Abstract

In the last 20 years or so, in 31 peace processes around the world, women made up only 2% of chief mediators, 4% of signatories and 9% of negotiators. In the 57 years since the inception of the Republic of Cyprus, only three Greek Cypriot women have so far had any kind of involvement and impact in the peace process, with the situation being worse as far as the Turkish Cypriot community is concerned, where the corresponding number is a feeble one.

Putting aside the obvious moral argument of diversity in the name of democracy, justice and equality, this paper will mostly emphasize a utilitarian approach to the necessity of applying a gender lens onto peace and security in the case of Cyprus. It will propose that for this to be made possible and effective, a new dialectic should infuse the ongoing security dialogue between the two communities, the guarantor states and the international mediation team – that of inclusive security. It will be additionally argued that not only could better outcomes be possible within diverse conceptual and decision-making frameworks, but, also, that the long-term sustainability and political effectiveness of such outcomes can be further improved, specifically through the wider participation of women, this being a mutually reinforcing process.

Overcoming the existing ferocity of clutching to the recurrent, widespread, yet failing methodology of non-inclusion, as far as women, peace and security is concerned, this paper will finally seek to address not only why gender and inclusive security matter, but also examine what (admittedly half-baked) measures have so far been taken in Cyprus to this effect. It will conclude with policy recommendations on how a gender-sensitive approach can be, in any case, further facilitated and put into practice, with a National Action Plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 being an obvious starting point.
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1 Executive summary

‘War is a stern teacher’ (Finley 1972) and yet we have still not learned. Half of all peace agreements signed fail within the first five years (Charles 1997), with the rate of relapse increasing every decade since the 1960s (World Bank 2011). It almost seems that we are becoming better in achieving ‘agreements without peace’ (Diaz, Tordjman 2012) – short term deals which remain unsustainable in the long run. So, what have we been doing wrong? And what does ‘we’ stand for? Definitely, not women!

In the last 20 years or so, in 31 peace processes around the world, women made up only 2% of chief mediators, 4% of signatories and 9% of negotiators (Diaz, Tordjman 2012). In the 57 years since the inception of the Republic of Cyprus, only three Greek Cypriot women have so far had any kind of involvement and impact in the peace process (Koukkides-Proconiou 2015), with situation being worse as far as the Turkish Cypriot community is concerned, where the corresponding number is a feeble one.

Peace negotiations’ failure can be attributed to a timely and complex amalgamation of reasons, possibly featuring among others a newly-established ‘tyranny’ (Kennedy 2016) of international experts i.e. technocrats who see each new case as yet another project to be managed and thus, fail ‘to capture the society at hand’ (Westendorf 2015) and fail to comprehend the complex historic and socioeconomic relationships which define a particular conflict on the ground (a feeling which does seem to resonate quite deeply with certain local actors and some of the media in the case of Cyprus). Subsequently, bearing in mind the analytical complexity involved, it could prove less daunting to focus instead on the success stories rather than ones of failure, by examining the positive effect of an endogenous factor which seems to irrevocably act as game changer, making negotiations and implementation of peace agreements thereafter run a little smoother and last a little longer.

For that matter, extensive qualitative and quantitative research shows that women positively influence reaching a deal (O’Reilly, O’Suilleabhan, Paffenholz 2015) and they can also make it last longer once it is reached. An agreement is 35% more likely to last at least 15 years if women participate in its creation (O’Reilly, O’Suilleabhan, Paffenholz 2015). Therefore, ignoring women’s perspectives, perceptions and needs, excluding them from the peace negotiation and implementation process seems to be perilous to any state. Thus, putting aside the obvious moral argument of diversity in the name of democracy, justice and equality, this paper will mostly emphasize a utilitarian approach to the necessity of applying a gender lens onto peace and security in the case of Cyprus. It will also be proposed that for this to be made possible and effective, a new dialectic should infuse the ongoing security dialogue between the two communities, the guarantor states and the international mediation team – that of inclusive security: ‘a framework that places social and economic concerns on equal footing with military and political issues...based on the premise that, in order to have real security, you have to have all of the stakeholders around the table’ (Synergos 2008). It will be additionally argued that not only could better outcomes be possible within diverse conceptual and decision-making frameworks, but, also, that the long-term sustainability and political effectiveness of such outcomes can be further improved, specifically through the wider participation of women (Hunt 2007), this being a mutually reinforcing process.

It is noteworthy that resistance among Greek Cypriot women towards the benefits of a solution and their own perceptions of possible future threats accruing from such a solution differ from ‘mainstream’

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1 A casual glance by any reader over the Cyprus media can easily illustrate the bashing that each UN Special Representative and his team has had to suffer in turn to this effect throughout the years.
(i.e. male) notions (Centre of Sustainable Peace and Development 2013-2015). All the more so, this points to the urgency of introducing a gender perspective of inclusive security into the narrative sooner rather than later. Primarily, this needs to be done to appropriately address such negative preconceptions – a bulwark which needs to be overcome before any future referendum. Subsequently, the creation of a new polity, where silos of existing power hierarchies will be broken down to make room for the emergence of new federal and communal structures could prove a great opportunity for the promotion of gender equality within both communities and at state level. If male elites are prepared to share power along ethnic lines, they could perhaps be a little bit more prepared to share power along gender lines. This is a boat we cannot yet again afford to miss.

Overcoming the existing ferocity of clutching to the recurrent, widespread, yet failing methodology of non-inclusion, as far as women, peace and security is concerned, this paper will finally seek to address not only why gender and inclusive security matter, but also examine what (admittedly half-baked) measures have so far been taken in Cyprus to this effect. It will conclude with policy recommendations on how a gender-sensitive approach can be, in any case, further facilitated and put into practice, with a National Action Plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 being an obvious starting point.

2 An introduction to gender and inclusive security: theory and practice

Whereas reference to notions of gender possibly evokes reactions that this is essentially ‘women’s stuff’, since gender is usually taken to be a synonym for women, in essence, gender reflects the dynamic relationship between male and female. ‘It creates the first political order within a society, one that influences how we relate to others, and how we govern ourselves. That means that the people fighting for gender equity aren’t advocating for some special interest group that will only affect a sliver of the population. The male/female relationship is created and sustained by all within the society.’ (Weingarten, Hudson 2016) In fact, policy should ‘look below the surface of the state, focusing on citizens. All citizens.’ (Slaughter 2016; also Slaughter, Weingarten 2016). This is exactly what inclusive security is about.

However, despite magnanimous declarations to this effect, involvement in policy usually remains the privilege of an elitist ‘democracy’, which practices the art of decision-making in a confidential and exclusive den – a den of men. In a recent New America investigation led by Ann Marie Slaughter (Weingarten, Hudson 2016), national security and foreign policy elites in the United States were asked how much they think about gender when formulating policy: most of them answered ‘very little.’ There was also confusion between gender-impact policy (i.e. how the same policy affects women and men differently) and gender representation around the decision-making table: ‘If there was a female face at the table, even one, that sufficed in terms of consideration of gender in the discussion.’ (Weingarten, Hudson 2016).

This confusion is all the more apparent in the case of Cyprus, where, too, this very same practice of name-dropping and counting the number of women in one’s team or department remains unchanged. In fact, the situation has been documented in pretty much similar ways (Papastavrou 2015): ‘women who work for peace... rarely reach national or international negotiating tables’; ‘government officials and policy makers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs... have one or two female representatives and perhaps another two behind the scenes making coffee’; ‘(but) there is one woman on this panel’.
Nonetheless, a notable exception and perhaps a worthwhile case study of international good practices would, of course, be Swedish foreign and security policy, which not only claims to be feminist (Government Offices of Sweden) but does not fail to follow through from theory to practice via implementation of its four ‘R’s: (a) Reality check of matching specific needs on the ground to international aspirations, something which leads to pragmatic prioritizing and maximizes local effectiveness in various countries where aid and funding is addressed, (b) protection of women’s Rights either by pushing internationally for prohibition of certain practices (such as forced marriages) or through empowering progress via others (for example, equal access to education), (c) Representation in all decision-making bodies, emphasizing the importance of participation when the agenda is set and of engagement when policy is decided and conducted, e.g. in the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, five out of six top positions are held by women. Lastly, (d) spending Resources and aid on development cooperation abroad with a gender perspective in mind, as global gender equality goals cannot be achieved without substantial financial backing.

Having joined the UN Security Council as a non-permanent member in 2017-2018, Sweden has pledged to prioritize women, peace and security by operationalizing UNSCR 1325 and by pushing against under-representation of female mediators in UN peace processes. This could offer a dim glimpse of hope, depending on the determination with which Sweden may choose to push through the implementation of existing Security Council resolutions for the cause of gender equality and inclusion.

3 The interaction between inclusive and human security

The concept of inclusive security can prove all the more useful when used in conjunction with the notion of human security, itself consisting of a variety of components, ranging from personal protection against extremism and violence, to educational, health and food security and to the safeguarding of communal, political, economic and environmental concerns (UNDP 1994). In essence, this precludes focusing away from the traditional definition of national interest (i.e. the strict ‘hard’ security requirements for the survival of the state per se) and instead turning one’s attentions to the security concerns necessary for the survival and the well-being of a state’s citizens, without these two processes being mutually exclusive. In turn, citizens’ needs and concerns cannot be easily identified or pursued, unless a policy of inclusion is followed, firstly, when mapping and secondly, when implementing actions to address such concerns. In this way, inclusive security and human security remain beneficially reinforcing concepts and additionally, can both act as strong indicators of trouble, when pursuing peace and security agendas.

Research indicates that feeling materially, physically and culturally secure usually makes citizens more willing and able to commit to national reconciliation processes (UNDP 1994), something critically important in any post-conflict society. In fact, the SCORE index has quantified such links between development and reconciliation, by assessing the levels of social cohesion (i.e. trust in institutions and civic engagement) in a given society through the lens of human security considerations (UNDP 1994). It seems that no one can feel secure or be prosperous for long, ascribing legitimacy and professing allegiance to any state, unless they feel that their right to life and property, as well as the rule of law, are

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2 See detailed analysis of the importance and premises of this Resolution which follows suit.
safeguarded by their state and within their state. The absence of such teleology should serve as source of concern.

Additionally, it is no coincidence that the UN Secretary General (UN 2005) has introduced another important determinant into the peace equation – namely, respect and protection of human rights, i.e. freedom to choose one’s way of life, access to natural resources, peace and security to enjoy such resources and so on. Thus, although the gradual introduction of sometimes informal, multi-stakeholder national dialogues (mainly through UN endorsement) to provide grassroots with a voice in conflict-ridden or post-conflict societies is primarily done in the name of inclusive security, it still serves to promote human rights principles and the right of each and every individual in determining one’s future. Therefore, introducing the notion of inclusive security into an otherwise elitist security dialogue framework encourages diversity of perspectives and the representation of various interest groups. This has been gradually the case in many peace processes around the world (partly including Cyprus) and it seems to have contributed, at least to some extent, to furthering grass-roots ownership of a peace process, reinforcing legitimization and thus, strengthening prospects of long-term peace sustainability. What’s more, emphasis on propagating security through the fostering of economic empowerment and development usually works in the same direction. Almost irreversibly, the economic becomes political, as there seems to be an inter-link of frequent occurrence/reoccurrence of conflict in low income environments. One can easily conclude that there is a visible relation between security and prosperity, while both, consequently, beget peace.

In fact, research findings prove a correlation between decline in human security and rise in the risk of conflict (Worldwatch Institute 1996). Thus, diminishing human security indexes should act as an alarm to contain such conflict before it materializes. No solution, be it in Cyprus or elsewhere, could prove viable and sustainable in the long-run, unless human security indexes such as financial security in current employment, or adequate access to physical and economic resources were both monitored and safeguarded (SeeD, UNDP, USAID 2015).

4 Women, Peace and Security

Despite declarations to the opposite effect, women, on a worldwide scale, have been largely ignored by ongoing security practices. Addressing concerns regarding gender and security has strayed very little from the realm of the rhetoric into the realm of practice. Despite the adoption of the seminal UNSCR 1325 in 2000, on women, peace and security (perhaps the first time that women’s empowerment is addressed in such context, with women treated as potential actors and not victims) and the subsequent seven resolutions that followed thereafter, little progress has been made since:

‘The resolution reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security. Resolution 1325 urges all actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspectives in all United Nations peace and security efforts. It also calls on all parties to conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, in

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3 For further information on this topic, see general and comparative overview on peace process legitimization provided by ACCORD 25: Legitimacy and Peace Processes: From coercion to consent, 2014. www.c-r.org/accord/legitimacy-and-peace-processes.

4 Extensive evidence to this end is available via data collected on Fragility, Conflict and Violence throughout the years by the World Bank. Such data can be accessed at www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence.
situations of armed conflict. The resolution provides a number of important operational mandates, with implications for Member States and the entities of the United Nations system.\(^5\)

Following an identification of gaps in UNSCR 1325 and in an attempt to move the Women, Peace and Security agenda forward, additional resolutions were subsequently passed: UNSCR 1820 (2008) which focused on the need for the protection of women from gender-based violence and mainly highlighted women’s victimization versus women’s empowerment; UNSCR 1888 (2009) which promoted accountability mechanisms and complemented Resolution 1820 on gender-based violence in conflict, calling for the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary General to advance UN’s work on sexual violence; UNSCR 1889 (2009) which built on the theme of increased implementation measures, complementing Resolution 1325 and the inclusion of the concept of women’s empowerment, making it more progressive than Resolutions 1820 and 1888; UNSCR 1960 (2010) which emphasized the need to address sexual violence during conflict and by UN personnel/peacekeepers, praising the work of gender advisors and anticipating the appointment of women protection advisers in peacekeeping missions, while states were also asked to deploy greater numbers of female police and military personnel in peacekeeping operations; UNSCR 2106 (2013) which addressed impunity and operationalized guidance on sexual violence in conflict and in addition, addressed areas of justice, women’s empowerment, arms, women’s human rights, and civil society engagement; UNSCR 2122 (2013) which built on the participation elements of the women, peace and security agenda and further implementation of UNSCR 1325, substantially addressing issues of women’s empowerment, access to justice, information and documentation of human rights violations, civil society engagement and requesting more briefings for the Security Council from various entities on issues of women, peace and security and lastly, UNSCR 2242 (2015) which marked the 15th anniversary and reaffirmed commitment to Resolution 1325, highlighting the role of women in countering violent extremism, by addressing the differential impact of terrorism on the human rights of women and girls.\(^6\) Nonetheless, despite having a rather robust theoretical framework in place, in reality too much talk has been compensated with very little action.

In essence, the safeguarding of women’s rights (which are, after all, human rights) has so far been heavily neglected, despite the fact that latest research (Hudson 2012) shows that disrespect and maltreatment of women is perhaps one of the strongest indicators of future conflict and breakdown of security in most societies. In a ground-breaking study of the Woman Stats Project database by (Hudson et al. 2012), there seems to be an inverse link between micro-level gender violence and macro-level state peacefulness, with women’s systemic insecurity effectively unravelling the security of all (ibid, p. 116). That is, whether a country can remain secure and prosperous can be predicted more by the way it treats its women than any other factor. In fact, this seems to be a stronger peace and stability predictor than wealth, democracy or ethnic identity indexes, but little or no proper attention is currently being paid to evidence. Statistics point out, among others, the following: where women are more empowered in multiple spheres of life, countries are less likely to go to war with their neighbours or experience crime and violence within their own society (Hudson et al. 2012); higher levels of female participation in parliament reduce the risk of civil war (Melander 2005a) and also, reduce the rate of human rights abuses by the state (Melander 2005b).

It is really unfortunate that the jury on this one still chooses to be out, when safeguarding gender equality and women’s rights seems to pay off. In addition to all aforementioned arguments, one should

\(^5\) See www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/ for quote, full text and comprehensive explanation.

not forget that many of the Sustainable Development Goals cannot be achieved in the absence of such preconditions and yet just 2% of worldwide funding dedicated to peace and security goes to gender equality or women’s empowerment⁷ and only 1% of spending in security sector reform is allocated to initiatives which consider gender equality a significant objective (Kjäll 2016). What’s more, most attempts to promote and implement a concept of inclusive security, highlighting the important role that gender can and must play, have been plagued by occasional, vague declarations in the absence of deliverables and proper reporting templates, indicators and services. The lack of comprehensive monitoring and any sense of accountability⁸ have merely served to add insult to injury.

Over and above the mounting evidence and the theoretical working framework already provided by UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions thereafter, which clearly recognize that women are key to ending violent conflict and to the establishment of lasting peace, also highlighting the importance of the role of women in preventing such conflict from breaking out, United Nation calls to its member states to take positive action to this effect mostly fell on deaf ears. In the space of sixteen years, only 54 member states or so have taken appropriate action to formulate UNSCR 1325 National Action Plans (or ‘action-lacking plans’ as one expert has pertinently put it) (Nobert 2014), so as to promote the four pillars of the resolution: participation, protection, prevention, relief and recovery. In fact, even when NAPs do exist, not all of them are implemented in reality, mostly because of few resources being allocated to them, but mainly, because of the absence of high-level political will to do so. Even the United Nations itself cannot take the high moral stance, as for example, its own Department of Political Affairs established its Mediation Support Unit in 2008, but did not consider it important for such a team to include gender and inclusivity experts (Herrberg et al. 2015) until three years later.

Nor is the European Union faring much better. With only seventeen out of twenty-eight member states having proceeded with the creation of a National Action Plan (conflict-ridden Cyprus being a notable absence), it was only last year that Ambassador Mara Marinaki was appointed by Commissioner Mogherini as the Principal Advisor on Gender of the European External Action Service. Her welcome by member states was 'half-hearted' (Horst 2015) to say the least and she currently has a huge mandate⁹ of responsibilities but very few resources to carry it forward. Coming from Greece, a country which neither champions women nor has a National Action Plan to date, there is little, or no, national support that she can, at least, expect to boost her cause.

5 Cyprus – where are the women?

The Cyprus conflict is a frozen conflict of neither war nor peace, with numerically insignificant casualties experienced since the 1974 Turkish invasion. Nevertheless, the disadvantage of experiencing conflict in this way is mainly the comfort zone created by the very absence of military tension, which would have translated into civilian deaths or violent incidents, which would, in turn, have forced victims to the conflict to react, one way or another. Thus, the willingness to reach a compromise or settlement under such circumstances of ‘false security’ varies, with Greek Cypriot women being

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especially suspicious of any change in the status quo, as it has so far safeguarded political stability and strong governance, has brought about very little social volatility (with perhaps one or two notable exceptions after the massive and violent displacement of refugees back in 1974) and has extinguished the proliferation of armed groups. In the light of exhibited female risk-aversion, taking a renewed risk in post-conflict re-stabilization in Cyprus approved through the popular vote of a referendum could prove precarious without the infusion of a gender perspective into peace-making and peace-keeping thereafter. Yet gender security considerations are treated as an after-thought, with other ‘hard’ security riddles taking priority.

Over and above local stereotypes, universal barriers to women’s entry into peace processes seem to stand their ground in Cyprus and women are simply not welcome to sit at the table. To begin with, male dominated political parties firmly believe that they represent everyone and fail to see why women are complaining. ‘Are women anyway not the ones taking minutes, preparing working notes, undertaking administration and research tasks, discreetly swinging those box files around? Are they not occasionally asked to head a team or two, granted participation in the Technical Committees running in parallel with formal negotiations? Are they not often responsible for the necessary nitty-gritty groundwork in the side-lines without which decisions cannot be made?’ (Koukkides-Procopiou 2015.) It is no coincidence, then, for example, that no woman has been nominated as a suitable candidate on behalf of the Greek Cypriot political parties to act as advisor to President Anastasiades and participate even in the outer circle of his negotiating team – team still made up by all the President’s men.

Secondly, the negotiating teams on both sides feel that they are so busy with various ‘important’ priorities that they cannot side-track the process to preoccupy themselves with ‘other’ matters, on the side-lines. They simply don’t do gender – they do peace and security and they feel that these topics have no gender perspective to be considered. They see gender issues as a separate, specialized and minor topic, which is irrelevant to their high-end work. Thus, they have allocated this matter to be dealt with by an adequately skilled but rather ill-equipped, marginalized Gender Technical Committee, to whom they rarely seem to pay any attention, as no concrete results regarding gender diversity and equality have so far been achieved. All in all, there is a complete and utter failure by local male leaders to see that gender is not a topic but a tool of analysis.

Thirdly, the expertise, credentials and desire of women to sit at the negotiating table is questioned and almost seen as a rather preposterous and illegitimate demand. ‘What for’ and ‘how come’ is a common response of Cypriot men from both communities to such claims. Interestingly enough, the few women who peripherally exist among the negotiating teams tend to be much better equipped to be there than most men around them.

Examining the bumpy ride to these minor achievements is telling. In October 2009, a Gender Advisory Team (GAT) was formed, including members of the bi-communal organization Hands Across the Divide (HAD), aiming to push for the integration of gender equality into the Cyprus peace negotiations and working closely with the UN Secretary General’s Mission of Good Offices. In 2015, the issue was taken up by the Cyprus Women’s Lobby (CWL) (the Cyprus chapter of the largest network of women’s organisations in Europe numbering 3000 members all over Europe) and raised during the European Women’s Lobby (EWL) General Assembly, successfully managing to pass an emergency motion calling for leaders of both communities to implement UNSCR 1325 and to ensure 50% participation of women in both negotiating teams. Prominent local activists joined a vocal social media campaign urging the two leaders to take this motion into consideration, while the EWL directly contacted both of them, as well as the two chief negotiators, the Special Advisor to the United Nations

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10 See www.seedsofpeace.eu/ SCORE index findings.
Secretary General on Cyprus and the Head of the UN’s Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in writing. Indeed, this campaign seemed to momentarily pay off as within that same year the establishing of the bi-communal Gender Equality Technical Committee was realized, as part of an ongoing process of Confidence Building Measures during negotiations.

Nonetheless, women’s organisations and activists on the ground were quick to point out the non-transparent appointment of the Committee’s members, as well as the lack of available public information on its mandate, its resources and the agenda within which it operates and of course, the extent to which its proposals are being heard by the negotiating teams. All in all, serious questions about the Committee’s effectiveness have been raised, bearing in mind the little role it seems to play. In addition to this, activists’ frustration has been further exacerbated by the lack of engagement and the minimal exchange of ideas between this Committee and the women’s movement on the island. This has been so as the Committee has often evoked negotiations’ confidentiality, something which, of course, raises additional questions about any legitimate claims to a true agenda of inclusion, gender empowerment and equality it could possibly lay. What’s more, the bi-communal Cyprus Dialogue Forum, consisting of 97 civil society organisations (NGOs, trade unions, politically-affiliated organisations, etc.), which, in another context, has also attempted to formalize and run a civil society dialogue in parallel to negotiations, did try to address gender inclusion in the peace process via a specialized gender segment in its ranks but to not much avail.

The absence of a pro-active spirit in promoting gender equality and gender diversity in Cyprus is further illustrated, for example, by the way the Republic has, in general, been forced to implement changes to this effect. An indicative case would be the appointment of an Equality Commissioner, when push came to shove. In 2014, the Republic of Cyprus proceeded to respond to a rather damning CEDAW report on issues of gender equality, among others through the appointment of an Equality Commissioner:

‘12. The Committee reiterates its recommendation in its previous concluding observations (CEDAW/C/CYP/CO/5, para. 16) that the State party strengthen the existing national machinery, by providing it with adequate authority and visibility, as well as human, financial and technical resources, and establish effective coordination among all the existing bodies for the advancement of women and the promotion of gender equality. In 2013, the Minister of Justice and Public Order, the competent Minister for gender equality issues, initiated broad deliberations with the major Women’s Organisations, all affiliated to political parties, with the aim to promote the restructuring and strengthening of the National Machinery for Women’s Rights (NMWR). As a result, Women’s Organisations submitted a joint proposal for the appointment of a Commissioner for Gender Equality, who will be fully engaged with gender equality issues. In 2014, a new institution was established by the President of the Republic with competence to further promote gender equality issues and women’s rights in Cyprus, that of the Commissioner for Gender Equality (hereinafter “the Commissioner”), to which a woman was appointed.’

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12 This information was made available to the author by the well-known Cypriot activist Magda Zenon and gender expert Sophia Papastavrou; this information was originally documented in the draft White Book of Best Practice the author was given access to through the workings of the Pathways towards Sustainable Peacebuilding Conference organized by Zenon and Papastavrou in Nicosia, between 3-4 Nov, 2016, in association with FES, World Vision and the Embassy of Sweden in Cyprus, an event under the auspices of UN Women and the European Union Representation in Cyprus.

13 As above.

14 As quoted in official document of the Republic of Cyprus, Follow-up to Concluding Observations: Provision of Information Requested by the Committee on the Steps Undertaken to Implement the Recommendations Contained in Paragraphs 12 and 20(b), (c) and (d) of the Committee’s Concluding Observations on the Combined Sixth and Seventh Periodic Reports of Cyprus Adopted on 25 March, 2013, Office of the Republic of Cyprus Law Commissioner.
Appointing a woman to this position seemed to tick all the right boxes, but still there was absolutely no mention of any intention of involving the newly-established Commissioner, or the women’s organisations who had fought to install her into place (and which were in fact affiliated with the political parties already involved in one way or another in the peace process) or any individual woman for that matter, into the Cyprus problem negotiations, the most important and pressing matter which has preoccupied Cypriot citizens for a good number of decades. In the eyes of male-dominated governments, gender, peace and security do not need to and should not mix. To sum up, evidence shows that gender in Cyprus remains an afterthought and the fact that the Equality Commissioner is the second lowest-paid among all other Commissioners and Cabinet Ministers in the Republic of Cyprus should come as no surprise.15

Yet women represent 50% of the Cyprus population. Unless their voice is heard in the most serious debate defining past and present of their country, human rights are not upheld – human rights cannot exist à la carte. The UN 2012 Mediation Guidance,16 with inclusivity as one of its key fundamentals, points to this effect. UNSCR 1325 does the same. Cypriot politicians in both communities should be reminded that they cannot only selectively evoke the United Nations and its principles, having called upon the assistance of the UN Good Offices and UN Peacekeeping17 forces for so long. Breather or no breather, the United Nations delegation in Cyprus should itself insist that gender equality and inclusion principles are upheld.

Furthermore, any Cyprus solution to be reached within a wider European Union framework should also respect and propagate EU guidelines. Speaking recently at the Pathways towards Sustainable Peacebuilding conference in Nicosia (November 2016), Ambassador Mara Marinaki, European External Action Service Principal Adviser on Gender and on the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, once more put forth a call to this effect: “Resolution 1325 is not a panacea, but it is certainly a solid platform on which to build long-term, 21st-century policies that should be the backbone of our decision making political realities for years to come.” Elizabeth Spehar, Special Representative of the UN Secretary and Head of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, reiterated the same point: “Women cannot be missing from that equation. Viability and sustainability of any agreement will depend on women’s participation.”18

6 ‘It’s not rocket science’19: diversity and inclusion pay

Cyprus has so far been suffering from ‘Gray’s Inn Politics’20: middle-aged, British-educated male lawyers, making most decisions most of the time. In the last fifty-seven years from the inception of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, only three Greek Cypriot women (the late Stella Souliotis, Dr. Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis and Androulla Vassiliou) and one Turkish Cypriot woman (Emine Colak) seem to have had any sort of impact on political negotiations and the peace process. Currently, both leaders, their chief negotiators and their spokespeople are all men.

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15 Available Republic of Cyprus government officials’ public payroll data illustrates this point.
19 A famous exclamation by Swanee Hunt, who was among the first to focus on gender and inclusive security, based on her male-dominated experience of the Bosnian peace process.
20 As above.
Women are still missing from the table, despite civil society organisations advocating and campaigning for change and in spite of the fact that diversity and inclusion will undoubtedly translate into an improvement in the quality of decision-making outcomes of both communities, at every level, whether before, during or after negotiations. This is so, because as simple and practical as it may seem, the rational actor decision-making model does not necessarily depict reality. Not only does it matter which leader makes the decisions, it also matters who the leader makes these decisions with.

Behavioural models point to heuristics (Tversky and Kahnemann 1974), i.e. cognitive biases or mental shortcuts that help people arrive at decisions through lazy reliance on what they already know (the concept of ‘beautiful is familiar’) and are comfortable with, but even if ‘heuristics are highly economical and usually effective… they lead to systematic and predictable errors.’ The problem is further exacerbated when forming a team (negotiating or any other) made up by a number of similar people, with similar preconceived ideas, beliefs and experiences and thus, similar heuristics, as the likelihood of negative outcomes increases. The more these people rely on similar biases to arrive at decisions, the worse these decisions could possibly be, especially since we know that a team has a tendency to arrive at more extreme decisions once personal responsibility is diluted within its ranks: ‘One source of problems in group decisions is that many deliberating groups end up adopting a more extreme version of the position toward which they tended before deliberation began. The problem is especially severe for groups of like-minded people, who typically get more extreme as a result of deliberation.’ (Sunstein and Hastie 2015). In the absence of diversity, often acting as devil’s advocate, a team can easily arrive at groupthink (Janis 1982) – the phenomenon of spectacular fiascoes where even the best and the brightest sleepwalk their way to disaster through a tendency of trying to minimize in-group conflict i.e. reaching consensus without sufficiently testing, analyzing, and evaluating their often similar ideas through pressure to conform.

On the contrary, opposing existing norms among Cypriot negotiating teams, it seems that the female perspective is invariably different and thus, could prove useful at breaking the current impasse in Cyprus, by bringing new creative ideas to the table during negotiations. In fact during the nuclear deal reached in Vienna, Austria, on 14 July 2015, between Iran and the P5+1, there were more women at the negotiating table than men – an unprecedented historic first, as one of the two sides was led by Federica Mogherini, the European Union’s chief diplomat and former Italian foreign minister, her widely-knowledgeable deputy Helga Schmidt and the highly qualified Wendy Sherman, United States’ first female undersecretary of political affairs and a veteran of nuclear negotiations. ‘So it was somehow new, but it’s my personal feeling that it was helpful’, Mogherini was quoted as saying to the BBC, going on to add that when the men veered off course and went on historical tangents or started to get tangled into debates about who gave more, the women walked them back to the present, concluding that ‘The fact of having many women at the table in key positions helped us be concrete and pragmatic the whole way.’ (BBC).

In addition to this, the insistence of excluding women from the process, over and above the obvious ethical and practical questions it poses, seems to be a future game spoiler in securing popular approval via referendum, for any given agreement. A recurrent fear that came out through the Security Dialogue 2016 focus groups research findings is the public feeling that negotiations are conducted by a closed club of insiders whom the process serves, with skeptics (and women) excluded. These findings have further validated 2013-2015 Cyprus SCORE findings where we see that Greek Cypriot women are less reconciliatory (less likely to vote YES in a future referendum) than men. They also exhibit greater anxiety

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22 See www.seedsofpeace.eu/ for updated information on recent findings.
23 See www.scoreforpeace.org/ for detailed information.
about meeting Turkish Cypriots of whom they are suspicious and from whom they wish to maintain their distance. This should not come as a surprise if women feel distant and excluded from the current negotiation/reconciliation process, frightened of negative prospects that a future solution may bring, including the possibility of a recurrence of past gender-based violence directed against them. Exclusion begets lack of ownership, lack of ownership begets lack of legitimacy and lack of legitimacy begets rejection. In simple words, a NO vote. It is indeed puzzling why this issue is not being addressed at all and male Cypriot politicians insist on preaching to the converted, who are mostly made up of other men in their own image.

What’s more, female security concerns (see aforementioned focus group findings) are different from those identified by men. Whereas men in both communities mainly focused on guarantees and the economy, Greek Cypriot women talked about racism, extremism and religious fanaticism leading to potential acts of violence, while Turkish Cypriot women expressed concerns about the future of their children, the health system, the social security system and so on. If these concerns are not heard, addressed and accommodated as legitimate interests during or at least, after the peace process, this would simply translate into 50% of the population’s security concerns being ignored, possibly jeopardizing approval at a referendum and later on, jeopardizing the long-term viability of any solution agreed by the leaders.

Bearing in mind all of the above, the role that women can, in addition, play in the aftermath of negotiations and while a peace plan is being implemented cannot be stressed strongly enough. In fact, capacity building of women’s organisations or networks thereof can be a valuable peace investment asset: ‘Although civil society organizations have fewer resources and may seem ‘weak’ relative to traditional notions of “hard power”, they are nonetheless exhibiting important soft power capacities. They can access and engage a wide range of local actors without the constraints that governments face, in part through new technologies and social media. They can focus on trust and confidence building across communities, inform and share experiences across regions, influence discourse, and support solution-oriented strategies. In the face of rising extremist rhetoric, they maintain and sustain the space for plurality and coexistence.’ 24 Evidence through the analysis of 83 peace agreements between 1989 and 2004 indicates that civil society participation lowers the chance of parties reneging on agreements (and thus increases sustainability of processes) by 64% (Nilsson 2009).

It should also be noted that women are less tolerant of corruption and in general, less corrupt when at positions of power (Dollar et al. 1999) (possibly projecting higher levels of integrity); thus, not only will it pay to have women participating, engaging and making decisions during the stage of negotiations, it would even be more crucial to promote gender equality in the newly-emerged federal state, as ‘higher rates of female participation in government are associated with lower levels of corruption’. It is suggested that ‘women may have higher standards of ethical behavior and appear to be more concerned with the common good.’ (Dollar et al. 1999, p.6)

Research also shows that women of one ethnic group are trusted more by the men of the opposing ethnic group and vice versa, as it is rarely women who have initiated and participated in atrocities through previous conflict (Dickinson and Schaeffer 2008). The experience shared by Angela EV King, Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women to UN, when analyzing the role of women in reconciliation in South Africa also points to this direction25 – the presence of women seemed to foster and maintain confidence and trust, as women came across as more compassionate, less threatening or insistent on status, less willing to opt for force over reconciliation, more willing to listen and learn.

25 See www.repository.uneca.org/bitstream/handle/10855/15804/Bib-64300.
In fact, the timely posing of all these arguments is of essence. It could very well be the case that if men are willing to accept ethnic quotas and share power along ethnic lines, at the aftermath of a peace agreement, perhaps they would be more willing to accept gender quotas and also share power along gender lines, marking a milestone towards gender empowerment and equality in Cyprus. Introducing gender analysis, mainstreaming and budgeting into the new constitution and the new federal state could be easier done sooner rather than later, as old silos of hierarchical power would be breaking down and this could offer a window of opportunity. If we will do it from scratch, we might as well do it properly this time.

7 Women waging peace

As momentum regarding the creation of a Cyprus UNSCR 1325 National Action Plan involving women from both communities, along with a number of international experts who are already willing and able to help, seems to be underway, this should be an immediate focal point and unifying platform to get the ball rolling towards a more inclusive peace process. In this manner, some progress towards achieving a few of the goals laid down in the UN Women, Peace and Security agenda can be expected to materialize.

With Sweden (a country already productively contributing to the Cyprus peace process) on board the UN Security Council during 2017, timing could provide a unique opportunity to push for a feminist agenda (or at least, a more feminist agenda) along these lines. The Embassy of Sweden in Cyprus has already achieved a historic first – a unanimous declaration by all five religious leaders in Cyprus condemning violence against women and pledging to practically support efforts to this effect. What’s more, the American government through its Embassy in Cyprus, which has so far been – albeit indirectly – a contributor to the peace process, could be asked to serve as an additional enabler to the NAP objective (through funding and/or through providing practical guidance and expertise), under the auspices of the United States National Action Plan which declares the institutional commitment of the USA to act as such ‘agents of positive change’.

In fact, any local effort should be enhanced by reaching out to an international network of expert contacts (such as, the Inclusive Security Forum, Swanee Hunt Alternatives, UN Women and so on) and world-connected journalists. By picking good communication practices and practical action plans from countries which have succeeded in making the WPS agenda a priority, further momentum can be stimulated, especially if local leaders consistently feel international civil society vocally breathing down their necks. Capitalizing on their EU membership, Cypriot women should, additionally, seek allies within EU institutions, develop ties with Members of the European Parliament who are friendly to this cause, look for support by the European Institute for Gender Equality and so on. The importance of

26 See previous references to Pathways towards Sustainable Peacebuilding Conference organized by Zenon & Papastavrou in Nicosia, between 3-4 Nov, 2016, in association with FES, World Vision and the Embassy of Sweden in Cyprus, an event under the auspices of UN Women and the European Union Representation in Cyprus: it seems findings and conclusions of the conference have reverberated towards the creation of a task force to this end, through collaboration with the existing 1325 Gender Advisory Team, led by Dr. Maria Hadjipavlou and Dr. Olga Demetriou, who also happen to be members of the Gender Technical Committee working with the two negotiators.
27 See previous mentions of UNSCR to this end; comprehensive analysis can also be found via www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/wps.
linkages between local women and the inter-connectedness of domestic and international networks cannot be stressed enough.  

Additionally, to further assist this process, the United Nations team in Cyprus should strongly insist that the two leaders using their mediation services should abide by the numerous Security Council resolutions on inclusivity, as an integral part of an effective and durable negotiation process. Explicit reference to the mandatory nature for all UN personnel of Policy Directive on Gender Equality in UN Peacekeeping Operations should be made – this policy requires ‘the equal participation of women, men, girls and boys in all peacekeeping activities’ that this personnel oversees, with member states made aware of their responsibility for providing the necessary support needed, special mention made to a NAP obligation. In fact, gender mainstreaming (‘the integration of a gender perspective into the preparation, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies, regulatory measures and spending programmes, with a view to promoting equality between women and men, and combating discrimination’ is therein referred to as an ‘international human rights instrument’ and Peacekeeping Operations have a ‘particular responsibility’ to promote gender equality and female empowerment, in this light.

Putting all these other justifications aside, superimposing a gender lens is, in any case, recognized by the United Nations (and as already argued in this paper, consistently backed by research findings) as a necessary prerequisite for success, since ‘women and men experience conflict differently and therefore understand peace differently. Recognizing and integrating these differences – known as gender perspectives – into all aspects of UN peace operations, is essential for the success of the UN’s peacekeeping efforts’. Thus, multi-level, multi-lateral and multi-faceted political lobbying, emphasizing the ‘business case’ for gender mainstreaming, complemented by a consistent media and social media campaign holding the male elites accountable, while at the same time raising grass-root awareness to this end, would be absolutely critical in trying to primarily, secure gender diversity and inclusion throughout negotiations and subsequently, secure an effective female presence in the implementation of a future peace treaty and state-building thereafter.

A carefully laid-out publicity campaign, aiming to communicate a simplified, utilitarian and thus, relevant message regarding Women, Peace and Security, on a widespread basis to the general public, aiming to mobilize women and general public opinion to this end, has forever been lacking from the Cyprus peace narrative. Women have so far been grouped with children and have been portrayed as helpless victims of the conflict, never given the chance to redress or address this as pro-active agents of change. To combat deeply embedded stereotypes and encourage women to participate in the peace process and the ensuing establishing of a new state, women need to be convinced that, on the one hand, this will have some kind of tangible impact on their everyday lives and on the other that their hitherto marginalized voices will, for once, be heard.

For an excellent elaboration of this point, see the 2013 OECD report on Conflict and Fragility – Gender and Statebuilding in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas, www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictfragilityandresilience/docs/gender_statebuilding.pdf.


Official definition provided by the European Institute for Gender Equality: look up www.eige.europa.eu/gender-mainstreaming/what-is-gender-mainstreaming for a detailed analysis of this concept.

As above.


An obvious way in which this can be done is, for example, through the identification and appointment of female mediators and experts, on an equal footing and in chief positions, in both negotiating teams and/or as members of the advisory teams appointed by political parties to consult with the two leaders. Another practical measure could also be the training and provision of an adequate gender-mainstreaming code of conduct to all members of such teams. However, a note of warning is necessary – individual women playing a role in negotiations does not necessarily translate into inclusivity of women as a social group, unless gender perspectives are included on their behalf in the main discussion narrative.
What would be necessary to get this process going would, firstly, be the capitalizing on the expertise of female communicators and secondly, the utilizing of the presence and assistance of high-profile Cypriot women, who would be committed to this cause and would, subsequently, lead, mentor and coach others, through use of a cross-party, bi-communal, WPS caucus, preferably chaperoned by an honest broker (e.g. the United Nations). Whatever the case, this initiative would almost irrevocably lead to the eventual formation of a pool of potentially politically-minded, knowledgeable and election-savvy female citizens, from which future politicians, parliamentarians, commentators, activists, gender experts could be drawn.

This could be additionally supported by the parallel creation of an online platform and a practical Peace Manual/Tool Kit on gender empowerment and peace process involvement, focusing on local experiences and suggestions, but also bringing into the picture good practices from elsewhere. Such a tool kit could be useful for educators, activists, government officials and individuals who would like to take this further or use it as reference. For example, a relevant manual and/or code of practical suggestions for Cyprus could be based on the soon-to-be-released White Paper already in place by bi-communal civil society, put together through the efforts of Magda Zenon, Sophia Papastavrou and Maria Hadjipavlou.36

Fostering this *en granaze* process in such a way is a prerequisite, if any kind of serious momentum is to be created now or in the not-so-distant future – such momentum could act as carrot and stick to these or any other leaders, especially during the pre-election period. Leaders and their surrounding elites must be made to understand that the empowerment and participation of women’s groups in the peace process makes their own personal chances of success (and hence, re-election) more likely. In fact, the stalemate that negotiations have reached, pending referendum in Turkey in April 2017 and presidential elections in the Republic of Cyprus in March 2018, could provide a much needed breathing space to civil society, allowing the setting off of a joint effort in a concise and organized manner on both sides of the divide. Joining forces to spearhead the creation of a NAP could either serve as the springboard or as the culmination of the aforementioned publicity campaign and could prove a truly unifying point for Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot women together pursuing this path.

Nevertheless, it is imperative that such a NAP (over and above the four thematic pillars of Participation, Protection, Relief and Recovery that underlie UNSCR 1325) should be based on four specific principles37 which will, in turn, define particular present and future actions and activities deriving thereof. It is extremely important that practical recommendations are clarified and included in detail.38 Such recommendations should include proposals to modify current negotiation practices, but, more importantly, should also deal with the work currently undertaken on the writing up of a new federal constitution and accruing legislation and consequently, the making of policies affecting among other issues security, policing,39 the media, education, health and economic empowerment, as well as budgeting allocated to the implementation of such policies (gender budgeting is a must). All of the above should be gender-proofed, much before the new state is ready to set off. If we really mean business, we should start as we mean to go on.

37 These derive from UN Policy Directive on Gender Equality and have been superimposed on this particular context by the author of this paper as helpful guidelines.
38 An excellent example of a practical NAP is the one prepared by Israeli civil society, look up [www.vanleer.org.il/sites/files/attachment_field](http://www.vanleer.org.il/sites/files/attachment_field) for further information.
39 Post-conflict female participation in the army and police force are extremely important, as levels of violence and crime can sometimes rise after the signing of a peace agreement, with women disproportionately being the victims of such violent actions. For elaborate evidence on this, see Blair, A.H., Nicole Gerring and Sabrina Karim 2016. Peace Brief, Ending Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in War and Peace, Recommendations for the Next U.S. Administration, United States Institute for Peace. [www.usip.org/publications/2016/09/ending-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-war-and-peace](http://www.usip.org/publications/2016/09/ending-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-war-and-peace).
All in all, a NAP should emphasize the following principles as fundamental foundations to sustainable peace-making, peace-building and state-building, during and after negotiations:

a. the principle of inclusiveness – the inclusive consultation with all stakeholders on all decision-making affecting them and incorporating their perspective into policy-making
b. the principle of non-discrimination – the safeguarding that policies and decisions ensure gender equality and protect women and girls from gender-based violence
c. the principle of gender balance – the equal participation of men and women in decision-making and representative positions

d. the principle of efficiency – the ensuring that all human resources are equally tapped on through political, economic and educational empowerment to assist in and safeguard a long-term peace-building process.

Nonetheless, irrespective of how much financial, logistical and technical support is provided by external sponsors and stakeholders and how much effort is put into upholding these principles by civil society, the creation of a NAP will not amount to much unless there is political commitment from leaders on both sides to endorse it, commit their own resources to this effort and then, of course, proceed by implementing it. No matter who will undertake to draw this up, the following variables should receive high-level political endorsement, if success is to be made possible: (i) widespread understanding and training of stakeholders on gender-sensitive conflict analysis, (ii) tangible deliverables and timely milestones, (iii) translating theoretical frameworks into feasible, practical on-the-ground measures, (iv) reporting and monitoring mechanisms and (v) enforcement accountability. These should be clearly laid out and accepted as binding by the political leadership in both communities. In the absence of these, a NAP will merely remain a reference point rather than a starting point for any kind of substantial change in mindsets and in established practices.

An effective way to convince local elites to comply with gender mainstreaming and gender budgeting in any new state of affairs is, however, the tying of financial assistance or reconstruction funds by international donors to such objectives, as was, for example, the request in the case of the Oslo Donors Conference for Sudan in 2005. It should be noted though that donors will most probably not assign funds in such a way unless they are asked to do so and this is exactly where a gender-sensitive negotiating team would make all the difference. Evidence exists that in cases where funds were linked to gender equality and female empowerment objectives (such objectives can vary as widely as the creation of male networks against gender violence; capacity building in the Ministry of Finance to train officials towards gender budgeting; financial and legal literacy provided to women so as to eliminate pay,

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60 Although quotas, or temporary corrective measures, are the subject of much debate, they undoubtedly seem to be a necessary evil in order to correct representative misalignment. In fact, a ‘critical mass’ of a minimum 30% of female representatives in any body seems to be preferable, for any change to really trickle down. Mere representation is, however, not enough, as female representatives should be actively participating and engaging in decision-making at the upper echelons of political and economic power structures. Extensive research can be found on quotas and the critical mass theory; concise and brief accounts in support of this can be found in Dahlerup, Drude 1988. From a Small to a Large Minority: Women in Scandinavian Politics. In: Scandinavian Political Studies, 11, 275–97; Dahlerup, Drude and Lenita Freidenvall 2005. Quotas as a “Fast Track” to Equal Political Representation for Women: Why Scandinavia is No Longer the Model. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 7, 1, 26–48.

41 A clear case why this is absolutely essential in any homogeneous economy transitioning to a new heterogeneous state of affairs, as would be the case of Cyprus on day one of a solution, can be found in Alesina, Alberto and Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kuriat and Romain Wacziarg 2003. Fractionalisation. Journal of Economic Growth 8, 2, 155-194: ‘Ethnic diversity is known to be an extremely challenging factor to reconcile nationally and is negatively associated with GDP growth; in fact, high levels of ethnic diversity are associated with a 2% decline in GDP growth.’

42 A clear elaboration to this end can be sourced through the findings of the Gender, Peace and Security Advocacy towards the EU training seminars conducted by the European External Action Service in EU member states. Look up www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/features and www.eplo.org/activities/policy-work/gender-peace-security-2/ for detailed EU countries information.

43 For details of this case, see Sudanese women’s priorities and recommendations to the Oslo donors’ conference on Sudan 11-12 Apr 2005. www.reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudanese-womens-priorities-and-recommendations-oslo-donors-conference-sudan.
pension and investment gaps and so on), there were positive results achieved. Provided assistance was long-term and not short-term, project-based gender-sensitive funding can make a difference.

8 Conclusion

To conclude, the infusion of traditional notions of security already on the Cyprus negotiating table with a revised gender-inclusive perspective, aiming to positively re-define the existing security dialogue framework, seems to be imperative under the current circumstances. The jury should not be out on this one anymore. The high stakes of impending failure have been made glaringly obvious with the current impasse the negotiating teams have reached and the ensuing male, pissing-contest-type, blame game which followed. Perhaps now is the time to do things a little differently. And when there is a will, there is always certainly a way.

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64 Such policies with accompanying statistics are diligently reported by the OECD, see, for example Aid in Support of Gender Equality in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States 2010. www.oecd.org/dac/stats/46954513.pdf.


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### 10 About this publication

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examples from similar and/or applicable scenarios and lessons learned, and by developing an understanding of possible approaches to the respective issues in transitional Cyprus, this paper aims at supporting the project’s goal. The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the Berghof Foundation and SeeD or their project partners. For further information please contact the programme director Luxshi Vimalarajah, at l.vimalarajah@berghof-foundation.org.

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