Concepts,
Crisis Prevention &
Capacities and
Conflict Management
Problems of Coherence
by the European Union
Tobias Debiel and Martina Fischer
Authors

Tobias Debiel is a research associate at the Development and Peace Foundation (Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, SEF) in Bonn. He is active in several non-governmental organizations, serving on the executive committee of World Economy, Ecology and Development Association (WEED) in 1999/2000 and on the steering group of the European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation in 2000 (as representative of the German Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management).

Publications:
He is co-editor of a book on the peaceful settlement of conflicts and of another on the new interventionism. He has published more than 70 articles in distinguished journals, readers, handbooks, occasional paper series, and newspapers. His latest publication is: Strengthening the UN as an Effective World Authority: Cooperative Security Versus Hegemonic Crisis Management in: Global Governance, 6 (2000), 25-41.

Tobias Debiel welcomes correspondence at his e-mail address: debiel@sef-bonn.org

Dr. Martina Fischer is senior researcher at the Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management in Berlin. Her special areas of interest are: European security policy within the framework of the EU and OSCE; conflict management in south-eastern Europe; and evaluation of training provision for peace workers.

Publications:

Martina Fischer welcomes correspondence at her e-mail address: martina.fischer@berghof.b.shuttle.de

Berghof Report Nr. 4
September 2000
© Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management

Contact Address:
Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management
Altensteinstraße 48a
D–14195 Berlin

Via Internet:
http://www. b.shuttle.de/berghof/

ISSN 0949–6858
# Table of Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1

1 Crisis Prevention as a Focus of EU Development Policy .............................. 3
   1.1 New Guidelines Set by the EU Commission and the European Council ... 3
   1.2 New Capacities and Networks in the Service of Crisis Prevention.......... 6
   1.3 Overcoming Structures of War and Containing the Spread of Weapons:
       Examples of Possible Concrete Action .................................................. 8

2 ACP Policy: EU Coherence Put to the Test ............................................ 10
   2.1 A Problematic Foreign-Trade Policy and an Inadequate Policy on Debt
       Relief ...................................................................................................... 11
   2.2 Peace Building as a Component of the ACP–EU Co-operation-Agreement... 14
   2.3 The Contentious Issue of Conditionality ................................................. 15

3 Crisis Prevention and the Reform of the CFSP ........................................ 16
   3.1 Civilian Crisis Prevention: More than just an Appendage to the Military
       Sector? ...................................................................................................... 17
   3.2 The Structural Reforms of the Amsterdam Treaty and the Helsinki
       Resolutions: Greater Coherence and Effectiveness? ................................. 19
   3.3 Civilian Crisis Prevention and Regional Co-operation ................................. 23

4 Concluding Thoughts .................................................................................. 24

5 Bibliography ................................................................................................ 26

Berghof Reports: An Overview ................................................................. 31
Occasional Papers: An Overview ................................................................. 32
Introduction

Since the second half of the 1990s, crisis prevention has often been declared to be a major criterion in the formulation of foreign and development policy. The European Union (EU) has also shifted its perspective in this area, as reflected in a whole series of resolutions. The African continent plays a special role here, because it has long formed a focal point of activity by the EU - and the European Community (EC) respectively.

The first part of this article analyses the new approaches and structures adopted in the 'crisis prevention' policy-making field. We sketch out the guidelines of the European Commission and the European Council, which have formed an appropriate framework for the analysis of conflicts, for early warning and early action. Then, we outline to what extent first capacities have emerged in this field and how the interaction of very different actors has increased since the mid-1990s. The relevance of a new approach is best put to the test by specific examples. Hence, we deal with the question of how far preventive policy can help to overcome structures of violence and with the ubiquitous proliferation of small arms.

A coherent approach to crisis prevention must be aimed, firstly, at improving control over processes likely to give rise to crises and at strengthening local forces and institutions capable of sustaining peace. Secondly, it must take into account the fact that the effects of globalisation foster the tendency of societies to violence. Trade and external economic relations must be framed in such a way that they work against the breakdown of weak economies. Does EU policy live up to this challenge?

The second part of this article examines this question through the prism of the EU’s relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. It starts with an analysis of the new EU-ACP-agreement, which was signed on June 23rd 2000 in Cotonou, Benin. Our assessment is critical: Although the ACP-policy was explicitly designed to be part of a coherent EU prevention policy, it provides little substance for the prevention or cushioning of socio-economic crises and their potential for violence. However, we welcome that the Cotonou agreement includes new opportunities for supporting peace-building efforts and seriously tackles the issue of good governance.
The need for effective crisis management is also cited as an explanation for the increase in importance of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Since the implementation of the Amsterdam Treaty (signed in October 1997)\(^1\) and the resolutions of the EU summits in Cologne and Helsinki in June and December 1999, the policy has undergone an overhaul in terms of both its institutions and its content. How appropriate are the newly created structures and the proposed instruments for tackling global threats to peace? Do the reforms create scope for an effective crisis prevention policy \textit{vis-à-vis} the countries of the South and East?

The third part of this article attempts to answer these questions. First, the different measures initiated by the Helsinki summit of December 1999 are assessed as to whether they are more than merely an appendage of the military approach. Secondly, we describe and evaluate the structural reforms of the Amsterdam treaty, which led to the reorganization of the European Commission and of the European Council in the areas of foreign and security policy. Thirdly, we focus on the EU’s policy of regional co-operation. Since the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU has developed the instrument of so-called ‘Common Strategies’ that have become an important framework for co-ordinated action among member states, the Council and the Commission. In our concluding thoughts, we assess the chances and problems that the EU will face should it seriously be willing to implement a preventive approach.

\(^1\) The Amsterdam Treaty from October 2\(^{nd}\) 1997 became effective on May 1\(^{st}\) 1999.
1 Crisis Prevention as a Focus of EU Development Policy

A reconfiguration of ideas has taken place in the development policy of the European Union since 1995. Overall, greater attention is now paid to civilian crisis prevention and to the socio-economic and political causes of conflict when development co-operation is being planned. This sets an important precedent, given that the EU and its member states are already global players in the field of development assistance and humanitarian aid: they account for about 60 per cent of the bilateral and multilateral aid given world-wide, and for 50 per cent of humanitarian assistance (Schüssel 1998).2

1.1 New Guidelines Set by the EU Commission and the European Council

This new approach was incorporated in particular into the Guidelines of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (OECD 1997), in the drafting of which the EU played an important role. In these guidelines, five areas were identified as determinants of the course of conflicts: rapid societal and political transformation; growing socio-economic disparities; the mobilisation of ethnic and other socio-cultural differences; scarcity of resources; and historical experiences of political violence.

The EU has set out its new guidelines on crisis prevention in a number of documents, initially focusing on the African countries. There was a special concern, within the framework of the CFSP, to see the early warning and peace keeping capacities of the OAU strengthened. This was particularly evident in the Council’s conclusions on Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution, and Peacekeeping in Africa, issued on 4 December 1995. A dialogue was also started at subregional level with the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In

2 In 1997, the EU Commission and the member-countries provided $US31.87 billion. The EU itself gave $US5.26 billion, and was thus the second-largest multilateral donor after the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) (see DAC 1998, 1999).
1996, the Directorate-General for Development (DGVIII) formulated the following five principles:\(^3\)

1. The African states and regional organizations are to be helped to assume *effective ownership* in dealing with their conflicts. This includes promoting the activities of civil society—for example in the fields of mediation-training and reconciliation-work.
2. The key area of concern for the EU Commission is the early prevention of conflicts likely to lead to violence.
3. The causes of violent conflicts are to be addressed through a coherent across-the-board approach that also encompasses the EU-ACP programmes.
4. Capacity for analysis is to be enhanced in order to facilitate prompt action.
5. Exchange of information with other international actors is to be intensified and the scope of the CFSP’s information network COREU (*CORRESPONDANCE EUROPÉENNE*) is to be extended to deal with crisis prevention issues (*LANDGRAF* 1998, 2000; *DEUS PINHEIRO* 1998, 1999).

In June 1997, the European Council passed a Common Position on *Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa* (*EUROPEAN COUNCIL* 1997a). Article 4 expressly mentions the ready availability of weapons in crisis regions as a key problem. The crisis prevention approach as part of development policy was again confirmed in the Council’s resolution on *Coherence* of 5 June 1997 (*EUROPEAN COUNCIL* 1997b). And in November 1998, the Council reaffirmed its existing policy in a resolution entitled ‘The Role of Development Co-operation in Strengthening Peace-building, Conflict Prevention and Resolution’. This document underlined the need for the resolutions so far drawn up in relation to the African continent to be extended to all developing countries, and for them in future to have binding force in EU member-state policies. It also stressed that effective prevention must preclude the

\(^3\) See ‘The European Union and the Issue of Conflict in Africa: Peace-building, Conflict Prevention and Beyond.’, Communication from the Commission to the Council, 6 March 1996.
undesirable side effects of development assistance (such as the reinforcement of clientelist systems of rule).

In reorienting itself in this way, the EU was drawing the obvious conclusion from the self-critical debate that had taken place about the experiences in Somalia and Rwanda—namely, that development co-operation is never neutral in conflict situations, and that it always constitutes interference in the structures of the recipient country: in favourable conditions, it can promote the constructive resolution of a conflict, whereas in unfavourable conditions it may further entrench unjust power structures and prolong situations of war (Uvin 1999). This is also true of humanitarian aid. Mary B. Anderson (1999) has identified a comprehensive series of problematic side effects. The influx of resources can effect dramatic changes in the political and economic situation on the ground, and can cause turmoil in local markets. For example, money is sometimes appropriated for provisioning troops or buying arms, or is channelled into particular areas in order to consolidate political support.

More subtle but equally dangerous are the implicit messages conveyed by the various development-agencies: contact between aid organizations and warlords can lend the latter greater legitimacy; an arrogant demeanour on the part of aid workers can reinforce cultures of dominance and thus generate additional injustices. In this context the issue of prostitution should be explicitly mentioned because it is frequently linked with the presence of international institutions.5

In short: inappropriate or ill-reflected behaviour on the part of external actors can unintentionally fuel conflicts or even encourage human-rights violations.

4 The Dutch study *Between Development and Destruction* (1996) and the *Joint Evaluation of Development Assistance to Rwanda* (1996), carried out under the direction of the Danish development-agency DANIDA, played an important role here.

5 See e.g. recent reports about forced prostitution in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the way this has been encouraged by demand not only from members of international organizations but also from members of aid organizations (Böhm 2000).
1.2 New Capacities and Networks in the Service of Crisis Prevention

The conceptual debate of and critical reflection on experiences in conflict prevention signify the emergence of a framework for this new policy field. However, this new approach will only inform political decision-making, if it is incorporated into the institutional design and manifold communication processes of the EU. In this respect several changes have taken place since 1997, most of which are, however, still at an embryonic stage. A first practical step towards strengthening the EU’s capacities in foreign-policy analysis was the creation, in 1997, of the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN), set up on the initiative of the former French prime minister and current MEP Michel Rocard. The CPN is located at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Ebenhausen. Its brief is to help various Directorates-General and the European Parliament (EP) formulate political measures by providing policy-oriented background-analyses and by organizing relevant workshops. In addition, focal points dealing with crisis prevention in Africa have been set up in the ministries of the EU states. The CFSP information network COREU, in use on a daily basis, is to be used to a greater extent to exchange information about crisis developments (Deus Pinheiro 1998, 1999). And with the creation of the Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB), the Commission and EU member states now have an electronic network through which they can exchange views.

Many NGOs working in development have recognized the relevance of peace building and conflict resolution and have incorporated this field into their work. Other NGOs have actually specialized in conflict resolution. They are active at a practical level, organizing training sessions and engaging in a whole range of mediation activities; they also lobby to get this new area of activity put on a more solid footing. Exchange with an increasingly well-interlinked civil society at EU level was already playing a crucial role prior to the Amsterdam summit. In the course of the Intergovernmental Conferences, NGOs—notably from the human-rights, peace, development and humanitarian-aid fields— repeatedly called for ‘coherence’ in the

6 See Asseburg/Schümer 1999. In producing its case-studies, the CPN calls on international specialists for particular countries and regions, and on 30 Western European institutions. However, participating NGOs complain that the CPN is too much of a ‘one-way street’, in which joint learning is not possible.

7 A number of manuals have also been compiled, for guidance on implementing the various instruments.
shaping of foreign relations, claiming this was essential for achieving the desired effect of preventing conflict.

At the EU level, new structures have taken shape, which have fostered close co-operation and exchange of expertise in what amounts to a policy network. The European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation was set up in February 1997 in Amsterdam. At the start of 1997, various international organizations, research institutions, and NGOs came together to form the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER). Good contacts exist between NGOs and the European Parliament on numerous issues relating to crisis prevention and the creation of social structures that foster peace (peace-building). Formalized consultations take place, for example, via monthly meetings of the EU–NGO Human Rights Contact Group, the EU–NGO CFSP Contact Group, and the Arms Transfer Working Group. In addition, a dozen or so organizations that are active in the field of conflict resolution have agreed to set up a European Peace-building Liaison Office (EPLO), as an independent subgroup of the European Platform. The office will begin its work in autumn 2000. Its purpose is to provide better access to EU plans and activities in this area, and to improve transparency and the flow of information for NGOs. Co-operation with non-governmental actors—many of whom have an enormous fund of knowledge about, and direct contacts with, the grassroots in crisis regions—have played a decisive part in ensuring that social and political causes of conflict are accorded greater attention in EU development policy.

---

8 Its membership is made up of national platforms and organizations from various Western European countries, plus a few initiatives from Eastern Europe.

9 As well as the European institutions International Alert (GB), the PIOOM Foundation (NL), the Russian Academy of Sciences/Institute of Ethnology, and the Swiss Peace Foundation, the membership includes, e.g., the Council on Foreign Relations (USA), York University (Can.), and various UN agencies. The Berne-based Swiss Peace Foundation has developed an information system for the "Early Recognition of Tension and Fact-Finding" (known by its German acronym ‘FAST’).  

10 As well as NGOs and MEPs, those attending the group's meetings include representatives of the EU Commission and of member states and associates.
1.3 Overcoming Structures of War and Containing the Spread of Weapons: Examples of Possible Concrete Action

Development policy geared to crisis prevention has at its disposal a wide range of instruments for preventing the outbreak of collective violence. This extends from promoting favourable economic, political and social structures right up to influencing current political processes. Preventive policies should work against structures underpinning war-economies, and should not unintentionally reinforce them. Mention has already been made of the need to minimize the side effects of humanitarian aid. Nevertheless, a European policy that claims to be coherent must go further than this. That is why the NGOs that joined forces to form the Eurostep network (European Solidarity Towards Equal Participation) have urged that, when drawing up its policies on Africa, the EU should take account of the part which arms exports and the exploitation of natural resources such as tropical timber, diamonds and oil play in fostering war-based economies. A ban on trade in diamonds—which are used to finance wars—could be particularly effective. The EU could enforce such a ban through the use of certificates of origin and monitoring mechanisms, and could punish infringements by prosecuting offenders and withdrawing concessions.

The EU should also play a more active role in containing the spread of weapons. In 1999, it was decided that the EU and its member states should broach the subject of small-arms with the ACP states and other developing countries, and should develop programmes for eliminating small-arms and supporting local communities in their efforts to overcome cultures of violence. The fact that the EU included this topic in the political dialogue is due, inter alia, to the pressure of the NGO networks. Similar pressure will be needed to persuade the EU and its

---

11 The ‘International Diamond Campaign’, launched in Oct. 1999, aims to increase the pressure on politics and business not to buy diamonds from Angola, since they are used finance the operations of UNITA. The NGO ‘Global Witness’ calls on oil-companies and international financial institutions to monitor the use of oil revenues and credits, because both of these are important sources of finance for waging war. Latest information from medico international at http://www.medico.de/angola.fatal.htm.

12 A large number of initiatives, conferences, and working groups lobbying in this area have now come into being in the EU ambit. In autumn 1998, at conferences in Canada and Belgium, representatives of more than 100 NGOs came together to form an International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA). This aims to keep the
member states to frame their own arms-exports guidelines in restrictive terms, and to get them to adopt a policy of self-restraint. The Code of Conduct on Arms Exports adopted by the EU on 8 June 1998, which sets out standard criteria for arms-export policy, still contains many gaps. In particular, it does not satisfy the principle of transparency and subjection to political control. The Joint Action on Small Arms of 12 December 1998, which is designed to counter the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms, is also unsatisfactory.13

Most of the small arms currently exported to Africa come from central and eastern Europe.14 This being so, the EU could apply specific pressure in the negotiations on association and entry, in order to push through more restrictive arms-control policies—particularly since some of the states concerned have already endorsed the Code of Conduct and the Joint Action. A precondition for such action would be a co-ordinated approach by the three Directorates-General in charge of external relations, enlargement issues and development that transcends mere declarations of intent. Furthermore, a fundamental deficit of the Maastricht Treaty remains even after the Amsterdam Treaty: Armaments policy is still excluded from this treaty system. Thus the crucial changes within the armaments sector, with serious implications for the structure of the arms industry and the arms export policy of EU member states, are negotiated on an intergovernmental level and not within the community framework.

spread of small arms to a minimum, on both the supply and demand sides, and to put a stop to the illegal trade in them. Further information at http://www.iansa.org.

14 Bulgaria in particular is a prime example of a major supplier to crisis regions and regions of war.
2  **ACP Policy: EU Coherence Put to the Test**

The violent settlement of conflicts in developing and transforming countries has a host of different causes. Weak state structures, a lack of legal guarantees, and socio-economic blocks to development number amongst them, as does destabilization resulting from regional and global developments. In fragile political-cum-economic systems in particular, the outbreak of war is often triggered by external ‘shocks’. Poorly diversified economies that have only limited access to foreign markets and are dependent on the export of a handful of raw materials are particularly vulnerable in this regard. Sudden falls in the price of raw materials can cause crises that put the stability of whole political systems at risk and plunge broad sections of the population into subsistence-level existence. The collapse of coffee-prices at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, for instance, made what was already a tense situation in Rwanda even more acute - an ‘ideal’ environment for extremist leaders to capitalize on deprivation and racist sentiments for waging war and genocide.

The human insecurity caused by economic crises is often exploited by political leaders: they mobilise and politicise ethnic, cultural and religious loyalties, and they channel social discontent into friend–foe configurations. If these kinds of tensions are not to escalate into violent inter-group conflicts, particular attention must be paid to getting processes of modernization and liberalization properly anchored in society. A far-sighted policy of structural crisis prevention must therefore go at least some way in offsetting the negative effects of economic globalisation and must open up equitable opportunities for development and integration for marginal countries.

In what follows here, we try to establish, by way of example, how far EU policy in regard to the ACP states matches the requirements of an integrated approach to crisis prevention (see also LEONHARDT 2000). We begin by assessing whether the EU has fulfilled the obligation it entered into in the Maastricht Treaty to foster the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them. Starting with the four Lomé treaties and the new ACP-EU partnership-agreement from June 23rd 2000, we examine whether the EU’s trade and development policy has lessened or indeed increased the vulnerability and crisis-proneness of African economies. In this
context, we also address the issue of debt relief. Secondly, we discuss the possibilities which the new ACP–EU partnership-agreement of June 2000 opens up for civil-society actors, and we end the section with an examination of the contentious issue of conditionality.

2.1 A Problematic Foreign-Trade Policy and an Inadequate Policy on Debt Relief

The four Lomé conventions that governed EU co-operation with the ACP countries contained a number of progressive elements. ACP countries were, for example, accorded trading preferences. One stabilization fund was established to guarantee export-earnings from minerals (Sysmin) and another to offset fluctuations in income from other raw-materials exports (Stabex). In addition, substantial sums in development aid were made available. How far these instruments actually took effect—and in particular how far they improved the lives of the impoverished populations—is a moot point. Furthermore, there were many fields of activity in which EU policy, only poorly aligned to the requirements of development, ran counter to these measures of support: the Common Agricultural Policy of the EC/EU continues, even today, to make it difficult for agricultural products from the South to gain access to markets; export subsidies for EU products facilitate the conquest of international markets and drive out other suppliers; and lastly, the graduated scale of tariffs for industrial products works against the efforts of developing countries to diversify exports.

The new partnership agreement, which was concluded on 4 February 2000 and was signed in June 2000 in Cotonou, aims to create a new basis for ACP–EU relations over the next twenty years. The two stabilization funds are done away with in the new agreement. Compensation on mineral exports is only provided for on a country-by-country basis. In the area of trade, the EU has geared itself to WTO framework-conditions and pushed for extensive liberalization. Further development will very much depend on how the Regional Economic Partnership Agreements (REPAs) are framed. These are due to come into force by 2008 at the
latest. Whereas the EU is pushing for regional free-trade agreements here, NGOs and the ACP countries are calling for equitable arrangements that take account of the unequal level of economic development. In order to guarantee a measure of protection for the ACP countries in the transitional phase, an exception is to be sought from the WTO to cover the granting of trade-preferences for the next eight years. In addition, there are to be interim assessments of the effects of liberalization on the competitiveness of the ACP economies.\textsuperscript{15}

A crucial factor will be whether the EU itself is prepared to lead the way in opening up the markets for the other ACP-countries and whether the EU is willing to cut back its agricultural subsidies. A timetable of five years was negotiated for full market-access by the poorest countries, but one cannot tell how far the opening-up of the EU internal market to the remaining ACP countries will go. If the EU refuses to countenance the removal of agricultural subsidies and the opening-up of its markets, its free-trade position—as Rainer Falk (2000) has aptly remarked—will turn into a ‘free-trade pose’. It would then be, not a ‘global player’ but a ‘global spoiler’, and would help cement an unfair international economic framework.

Over the last twenty-five years, the ACP states have drifted even further towards the periphery of the international economic system, whilst other groups of states—particularly in east and southeast Asia—have managed to make up ground. One disturbing fact is that the development-assistance budgets of the EU member states have, overall, decreased, and that the relative proportion of EU development-cooperation resources going to the ACP countries has fallen sharply, to the advantage of the countries of the Mediterranean region, central Europe, and the CIS.\textsuperscript{16}

Whatever the case, the vulnerability of the African economies within the process of globalisation is clearly set to increase further. Up to now, no coherent scheme for creating diversified structures of industrialization has been developed. Africa will have to work to secure investments. Individual countries will also have to

\textsuperscript{15} See Holtz 2000, Schilder/Martens 2000.

\textsuperscript{16} Between 1992 and 1997, the ACP countries’ share of budget allocations fell from 45\% to 14\%. The share of the countries of the southern Mediterranean region rose from 9\% to 25\%. The bulk of the funds now flow into central Europe and the CIS states, and their share has risen from 33\% to 46\%. At 15\% the share of the Asian and Latin American countries is more or less the same as that of the ACP states (van Reisen 1999: 13).
try to get plugged into the ‘Internet age’ and go out and secure market niches. Developing the relevant know-how and building up the requisite technical capacities will be a huge challenge. Nevertheless, this area can only be an adjunct to the main socio-economic task: the creation of a regionally integrated economy that will bring broad-based modernization and thus help satisfy the basic needs of large sections of the population.

Any serious policy of economic crisis prevention concerned to bring about global good governance must promote what, in the national sphere, is called an enabling environment. This does not just imply making the poorer countries ‘WTO-compliant’; it also means reconfiguring the WTO in a ‘development-compliant’ way (Falk 2000). The EU ought to be involved in this process. It also ought to develop economic instruments of intervention that could respond to externally triggered economic crises with targeted stabilization-measures. This would, of course, necessitate a whole new way of thinking: the EU would have to present a united front in acute crises, and would have to be empowered to act. This presupposes viewing crisis prevention as a cross-sectoral task, and seeing that the EU commissionership responsible for civilian aspects of prevention and conflict resolution is invested with sufficient powers.

The fact that aid is declining makes the institution of a systematic debt-relief policy for the poorest countries all the more urgent. An initiative launched by governmental donors in 1996 offers relief for the group of 41 heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs), who are indebted to their Western creditors to the tune of about $US 210 billion. At the economic summit in Cologne in June 1999, and at the joint annual conference of the World Bank and IMF in autumn 1999, concessions of up to $US 70 billion were granted. One positive development is that debt-relief is to be tied to poverty reduction strategies. However, this will necessitate a radical change in the IMF’s existing structural-adjustment programmes. Furthermore, the current relief-initiative must be developed a good deal further in order to bring the level of debt and the rate of debt repayment into reasonable proportion with export earnings.¹⁷

¹⁷ The target value of 150% for the proportion of debts to export earnings is too high. Processes of ‘sustainable development’ can only get off the ground if bilateral debts are written off totally and if the international financial
2.2 Peace Building as a Component of the ACP–EU Co-operation-Agreement

The new ACP–EU partnership-agreement offers scope for effective crisis prevention and peace-building measures—that is to say, for the promotion of social structures capable of sustaining peace. It opens up the possibility of involving NGOs in crisis prevention measures and of drawing them into the political dialogue (for example about the arms trade, the options for overcoming structures of war, or the competition for scarce resources). In addition, specific programmes are to be instituted—to provide mediation-training for local authorities, for instance, to strengthen civil society, or to help create democratic institutions—and development projects overall are to be reviewed to see what contribution they make to peace building. The fact that this co-operation is no longer confined to the intergovernmental level, and that ‘decentralized’ actors such as local administrations, private companies, and NGOs are increasingly being involved, forming a kind of ‘pluralist partnership’, represents a decisive advance in the relations between the EU and ACP countries. This participatory approach brings with it: the possibility of exchanging information and advice when formulating development strategies; improved options for financial support; involvement in the implementation of projects and programmes; and the opportunity to engage in capacity building (Holtz 2000). Particular importance is attached to the strengthening of regional initiatives and local capacities. That said, the question of the choice of civil-society actors will be a crucial one here: undemocratic governments must not be allowed to co-opt, or indeed call into being, organizations that are convenient to themselves, and bolster them with development money.

---

18 Whether the new approaches actually reflect real political priorities can only be ascertained by looking in detail at the way funds are distributed and the specific effects of civil-society support.
2.3 The Contentious Issue of Conditionality

Imposing conditions on development assistance is probably the most effective lever through which the EU can exert direct influence on the conduct of government in the ACP countries. Development assistance has always been tied to certain conditions, though these have changed over time. At the beginning of the 1990s, the donor countries decided to link aid to good governance (>political conditionality<). This led to the EU’s suspending payments to Sudan, Somalia, Zaire and Liberia, even whilst Lomé IV was still in force. On 28 November 1991, the European Council passed a resolution in which aid payments to the ACP states were explicitly tied to democratisation, human rights and reductions in arms spending. In addition, a special budget-line (B7-522) was created for the promotion of civil society and good governance. And finally, in order to increase the pressure, the EU drew up a catalogue of sanctions ranging from diplomatic protest, through cuts in funding, to the suspension of development work.

In the negotiations on the new ACP–EU co-operation-agreement, the actual concept of good governance was a bone of contention. It was defined as a political and institutional framework within which human rights, basic democratic principles, the rule of law and the transparent and responsible management of public funds are guaranteed. The EU pushed through this clause in the face of opposition from a large number of ACP countries. Of course, insistence on good governance brings with it the risk of patronization. On the other hand, a method of distributing funds that is geared to crisis prevention, democratic development and sustainability cannot function without political criteria. If it has none, it runs the risk of fostering repressive power-structures. The provisions on good governance should therefore be seen as a step forward (see HOLTZ 2000). Despite this, conflict of aims arises, since conditionality runs counter to the principle—also contained in the new EU–ACP agreement—that the African countries are themselves mainly responsible for

---

19 As far back as the 1950s, allocation of credits by the World Bank (IBRD) and the IMF were conditional upon the recipient being acceptable to the Western camp. Since 1973, 'poverty-reduction', 'environmental friendliness', and 'the promotion of women', have also been adopted as criteria. At the beginning of the 1980s, the IMF and IBRD introduced a further, 'economic condition': countries that applied to the international financial agencies for
resolving their conflicts. This contradiction is irresolvable. All that can be done is to cushion its effects through a careful country-based formulation of strategy.

3 Crisis Prevention and the Reform of the CFSP

The need to assume responsibility for the full spectrum of tasks relating to conflict prevention and crisis management (Solana 2000: 2) was also cited as the reason for the innovations in the ideas and institutions of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 paved the way for the incorporation of the Western European Union (WEU)—that is to say, a military alliance—into the EU. At the Helsinki summit on 10–11 December 1999, within the context of a revised European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the European Council agreed the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force for military crisis intervention, to operate in consultation with NATO. Specifically, the declaration also contains undertakings ‘[t]o improve national and multi-national military capabilities, develop common collective capability goals and establish new decision-making bodies and principles for co-operation with non-EU European NATO members’.

20 The plan is that by 2003 it will be possible to deploy between 50,000 and 60,000 troops within a period of 60 days. At the same time, it was announced that civilian instruments of crisis prevention and conflict resolution were to be expanded. However, we have to ask how far civilian crisis-prevention measures are to be accorded independent status. In addition, we have to check to see how far the reforms will create scope for the democratic control of foreign policy, and promote transparency and coherence in the latter.

In the following section we first analyse those fields of activity in which the Directorate-General for External Relations wants to improve the capacities for civilian conflict resolution. We evaluate critically whether or not this area will be likely to play a relevant and independent role. In this context, we also outline an initiative by members of the European Parliament (EP) for the establishment of an European Civilian Peace Corps; such a corps would emphasize the EU’s commitment help on account of indebtedness or balance-of-payments deficits had to submit to ‘structural adjustment’. Structural-adjustment programmes were also used, in tempered form, by the EU from 1987.
for civilian conflict management. Considerable structural reforms of the European Council and the European Commission are linked to the Amsterdam Treaty from October 1997. Then, we give an overview of these changes and comment on their potential impact on the effectiveness and coherence of the EU’s development, foreign and security policy. We conclude this section by describing the EU’s instruments for regional co-operation that in the near future could be further developed into joint policies designed to ensure coherence in EU foreign relations.

3.1 Civilian Crisis Prevention: More than just an Appendage to the Military Sector?

The resolutions of the Helsinki summit provided for the improvement and more effective use of the instruments of non-military crisis management. The EU commissioner charged with bringing this about, Christopher Patten (2000b: 14), has stated that the EU will have to launch initiatives in a whole range of sectors: humanitarian aid and rescue services; mine clearance and disarmament; the supply of police personnel; the provision of administrative and legal support for democratisation; monitoring of elections and human rights; and conflict mediation in crisis regions. In order to fulfil these tasks, a Rapid Reaction Capability is to be developed; there is to be a review of national and community resources in this area.

There are already indications of massive imbalances in the allocation of resources to the military and civilian sectors of crisis intervention. The EU Commission has been talking of a draft budget of 15 million Euros for the civilian sector. This is approximately equal to the amount earmarked for crisis prevention and civilian conflict resolution by the German foreign ministry. It is hard to see that the measures described by Patten could even be co-ordinated or initiated with such a small sum. It is obvious what is going on here: whilst plans in the military sector are speeding ahead, are fully elaborated, and are set to absorb many times the amount of resources envisaged for civilian measures, proposed measures in the
civilian sector have so far remained confined to improving information and co-
ordination.

Of course, this is not really surprising. Patten himself had remarked that the
instruments for non-military action were necessary as a complement to those in the
military area (Patten 2000b: 13). The civilian dimension thus becomes more or less
an appendage of the military sector. And yet such a point of view conflicts with
Patten’s simultaneous claim about moving from a policy of reaction to a policy of
long-term, structural prevention, and of ensuring the prompt use of preventive
diplomacy as a means of avoiding violence.

Civilian crisis prevention, which aims at long-term processes, is often faced
with the problem of not being able to come up with demonstrable successes and of
not being sufficiently visible in institutional terms. A project proposed by MEPs in
the mid-1990s could be helpful in countering this: the establishment of a European
Civilian Peace Corps (ECPC), which was designed as a link between the EU
bureaucracy and societal actors in crisis regions in order to provide the latter with
support. The project draws conclusions from the experience that military
intervention in already escalated conflicts frequently intensifies rather than
mitigates hostilities. Moreover, it acknowledges that the military is not the most
suitable actor to create sustainable structures of peace in crisis or post-conflict
situations.

As a civilian body, composed of specialists from the fields of peace, human
rights and humanitarian aid, and from the administration, the justice system, and
the police, the ECPC’s primary mission focus would be pre- and post-conflict
situations. It is thought to operate under the mandate of the UN and OSCE. The plan
is to set up such a contingent of specialist personnel as an official EU body, to be
funded out of the community budget and by member states. The ECPC’s terms of
reference range from fact finding and human-rights monitoring, through local
conflict management, to coping with the after-effects of conflict and supporting civil-
society structures. At the beginning of 1999, after submission of a report by the
Foreign Affairs Committee, the European Parliament sent a recommendation to the
Council proposing that it set up an ECPC21. The Commission was charged with the

---

21 See Per Gahrton, Bericht über die Einrichtung eines Europäischen Zivilen Friedenscorps mit dem Vorschlag für
task of instituting a pilot study. The rapid establishment of an ECPC would create an interesting opportunity for making the benefits of civilian approaches to conflict resolution visible, and for bringing them to the public’s attention. Pressure from civil society organizations will, however, be necessary to ensure this idea is not lost in the chaos of new responsibilities and competences.

Moreover, it is vital that EU deliberations in the domain of civilian crisis prevention be linked to initiatives in the national and multilateral spheres. In the national sphere, a large number of member states—including, for example, Germany—have made efforts to introduce training schemes, create pools of experts and establish crisis indicators (see Debiel et al. 1999, Debiel/Matthies 2000). At the multilateral level, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), at its summit in Istanbul in November 1999, approved the creation of Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams (REACT). The EU could regard itself as a connecting link, bringing together the inputs of its member states and translating these into a form that is also usable within the framework of the OSCE and United Nations. Most importantly, the EU should see the further development of its foreign, security and defence policy as helping to strengthen multilateral approaches to conflict resolution.

3.2 The Structural Reforms of the Amsterdam Treaty and the Helsinki Resolutions: Greater Coherence and Effectiveness?

As a consequence of the Amsterdam Treaty, new structures and decision-making procedures have been set up in the area of foreign and security policy. Principally, we welcome the upgrading of this area. However, severe obstacles to achieving concerted action with clear responsibilities remain. There is still a marked discrepancy between the declarations made in the context of the CFSP and the actual implementation of the policies in question. Problems of co-ordination are pre-programmed into the situation: externally, the EU is now represented by a new troika comprising the current presidency, the High Representative, and the future presidency. The CFSP comes under the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers and
thus falls largely outside the control of the parliament. Formulation of trade and development policy is under the overall control of the EU Commission. Even within the Commission there is interdepartmental rivalry and bickering over responsibilities. Crisis prevention and development co-operation come within the remit of the Directorate-General for External Relations, the Directorate-General for Development, and partly also the Directorate-General for EU Enlargement. In addition, individual agencies—notably the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO)—also have considerable clout of their own because of the funds with which they are endowed. As a result, they often cannot be properly tied into an overall political strategy (see Cottee 2000: 32–3).

The new Commissioner for External Relations, Christopher Patten, is to lead a new team consisting of himself and three other EU commissioners: Pascal Lamy (trade), Paul Nielson (development policy), and Günter Verheugen (EU enlargement). Although the Amsterdam Treaty envisages a co-ordinating function for the Commissioner for External Relations, it seems unlikely that this provision can be implemented. What is more, the appointment of the former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana to the post of High Representative may result in Chris Patten’s being shunted into second place: after all, the infrastructure needed for crisis prevention is at the disposal, first and foremost, of ‘Mr CFSP’, who is in charge of the military domain. That infrastructure includes the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU). An important component of this is the Situation Centre Crisis Cell. It will provide round-the-clock assessments of the significance of international developments in terms of crisis, draw up policy options for the European Council and, in conjunction with the Commission, establish links with trade and development policy.

On 22 May 2000, at the General Council of Foreign Ministers in Brussels, it was also agreed that a civilian crisis-management committee should be set up. Its task will be: to provide advice to the first- and second-pillar bodies that deal with

---

22 ECHO is responsible for the provision of humanitarian aid in natural disasters and armed conflicts, and for long-term aid to refugees.

23 The PPEWU contains the following 6 Task Forces: European Security and Defence Policy; Western Balkans/Central Europe; Mediterranean/Barcelona Process/Middle East/Africa; Russia/Ukraine/Transatlantic/Baltics/Asia; Situation Centre Crisis Cell; and Administration.
issues of crisis management; to fulfil co-ordinating functions; and to develop civilian crisis-management objectives further. The committee will act as a working group within the Council and is meant to present recommendations for civilian aspects of crisis prevention to the Interim Political and Security Committee and related institutions. Furthermore, a co-ordination mechanism was created within the secretariat of the European Council, and this has close links with the Situation Centre in ‘Mr CFSP’s’ secretariat-general. As part of this process, a data bank on civilian police capacities in the member states was set up as a matter of priority (Council of the European Union, DG E VIII, 9149/00). The Presidency Conclusions from the meeting of the European Council in Santa Maria da Feira (Presidency Conclusions SN 200/00, 19./20. June 2000) state that member states, co-operating voluntarily, undertake that by 2003 they will be able to provide up to 5,000 police officers for international missions across the range of conflict-prevention and crisis-management operations. Member states also undertake to be able to identify and deploy up to 1,000 police officers within 30 days.24

The numerous institutional reforms and dynamic efforts to establish new mechanisms for consultation as well as early warning and civilian police capacities show the EU’s ambition to overcome its inertia in these areas. Yet, these measures are no guarantee for greater effectiveness or coherence. The difficult restructuring of well-established working relations and the inscrutable jumble of responsibilities may cause frictions that could paralyse concerted action in practice. In particular, two potential consequences of the reform process give rise to concern: the possible return to a ‘depoliticised’ approach in development assistance and the imminent marginalization of the European Commission with respect to foreign relations.

As regards the first point, the structural reform of the European Commission, begun in mid-1999, signals that foreign and development policy are once again to be more sharply distinguished in their content. As a result of the restructuring in the Directorate-General for Development (DG VIII), the Conflict Prevention Unit has been disbanded. This is regrettable in that the unit had pursued the issue of crisis prevention with great gusto, and that, with its demise, a tried-and-tested working set-up has now disappeared. So far, it is still unclear how the work done up to now

24 See Presidency Conclusions SN 200/00.
will slot into the Commission’s new structures. Crisis prevention will be incorporated on the one hand into the CFSP High Representative’s Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit and on the other assigned to the new Directorate-General for External Relations. The main areas of interest here are, of course, the Ukraine, Russia, the Balkans and the Caucasus. This could, *de facto*, mean that less attention is paid to crisis prevention in the Southern regions, particularly sub-Saharan Africa. This further marginalization of Africa aggravates a trend that had begun in the 1990s with the shifts of development funds mentioned above.

Secondly, far from decreasing tensions between the foreign policies of the various states and the commitment of the EU Commission, the institutional innovations have evidently aggravated them. The creation of a *High Representative of the CFSP* has ‘made relations even more complicated’, warned EU Commissioner Patten on 15 June 2000, in a speech to the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI) in Paris. Patten also bemoaned a loss of prestige on the part of the EU Commission. Governments would, he said, allocate tasks to the CFSP which ought really to fall within the jurisdiction of the Commission; and the Commission would only be left with ‘clearing-up’ tasks—for example, in the case of financing ‘ringing declarations’ by heads of government (quoted from the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 15 June 2000). Patten called for the Commission to be given a weightier role: the Amsterdam Treaty, he said, ‘fully associates’ the EU Commission with the CFSP (*Patten* 2000c). European foreign policy must not be reduced to ‘simply filling in the blanks on a canvas drawn by others’. As an ultimate goal, Patten proposed: strengthened links between the three pillars of the EU treaty, greater commonality in foreign-policy decision-making (instead of further strengthening the intergovernmental level), and greater efficiency in the management of individual budgets—for example, in the domains of foreign aid and development co-operation. At the moment, there are few signs, however, that the European Commission and the European Parliament will be able to achieve and establish such a coherent approach.
3.3 Civilian Crisis Prevention and Regional Co-operation

The EU has developed various forms of co-operation with the different regions of the world. Programmes and processes of dialogue include the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and market economies as well as support for stability, security and co-operation in these regions. Furthermore, issues of foreign trade and development policy are part of such agreements. In the final analysis, it is regional co-operation that offers the most suitable framework to pursue a concerted approach of crisis prevention. So far, the EU has developed the following broad spectrum of instruments: 1. enlargement in central and eastern Europe, supported by PHARE; 2. the partnership and co-operation agreements with the successor states of the Soviet Union, with help from the TACIS programme to get them through the process of transformation; 3. the Stability Pact for south-eastern Europe; 4. the Barcelona process in the Mediterranean region (on the MEDA programme, see Fischer/Statz 1998); 5. support for the Middle East peace-process; 6. the Asia–Europe Meetings that have been taking place with the ASEAN states since 1996 (ASEM process); 7. increased co-operation with the South American countries; 8. the previously mentioned encouragement of regional co-operation for the ACP states (COTTEY 2000: 32).25

The Amsterdam Treaty has now opened up further options for action, allowing integrated policies to be developed for particular countries, regions and issues. The framework for this is provided by the Common Strategies—that is to say, the development of joint policies designed to ensure coherence in EU foreign relations. These Common Strategies are implemented through Joint Actions and Common Positions. Common Strategies have already been formulated in regard to Russia and the Ukraine—with whom there are also partnership agreements. Still in preparation are schemes for the Middle East and south-west Asia, the Mediterranean region (with specific links to the Barcelona process), and the western Balkans. The policy of regional co-operation agreed within the framework of the Common Strategies ultimately forms the umbrella under which the EU can promote

---

25 PHARE = Pologne, Hongrie, Assistance à la Réstructuration Économique; TACIS = Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States; ASEAN = Association of South East Asian Nations; ASEM = Asia–Europe Meetings; MEDA = Mediterranean Assistance.
democratic, peace-promoting structures and pursue a coherent policy of crisis prevention. Besides the instruments of development, foreign and security policy previously described, the EU, as a 'civil power', can bring considerable impetus to these tasks, by putting forward proposals for economic co-operation and supporting regional integration projects. The principles of its 'success story' within the Union – peace through economic and political interlocking among its member states – could become guidelines for the EU with regard to its foreign relations.

4 Concluding Thoughts

Since the mid-1990s, the EU has produced a whole range of forward-looking ideas. The example of the EU-policy towards the ACP-Countries shows, that in development policy in particular, it has made notable advances in incorporating issues relating to the rule of law and good governance and in adopting crisis prevention instruments. It has given civil-society organizations access to policy-making processes and has supported them with practical programmes. This is a progressive element. By contrast, there has been little progress in realigning EU policy on trade and external economic relations. No methods have been developed that go any way to offsetting the negative effects of globalisation; nor has any equitable system of exchange with the countries of the South been instituted. No coherent approach to policy-making is to be expected here in the future either.

Whether the restructuring of the EU Commission will bring progress in this area is, at least initially, doubtful. At present, all the indications are that additional problems of competence and co-ordination have arisen in the course of the appointment of the new Commission and the creation of the office of High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (‘Mr CFSP’). With the dissolution of a tried-and-tested working set-up, and the shifting of competences to the High Representative’s area of jurisdiction, there is now a greater danger that advances so far achieved in the fields of crisis prevention and peace building will be obliterated in a process of institutional reform. The structural reforms contained in
the Amsterdam Treaty harbour a whole cluster of problems of coherence, most of which have not even begun to be tackled. In particular, the interlinkage between foreign and development policy could be loosened, and the power of the structures responsible for development policy could be weakened. In addition, it is to be feared that non-European regions will fall out of view.

The shifting of key responsibilities to the CFSP sector suffers from the serious drawback that these areas of policy are largely outside the control of Europe’s citizens: the European Parliament has effective mechanisms of control available for dealing with the EU Commission, but in the CFSP domain it has only consultative rights and no say in decision-making. Up to now, the degree of accountability and control, which security and military policy have been subject to, has been minimal—restricted, in fact, to the domain of budget proposals. This democratic deficit must be made good.

The scope that will be created as a result of the establishment of an area of responsibility for civilian crisis-management in the EU Commission is likely to be modest: the focus on military capacities and on the development of the intergovernmental CFSP that has resulted from the war in Kosovo is pointing us in quite a different direction. Civilian crisis prevention is in danger of becoming an appendage of a military-based form of reactive crisis management. Despite this, we should not give up the civilian domain for lost; we should make systematic use of the existing options and fight to get them extended. An important contribution can be made here by increased lobbying by civil-society organizations in the EU member states, by pressure from increasingly professional NGO networks, and by critical Euro-parliamentarians in Brussels and Strasbourg. The key objectives from a peace-related point of view are: 1. ensuring the primacy of civilian approaches and the adequate resourcing of these; 2. replacing crisis reaction with an effective policy of prevention; 3. stopping ‘crisis prevention’ from being increasingly defined in military terms by representatives of the world of states. That said, the multifarious declarations of the EU will only have some claim to credibility if the development of civilian instruments within the framework of the CFSP is backed up by an adequate budget. Nevertheless, this would presuppose that member states were willing to act to overcome the glaring disparity between the considerable expenditure on military crisis intervention and the meagre funding for civilian approaches.
5 Bibliography

ANDERSON, Mary B., 1999: Do No Harm: How Aid can Support Peace - or War. London.


(http://oneworld.org/eurostep/euafrsta.htm, 1 April 2000)


(http://www.dse.de/zeitschr/de200-3.htm, 1 April 2000)

(http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/jpb.htm)


Patten, Christopher, 2000c: Eine europäische Außenpolitik: Anspruch und Wirklichkeit (Speech/00/219).
(http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/exte...s/news/patten/speech_00_219_de.htm)

Schüssel, Wolfgang, 1998: Punktuationen der Erklärung des Vorsitzenden des Rates der Europäischen Union, Vizekanzler Dr. Wolfgang Schüssel, anläßlich des


# Berghof Reports: An Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Berghof Report</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Published</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Friedliche Einmischung. Strukturen, Prozesse und Strategien zur konstruktiven Bearbeitung ethnopolitischer Konflikte</td>
<td>Norbert Ropers</td>
<td>Oktober 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><em>Peaceful Intervention. Structures, Processes, and Strategies for the Constructive Regulation of Ethnopolitical Conflicts</em></td>
<td>Norbert Ropers</td>
<td>October 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Krisenprävention und zivile Konfliktbearbeitung durch die EU. Konzepte, Kapazitäten und Kohärenzprobleme</td>
<td>Tobias Debiel / Martina Fischer</td>
<td>August 2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Occasional Papers: An Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occasional Paper No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Published/Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Golitsino Workshop for Peace Builders. 25.–29. September 1999</td>
<td>Anja Weiss and Aleksej Nazarenko</td>
<td>August 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Hungarian Concept of Autonomy for Romania. The 1993 DAHR Draft-law on National Minorities and Autonomous Communities and Reactions from Other Political Parties in Romania.</td>
<td>Kinga Páll</td>
<td>September 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The International Relations of the DAHR 1989 — 96. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania. An Introduction.</td>
<td>Anna-Mária Bíró</td>
<td>August 1996 Internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Strategies and Needs of NGOs Dealing with Ethno-political Conflicts in the New Eastern Democracies</td>
<td>Anja Weiss and Aleksej Nazarenko</td>
<td>March 1997 Internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasional Paper No.</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Published/Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Peace Work by Civil Actors in Post-Communist Societies.</td>
<td>Diana Francis and Norbert Ropers</td>
<td>September 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Aktivitäten der bikommunalen Conflict Resolution Trainer Group in Zypern.</td>
<td>Oliver Wolleh</td>
<td>November 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Natural Law, Agents and Patients, and Minority Rights.</td>
<td>Gabriel Andreescu</td>
<td>November 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Roles and Functions of Third Parties in the Constructive Management of Ethnopolitical Conflicts.</td>
<td>Norbert Ropers</td>
<td>November 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Internet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>