutual interests on all sides in maintaining constructive, collaborative, and, most importantly, sustainably nonviolent relations.

Mediation is particularly useful in cases where the root causes of structural violence are addressed. Mediation is a tool for revealing these root causes and seeking alternatives to force (c.f. Touval & Zartman, 1985; Bercovich & Schneider, 2000; Beardsley 2009; Sisk 2009). While mediation has been primarily conducted by third parties (Giessmann/Wils 2009), insider mediation has attracted increasing attention due to the constructive contribution of their in-depth knowledge of the conflict situation, cultural-sensitivity and close relationships to the parties – and, in some cases, their normative authority (Mason 2009, 4). Insider mediators have recently been defined as:

**Insider Mediators**

Individual(s), groups, entities or institutions possessing high levels of legitimacy and trust with the individuals and institutions involved in a specific conflict setting by virtue of their relationships and reputation with the parties and who/which possess a unique ability to directly and indirectly influence the conflict parties’ behaviour and thinking.


What can insider mediation and insider mediators do within – or in support of – I4P? According to UNDP, insider mediation addresses five dimensions of engagement:

**Insider Mediation**

- **Identifying/providing entry points:** Insider mediators can help build faith in a process and pave the way for official dialogue to begin by taking the initiative, setting the tone, and offering a starting point for conversations that may eventually lead to more fully-fledged and formal dialogue or mediation;
- **Building consensus/solving problems:** Insider mediators can help build bridges, seek "win-win" solutions, advocate core approaches and break deadlocks, if necessary;
- **Direct mediation:** Being impartial and honest brokers, insider mediators can also step into direct mediation roles as conveners, dialogue facilitators or mediators;
- **Advocacy:** Insider mediators can help connect track-related processes with the wider public, influence the public discourse and generate the public support that is needed to shift public opinion towards peace;
- **Early-warning:** Due to their proximity and empathy, insider mediators are in a pivotal position to be able to play early-warning roles.

In Lesotho, institutional insider mediators played a crucial role in 2011-12; “they helped ensure peaceful national polls and the first ever transition from one elected government to another. The Christian Council of Lesotho mediated the agreement among political parties in 2011 that made this result possible. […] The Christian Council provided a safe space for dialogue among the parties, served as facilitator, and brought in technical experts in a timely manner to advise the parties on best practices, and to clarify specific matters as and when they emerged.” (UNDP Guidance Note 2014, 15)

An on-going institutional format is the Mesa de Gestión y Prevención de Conflictos (MGCP) in Ayacucho (Peru), a roundtable discussion forum between civil society, government representatives and other actors. Local government plays the vital role of a caudillo, a system of political-social domination, based on the leadership of strongmen in a dialogue process.

Being supportive of I4P, insider mediation can help foster the readiness of actors and their communities to become included and, more importantly, to become actively engaged in peacebuilding and reconciliation processes. By fostering greater inclusivity, participation and ownership, insider mediation can become an I4P in of itself, particularly if it can build upon committed and skilful individuals and sustainable structures. The Insider-Peacebuilders Platform that has been established in recent years in Southeast Asia, for example, can be considered a transnational I4P.

Insider mediation seems to be a particularly suitable I4P in societies which suffer from weak State and governance structures, but which have strong community structures based on cultural, ethnic or religious ties. It is also an attractive alternative in contexts where the intervention of external third parties – such as former colonial powers – may be unwelcome or perceived as suspicious or intimidating.

Engaging insider mediators as part of I4P may have some remarkable advantages: they can help enhance national, local or community ownership, strengthen self-reliance and improve social cohesion. The close connection of insider mediators with the conflicting parties could be beneficial in building mutual confidence and, last but not least, the mediators often have better in-depth knowledge of their society (UNSG 2012, 6; Haysom 2002). Conversely, it is important to recognise that insider mediators may also share the society’s blind spots, and may lack the necessary distance and objectivity to fulfil their roles (Odendaal 2013, 16). In such cases it is particularly important to combine their efforts with those of external third-party mediators.
7. Promising Entry Points for International Support

There are many entry points through which international support for I4P can be fostered, thereby building bridges between internal and external processes. Actor and issue-focused approaches can be envisaged, as per the below overview:

**Text Box 11: Actor-based approaches**

- **Diaspora**: Diaspora communities are often influential stakeholders in two ways. On the one hand, diaspora communities are often closely connected to their home communities and so engaging them as intermediaries between the international community and their fellow countrymen can help strengthen and legitimize external support. On the other hand, they are also able to influence the political class and public opinion in the host countries, and more often than not diaspora groups tend to be more radicalized than the actors on the ground. Working with them can help strengthen a constructive, supportive role for the diaspora, or may at least help prevent them from engaging in spoiling activities from the outside. Diaspora communities bring professional skills and practical experience from their “adopted” home, which can help enhance national and local ownership vis-a-vis I4P on the ground. A few caveats must be acknowledged; however: If diaspora communities have long been disconnected from their home constituencies and chose to return, they may not have sufficient empathy and patience to adapt to the local needs; they may also not be trusted, and/or may be perceived as competing with inherited hierarchies of power and influence. For example, early returnees from the US and UK to Iraq after the power transition in Iraq were confronted with widespread mistrust amongst the old Iraqi political and academic elites.

- **Disasters and disaster relief**: Most natural disasters are unexpected/cannot be predicted, and most often they have a lasting impact on the whole society. Natural disasters can change the inherited rules of the game dramatically and immediately, resulting in shifting priorities and interests. While the tsunami, for example, was not the only reason for the subsequently successful negotiations between Indonesia and the GAM rebels, the Aceh case demonstrates how a disaster and the subsequent international attention for collaborative disaster relief can change the patterns of decision-making on all sides of the conflict. The detrimental consequences of the earthquake in Nepal brought about a similar awakening of the impacts of the political stalemate; this situation has the potential to revitalize the inefficient local peace communities, established as a core element of the Nepali I4P. It is too early for a final assessment, but a window of opportunity has opened. In a post-disaster context alliances across the traditional cleavages can be more easily built, and various actors may become interested in organising sustainable structures for reconstruction and peaceful development.

- **Business sector**: The business sector is often overlooked or even side-lined as a potential ally. However, most of the social and political armed conflicts are rooted to a large extent in social grievances, economic under-development and discrimination. A small and medium enterprise base is of utmost importance for prosperous and sustainable development after war. Hence business actors have an important role to play, especially in the absence of functioning government at the local level.

- **Professional organizations, including veterans**: Professional organizations (such as teachers, bar associations, fishermen, etc.) serve as important stakeholders in all societies. Some are more influential than others, depending on their structural relevance and public
recognition in the respective State. Engaging interested organizations proactively can help to create stakeholder support that spans ethnic or religious diversity. In many post-war settings the influence of veteran organizations is remarkable. While often viewed as backward-looking and/or as potential spoilers, the constructive potential of veterans seems to be underestimated. If veterans engage in building peace, they can help foster societal discourse and a positive climate for establishing and conducting I4P. Preliminary initiatives that were recently undertaken by veteran organizations in Bosnia and Croatia reveal the existence of another added value: the potential influence of similar stakeholders across national and State boundaries within the geographical scope of the former armed conflict.

- **Negotiated peace accords**: All agreements to terminate a war or any armed hostilities (from ceasefire agreements to peace treaties) share at least one common feature: they seek to restore a framework for nonviolent interaction. Hence, peace accords serve as the first step in this regard to build or restore what was destroyed in the past. Agreement alone, of course, cannot bring about sustainable peace. In transforming societies where peacebuilding is often combined with statebuilding initiatives, the legitimate constitutional and administrative prerequisites for both tasks usually do not exist. Peace accords can formulate and extend formal mandates to create I4P and provide legitimacy even in the absence of a reformed legal and political framework. At the same time the peace accords provide a legal reference that the parties can refer to when they begin working on a new social contract after war (UNDP 2012, 50, 58, 67; Stedman et.al. 2002).

- **Addressing and empowering civil society actors**: Civil society actors are usually not active parties to conflict. They are not – and do not intend to become – players in power struggles. Due to these low political stakes, civil society actors are well positioned to adopt roles as facilitators and mediators. Due to their social roots and cultural empathy they can provide mediation not only as third parties but also as insiders. A wide range of examples exist of civil society organizations and individuals playing very important roles in creating and supporting I4P e.g. Lesotho, Uganda, Malawi, Thailand’s Deep South. In some cases, religious groups (or leaders) are particularly well-placed to play this role.

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**Text Box 12: Issue-based approaches**

- **Generating political will through experience-sharing**: International organizations and Member States possess rich experience and knowledge about both good practices and previous mistakes to be avoided. They are thus able to provide lessons learned, as well as tailor-made recommendations and support. An experience-sharing exercise on “national I4P” convened by UNDP in Kenya in 2010 enabled delegations from Tanzania, Togo and Uganda to draw conclusions for developing peace initiatives for their own countries.

- **Mobilizing resources and capacities**: International actors can provide supportive resources to actors who are need them, but they are not able to generate them on their own. For example, the UN offered the UN House in Maseru as a “safe space” for the mediated peace process in Lesotho in 2011.

- **Initial facilitation**: International actors and organizations can mobilize skilful experts, experienced trainers, and policy advisors, even on short notice; international actors may also already have their own regional or country-specific mobilization structures. For example,
in 2009 UNDP facilitated a consultation among senior political leaders in Nepal aimed at developing a national programme on collaborative leadership. In 2010, the Berghof Foundation facilitated a peer-advice workshop with the Government of Nepal, former Maoist rebels, and experienced resource persons from South Africa on how to reintegrate former combatants into the military.

- **Accompaniment:** Coordination of donor-assistance and multi-donor platforms can help support complex negotiations or mediation processes. The multi-donor International Contact Group, supported by the UN-World Bank Facility for Support for Transition Capacities (FASTEAC), accompanied the talks between the Government of the Philippines and the MILF, which were nationally-led and formally facilitated by Malaysia, by providing observation and expertise upon request in order to reduce the capacity gap between the negotiating parties.

- **Maintaining momentum:** In Timor-Leste between 2010 and 2013, UN and bilateral partners provided assistance to help train local level mediators – primarily women and youth – who later engaged in resolving land-related conflicts precipitated by the return of refugees.

- **Connecting tracks:** Collaboration between IGOs and INGOs as well as bilateral governmental and non-governmental partnerships can help create a “space of dialogue” that helps to restore social cohesion, national cultures of peace, and recognition for the rule of law. A good example for this is provided by the German Civil Peace Service and the Center for International Peace Missions which, since 1999-2001, have trained and deployed hundreds of peace advisors who have been embedded into national governmental and non-governmental organizations in Africa, Latin America, Europe and Asia.

8. UNDP Strengths and Challenges

UNDP is a pillar of the global UN system and, as such, it has a remarkable track record in conflict prevention, supporting peacebuilding and socio-economic recovery. A key illustration is the joint DPA-UNDP Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention (Joint Programme), first launched in 2004, which has provided catalytic seed funding to emerging and ongoing conflict prevention initiatives in many countries across Africa, the OSCE area, East Asia and Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

Based on the Joint Programme in 2015 alone, 35 countries hosted more than 40 policy advisors. This physical UN presence helps foster space for dialogue and mediation activities during early transition stages (UNDP/DPA Reflections 2013b, 22). Due to its on-site presence the UN is particularly well-suited to address immediate triggers and prevent violence, support national stakeholders, implement peaceful elections, build national and local dialogue and conflict resolution capacities, and strategically position itself (UNDP/DPA 2013a, Report, 5) in the wider I4P landscape (UNDP/DPA 2014, 4).

The UN’s peacebuilding agenda and UNDP’s development agenda are intrinsically interconnected and mutually reinforcing one another. Within this relationship, UNDP has remarkable and distinct strengths which can prove useful in providing a broad range of support for building and maintaining national as well as local I4P.

Text Box 13: UNDP Strengths

• **Large presence on the ground:** UNDP has carried out operations in over 180 countries and territories, and is able to build on practical lessons learned from its physical presence on the ground with more than 100 offices. Even within the entire UN system, this strength of presence is unique.

• **Excellent conflict analysis and context assessment:** UNDP has access to all necessary resources for a sound political and conflict analysis in literally every country on the globe. The database available for conflict prevention strategy and programming development, including real-time reports from its local staff on the ground, is unique both in richness and quantity. Due to its large presence on the ground, UNDP in many cases serves as the first focal point when national and local stakeholders request support. Moreover, money and resources earmarked to UN peace missions are often channelled or administered through UNDP offices.

• **Long-term experience in providing conceptual and technical support:** UNDP enjoys immense credibility in the eyes of national and local actors due to its long-term commitment and long track record in providing institutional, technical, and process support. For example, an interview respondent from Ghana stipulated that the success of the peace process was to a large extent owed to the engagement of the UNDP Peace and Development Advisors, “working to institutionalise the National and Regional Peace Councils, by building their capacity to pre-empt, analyse, coordinate, collaborate, respond etc. [to] violent conflict at the local and national levels”.

• **Rich dialogue facilitation, mediation and mediation support skills:** From the late 1990s onwards UNDP has continuously strengthened its dialogue, mediation support, and reconciliation capacity. (UNDP/DPA 2013c). Few other international actors can bring all relevant stakeholders (national/international/State/civil society) together (Marta Ruedas, UNDP/DPA Reflections 2013b, 25).
• **The network of Peace and Development Advisors (PDA)**: This network is a core UNDP asset. Together with DPA’s Political Advisers, PDA’s address the immediate triggers of violence and provide short-term assistance with regards to confidence-building and conflict prevention. PDAs are also an important “internal” voice on the ground of the recipient countries, which help keep UNDP and the broader UN Country Team informed. PDAs serve as an effective tools of tailor-made direct support. For example, the temporary deployment of a PDA - and the establishment of joint platforms to diffuse inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions - helped to prevent another outbreak of violence during the April 2011 elections in Nigeria; Bahrain, Benin, Chad, the Comoros and Thailand shared similar experiences (UNDP 2013, 8). Similarly, according to statistics, 122 incidents of election-related violence in Kenya were prevented or de-escalated 2010 thanks to the engagements of PDAs. They provide vital national and local capacity for dialogue and conflict resolution. For example, in Chad dialogues between authorities and refugees/IDPs at national and local level were facilitated, and support was provided to recruit and train mediators from cross-sections of society; mediation support was also provided and a “peace caravan” was organized, which travelled to a number of regions. Furthermore, in Cyprus society-led track-two initiatives were supported through a joint Contact Room for sharing information between the police forces in the two parts of the country, and inter-communal engagement was facilitated.

• **Mutually reinforcing collaboration within the UN system**: Reinforcing effects emerge where there is strong collaboration between PDAs and other UN “tools”. PDA’s access to DPA’s expertise on mediation and elections through the Mediation Support Unit and the Electoral Assistance Division, for example, can allow the UNCT to leverage expertise to advance efforts at country-level, whether to address a deadlock or breakdown in dialogue, facilitate disputes on natural resources, or position the UN to support electoral violence prevention. Collaboration between PDAs and other expert deployment mechanisms such as DPA’s Standby Team of Mediation Experts (SBT) can be similarly catalytic and impactful. PDAs help prepare the ground for the intervention, and provide their nuanced insights about actors, positions, and other relevant country dynamics to greatly boost the SBT member’s preparatory knowledge about a situation and allow them to focus on the mediation itself. And as a fly-in external expert, the SBT member is able to bring a different perspective and approach than a PDA. Greater synergy should be encouraged, and PDAs need to be able to leverage the broad range of expertise housed within UNDP pertaining to governance, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding if they are to effectively fulfil their role.

• **Capacities for mediation support**: UNDP can leverage reinforcing effects through close collaboration within the UN system. A particular useful leverage for reinforcing support is the Mediation Support Unit (MSU) in DPA, which was established in 2006. MSU, through its expert roster, Standby Team of Mediation Experts (SBT) and members of the Unit, has provided substantial technical support to a number of peace processes, including in: the Central African Republic (expert assistance in 2008 to the ‘Dialogue Politique Inclusif’ and more recently the national dialogue process initiated in Brazzaville); Yemen (the UN Special Advisor and members of the MSU SBT provided technical support to the National Dialogue Conference); Libya (desk support to the SRSG to Libya through assessment and evaluation support for strategic planning and documentation); the Philippines (ICG negotiation and mediation support since 2007 in cooperation with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue along with Japan, Saudi-Arabia, Turkey, the UK, and the negotiating team); and Syria (expertise provided

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8 According to Kumar, “PDA” is a generic term. Dependent on the circumstances in a country, PDA are peace and governance advisors, collaborative capacity advisors, social cohesion advisors and so on (Kumar 2012, 398).
to the Joint Special Representative for Syria, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, for the Geneva II talks). Other peacebuilding processes supported by MSU exist in the Comoros, Darfur, Madagascar, Mali, and the Philippines. MSU has helped to elaborate and implement standard operational procedures (SOP), training curricula for local and national mediators, procedures for briefing and debriefing, and methods for improving communication and human resources (Lehman-Larson 2014, 11). Formal partnerships have also been forged with donors such as Folke Bernadotte Academy and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), allowing for greater expert autonomy (Wils and Herrberg 2011, 10). Additionally, partnerships with experienced mediation hubs such as the Berghof Foundation, Crisis Management Initiative and swisspeace allow for increased flexibility in deploying specialists according to needs on the ground. Nevertheless, it must be understood that any external mediation support should primarily enhance the effectiveness of local and national mediation efforts (UNSG 2012, 6).

• **Close collaboration and coordination with other international organizations:** Activities undertaken by regional and sub-regional organizations such as the European Union complement UN efforts and help nurture synergies from cooperation and a division of labor. The EEAS Mediation Support Team, for example, which was established in 2011, has provided support to several countries and regions, including: Mali, Myanmar, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Nigeria, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, the Western Balkans, and Central America. Similarly, the Organization of American States (OAS) established a mediation unit within the OAS General Secretariat in 2010, and in Africa the AU, IGAD, SADC, and ECOWAS each established their own mediation support structures. Co-funding is also increasing; the project on “Equipping National and Local Actors in Internal Conflict Management Processes with Skills for Dialogue and Constructive Negotiation”, for example, which is led by UNDP in partnership with DPA and EU and with funding from the Instrument for Stability in 2013-2013 serves as a good example of such collaboration.

Despite positive intentions, an international presence on the ground is not always helpful for building I4P. It can even cause harm if national or local ownership is not granted, if deployed personnel misbehave, if facilities are inaccessible to local people, if the salary systems are far beyond the average wage systems in the host country, and/or if a lack of empathy and understanding for the local needs and interests overshadows the public perception of the intervening organization’s mandate and operations. The “Delivering as One” approach, while aimed at nurturing synergies and improving the UN effectiveness as a whole, may unintentionally risk the **loss of time-sensitive entry points for specialized programs**. Certain advantages of an all-encompassing organizational profile may become problematic if objectives go un-prioritized.

Other challenges for UNDP that have to be taken into account when designing and implementing support activities for national and local I4P can be summarized as follows:

**Text Box 14: Challenges for UNDP**

• **Balancing between multiple competing priorities** presents a permanent and crucial challenge to UNDP (UNDP 2012, 27-27).

• **Staying open to the local context.** Coordination at the top-level may prevent flexibility and responsiveness at the bottom-level. Currently a lot of INGOs are decentralizing, thus bringing
decision-making processes closer to the ground. For UNDP this means accepting more responsibility and flexibility in taking decisions at the level of country and sub-regional offices. Moreover, NGOs working at the local level should be regarded as partners, and appreciated for the added value they can bring to the process.

- **Competition between units, programs, and individuals.** Governance and conflict prevention/peacebuilding are interconnected, but the unique character of both has proven to be contested, resulting in disputes over influence and control over resources. Competition can turn into rivalry, possibly impeding synergies, reducing impact, and preventing adaptation to evolving needs. UNDP’s recent thinking on the issue has been reflected in its latest strategy on governance and peacebuilding that sees functioning governance as the most important pillar of conflict prevention and conflict prevention as an important – and distinct – element of governance.

- **Conflicts over the distribution of economic shares and political influence.** External support may fuel greed and rivalry on the ground. This is particularly relevant for I4P support because local rivalry can create tensions regarding the needs for inclusive governance and ownership. UNDP’s 4-pillar approach to reconstructing responsive institutions, promoting inclusive political processes, fostering resilient societies, and strengthening partnerships provides sufficient guidance in this regard (Jordan Ryan and Olav Kjorven 2012, 7).

- **Better vertical information-sharing and horizontal coordination within the UN-system.** This is what all Political Advisers and PDAs interviewed for this research have emphasized. Although some progress has been acknowledged, it seems to be a continued challenge.

- **Impact of counterterrorism legislation on external support.** Counterterrorism legislation at international and national levels may impede upon UNDP mediation support missions, especially if insider mediators must act in a legal grey zone that are created by these tensions (for details Whitfield 2010, Dudouet 2012, Giessmann 2013).

- **Resource needs and resource curse.** Providing the help that is needed and requested without fuelling tendencies of bribery and corruption remains a permanent challenge. If resources are provided insufficiently or if time-lines are too tight, support may do more harm than good.

- **Flexibility and adaptation.** Needs for support may change rapidly. Decentralizing decision-making bodies can help when rapid strategy and policy recalibration is needed.

- **Preserving continuity in programming, staffing and funding is a permanent challenge.** Annual budget planning schemes and event-driven project prioritization can negatively affect the scope, intensity, and, eventually, the continuity of practical support for national and local stakeholders. Continuity is essential. Complaints about inadequate external funding have been expressed in a number of countries, for example in Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Uganda. Other complaints relate to: the lack of institutional capacities, support and political will; low coordination and poor communication; and, concerns about spoiling bureaucracy (for details see UNDP / ACTION 2014). Another continuity challenge refers to staffing: trust-building takes time and inter-personal relations can make an enormous difference in fragile political and institutional environments. In these cases, mandatory rotation cycles of 3-4 years can put projects at risk and force new envoys to start establishing their own disjointed communication and cooperation frameworks. Selection of staff, furthermore, is a key to success; if mission staff understand their deployment more individualistically in terms of career planning or legacy, their commitment and loyalty to their project may suffer.
Potential drawbacks such as the following must be taken into account:

- **Diverging interests between stakeholders**: Notwithstanding general consensus on building and supporting I4P, external actors, regardless of whether they are State or international/regional organizations, have their own interests and follow their own agendas. These may or may not align with the agendas of the conflict parties themselves. Intervention support timing and intensity depend on overlapping interests between external and internal peacebuilding drivers.

- **Unevenly distributed support tools**: International actors often fail to agree on burden-sharing or labour distribution, competing with each other over power and influence. Redundant, cost-ineffective, and harmful efforts feed corruption and waste resources needed in other, under-supplied areas. Occasionally supporters and mediators are also susceptible to bribery – an interviewee from Peru reports that lawyer-mediators in this country managed to earn up to 400,000 EUR for one job. Transparency and honesty are preconditions for the credibility of an I4P.

- **Annual planning and budget cycles**: Most international actors operate according to annual planning, budgeting, and expectations. Building I4P may take many years. If support remains issue-focused rather than structure-related, disrupting support prematurely or on short notice may result in enormous impacts on the credibility and progress of structural change on the ground. However, if international support is unconditional and proceeds without critical stock-taking, this may significantly reduce local ownership. While annual planning often outlines linear progress expectations, systemic conflicts do not conform to linear models and resist compartmentalization into log-frames and mono-causal theories of change (for more reading see Koerppen et.al. 2013).

- **Lack of insider expertise and reflection**: Any agenda that conceptually underpins external support must critically reflect on progress and failures as a part of a practice-to-theory feedback-loop. Such an agenda is rare. Most often, the expertise related to support is in-house and politically driven. While conceptual strategizing and critical reflection on missions has significantly improved in many international organizations (including occasional independent actor engagement), the ability to feed critical lessons back into strategy adaptation and implementation appears hard to achieve. The broader perspectives of international organizations i.e. their overall spectrum of outreach and activities and tendency to centralize decision-making processes often impede upon the flexible and adaptive approaches preferred by local representatives and project officers e.g. critical lessons learned from Afghanistan were time and again politically withheld in order not to put continued engagements at risk.

- **I4P – a “catch-all” or empty phrase**: The intrinsic positive connotation behind I4P implies that the term could be a “buzzword” - attractive to State officials, parties, ministries, peace commissions, State-run institutions, or even the military. However, the concept will only create peace if it creates real, sustainable structures. In some countries viable I4P components exist, but political and social actors remain blind to the potential for integrating these components into a national infrastructure at large. If nothing more than an empty shell, the concept of I4P loses credibility and meaning. The reputation of the LPC in Nepal, for example, has sharply declined where they have become abused as tools for power games. International actors must carefully and regularly assess if I4P deliver on their promises, Furthermore, if overloaded with tasks and functions, the value added through I4P is easily lost.
9. Conclusions and Recommendations for UNDP

Through a deeper understanding of the intrinsic “fabric of peace”, UNDP can help design and implement adaptive, tailor-made and coordinated I4P - understood as the structural underpinnings to restore, build and maintain constructive social relations, to enhance resilience and to foster a durable culture of peace. In this sense I4P can transcend the traditional divide between structural and operational conflict prevention, between development, peacebuilding and diplomacy (Kumar 2012, 387).

The distinct conceptual and practical added-value of I4P rests with their supportive role in providing what is needed within a community of social actors (units, States, societies) to allow for a consensual and participatory settlement of differences and disputes. I4P can complement the governance architectures of States or societies by offering skills, resources, capacities, tools, and institutions that mitigate tensions and prevent conflict escalation, and which foster relational principles such as participation, inclusion and collaboration.

The following generic and practical recommendations shed light on the potential key driver role that UNDP can play in promoting and supporting I4P both in conceptual terms and in practice.

- **Improve conflict analysis and entry point decision-making:** A first requirement of any supportive external intervention is a sound assessment of the root causes, the drivers of, and risks to peace. In the context of I4P even more important than this, however, is a profound understanding of the “intrinsic fabric” of peace. UNDP, with its holistic approach to development, statebuilding and human security is in a privileged position to generate the systemic analysis that is necessary to provide information about best practices and lessons learned in the context of I4P. UNDP should take the lead in this endeavour, while cooperating with other relevant information hubs within the UN system as well as with close partners such as the OECD and the World Bank. Reliable data is often lacking and information is often scattered. Instruments and mechanisms for joint analysis and information exchange within the UN system (but also between UN and other sources of information) should be further improved. United Nations Peacemaker (www.peacemaker.un.org) should become further improved as the UN professional database through including a portal devoted to I4P.

- **Identifying the best entry points.** Systematic knowledge management could be an important resource but is underdeveloped within the UN System. Short-term rotation schemes for staff annihilate the knowledge that is possessed by individuals. Competition between different UN bodies seems to be another impediment for sharing and saving acquired knowledge.

- **Seizing the ripe moment:** This requires sufficient data processing and analysis capacities. Often it is not the availability of information that causes problems but the lack of capacity to distinguish data according to quality and to take immediate decisions. Different levels of decision-making must be taken into account and coordinated to allow for timely decisions. The UNDP Country Offices are a big asset in this regard, because they can generate and share the data by which first-hand knowledge can be nurtured to design a tailor-made response.

- **Living up to and promoting principles:** UNDP stands for transparent values and principles that can positively impact any national and local approaches to create I4P. Inclusivity, promotion of human rights, cultural-sensitivity, gender equality, and the protection of minorities, to mention a few, are key value-based principles for making I4P function. As an operational principle, granting ownership is equally important. However, for the UN, living up to their own values can also bring about a severe conflict of interests. Whilst I4P should be designed to be as inclusive as necessary, in the early stages of peacebuilding the main
stakeholders who should be engaged may include actors who have violated human rights, or oppressed minorities or who are gender-blind, for example. Such dilemmas need to be reconciled in a conflict-sensitive manner.

- **Establishing full transparency.** High levels of transparency regarding support for I4P can help sensitize the conflicting parties, the society, the international community and the UN family to ensure that supporting inclusive I4P in a post-conflict environment does not contradict the normative framework of the UN. The UN family needs to find appropriate mechanisms to better mediate internal conflicts that originate from conflicting interests or responsibilities within the UN system.

- **Clear mandates, roles and timelines:** To be effective national/local I4P must be nationally/locally owned, participatory and inclusive. A clear mandate allows for accountability; national mandates are of particular relevance because they provide an overarching framework that can help restore national cohesion and identity. At the local level, within social communities where people know each other well, informal mandates may serve the same purpose, but the roles and tasks should be clearly defined and articulated publicly. UNDP can play the role of a “guarantor”, and may also provide the intellectual, financial or technical assistance to establish I4P in practice (e.g. safe houses, trainings, facilitation etc.). National peace infrastructures, which are fully dependent or steered by external actors, cannot create a self-reliant and resilient society, nor will they be recognized as national assets. UNDP should continue to provide, and even expand, support from and on the ground. Political Advisors and PDAs are not only well informed about the acute challenges and needs on site, they are also perceived as having a less high profile of external support than missions that fly in and out. Timelines of support should be thoroughly and empathetically planned, but also be made transparent to the partners.

- **Learning from cases:** Different cases teach different lessons. But there are a few lessons that can be generalized. There will be no peace without local peacebuilding, participation and ownership. External actors can provide support, but there seems to be more space for a direct intervention in negotiations during transitions from war to peace than in statebuilding processes, when the local and national drivers of peace must be mobilized. A careful and case-based analysis must be undertaken to understand the drivers of peace and conflict, to identify the entry points and to take decisions on where and when to engage – and where and when not to. I4P have been successful in cases in which the level of ownership was high and where national/local responsibility and accountability has been established. In all cases, whether Ghana, and South Africa or Thailand and Tunisia, it has become obvious that local sustainability, effective networks and the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders is of high importance. UNDP is in a privileged position to offer a broad spectrum of support that can help to better interlink I4P to the concrete challenges of statebuilding (elections, democracy, rule of law etc.) and development (fragility, economic imbalance, social tensions etc.). All UNDP projects in post-conflict and peacebuilding settings on the ground should comprise a mandatory reference to I4P and how to strengthen using them. Strengthening I4P should become a focal norm for the joint UNDP/DPA programme planning, implementation and reflection on outcomes.

- **Practice-to theory loops:** I4P provide a flexible, mutually reinforcing and dynamic space for various tools, skills, institutions, resources, and capacities. Some generic lessons can be learned from using all of them in different countries. The regional directors should be encouraged to hold frequent lessons-learned workshops with Country Officers, PDAs and thematic experts and project planners.
• **Inclusivity:** Of course, inclusiveness is not a panacea. I4P should be as inclusive as necessary, and not exclude actors that want to participate and contribute to functioning institutions and processes. Dialogue and mediation have proven to be key tools to make I4P effective. Insider mediation (or insider peacebuilding) seems to be of particular relevance because insiders can addresses peace-related issues from **within or bottom-up** i.e. insider mediation nurtures the in-depth knowledge of insiders about the conflict situation, their cultural sensitivity and their close relationships to the parties, and in some cases also their normative authority. Insider mediators, better than third parties, can seize the middle ground between society-rooted, traditional structures and networks, and the more modern (in the sense of the nation State and rule of law-based) structures and networks. UNDP can provide resources and expertise that are necessary in order to allow insider mediators (or peacebuilders) and local NGOs to do their work, without claiming the driver’s seat for its own. NGOs and insider mediators are not in need of a formal mandate, which makes it easier for them to engage earlier, more intensely, and on a lower profile.

• **Deepen collaboration within the UN:** The lessons learned from the former Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action strategy development process should be translated into viable collaboration schemes. Although some steps to reconcile the cultural dichotomy between the approaches of DPA (with its primary focus on governance and preventive diplomacy) and UNDP (primary focus on conflict transformation and development) have been made, more efforts should be undertaken to harness the complementarity of existing programming and interventions. Whereas governance and preventive diplomacy help avoid/ manage crises and sudden eruptions of violence, conflict transformation and development help to transform the root causes of crises and violence. Again, as UNDP is often the first addressee for national and regional stakeholders to provide support for I4P, it could become a first responder, leveraging its local strength further.

• **Strengthen the local level:** Peace is inevitably a bottom-up and collaborative process. Any mechanisms intended to become I4P that are imposed “top-down” or that are disconnected from the local level cannot achieve their goals. If inclusivity is elementary for peace, it is of particular importance at the local level where people interact on a day-to-day basis, and where mistrust spreads faster than trust is built. Local peace committees can make a difference if they are designed in an inclusive manner, co-owned by all main local stakeholders, responsive to risks and threats, linked-up at the vertical level and if they liaise with neighbouring councils. UNDP should provide all necessary assistance without claiming any stakes of its own, and it could help to strengthen the councils’ occupation of the middle ground in their communities (Wehr/Lederach 1996). Local UNDP partners should be encouraged to make more operational decisions in their own capacity, and Resident Coordinators should serve as focal point and catalysts for organizing synergistic support efforts. Moreover, UNDP regional and headquarters staff should consult Country Officers, Political Advisors and PDAs, and the wider UN mission staff before making decisions that affect UNDP activities on the ground. In principle, the PDAs are already a kind of ‘first responders’; thus they play a crucial role in directly addressing national and local stakeholders. Given their engagement with UNCT colleagues and national interlocutors, PDAs and Political Advisors know best about needs on the ground. Their insider knowledge should be available not only to Resident Coordinators, but to the whole UNCT (see Aeneas Chuma, in UNDP/DPA Reflections 2013b, 15). The role of PDAs could be further strengthened by involving them more in the preparation of country strategies and programming, in countries where this is not seen as standard practice.
• **Create synergies, earmark resources needed**: The UN approach to structural post-conflict peacebuilding support needs an overall framework that applies to the entire conflict cycle. Whereas coordination seems to function better during higher levels of crises, prevention strategies are often not sufficiently integrated. A mechanism is needed that helps UNDP formulate an integrated prevention strategy for creating I4P for each country case, based on sound conflict analysis, buy-in, complementarity and synergy. After the dissolution of the Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery, the coordination responsibility of BPPS has become even more important. Conceptual and personnel resources seem insufficient to face the increasing challenges of systemic crises across the world.

• **Engage civil society**: Civil society organizations (CSO) have become widely recognized as stakeholders and supporters for I4P. Since they are neither part of a national governance structure, nor a formal part of the national peace architecture (as they are membership-based and provide a caucus for dialogue and cooperation among the members) civil society actors can enormously contribute to embedding I4P into the society. They carry the legitimacy of social members and have often equipped themselves with the capacity to convene key actors and to mediate. Hence they are critical components of the national I4P. The strength of CSOs and NGOs can also be their weakness: having less power and less influence can make them more acceptable as mediators than powerful third actors. UNDP can help increase the influence of these actors through active collaboration, providing legitimacy (through joint projects), as well as through technical support.

• **Mobilize the public and the media**: Although encouraging stories have been shared about I4P, media coverage remains slim. Public opinion matters if support is to be generated, not only in countries where, for example, local peace infrastructures could provide role models for other places, but also in salient democracies where policies and budgets depend on ballot outcomes. UNDP has become well-known in many countries of the Global South, yet in the North the potential of UNDP as a provider of service for peace is far less known. UNDP should improve its advocacy work in the public, but also with regards to parliamentarians, opinion makers, key advisers and, last but not least, government officials. An I4P website could be established, a shared knowledge and training platform developed, and UNDP could commission a Guidance Note and a Handbook for Practitioners, which combines the advantages of information-sharing, guidance and advocacy into one easy-to-use tool.
10. Sources

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11. Abbreviations

ANC  African National Congress (South Africa)
AU  African Union
BPSPS  Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (UNDP)
CA  Constituent Assembly
CAR  Central African Republic
CEWARN  Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CICR  Municipal Committees for Inter-Community Relations (Macedonia)
CPA  Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPN-M  Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (Nepal)
CSO  Civil Society Organization
DFID  Department for International Development (UK)
DPA  United Nations Department of Political Affairs
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
EEAS  European External Action Service
EU  European Union
FDFA  Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (Switzerland)
FYR  Former Yugoslav Republic
GAM  Free Aceh Movement
GPPAC  Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
HLPC  High Level Peace Committee (Nepal)
IGO  Inter-Governmental Organization
INA  National Lawyers Forum (Tunisia)
INGO  International Non-Governmental Organization
IPP  Platform of Insider Peacebuilders (Thailand)
LPC  Local Peace Committees or Local Peace Councils
LTDH  Tunisian Human Rights League
MCP  Malawi Congress Party
MINURP  Ministry for National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace (Solomon Islands)
MPNP  Multi-Party Negotiating Process (South Africa)
MSN  Mediation Support Network
NCC  National Consultative Council (Malawi)
NDC  National Dialogue Conference (Yemen)
NEC  National Executive Committee (Malawi)
NP  National Party (South Africa)
NPA  National Peace Accord (South Africa)
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONDS  National Office for Dialogue and Sustainability (Peru)
OPAPP  Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process (Philippines)
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PBC  UN Peacebuilding Commission
PDAs  Peace and Development Advisers
PRA  Peace and Reconciliation Association (Afghanistan)
PSGs  Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals
SCOPP  Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (Sri Lanka)
SIDA  Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
TRC  Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UGTT  Tunisian General Labor Union
UN  United Nations
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UK  United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
USA  United States of America
UTICA  Tunisian Employers' Association
WANEP  West Africa Network for Peacebuilding