From Combatants to Peacebuilders
A case for inclusive, participatory and holistic security transitions

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Policy Report
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About this report

The ‘war on terror’, launched by the US government and its allies in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, has profoundly transformed the geopolitical environment of the past decade. In particular, the dominance of hard security approaches to inter- and intra-state conflicts has led to a generalised interpretation of all forms of armed insurgencies that challenge the established socio-political order being seen through the lens of ‘terrorism’, regardless of the nature of such actors, their degree of social legitimacy or their political roles and aspirations. Such trends have severely affected not only the dynamics of armed conflicts, but also the course of peace processes and post-war environments. There has indeed been an increasing tendency to view all armed actors as ‘spoilers’ to be fought at all costs or, at best, pacified through disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), rather than as agents of change who can play constructive roles in securing peace and building more legitimate states.

Against this background, the purpose of this report is to present key policy-relevant findings from a two-year participatory research project on the timing, sequencing and components of post-war security transitions, from the perspective and self-analysis of conflict stakeholders who have made the shift from being state challengers to being peace- and state-building agents in South Africa, Colombia, El Salvador, Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Burundi, Southern Sudan, Nepal and Aceh. Unless otherwise stated, the empirical data presented here is based on thematic case studies, which were written by local teams made up of researchers and former combatants, and which were collected and analysed in an edited volume published in parallel with this report (Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta 2012). Any unattributed citations stem from the book.

There is increasing acknowledgement within the peacebuilding policy and research communities that DDR and security sector reform (SSR) are mutually dependent and are in turn heavily conditioned by their broader political environment. Building on this, the project sought to address the conditions under which armed resistance/liberation movements (RLMs) generate and maintain the political will to restore the state’s monopoly over the use of force and participate in post-war peacebuilding. It does so by assessing the interconnections between individual, organisational and structural transitions in the spheres of security and political governance. This report presents the main conclusions of this research process, as well as their implications for international efforts to support inclusive, participatory, holistic and sustainable post-war transitions. It focuses less on the negotiation of peace agreements – which was addressed more specifically in previous reports (Dudouet 2008, 2009) – than on the factors conducive to their effective implementation. Drawing comparative lessons from nine cases of successful war-to-peace transitions, it aims to identify common findings that can be generalised to various types of intra-state armed conflicts and post-war contexts. At the same time, it also presents context-specific findings for particular situations such as security transitions amidst an ongoing conflict (Colombia) or in contexts of state formation (Southern Sudan, Kosovo).

The report is organised as follows: after compiling the main policy recommendations resulting from the analysis, it presents the research background, some key definitions and the core problems at stake. It then spells out thematic challenges, lessons learnt and policy recommendations (highlighted in boxes) for managing volatile post-war transitions and building more legitimate, democratic and accountable political and security institutions.
2 Summary of key findings

International, national and non-governmental actors interested in offering negotiation and peacebuilding support in contexts of polarised societies affected by, or emerging from, protracted violent conflicts should pay particular attention to the three following dimensions of security transitions:

= Inclusivity:

This report emphasises the need for multi-partial constructive dialogue and peacebuilding engagement with all key conflict stakeholders who have the effective capacity to either impede or promote constructive social change. This is all the more true for self-labelled ‘resistance and liberation movements’ who have large social or ethnic constituencies and represent legitimate socio-political interests, who embody an inclusive and participatory vision of society, and who have an interest in governance participation. Many such actors already perform responsible governance and security functions in areas under their control during conflict. They thus have the potential to play vital leadership roles in implementing post-war political reforms, community peacebuilding and the provision of (human) security. A broad engagement with all conflict interests and affected parties helps to preserve organisational cohesion, to ensure that the conflict’s root causes will be addressed, and to convert potential ‘spoilers’ into peacebuilding agents.

An inclusive approach to war-to-peace transitions also underscores the need to adopt all-encompassing definitions and identification criteria for ‘embedded insurgencies’ and their combatants during DDR support programmes. Members of rebel movements often include men, women and youths who are immersed in their communities, and comprise fighters-in-arms as well as political cadres, logistical support personnel and a broader constituency of sympathisers and family. Consequently, socio-economic facilitation schemes should pay attention to the divergent needs and aspirations within and between armed groups, and should use community-based approaches to reintegration. Moreover, national stakeholders should be encouraged to build inclusive, accountable and democratic state institutions which integrate former contenders as well as marginalised social or ethnic groups. Locally meaningful schemes enabling such processes might include power-sharing provisions in decision-making structures and political/security institutions, electoral reform or democratic oversight and verification bodies.

= Participation:

If inclusive mechanisms help to improve the legitimacy of political and security transitions, participatory approaches guarantee their sustainability. This second dimension shifts the focus from ‘with whom to engage’ to ‘how to engage’. It calls for peacebuilding support strategies that place a strong emphasis on the empowerment of local stakeholders, based on the understanding that they will only feel genuinely committed to a transition process if they are centrally involved in driving it. Programmes driven by local needs, interests and practices have a much better chance of sustaining themselves once foreign assistance has dwindled and international missions have been completed. Resistance and liberation movements, in particular, should be acknowledged as proactive change drivers, and encouraged to design and implement self-managed transition management schemes (e.g. interim stabilisation measures, arms management, transitional justice, organisational transformation, etc).

This report offers various examples of constructive forms of light-handed international support that empowers local protagonists instead of bypassing their ownership of security transition processes, and that
recognises (former) combatants as peacebuilding partners, rather than as mere recipients of reintegration assistance or as spoilers to be disarmed and demobilised as quickly as possible. Such support includes in particular programmes that enhance security in volatile early post-war transitions, that encourage and sustain local protagonists’ confidence in undergoing necessary reforms, that build capacity and expertise through technical and financial support, and finally that monitor the parties’ effective implementation of their commitments.

- **Comprehensiveness:**

Finally, security transitions should be envisaged as holistic or systemic processes by embedding DDR and SSR programmes into their political, social and economic contexts. From the perspective of so-called ‘non-state armed groups’, challenging state authority through the use of force does not represent an end in itself, but is envisioned strictly as a means of achieving their broader socio-political objectives. In most cases, they are ready to accept – or might even be struggling for – a genuine integration into transformed state structures. Restoring a truly legitimate monopoly for the state over the use of force is hence in their interest, as long as reliable security and political guarantees are met. Reflecting this, this report rests on a “whole-of-transformation” approach, focusing on the interactions between the demobilisation and conversion/integration of rebel forces into conventional political or security entities, and the parallel planning and implementation of their reciprocal claims to broader structural (i.e. state and societal) change, including the transformation of the security, political, socio-economic and justice systems of governance. Peacebuilding should thus be understood as the interaction between reciprocal and mutually-dependent processes of building human security, justice and development for all citizens.
3 Background

3.1 Project description

This report presents the findings from a participatory research project initiated in 2009 under the supervision of the Berghof Foundation (previously Berghof Conflict Research) in Berlin, in collaboration with regional partners in South Africa, Colombia, El Salvador, Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Burundi, Southern Sudan, Nepal and Aceh, and with funding from the International Development and Research Center (IDRC) in Canada. It was jointly designed with participants from a previous project (2006-2009) representing a network of groups who have experienced the transition from armed resistance to non-violent engagement in negotiations and peacebuilding. Its main aim is to analyse their roles and approaches in processes of post-war security transition.

Several research assumptions underpin this project. Firstly, although non-state armed groups have become central stakeholders in contemporary political conflicts, their crucial contributions to war termination and peace implementation are still largely neglected and misunderstood. These actors tend to be dealt with by state and international policy-makers as bothersome spoilers or dangerous ‘terrorists’ to be fought and eliminated, or as ‘objects’ of internationally-led peace operations who have to become ‘educated’ and ‘socialised’, rather than as agents in the driver’s seat of transformation. However, past research has shown that in most cases, armed insurgencies are rooted in deficits in the structures of conflict prevention and resolution within society. Furthermore, they build on the support of large layers of society who consider them to be legitimate defenders of their interests and grievances. Engaging with these actors constructively as political stakeholders in inclusive peace processes, with a great deal of ownership on their side, may thus bring about better chances for conflict transformation.

A second major assumption is that rebel movements tend to be strongly sceptical about security management models focusing primarily (or solely) on disarming, demobilising and reintegrating their combatants, since they perceive such models as biased, state-centred and unbalanced. Indeed, while DDR has become a major component of international peacebuilding assistance, international support for SSR programmes to enhance the legitimacy, accountability and efficiency of the state’s security apparatus is still limited and minimal in scope. Moreover, despite increasing recognition that DDR is closely interdependent with its surrounding political environment (UN 2006b, Swedish MFA 2006, Colletta et al 2009), post-war international support tends to concentrate on the dissolution of the structures from which ex-combatants are released, while there is little support available for their transformation into non-violent political organisations.

The overall research goal of this project was thus to better understand the challenges of negotiating and implementing security-related transitions (i.e. parallel DDR and SSR) within an interdependent process of political and socio-economic transformation. This was achieved by investigating the different motivations, approaches, strategies and tactics of (former) combatant organisations who are interested in engaging politically, and in shaping security processes in order to overcome protracted violent conflict. The enquiry was organised around a cluster of key research questions addressing complementary transition processes at the agency level (combatants’ trajectories and re-skilling), the organisational level (transformation from underground movements to legal entities) and the structural level (state reform or state-building).

Finally, one of the themes of enquiry which is particularly relevant for this report relates to the
participants’ assessment of international intervention in conflict-prone and post-war environments. The level of foreign involvement has been highly uneven in the nine countries under investigation. In some contexts, such as Colombia and South Africa, peace negotiations and subsequent peacebuilding occurred with hardly (if any) interference or assistance from foreign actors. Elsewhere, mediators and peacebuilding agencies have been involved to various degrees, with their roles ranging from facilitating contact between opponents, to strengthening local capacities and even to substituting national institutions in the absence of a functioning state (i.e. in Kosovo). The project thus aimed to identify appropriate forms of external support mechanisms that promote and support sustainable and locally-owned security transitions.

3.2 Cases

The criteria for selecting the cases to be investigated were based partly on practical and institutional contingencies (e.g. on contacts established over the course of a preceding project, and on the level of interest expressed by the respective movements), and also reflect an attempt to cover a wide spectrum of conflict types and geographic distribution. More importantly, the nine movements under study share a number of similarities, based on which we aimed to identify common patterns and generalisable insights. Firstly, they define themselves as resistance/liberation movements (see below). Secondly, they have been centrally involved in the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements, resulting in sustainable conflict transformation outcomes, although they have currently reached various stages of post-war security and political transition. Finally, the nine movements have undergone successful shifts from armed insurrection towards post-war conventional politics, and most of them are presently in control of national (or regional) legislative or executive powers, or are participating in national or local power-sharing governments (see Table 1 below).

3.3 Methods

Although there is increasing academic interest in the political and security governance roles of non-state armed groups, existing studies rest on scientific analysis by outside academics, failing to include the insider perspectives of the actors concerned. By contrast, this project aimed to analyse the successes and limitations of past or ongoing peacebuilding processes from the point of view of their ‘receiving end’, by integrating the voice of insurgency movements and their demobilised militants.

In order to elicit self-analysis and lessons learnt ‘from inside out’, the project was inspired by the methodology of participatory action research, which allows the participants to bring their own experience and creative ideas into the research process. This innovative approach was selected in line with the project’s guiding assumption that inclusive and participatory approaches are the best choice for locally-owned and sustained conflict transformation. In practice, this meant that the project was designed, conducted and evaluated in collaboration with local teams for each country, made up of (former) combatants as ‘insider experts’, and local independent researchers with a history of collaboration or closely associated with the respective movements. This specific methodology entails several caveats. Based on the premise that there is no single ‘truth’ in either conflict or peace, we consciously chose to prioritise authenticity and accuracy over scientific ‘objectivity’, by asking participants to reflect on these movements’ direct experiences as observed from their own unique point of view. Consequently, the project departs from the classical scholarly distinction between ‘objects’ and ‘subjects’ of research, by mutually implicating insider militants and outsider analysts in the process of data collection and analysis. Moreover, this project fully embraces the emancipatory ethos of ‘critical praxis’ (Gunning 2010) by aiming simultaneously to observe social reality and support constructive processes of social change that tackle the direct, structural and cultural sources of violence.
The overall research framework and scope of enquiry were collectively agreed during a preliminary network meeting in Bangkok (May 2009), based partly on the discussion of a background paper commissioned to a senior DDR/SSR expert. For each case, the methods of data collection were selected locally, ranging from the self-analysis of personal recollections to the use of secondary sources or archival material and to the conducting of interviews with key actors. Draft case studies were presented and collectively discussed by their authors at a roundtable meeting in Bogotá (May 2010), and edited on a peer-review basis. A draft comparative analysis exploring cross-country commonalities and local specificities was then drafted by the project coordinators and discussed in Ottawa (May 2011), where the main project findings were also presented to selected national policy-makers and inter- and non-governmental experts. This report, which builds on these discussions, mainly addresses the policy community, while more comprehensive research findings can be found in the edited book compiling all project outputs, including background research, country cases and comparative analysis (Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta 2012).

Table 1: Origin, nature and current position of the actors under investigation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>RLM¹</th>
<th>Type of conflict</th>
<th>Start of armed conflict</th>
<th>Peace agreement</th>
<th>Current political status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>M-19</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>In politics²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>ANC/MK</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Heads government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>FMLN</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Heads government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>Sinn Fein/IRA</td>
<td>Territorial</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>In local power-sharing government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Territorial</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Heads government³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>CNDD/FDD</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2003⁴</td>
<td>Heads government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Sudan</td>
<td>SPLM/SPLA</td>
<td>Governance / Territorial</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>In power-sharing government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh/Indonesia</td>
<td>GAM/AGAM</td>
<td>Territorial</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Heads local institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>CPN-M/PLA</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Heads government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ The full names of these actors will be spelt out in forthcoming sections. When two names are mentioned, they refer respectively to a political movement and its armed branch (or an autonomous armed organisation closely associated with it).
² The M-19 did not exactly transform from a guerrilla group to a political party; rather, some of its members founded a new political party with other social and political actors, which only lasted for a few years. Many former combatants are currently active in national, provincial or local politics as members of various leftist parties.
³ There was not one single political party emerging from the KLA in Kosovo; instead, the new independent state is presently governed by one of two parties formed after the dissolution of the KLA and headed by a former political leader of the armed movement.
⁴ A multi-party peace accord was signed in 2000, which laid the basis for political and security transformation, but the CNDD-FDD was not a signatory; it signed a separate ceasefire agreement with the government in 2003.
4 Definitions

4.1 Security transition processes

In intra-state asymmetric conflicts, all stakeholders stress the importance of security enhancement for successful war-to-peace transitions, but the concept of security relates to different interests according to which side of the conflict one belongs to. State actors, whose contested authority and legitimacy gave rise to conflict in the first place, are mostly concerned with restoring their monopoly over the use of force, enforcing law and order, and protecting their country against external threats. By contrast, for armed opposition groups and their constituencies, security entails various human needs ranging from personal safety to socio-economic well-being or political freedom, all of which need to be addressed in order for sustainable peacebuilding to take place.

These various interests underscore the need for a holistic understanding of ‘human security’ (UNDP 1994), in line with the definition of security offered by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as “an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the governance of their countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and the basic necessities of life, and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being” (OECD-DAC 2001).

State institutions are responsible for ensuring the essential legal framework and protection of human security, including by running an efficient, controlled and accountable security sector that serves the justice and security needs of all citizens. Establishing a legitimate security sector (or ‘system’) thus lies at the core of any peacebuilding process. According to the DAC definition, the security sector encompasses three main groups: statutory and non-statutory security actors (armed forces, police, paramilitary forces, guards, intelligence services, reserve forces and territorial defence units, customs authorities, liberation and guerrilla armies, private security companies, militias); security management and oversight bodies (the executive, security-related legislative bodies, relevant ministries and civil society organisations); and finally law enforcement institutions (the judiciary, justice ministries, prisons, investigation and prosecution services, human rights commissions, ombudsmen, truth and reconciliation commissions, traditional justice systems).

From the point of view of resistance and liberation movements, the recognition of ‘state security’ of a regime that they consider to be illegitimate is a contradiction in terms. In fact, if their main motivations for engaging in armed activities are rooted in structures that are conducive to an endemic climate of insecurity, then their continued willingness to participate in constructing a peaceful and legitimate post-war political order is inherently conditional upon the transformation of the (security, political and/or socio-economic) structures of oppression and inequality that caused the conflict in the first place. For its part, the concept of DDR is considered deeply flawed because it implies that non-state actors represent the only threat to security. From the perspective of these actors, however, their renunciation of force is interdependent with, and hence cannot precede, the transition of power towards more accountable and legitimate state institutions that can provide a more secure environment for all. Therefore, conceptually, the term ‘security transition’ may capture more precisely what they deem necessary to be changed.

Time-wise, security transition will be framed as the process of recovery and maintenance of human security during the period running from the negotiation of a peace agreement between a state and its challengers up to the establishment of democratic governance (i.e. a transformed security and justice system controlled by democratically-elected and accountable political institutions). Indeed, this report adopts a systemic ‘whole of transformation’ approach, which starts from the premise that the security
agendas of DDR (in which non-state armed groups voluntarily relinquish their capacity to engage in armed rebellion) and SSR (building the state's legitimacy, effectiveness and accountability over its use of force) are interdependent with other peacebuilding arenas, such as political development and democratic state-building, socio-economic regeneration and reform, reconciliation, and transitional justice.

4.2 Resistance/liberation movements

What do former non-state armed groups in El Salvador, Nepal or Southern Sudan have in common? The nine movements referred to in this report share a number of commonalities which – according to their self-ascribed label – qualify them as ‘resistance and liberation movements’. These commonalities can be summarised as follows:

- They have been engaged in a political struggle against a ruling regime or government, which is or was principally considered illegitimate, and they aimed to gain their own share of political responsibility, be it in a separate state or through more democratic and inclusive governance. For these actors the recognition of their political case and motivation is of particular relevance, because they consider targeted violence to be justified as a necessary means for a legitimate political end. This also explains why these movements usually reject attributes such as ‘non-state’ or ‘armed groups’. Neither their non-state character nor the possession of arms is what the movements see as ‘typical characteristics’ of their role and mission.

- They enjoy the support of a large portion, often even the majority, of their ethno-political or social constituency, who consider them to be legitimate representatives of their interests and grievances. In some cases their rebellion represents the power of the oppressed majority against the power of a ruling minority. For the marginalised constituency it is rather the government which has lost the moral and legal right to represent the interests of the people, and the backing of armed rebels is clearly driven by the conviction that the government would not change its policy and politics without being pressed, if necessary with the means of insurgency.

- They do not view the use of force as a preferred choice, but rather as a legitimate last resort in the face of permanent and acute human rights abuses and the denial of democracy by the ruling regime. Their strategy is often much more complex than their opponents try to portray. They often provide local governance and social support, compensating for the lack of services where the state is unwilling or unable to deliver them to the people, especially in the territories under their control. Such initiatives bring them increased popular backing.

- They are formally organised and have hierarchical, accountable structures. Unlike single-issue organisations, criminal gangs or bandits, these movements are functioning organisations, based on internal regulations that are fixed or informally agreed upon. They are composed of women and men serving in different functions, ranging from fighting to political and intelligence work, to fundraising and communication. The formal organisation also provides a framework in which a transformation of structures and policies can be initiated and materialised.

- They are ready – or at least declare readiness – to respect the rule of law and a transparent state monopoly over the use of force once the political change they strive for has been attained. It is important to note that most RLMs make no clear difference between using violent or non-violent means of force if the chosen policy serves the purpose. While this is usually considered a risk by states and governments because a renunciation of force by the rebels cannot be expected before substantial political transformation has happened, it could also be considered by them as an opportunity. The same actors would likely be receptive to non-violent alternatives to their hard and deprived life as combatants.

It should be noted that the analysis and recommendations drawn in this report are only valid for actors who fulfil these criteria, although some lessons might be transferable to other types of intra-state conflict stakeholders.
5 Problem statement: terrorists or peacebuilders?

5.1 Post 9/11 dilemmas of interaction with non-state armed groups

Commemorations of the first decade after the 11 September 2001 attacks have led to a flurry of commentaries and reflections on the potential short- and long-term impact of this event on efforts to transform violent political conflicts. In retrospect, the following trends in the aftermath of 9/11 and the US-led ‘war on terror’ seem to be of particular relevance for our analysis:

- For the first time, terrorism became flagged as a global threat to world peace and security, and counter-terrorism became a top priority in most national policies across the world. This overall trend brought about a politics of “securitisation” (Wæver 2011: 466), which is both based on and results in simplified and polarised perspectives on intra-state conflicts, especially concerning the legitimacy of the use of violence by non-state actors.

- Resistance and liberation movements in intra-state political conflict have been uniformly labelled and denounced as terrorists and illegitimate spoilers, thereby denying the legitimacy of the political and social cases driving or underlying their insurgency. In many intra-state conflicts, the goal of ‘counter-terrorism’ has become a catch-all justification for the state’s use of force against any forms of political (especially violent) unrest and resistance.

- The focus on counter-terrorism has brought hard-power counter-insurgency (from criminalisation to military intervention) to the forefront of security politics in many countries with intra-state conflicts. This tends to be at the expense of non-violent forms of conflict settlement and intentionally transformative approaches, from preventive diplomacy and dialogue to the use of civilian ‘soft power’.

The branding of almost all insurgents as terrorists, regardless of their nature and motivations, has created some new dilemmas and aggravated others in the arena of conflict management and peacebuilding strategies. The most striking of these effects are outlined below.

- The simplification dilemma

The counter-terrorism paradigm, which has come to be applied by many governments, tends to frame intra-state armed conflicts principally as conflicts over the legitimate use of force between the governing authority and non-state power contenders. This severely limits the issue of the use of force, tying it down to being a simple contrast between ‘legitimate state actors’ and ‘illegitimate’ non-statutory forces, regardless of the nature and performance of the government in power. This over-simplified state/non-state focus, which protects and privileges the legal authorities simply due to their legal status, fails to take into account that in cases of corrupt, autocratic and oppressive regimes (or civilian/military ‘foreign’ occupation), legitimacy may rather be on the side of those who resist the existing state bureaucracy and its statutory security forces.

The ‘simplification dilemma’ also has a reverse side. In cases where secession is not an option, if the power contenders reject state authority as such, rather than the character of the existing state rule, armed rebellion will be hardly considered legitimate across large layers of society and the use of violence might then even deepen the existing polarisation.
The non-discrimination dilemma

The uniform branding of all forms of armed resistance and insurgencies as ‘terrorism’, and the sanctions that come with this (e.g. blacklisting and proscription), impedes the chances of offering constructive political alternatives to the use of force. It does not distinguish between different non-state armed groups and their motivations for using force, and it side-liners the variety of socio-economic and political causes of conflicts. The old adage of one man’s terrorist being another man’s freedom fighter perfectly illustrates the dilemma of stigmatising actors regardless of the type of actions they carry out and their degree of social or political legitimacy.

A telling illustration of this shifting paradigm can be offered through the case of the guerrilla organisation Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador. Although it was recognised in 1981 by the French and Mexican governments as a legitimate “representative political force” that should be invited to the negotiation table, the FMLN was later on retroactively added to databases of terrorist organisations, such as the “global terrorism” database set up by the US Department for Homeland Security at Maryland University, or the RAND corporation’s statistical study, “How terrorist groups end” (RAND 2008).

Branding any violent resistance as ‘terrorism’, and consequently justifying any use of oppressive force by the state as ‘counter-terrorism’, does not only diminish the chances of the state and opposition groups engaging with each other constructively in transformation processes. It is also detrimental to the state’s flexibility with respect to taking action. Publicly flagging ‘counter-terrorism’ as a core issue of security policy puts pressure on the government to deliver to society as a whole that which it had promised, namely the elimination of the identified terrorist threat. The government thus runs the risk of losing public support if it enters into a constructive dialogue with actors it had previously branded as ‘terrorists’. This dilemma also explains why it is so difficult to get proscribed actors subsequently de-listed when they demonstrate that they are ready to dissociate themselves from the use of force (Dudouet 2011).

The ‘non-discrimination dilemma’ also poses serious problems when it comes to the timing and sequencing of ‘de-radicalisation’, security transitions and state reform. Indeed, by pushing RLMs into the ‘terrorists’ corner, simply because of their past or current armed strategies, states logically assume that demobilisation and disarmament should be imposed unilaterally, outside of the framework of negotiated agreements that address all sides’ concerns and grievances. However, as will be argued in this report, RLMs consider the possession of arms and the use of force as indispensable leverage power for settling political conflicts. They therefore cannot seriously envisage renouncing such ‘bargaining chips’ without reciprocal commitments by the state to substantial security sector transformations and socio-political reforms.

The support dilemma

If terrorism is a crime, then collaboration with terrorists must also be a crime. This conclusion was supported by the jurisdiction of the US Supreme Court in the Holder vs. Humanitarian Law Project case in June 2010, confirming the 2001 US Patriot Act’s statement that all forms of services provided to ‘terrorists’, including advising and consulting, are punishable according to US law, no matter whether they materialise in the US or overseas. While this court ruling was premised by the intention of avoiding potential increases in political legitimacy for criminal action, it fatally results in the implicit criminalisation of any engagement to prepare, support or accompany the conduct and implementation of participatory peace

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5 See http://www.start.umd.edu/start/
processes with individuals or groups listed as ‘terrorists’ by the US government. This legal framework may create a dramatic obstacle to third-party peacemaking and peacebuilding support, even where conflicting parties have indicated at length their interest in entering into constructive collaboration, including by having already signed a truce or peace accord. Although this jurisdiction is only binding for US residents or projects funded by US institutions, it might set a precedent for other states and international organisations (e.g. the EU) introducing comparable legislations, thereby further reducing the scope for direct or indirect conflict transformation support around the globe.

In Nepal, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) was placed on the US Terrorism Exclusion List and Specially Designated Nationals List in 2003, in the wake of failed bilateral peace negotiations with the King’s government. Although the movement renounced violence, signed a peace accord in 2006 and entered the realm of conventional politics in 2008 (it is currently leading the government and represents the largest party in the constituent assembly), its terrorist designation has still not been revoked by the US administration. This designation has created numerous impediments for US diplomats and citizens as well as for US-funded initiatives to engage constructively with the rebel movement and later the Maoist party and government in order to support the peace process and the implementation of necessary reforms (Gross 2011).

The sovereignty dilemma

The practice of conflict intervention under the auspices of the international community, especially if backed by the United Nations, reveals that states and governments are no longer protected simply because of their legal status according to international law. The emerging norm of a ‘responsibility to protect’ has advised and guided several decisions around ‘humanitarian’ intervention taken by the UN Security Council. Today, the binding of a state’s sovereignty to its inescapable obligation to comply with the norms and rules of international law has the effect of providing RLMs with a point of reference when a government is not willing or able to comply with its duties to provide human security to all citizens. The international recognition and assistance offered to rebels-turned-state leaders in the breakaway states of Kosovo and Southern Sudan, as in Libya, testify that it is possible, in favourable circumstances, for opposition groups to successfully contest the state’s legitimacy, to gain international backing, and furthermore to become credible political interlocutors in the eyes of governments and international agencies.

On the reverse side of this new opportunity, it must be taken into account that if RLMs question the sovereignty of a state, the latter will hardly enter into inclusive approaches to governance reform, because of feared losses in authority and power. Rebels-turned-governments may also not feel inclined to adopt inclusive approaches vis-à-vis representatives of the regime they have toppled with the consent of - and sometimes support from - third parties. This highlights once more the comparative advantage of negotiated transitions over imposed or one-sided conflict settlements.

5.2 Risks and advantages of inclusive transitions

The aforementioned dilemmas highlight the enormous challenges of transforming asymmetric conflicts amidst state-centred political practice, all of which are reinforced by the securitisation paradigm of the ‘war on terror’. The analysis presented in this report is rooted in the presumption that engaging with non-state armed groups is an essential component of any peace process support strategy and a key ingredient to a peace agreement’s implementation. In particular, armed resistance and liberation movements who represent large social or ethnic constituencies with legitimate collective grievances, and who possess the capacity to either impede or facilitate constructive social change, must be involved in conflict settlements.
This standpoint raises several questions concerning the definition and boundaries of inclusivity in engagement with RLMs.

- **Engaging with ‘hardliners’ in peace processes**

State and international actors alike often seek to address as primary RLM interlocutors the so-called ‘moderates’, i.e. those representatives who seem to be most amenable to striking a compromise over the renunciation of force. There are, however, some caveats vis-à-vis such an approach:

- For RLMs, efforts to seek compromise over their use of force start the peacebuilding process from the wrong end when they do not address the root causes of the conflict and the political needs for change. Empirical evidence from the past decades shows that moderation (i.e. a shift from violent to peaceful politics) is more likely to result from substantive negotiations than to precede them.
- The ‘moderates’ may not represent the key stakeholders of RLMs; their vote might be not important enough to be heard and respected by all constituents. By contrast, a broad engagement with all relevant factions may help to preserve organisational cohesion in the transformation period, and thus prevent the formation of splinter groups hijacking the process, or the loss of effective leadership control over more radical constituencies that feel excluded or uncommitted to the negotiated agreements.

On the other hand, inclusivity also highlights the need to ensure that ‘hardliners’ will not monopolise the agenda, and that marginalised constituencies will have access to the negotiation table. This entails, for instance, the promotion of gender-balanced participation in peace and security talks by inviting female representatives to the table, or the opening of negotiation forums on the contours of state reform to other political parties and civil society actors. Such broad platforms might increase the likelihood that the root causes of the conflict will be placed on the peacebuilding agenda. This may also make it more likely that parties will generate and maintain the political will to bring about the necessary reforms to demilitarise, democratise, develop and reconcile the country.

- **Inclusivity and ownership in post-war peacebuilding assistance**

Along the same lines, it can be assumed that post-war peacebuilding will more likely be sustained if it is owned and driven by all relevant conflicting actors and their constituencies, and if it addresses their respective needs and interests. According to their self-ascribed transformative agenda, RLMs will hardly give up their capacity for armed action before they can receive serious guarantees for their inclusion in post-war security and political governance. In fact, this participatory claim for ‘local ownership’ has come to be widely recognised by international peacebuilding agencies, and is increasingly acknowledged as encompassing a broad spectrum of actors, including not only civil society organisations but also former combatants. At the UN level in particular, recent reports have pointed to an appreciation of the potential significance of non-statutory combatant organisations as actors for positive change in post-conflict peacebuilding. For instance, the UN Security Council recognises that “in the aftermath of recent internal conflict, peace agreements may allocate parallel legitimate roles ... also to some non-state security actors such as former rebel forces or militias” (UNSC 2007).

On the other hand, these widely acknowledged principles are still far from actually being implemented. A review of peacebuilding missions by regional organisations, such as the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or the African Union (AU), has shown that in most cases, their mandates made no explicit references to non-state armed groups, even when these were primary signatory parties to the peace accords (Schnabel 2009). Even at the UN level, despite the aforementioned recognition of former combatants’ roles in post-war settings, the implementation of mandated missions has often failed to include them as primary peacebuilding stakeholders.
It can, however, be logically assumed that when reforms or power-sharing provisions are externally imposed, or when they exclude key local stakeholders from decision-making, then these actors will not feel genuinely committed to the process. RLMs wish to play an active role in shaping state-building and peace-building, by negotiating the terms of DDR and state reform, and being the primary agents of their implementation through self-managed transitions and power-sharing governance. In all of the cases considered in our research, RLM leaders were centrally involved in peace talks as well as their implementation, resulting in an effective restoration of the state’s monopoly of force, as well as offering guarantees that this monopoly would be exercised in a legitimate manner. The next two sections offer more detailed insights into the challenges they have met as well as the lessons learned through their participation in securing peace and building more accountable and democratic political and security institutions.
6 Core issues of security transition

This section presents the challenges of early post-war transitions from the perspective of RLM combatants. These are based on their experiences of negotiating and setting up interim mechanisms to maintain security and cohesion in volatile contexts, to restore the state’s monopoly over the use of force, to provide relevant professional perspectives for demobilising troops, and to address transitional justice imperatives. The focus here is mainly on agency-based (individual, collective and organisational) shifts, whereas section 7 will address the macro-perspective of structural state reform and development. Each sub-section offers lessons learnt for effective, fair and balanced transitions which address the parties’ core security dilemmas. Some policy recommendations are then suggested for constructive intervention by international (third-party) actors.

6.1 Transition management

Immediate post-war transitions are particularly prone to instability. This conclusion is well-known, as is suggested by the often-cited statistics that more than one third of conflicts ending in peace agreements since 1990 have seen a return to violence within five years (e.g. Human Security Center 2008). This instability can be explained by the disconnection between the high expectations raised by the signing of a peace accord and the often slow start to its implementation, as frustrated combatants eagerly wait for the benefits of ‘peace dividends’ to be felt. Therefore, the first challenge of post-war transitions concerns the daunting task of dismantling irregular combat structures, while simultaneously maintaining discipline among the demobilising combatants and preventing the appearance of new ‘spoilers’.

6.1.1 Challenges of premature demobilisation

International guidelines on early demobilisation stand in sharp contrast with the field experiences of most combatant organisations under study here.

On the one hand, there is a prevailing understanding among state and international agencies that rebel armies should be dismantled as quickly as possible after the cessation of hostilities, so that members can demobilise and regain civilian status or join the statutory security forces. According to the UN Integrated DDR Standards (UNIDDRS), demobilisation consists in “the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups”, combined with the dissolution of the structures of the organisation from which they are released (UN 2006a, 2.1: 4). This process can be achieved either voluntarily or through military enforcement, in order to “break the hold of armed forces and groups and weaken their structures” (UN 2006a, 2.10: 6). According to analysts, “it is important to organise a process to break the chain of command and erase oaths of obligation”, since “chains of command, if left intact, can develop into criminal or terrorist networks” (Liesinen and Lahdensuo 2007).

On the other hand, abrupt demobilisation brings with it the risk of creating a security vacuum, leading to disorder and disorientation among former combatants when they are dissociated from their group and thus suffer disruption to their collective identity. Growing feelings of impatience and discontent with the slowness of the peacebuilding process can also trigger fragmentation of the movement and a return to violence by unsatisfied splinter groups. This might be especially the case if the peace process led to an intensified polarisation between ‘pragmatist’ and ‘radical’ factions (see section 5.2. above). Symbolically, a one-sided demobilisation of non-statutory forces (while the state’s army and police are kept intact) might
also create feelings of unfairness and imbalance. Opposition groups are thus reluctant to disband their troops and dismantle their command structures before receiving tangible indications that their grievances will be addressed and their governance or reform claims implemented.

In Nepal, the ongoing peace processes illustrates the linkages between demobilisation, security sector transformation and constitutional reform. The Maoists considered the DDR framework advocated by the international community (e.g. UN, US and Indian governments) to be “putting the cart before the horse”, because it aimed to dismantle the rebel forces before agreeing on security sector integration modalities for combatants. With regard to linkages with political negotiations, Maoist leaders have also set constitution writing as a condition for, and a process to act in parallel with, the demobilisation of their troops, thereby using their armed force as a ‘bargaining chip’ to influence the state reform agenda at the Constituent Assembly.

6.1.2 Lessons learnt from the field: maintaining cohesion in fragile post-war transitions

The challenges highlighted above underscore the need for transitional support structures to prevent the creation of security vacuums, guide combatants during their professional reorientation, and maintain their trust and good will throughout the transition process. Comparative experiences across the countries under study highlight the importance of retaining coordination and communication channels through the temporary cantonment of troops in assembly areas to retain control over combatants, the maintenance of command structures in the short- or middle-term, and the formation of interim bodies as ‘interim stabilisation measures’ (Colletta /Muggah 2009) to supervise an orderly civilian or military (re)conversion.

Temporary cantonment of troops

Although the assembly of combatants in cantonment areas is seen in DDR manuals as a prelude to (or the first stage of) demobilisation, it can also serve the purpose of keeping rebel troops united and disciplined during fragile post-agreement transitions.

In Colombia, the guerrilla troops of the 19th of April Movement (M-19) proactively took the initiative to converge from all over the country into a single assembly area (the Santo Domingo camp), surrounded by a demilitarised zone, where the negotiations with the government took place throughout 1989-90. The camp was also used as a deliberation site, where combatants engaged in strategic discussions on their post-war trajectories and received visits from other social, political and security forces in order to prepare the formation of an inclusive political party and begin a reconciliation process with the Colombian army.

In Nepal, Maoist rebel troops have been stationed in self-built cantonments since the 2006 peace accord, following their leadership’s instructions to wait patiently for a political compromise on their military integration and/or socio-economic rehabilitation (negotiations were finally concluded in late 2011, as mentioned below). Despite the slow progress of the security negotiations, all combatants interviewed for this research expressed their full trust in their party leaders to make the right decisions on their behalf, and their readiness to remain cantoned as long as deemed necessary. This high level of commitment can be largely explained by the strong discipline and political ideology within the movement, as well as the intensive ‘coaching’ carried out by commanders down the chain of command within the cantonments.
From Combatants to Peacebuilders

- Keeping militant command structures intact throughout the transition

The timing and sequencing of implementing the various provisions of peace accords represent a crucial factor influencing the political will of stakeholders to comply with their agreed commitments. This is particularly true for the dismantling of militant structures and decision-making bodies.

In South Africa, non-statutory armies were only formally disbanded once their members’ main political demands were met through the organisation of democratic elections in 1994.

In Southern Sudan, in the aftermath of the 2005 peace accord, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) insisted on keeping its army intact until the clarification of the political status of the territory through the 2011 referendum on independence, while only demobilising ‘non-essential elements’ such as minors, and elderly and disabled combatants.

In Northern Ireland, since the declaration of a first ceasefire by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 1994, its command structures, including the IRA ruling Army Council, remained largely intact during the negotiations leading to the 1998 peace accord and the subsequent peacebuilding process. Even their political opponents (i.e. unionist parties and loyalist paramilitaries) have come to accept implicitly the pragmatic logic that maintaining a leadership structure was required to oversee the transition and demobilisation of the organisation. In fact, the IRA admittedly continued to recruit new members and engage in training and intelligence gathering up until 2006/7, even though the organisation’s trajectory towards complete unarmed struggle was by then irreversible. This was justified by the necessity of maintaining discipline within the broader movement by preventing young people from joining dissenting factions opposed to the peace process. In November 2009 the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) recognised that these actions had helped to support the peace process, and reported that ‘by conscious decision the Army Council was being allowed to fall into disuse; and the … IRA had in these ways completely relinquished the leadership and other structures appropriate to a time of conflict’ (IMC 2009: 10).

- Setting up self-run interim security organs

A third mechanism helping to maintain cohesion and stability during the immediate post-war period is the formation of interim self-run security organs, which also play a symbolic role by providing elements of continuity in the struggle in the eyes of the movement’s constituency.

In Kosovo, the 1999 peace accord provided for the withdrawal of the Yugoslavian army, combined with the deployment of NATO troops in charge of providing security in the territory. International negotiators therefore argued that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was redundant and should be swiftly dismantled. However, the dissolution of the victorious liberation movement was bound to stir up opposition and alienate the local population. A compromise was found in the transformation of the KLA into a smaller civilian security entity, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). The establishment of the KPC met, to some degree, the aspirations of combatants to keep ‘the uniforms on’, albeit within an unarmed civil organisation with specific tasks of emergency reaction and civil protection. In public perception, the KPC also had an important symbolic status as a direct successor of the KLA and as a possible precursor to a future army of Kosovo. Once the new Kosovo army was set up, the KPC was dismantled in an orderly fashion.
In Aceh, GAM’s military wing was transformed into a civilian Transitional Committee (KPA) in the wake of the 2005 peace accord, in order to supervise an orderly demobilisation of its combatants, ensure their economic well-being during their transition to civilian reintegration, and maintain a cohesive structure until a political party could be formed.

Although the maintenance of combatant structures is helpful in the early stages of post-war transition, in the long-term, the demobilisation of non-statutory security forces should be accompanied by the consolidation of inclusive and democratic civilian entities. In most countries under scrutiny, the dissolution of guerrilla structures was concomitant with the formation of a political party. Such processes will be addressed further below.

6.1.3 Recommendations

Third-party mediators should:

- Promote unity and cohesiveness within conflict parties during peace processes by encouraging inclusive negotiation formats and engaging with a broad spectrum of representatives (including ‘radical’ and marginalised factions as well as pragmatic leaders);

- Advise state negotiators to refrain from insisting on dismantling rebel organisations and command structures prematurely, as they can play important security and symbolic roles in volatile post-war contexts;

- Recommend the regrouping of dispersed combatants from all conflicting parties into self-managed assembly camps;

- Devise, in conjunction with the conflict stakeholders, context-relevant interim mechanisms to maintain cohesion and discipline in the early phase of peace implementation.

6.2 Arms management

Governments typically assess the success of peace processes according to the effective restoration of the state’s monopoly over the use of force. However, for rebel groups, the possession and use of weapons might perform a number of complementary functions, such as: a strategic role in the fight for military supremacy on the battlefield; a safety role in the provision of physical protection for fighters and their surrounding environment; a governance role in community policing; a political role as a ‘bargaining chip’ to be exchanged for political concessions; and a symbolic or even ‘mystical’ role through which combatants create their collective identity or are defined by others. Therefore, their political will to carry out demilitarisation schemes is highly dependent on the provision of effective security guarantees and ‘governance incentives’ (Sriram 2008). This section reviews security challenges during peace processes, offers some lessons learnt on the timing of ceasefires and arms management, and identifies constructive support roles for the international community in enhancing parties’ security and confidence during war-to-peace transitions.
6.2.1 Challenges of disarmament amidst climates of insecurity and mistrust

Arms management represents a primary concern for state actors in early peacebuilding processes. This is due not only to its role in restoring stability and the rule of law, but also to the challenge of building confidence that their former challengers are genuinely ready to commit to the process of security transition and implement their part of the ‘deal’. On the other side of the conflict divide, however, acute strategic and security concerns also have to be taken into consideration.

- Power imbalances inherent in biased terminology and one-sided disarmament schemes

According to the UNIDDRS, disarmament is defined as “the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population” (UN 2006a). This definition, however, typically applies to non-statutory troops only, while state security forces undergo mere ‘demilitarisation’ or ‘rationalisation’ schemes through partial withdrawals or the reduction of troops, while their apparatus and arsenal remain largely intact. Rebel troops are likely to take exception to this disparity, as they see ‘disarmament’ as being connoted with defeat or surrender, whereas negotiated peace settlements are typically signed between parties in situations of relative power parity after having reached a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (Zartman 1996). Alternative labels were thus preferred in most contexts: the term ‘decommissioning’ in Northern Ireland and Aceh was associated with a voluntary process of ‘putting weapons beyond use’ rather than ‘surrendering’ them, while the terms ‘management of arms and armies’ (Nepal), ‘demilitarisation’ (El Salvador, Kosovo) or ‘forces reduction’ (Sudan) highlight the importance of simultaneous and equal processes of arms reduction and/or downsizing on the part of both statutory and non-statutory forces.

- Combatants’ security and political dilemmas

DDR is conventionally programmed as a first step of post-war peacebuilding, preceding the implementation of structural reforms to redress the conflict’s root causes, such as the transformation of the state’s security apparatus. “Both academia and practice generally assume that DDR is a relatively quick process, followed sequentially by SSR, which plays out over time” (McFate 2010: 3). A UN Security Council report confirms that “most current missions treat DDR as a separate discipline with DDR completion as a precondition for commencing a future SSR strategy” (UNSC 2007).

However, while governments consider the existence of armed non-state actors to be a serious threat to state security, RLMs view the possession and use of arms to be an indispensable prerequisite for their own safety and the security of the people they represent. Therefore, premature demands by governments for rebels to decommission their weapons in the absence of (or prior to) broader structural reform represent a major preoccupation for combatants.

In South Africa, members of the liberation forces were called to report unarmed to assembly areas while the apartheid army was allowed to keep its weapons to defend the country. This created some strong resentment, as they feared being targeted by the ultra-right, a fear that was exacerbated by the period of negotiations being marked by a violent campaign of criminal attacks by elements of the army and other armed groups, aimed at derailing the peace process.
In fact, in some instances, RLM negotiators have been arrested following the collapse of peace talks and lost their lives while in detention (e.g. Aceh), while in other cases combatants were killed after having decommissioned their weapons.

In Colombia, the M-19’s Commander-in-chief, Carlos Pizarro, was assassinated during the presidential campaign that swiftly followed the guerrilla’s transformation into a political party, and 160 other members (or 18% of the whole movement) were also killed in the aftermath of the 1990 peace accords. This disastrous record can be partly explained by the penetration of criminal organisations opposing the peace process into the state’s security institutions and the absence of security sector reform measures, as well as the prevalence of endemic political and social violence involving other armed actors (i.e. drug cartels, paramilitaries and other guerrillas) throughout the country.

Besides safety issues, early decommissioning is also seen as being strategically unwise for non-state actors, as it is tantamount to sacrificing their main means of leverage against a formally legitimate state. Because negotiations and post-war contexts are often prone to political setbacks, the loss of weapons leaves RLMs in a vulnerable bargaining position when there is an absence of reciprocal concessions addressing their main demands and grievances.

In Northern Ireland, the breakdown of the first IRA ceasefire (1994-6) was primarily caused by the insistence by the then Conservative government in Britain that weapons decommissioning should begin before all-party political negotiations. By contrast, the IRA’s position throughout negotiations was to emphasise that decommissioning could only be done on a voluntary basis and in the context of (rather than as a precondition to) an overall agreement.

In addition, studies on small arms and light weapons (SALW) reduction have also highlighted the limitations of treating disarmament as a technical endeavour isolated from its structural or cultural environment. The proliferation of weapons in many post-war contexts cannot be tackled solely by short-term decommissioning schemes, but rather is closely connected with broader micro-and macro-level determinants, such as individual and cultural security perceptions, socio-economic development and job creation, or dynamics in the regional geopolitical environment (Colletta and Muggah 2009).

In Southern Sudan, the SPLA provided weapons to many communities during the war, as a means of self-protection; as a result, civilians became used to taking charge of their own security. The refusal of armed youth from different ethnic groups to disarm after the signing of the 2005 peace accord has in turn exacerbated the inability of the security agencies to provide security. This highlights the need for community-based DDR measures (see below) as well as a regional approach to civilian disarmament that operates with stronger collaborations with neighbouring countries and regional organisations.

These challenges of early disarmament thus indicate that programmes solely focused on depriving fighters’ access to weapons are doomed to failure; the technical ability or financial means of acquiring them cannot be erased. Rather, the aim of such programmes should be to generate the combatants’ interest in relinquishing their use by addressing the broader environment in which they operate. Rebel troops will usually only agree to formally disarm once they are confident that they can ensure the safety of their demobilised combatants, that comprehensive agreements have been reached over the substantive conflict issues and that their political aims will be achieved, or at least that they will be able to pursue them effectively by non-violent means.
6.2.2 Lessons learnt from the field: reciprocal security guarantees and confidence-building

The nine countries under study offer a number of interesting insights with regards the modalities, timing and sequencing of arms management during peace negotiation and implementation processes.

- Embedding arms management in broader structural reform schemes

Empirical evidence in many contexts contradicts conventional assumptions that the readiness by irregular armed groups to disarm unilaterally is a necessary precondition to start talks, or that DDR should precede SSR. Instead, arms management schemes were carefully embedded within comprehensive peace accords, which aimed to redress the root causes of violence by transforming state institutions and offering governance incentives to former state challengers.

In El Salvador, the peace process was organised around a series of incremental accords, starting with agreements on human rights, political, socio-economic and security sector reforms, and ending with a deal on demobilisation and demilitarisation of both the FMLN and army troops.

In Aceh, the principle ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ adopted by the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), under the decisive influence of the Finnish mediator Ahtisaari, meant that all components of the peace deal were included in a single comprehensive accord. This addressed the Indonesian state’s security concerns as well as GAM’s grievances by introducing extensive power devolution measures.

In Burundi, the 2000 Arusha agreement negotiated by the main political parties spelt out democratisation modalities in the political and security sector arenas, while arms management issues were left open for later negotiations once the main rebel troops had joined the table. By proposing solutions that went to the root causes of the conflict, the accord persuaded the main opposition movement, the National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), to sign a joint ceasefire agreement in 2003. Following an assessment of security sector absorption capacities and integration modalities, rebel groups which had passed selection criteria then joined the reformed army and police along with their weapons.

Once reciprocal security and political agreement provisions were signed, their implementation was also carefully timed to encourage RLMs to abide by their commitment to restore the state’s monopoly of force.

In Northern Ireland, Republicans insisted on making progressive concessions on the weapons issues only alongside parallel “tangible progress” in the withdrawal of UK army troops, the setting up of a power-sharing government, the reforming of the police and justice systems, and the establishment of some island-wide political institutions. The IRA started opening some of its weapons dumps for international inspection as a confidence-building measure in 2000, and disposed of the rest of its arms in several stages, culminating in a final declaration in 2005 announcing that the process was completed and instructing members to pursue exclusively peaceful means.
Parallel or reciprocal demilitarisation

In several contexts, the parallel demobilisation of state and non-statutory forces was implemented, in strict reciprocity and often simultaneously. This was the case in Nepal, where a similar number of weapons from the rebel and national army were collected and registered. Elsewhere, the handing-over of weapons by non-statutory forces was accompanied by a parallel, jointly-phased process of downsizing regular armed forces (El Salvador) or withdrawing non-indigenous army troops (Aceh).

Individual, collective and international protection schemes

In addition to carefully planning the timing of arms management, additional security guarantees might be introduced for demobilised combatants. These may include amnesty provisions (see below 6.4), de-proscription from terrorist blacklists and other measures to legalise their status, human rights vetting and accountability systems within the security apparatus (see section 7), or individual protection schemes to reduce fighters’ concerns of being attacked after having given up their arms.

In Colombia, a range of safety measures were put in place to protect the lives of demobilising combatants, including their relocation in regions considered safer and less affected by violence, and the deployment of bodyguards and armoured vehicles (according to a risk hierarchy with four protection levels).

Other movements have used additional precautionary tactics in anticipation of possible breakdowns in the peace(building) process, for instance by understating the number of troops and weapons during negotiations. This was the case in El Salvador, where the FMLN kept hidden weapon caches, or in Aceh, where GAM provided an official number of 3,000 combatants at the negotiation table, when the real size of the movement was estimated between 20,000 and 30,000.

Finally, the deployment of international peacekeeping forces and monitoring teams might also play a crucial security-enhancement role for combatants, for instance through their physical presence in cantonments (e.g. Nepal).

Self-managed decommissioning

When it comes to the verification and monitoring of arms management, RLMs highlight their rejection of state control over the process, insisting instead upon the importance of their own agency over the decommissioning of their troops. As stated in South Africa, the guiding principle was that the protagonists of the conflict were responsible for arming and therefore also for disarming their soldiers.

In Colombia, the decision for the M-19 to disarm was taken unilaterally by the guerrilla leadership, and then approved collectively through a democratic vote. The process was implemented through the movement’s own agency, by melting its weapons before the eyes of an international commission rather than handing them over to the state.

In Nepal, the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has maintained full control over its weapons since the 2006 peace accord, by granting its combatants the responsibility of keeping the keys of the containers where they were stored (while UN troops exercised 24-hour control). PLA weapons were finally handed over to a national technical committee comprised of mixed security personnel (including PLA commanders) in August 2011, a few months after the departure of the UN monitoring mission. They will come under the government’s ownership once the process of army integration begins.
Confidence-building measures towards the government

Notwithstanding the security concerns felt by all armed actors during fragile transitions, RLMs need to engage in confidence-building measures in order to enhance the government or national security forces’ trust in the process, and their political will to undergo the necessary reforms.

Most of the peace processes studied here were immediately preceded or accompanied by demonstrations of the parties’ readiness to renounce the use of force. In some cases, well-timed unilateral ceasefires encouraged political progress and helped build the government’s trust that the RLM was committed to negotiations.

In South Africa, the African National Congress’ (ANC) unilateral suspension of its armed struggle in May 1990, in response to the release of Mandela and other political prisoners, was viewed with scepticism by many cadres, who feared it would be used by the enemy to gain respite from the political and military struggle. In hindsight, the unilateral ceasefire helped convince the apartheid government that the liberation movement was committed to negotiations.

The intervention of external actors to verify the process of decommissioning can also be called for as a form of confidence-building measure for state institutions. International commissions were entrusted with the task of overseeing the process of arms management in Aceh, El Salvador, Kosovo, Nepal and Northern Ireland. In the last case, the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) played a key role in securing the confidence of all actors and the broader public that the IRA was genuinely committed to “verifiably putting arms beyond use”.

6.2.3 Recommendations

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<td>Advise state actors to refrain from making unilateral disarmament a necessary pre-condition for substantive agreements on the roots causes of the conflict;</td>
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<td>Be aware of context-specific sensitivities (and symbolic or political connotations) that surround the terminology of arms management, and encourage parties to adopt a holistic approach, comprising reciprocal demilitarisation measures by state and non-state armies alike;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage parallel and reciprocal implementation timeframes for decommissioning and state reform, as mutual confidence-building measures;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devise appropriate individual and collective protection schemes to ensure the safety of demobilising combatants.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

International peacekeeping missions and peacebuilding agencies should:

| Support combatants’ ownership of arms management schemes; |
| Coordinate the work of the various agencies in charge of supporting DDR and SSR processes, in order to ensure their coherent planning and parallel implementation; |
| If required by the parties as confidence-building measures, monitor or verify their compliance to their agreed commitments with respect to the decommissioning and demilitarisation processes. |
6.3 Former combatants as change drivers

According to the UNIDDRS, “Returning ex-combatants are potential ‘spoilers’ of peace. This is why, while other war-affected groups, such as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), may far outnumber them, ex-combatants will usually need focused and sustainable support if they are to succeed in making the transition from military to civilian life” (UN 2006a, 4.30: 6). This section outlines how misperceptions surrounding the nature of RLMs and former combatants shape current peacebuilding practice, and suggests key areas for improvement.

6.3.1 Challenges linked to combatant ‘reintegration’ programmes

Reintegration refers to the processes of facilitating the transition of combatants to civilian status and their access to the job market. According to the UNIDDRS, “reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open timeframe, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often requires long-term external assistance” (UN 2006a, 1.10: 2). However, from the perspective of many combatants, the term reintegration is viewed with a lot of scepticism, because it suggests a distinction between an imagined ‘normal’ society and the ‘outcasts’, who need to be ‘re-socialised’ after having seen the errors of their violent ways. Using terminologies which best reflect local preferences and which underline the dignity and self-assertion of the individuals undergoing these schemes (such as ‘socio-economic facilitation’ or ‘re-skilling’) could be a first step towards understanding ex-combatants as agents rather than passive beneficiaries of assistance programmes.

The embedded rebel: misconceptions of ‘combatants’

The term ‘ex-combatant’ is broadly used in academic and policy circles to denote people formerly involved in acts of violence during a conflict. Selecting definition criteria for combatants and identifying eligible candidates for reintegration programmes constitutes a major challenge for (inter)national DDR programmers. Whereas members of statutory armed forces can easily be distinguished from civilians through official registration or a uniform, it is much more difficult to establish clear-cut identification criteria for non-state combatants. They are very often immersed in their communities and comprise fighters-in-arms as well as political cadres, logistical support personnel and a broader constituency of sympathisers and family. As argued by a former rebel leader from Aceh, “the relation between fighters and the people was so close that the border between the two was practically non-existent.” In addition to fluid membership boundaries, few armed groups have official registration records.

In South Africa, the liberation movements were put in charge of providing a Certified Personnel Register of soldiers to be integrated into the new national army. This proved very difficult since the ANC’s military wing, Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), had never established membership lists due to the exigencies of underground existence, the dispersed character of command and control across several countries, and the fact that most personnel used ‘noms de guerre’.

The simple solution of linking combatant identity with the possession of a weapon fails to reflect the diversity of functions performed within armed groups that span far beyond military tasks, and might thus lead to the exclusion of significant parts of a movement’s members. In Kosovo, only an estimated 50% of

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7 The first stage of reintegration, ‘reinsertion’, refers to the short-term ‘transitional’ assistance offered to ex-combatants to meet their immediate needs, including transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools.
From Combatants to Peacebuilders

those drafted had a weapon during the conflict, while in Aceh the official ratio between combatants and arms (as stated in the peace accord) was about 3:1.

The disconnection between arms possession and group membership is especially relevant in the case of female combatants, who often sustain the resistance movements through support functions such as logistical, communication and fundraising activities. Women represented between 20 and 30% of RLMs in Colombia, Nepal and El Salvador, and some movements even had special female battalions, such as GAM’s Inong Bale wing in Aceh. Political prisoners, who often continue to work (including in leadership functions) for their movement from jail, represent another neglected group when linking combatant status exclusively with the possession of weapons. In fact, in Northern Ireland, the IRA never publicised any membership list, and instead former prisoners were treated as synonymous with combatants.

“Reintegration into what?” A difficult post-war environment

Most post-war situations are characterised by damaged physical infrastructure, a lack of employment opportunities in the regular economy, and a breakdown of social networks. Reintegration schemes are thus doomed to failure if they exclusively target registered combatants at the expense of addressing their broader constituency and other affected population groups. As outlined in the case of Colombia, “finding a decent and stable job is a structural problem typical of a society that lacks the capacity to quickly absorb the available work force ... That is to say, it is not a problem of reinsertion; it is a social problem that the reinsertion of ex-combatants does not resolve, but rather intensifies.”

Against the background of difficult economic conditions, programmes focusing solely on individual ex-combatants risk producing a ‘ghetto feeling’ among former fighters. Furthermore, they can trigger negative reactions in the needy population, who might see these support programmes as an unfair privilege granted to those who took up arms to defend their interests. An excessive focus on individual financial compensation can also lead to resentment, social disparities and uneven economic opportunities among former combatants themselves when resources are not distributed equally but rather (as in most cases) according to ranks and hierarchies. This challenge also highlights the need to accompany socio-economic measures with awareness-raising and activities promoting reconciliation.

In El Salvador, a land transfer programme was designed to tackle both the country’s land tenure problem and the economic reinsertion of ex-combatants from the FMLN and the armed forces. However, its implementation was impeded by the scarcity of affordable and suitable land, poor governmental outreach initiatives and implementation delays. In addition, the scheme lacked long-term sustainability as farmers encountered difficulties in gaining access to agricultural loans, lacked technical assistance, and were not able to enter the lucrative export market in the broader context of economic liberalisation. Finally, this scheme only benefited ex-combatants and was not complemented by a broader land reform programme, thus failing to lay the basis for economic prospects for the majority of the country’s citizens.

In Southern Sudan, the reintegration scheme carried out with UN support is facing a number of challenges. The high rate of illiteracy among combatants limits the type of training they can attain, and their difficulty in accessing the labour market is exacerbated by the dire economic conditions in the country. In addition, the large size of the territory combined with the lack of infrastructure make the logistical and general operational needs monumental. Finally, there is a lack of sufficient balance and coordination between the official DDR scheme for SPLA veterans and civilian disarmament programmes, and individual-based reintegration also creates competition for resources between ex-combatants and host communities that often lack basic amenities themselves.
Gender-blind DDR schemes

Finally, DDR programmes often tend to reflect a double standard for male and female combatants, prioritising male combatants as a ‘security concern’, while women are put into the de-securitised development and social programming box (Dietrich Ortega 2009). While vocational training based on stereotyped female occupations reinforces traditional gender roles, structural conditions such as male land tenure and inheritance rights can further impede female combatants’ economic independence in the post-agreement period. While it is important that reintegration planners take female fighters into account, they must also address the problem that some women might deliberately choose not to enrol in DDR programmes out of safety concerns or to avoid stigmatisation. In such cases, a balanced approach must be found to ensure the physical safety and personal integrity of female combatants. Support programmes should not ignore existing codes of masculinity in fragile societies, which tend to side-line the interests of female ex-combatants during the peace process. Neither should they, often unwittingly, pave the way for pushing women back to their previously marginalised roles.

In El Salvador, the gendered distribution of high-ranking positions within the FMLN and the categorisation of most female members as mere ‘supporters’ led to an underrepresentation of female participation in the negotiation process, and the marginalisation of female combatants during the demobilisation process. In particular, women were victims of discrimination during the establishment of beneficiary lists for the land transfer programme established for demobilised combatants. At first, married women or those with a son did not appear on these lists, as the land was automatically allocated in the name of the male family member. This changed only after heavy pressure from various women's groups. In addition, as most female combatants held lower positions than their male comrades within the guerrilla movement, financial benefits distributed according to rank did not reach most of these women.

In Burundi, many women and girls who had joined the ranks of the CNDD-FDD during the war – especially amputees and trauma victims, and those who had children or were infected with HIV/AIDS as result of sexual violence – did not go to the cantonment sites but instead sneaked home, thereby losing all of their reintegration rights. Those who did join the barracks were exposed to sexual violence and infringements of privacy. Complaints about the violence they suffered were rarely acknowledged and their war babies – abandoned by the fathers – were seldom legally recognised.

In Southern Sudan, the creation of the category ‘women associated with armed forces’ (WAAF) was meant to enhance the inclusion in the beneficiaries list of women who did not fight in the war but assisted the SPLA in non-combat-related activities. However, female ex-combatants faced particularly severe challenges upon their return because the term WAAF was congruent with ‘loose woman’ in many receiving communities.

6.3.2 Lessons learnt from the field: holistic approaches to civilian return

Having reviewed major challenges to mainstream (often internationally-led) reintegration programming, this section outlines key lessons learnt to improve the identification of combatants, the design of reintegration programmes and implementation methodology.
- **Revising selection criteria for combatants and tailoring assistance to individual needs**

Dismissing the ‘one-combatant-one-gun’ criterion for identifying RLM members, alternative strategies for selecting candidates for demobilisation and (re)integration programmes have been explored in several of the countries under scrutiny.

**In Nepal,** the Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies defined “Maoist army combatants” as “regular active duty members of the Maoist army who joined service before 25 May 2006, who [were] not minors and who [were] able to demonstrate their service, including CPN-M identity card and other means agreed by the parties”. This provision partly granted Maoist commanders the means to identify combatants themselves, although some of them complained that too much emphasis was being put on physical attributes such as age.

**In Burundi,** the government initially insisted on accepting only gun-carrying individuals into reintegration schemes, but later settled for a broader range of selection criteria. Fighters had to demonstrate their ability to manipulate an assault rifle, give evidence of basic military aptitude and competency, be familiar with the military command structure, or be able to name the sites where they had fought.

Combatant registration processes are aimed at identifying individuals who are entitled to receive reintegration benefits, but they also serve as a first step towards assessing the specific needs of subgroups (e.g. child soldiers, disabled combatants and women fighters) and directing individuals to their preferred career options. Certified training programmes are particularly important as they opens doors and grant status in the social and labour worlds; training needs might vary greatly, from basic vocational training to pursuing interrupted university studies.

- **Integrated approach to political, security and socio-economic (re)conversions**

While reintegration under the prevailing DDR model is firmly placed within the development sphere as a socio-economic undertaking, in reality combatants’ post-war career trajectories differ substantially between and within movements, ranging from (re)conversion into politics to integration into security institutions, or to returning to the labour market or community work. Reintegration programmes should thus be planned in a holistic manner across the various sectors of absorption of former combatants, and they should also pay particular attention to the specificities of the conflict and context, as well as to the individual profiles, pre-war backgrounds and wishes of combatants.

- **Security sector integration:**

Depending on the nature of the conflict and the role played by the security institutions during the war, army (or police) integration might constitute an absolute no-go zone, or on the contrary it may be the option of first choice. In cases where elitist, mono-ethnic and/or highly repressive security forces represented a major issue of contention during the war, security sector integration takes on a highly symbolic character and RLM combatants tend to favour it as a primary career option. Given the clash between a collective sense of entitlement and limited career opportunities, the process of selecting combatants appropriate for joining the statutory security apparatus represents a real challenge. In Kosovo, 17,000 out of 20,000 estimated KLA members applied for a position within the KPC, while in Burundi, less than 10% of former armed group members applied for voluntary demobilisation.
In Nepal, most male and female interviewed combatants stationed in Maoist cantonments indicated that their “only hope is to work in the national army”. When pregnant women or mothers of young children were forced out of the cantonment sites, they expressed strong feelings of discontent, worrying that they might not be considered for army integration. In November 2011, a screening process began for selecting PLA candidates to integrate into a new division within the national army, to be deployed mainly for noncombat duties such as construction and emergency response. Two thirds of the 19,000 cantoned combatants volunteered for the 6,500 available positions, instead of opting for a generous civilian rehabilitation package.

In the contexts under study, selection criteria for army/police integration were partly based on a needs assessment with respect to the absorption capacity of the security apparatus (where DDR was concomitant with SSR planning), as well as on the level of education, age and physical aptitudes of the candidates. In most cases, recruits were selected individually according to criteria set up by a national law or ad-hoc commission, often with the assistance of international advisory bodies. In South Africa, the screening was conducted by the leadership of each liberation army, while in Burundi and Sudan it was managed ‘by default’, after selecting candidates for demobilisation (such as volunteers, disabled, children, the elderly, ‘undisciplined’ elements, under-educated combatants or ‘women associated with armed forces’).

In self-determination or identity-based conflicts settled through power devolution rather than state formation, former liberation troops tend to show no interest in joining an army still controlled by the ‘imperialist forces’ or the ethnic majority. In Aceh, GAM fighters have unanimously refused to integrate into the Indonesian security forces that they fought against for several decades, as a matter of principle and dignity, even though this right was enshrined in the peace accord. In Northern Ireland, there are no recorded cases of ex-Republican combatants joining the new police force, let alone the British army.

Community-based socio-economic facilitation:
Given the often-blurred distinction between fighters and their surrounding environment, there is a strong need for collective approaches whereby the whole community benefits from socio-economic support and re-skilling programmes offered to demobilising forces (e.g. financial compensation, health services or educational training). Ex-combatant support programmes should also be embedded into broader structural reforms that provide a more equitable distribution of resources across the population (e.g. land reform, decentralisation, reconstruction policies), in order to address post-war development needs and transform the structures of inequality and exploitation that triggered the conflict. This might help not only with maintaining the political will of former combatants, but also with inter-community reconciliation, through rehabilitating regions affected by conflict as a whole. It is therefore important that DDR programming is linked to broader national development policies. These should also implicate the private sector as a partner in providing job opportunities to former combatants on the basis of sound market analysis identifying workforce needs and absorption capacities. While several of the movements under scrutiny had supported such approaches, the challenges met during their implementation demonstrate the need to improve the community-centred approach to civilian return.

In Colombia, a National Peace Fund was created to support the rehabilitation of regions and communities affected by the armed conflict, and its resources were allocated to 50 communities suggested by the M-19. Even though well-conceived, the peace fund soon became contested, by the government and other political parties, as a tool for the M-19 to consolidate its grassroots support during electoral campaigns.

In Southern Sudan, the SPLA is developing a new DDR framework involving self-administered cantonments which will be used not only for its own troops, but also as community development sites, boosting the capacity and security of both ex-combatants and their surrounding communities.
instance, they might act as a ‘half-way house’ for returning IDPs and refugees, building their capacity and reintegrating them back into their communities. The camps might also be run in conjunction with civilian disarmament schemes by offering communities the chance to hand over SALWs in exchange for civilian capacity-building. Furthermore, it is planned that the whole community will be able to benefit from the health centres and schools set up in or around the cantonments, and from the general development that will result from the reintegration of ex-combatants.

Political conversion and capacity-building:

The election of former M-19 member Gustavo Petro as Mayor of Colombia’s capital city Bogota in 2011 led President Juan Manuel Santos to assert that “reintegration pays off and social transformations are reached through ballots and democracy instead of arms”. The cases under study have indeed shown that political activism is a post-war life path towards which many former combatants aspire. The swiftest conversions from rebel to politician are usually undertaken by movement leaders, with the most dramatic conversions made by (male) central commanders becoming presidential candidates, such as Pierre Nkurunziza in Burundi, Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Schafik Handal in El Salvador and Carlos Pizarro in Colombia. Other war veterans have also assumed major political positions. The KLA Chief of Staff, Agim Çeku, led the first transitory government of Kosovo, while the current Prime Minister, Hashim Thaci, was head of the KLA’s Political Directorate. The late SPLM/A leader, John Garang, became President of Southern Sudan and Vice President of Sudan. The governor of Aceh, Irwandi Yusuf, is a former GAM member. In Nepal, the Maoist leader, Prachanda, became Prime Minister in 2008-9, while his vice chairman, Baburam Bhattarai, leads the current government. Finally, the Northern Irish Deputy Prime Minister, Martin McGuinness, is a former IRA commander.

Many cadres also successfully ran for positions in the parliament or local administrations, and it is in fact at this level that female leaders have most directly contributed to their movement’s political conversion. However, many female combatants experience the transition from rebellion to politics as particularly challenging, and their conversion might be well facilitated by the introduction of structural measures such as gender quotas.

In El Salvador, in 1997 the FMLN introduced a women’s quota of 30% for its internal party structures, which later increased to 35%. One third (13 out of 35) of the FMLN’s deputies in the National Assembly today are women, several of whom are former combatants.

Enhancing ownership and self-management in ex-combatants’ re-skilling support schemes

When reintegration schemes are conceived by foreign ‘technocrats’ within international agencies (such as UNDP, IOM or the World Bank) with a poor understanding of local realities (as was criticised in the case of Burundi), they often lack sustainability beyond the ‘project’ funding phase. Since there is no real internal ownership at either the conceptual or financial level, local actors do not get seriously involved in these projects. By contrast, there are several contexts in which ex-combatants have created their own organisational support networks to facilitate their post-war (re)conversions, in the form of veteran associations, communal projects, or private non-governmental organisations (NGO). This was the case, for instance, in the independent women’s organisations (co-)founded by female war veterans in Aceh (Aceh Women’s league, LINA) and El Salvador (Las Dignas), which, among other activities, offered political training for fellow female ex-combatants who wanted to pursue a political career.

See www.eltiempo.com/politica/petro-es-el-mejor-ejemplo-de-que-la-reintegraci_10677784-4
In Northern Ireland, former prisoner groups and affiliated projects received funding from the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland and the European Union Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation, in order to support their work on a broad range of issues, including counselling, capacity-building and training, community-based dispute resolution, and developing relations with victims of violence.

Such projects highlight the communal leadership potential of former combatants and the opportunities for using their wartime managerial and political skills at the service of their colleagues, families, constituencies and broader community.

### 6.3.3 Recommendations

**National and international planners of reintegration programmes should:**

- **Carry out extensive analysis of the nature and specificities of the organisations undergoing demobilisation; pay attention to the specificity of 'embedded' insurgencies, and broaden combatant identification criteria to take into account the diversity of roles and functions within and between RLMs;**

- **Design tailored reintegration schemes paying attention to the divergent backgrounds, needs and aspirations of combatants, and adopt a comprehensive approach to post-war ‘re-skilling’ and (re)conversion by linking up socio-economic, political and security sector integration schemes, and assessing the absorption capacity of each sector;**

- **Include combatant organisations in programme planning and implementation, in order to truly embody the principle of ‘local ownership’, offer capacity-building and support for self-managed schemes, and revise the generic ‘reinsertion’ and ‘reintegration’ terminology in the light of alternative, locally meaningful and acceptable concepts;**

- **Enhance gender-sensitivity in combatant identification criteria, in the selection of appropriate re-skilling schemes, and in the review of security provisions in and beyond cantonment sites; engage more strongly in awareness-raising with the receiving population;**

- **Pressure for and support community-based approaches linking individual socio-economic facilitation with broader regional or national rehabilitation schemes that target needy constituencies, such as low-income housing, health and education programmes;**

- **Include the private sector by encouraging private companies to support reintegration of ex-combatants through productive or entrepreneurial projects;**

- **Where appropriate, complement reintegration measures with psychological assistance and the development of personal and cultural sensitivity for both former combatants and return/host communities, in order to reduce suspicions and negative perceptions, and thereby foster conditions for societal reconciliation.**
6.4 Transitional justice: security needs vs. justice norms?

The field of transitional justice (TJ) has experienced a real boom in the last two decades, among researchers and practitioners alike. Centred on the accountability needs of war victims, post-war TJ encompasses different types of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, such as extra-ordinary criminal prosecution (e.g. international ad-hoc courts), (partial) immunity through (conditional) amnesties, truth and reconciliation commissions, reparative justice including financial compensation for victims or memorialisation efforts, and the removal of state personnel responsible for human rights violations through vetting processes. This section examines the interdependence of, and complementarity between establishing security and upholding justice in war-to-peace transitions. These two processes share a common long-term goal, namely to strengthen confidence and trust in the peacebuilding process and the reformed (or newly-established) state institutions, especially if TJ is understood as a valid imperative and challenge for all sides of the conflict, including statutory forces.

6.4.1 Challenges of accountable transitions

While the shift from a ‘turn-the-page’ mentality towards a ‘dealing-with-the-past’ imperative has been welcomed in theory, there remain many unresolved challenges to implementing accountable security transitions in practice.

- Accommodating changing international norms

Facilitators in national peace processes have often tended to side-line or at least postpone the discussion of TJ mechanisms, fearing that judicial threats to conflict stakeholders might jeopardise the successful completion of negotiations and thus endanger prioritised stability concerns: a dilemma that poses real challenges to accountable transitions. In the past, amnesties have served as a method of choice for providing incentives for former combatants to demobilise and decommission, by providing them with some (judicial) security. In Colombia, Amnesty Law 77 from 1989 asserted that legal processes against M-19 members were to be suspended, and in El Salvador and Aceh, full amnesties were granted to former combatants without any trade-offs from their side. Political prisoners were also released in Northern Ireland, Aceh and South Africa under the terms of ceasefires or peace agreements signed by their organisations.

However, the conjunction of various factors, most notably the growing rise of the human rights movement, public opinion pressure for ‘peace with justice’ (especially from victims’ organisations), and constraints from international law, suggests that immunity deals are less likely to be accepted in the future.

- War veterans’ multiple identities: heroes, perpetrators and/or victims?

The claim of former combatants to be freedom fighters “looked upon like heroes” by their local constituency (Colletta et al. 2009: 73) stands in sharp contrast with the widespread perception of them as ‘perpetrators’ who will face a difficult social reintegration because of their alleged past human rights abuses. In our project, ex-combatants claimed that their decision to join RLMs was often motivated by the experience of direct violence against themselves or family members in the first place and that they, too, should be recognised as ‘victims’. In most cases, rebel fighters also saw themselves as holding the moral high ground in their struggle against the structural violence of an oppressive, undemocratic and illegitimate state apparatus.
Accounting for violence by whom?

Calls for accountability are often based on the observation that “the actual and perceived impunity of ex-combatants who have perpetrated severe acts of violence and other abuses of human rights can significantly impact on tensions and the potential for reintegration at the community level” (Bell and Watson 2006: 27). While the argument is in many cases valid, a problem appears when human rights abuses are framed as a concern for former rebel fighters only, obscuring the fact that statutory forces act in many cases as primary perpetrators. For instance, the ratio of killings attributed to the state or its allies during the conflict amounted to 85% in El Salvador (UN Truth Commission on El Salvador 1993) and 63% in Nepal (ICG 2010). While accountability measures do in many contexts constitute a threat to ex-combatants, who fear both individual penalties and the de-legitimisation of their movement, in most of the cases at stake the former combatants actively asked for justice and truth-seeking mechanisms to be put in place, in order to reveal the responsibility of the state and its armed forces in triggering the conflict and committing human rights violations.

Implementing accountability: lack of political will and/or institutional capacity

While the side-lining of justice issues during negotiations is definitely a questionable strategy, the inclusion of transitional justice mechanisms in official documents is not sufficient either, as they have remained as empty words in several cases.

In Burundi, the Arusha Agreement foresaw the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to investigate crimes, identify perpetrators and clarify the entire history of Burundi. Although international support was warranted, negotiations between the UN and the government of Burundi failed to provide concrete steps, and until recently there has been a complete failure to establish any kind of accountability or reparation mechanism. After permanent clashes between the President’s demand for unconditional ‘pardon’ and insistence on amnesty provisions for all those willing to confess their crimes, and human rights organisations’ claim for ‘justice before reconciliation’, the CNDD-FDD government finally set up a technical commission to establish the TRC before the end of 2011.

In Nepal, one year after the 2006 peace accord called for the setting up of a TRC (as well as a Disappearance Commission), the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction passed the corresponding legislation to establish the country’s TRC, although it has failed to be acted upon so far.

In Aceh, the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) contained clauses for establishing both a Human Rights Court and a TRC for Aceh. However, the law passed by the Indonesian government to legalise the implementation of the MoU limited the Court’s jurisdiction to crimes committed after the date of the MoU, and declared the TRC an “inseparable part” of an anticipated national TRC. A national legal framework for a TRC was approved by the parliament but annulled by the Constitutional Court in 2006, leaving some uncertainty about the possibilities of setting up a special TRC for Aceh.

The lack of political will among political stakeholders is not the only hindrance to TJ implementation. In some cases, deficient capacity might be the prime challenge to enhancing justice mechanisms. Wide-scale violence and massive amounts of cases to deal with can simply overburden fragile post-war societies with a damaged national legal system and lacking the infrastructure necessary for building up offices or accessing remote areas. In addition, employees in the judiciary might have been actively involved in the conflict and therefore lack credibility to judge upon others. In Southern Sudan for instance, many appointments at
senior level positions within the judiciary were political or ethnically orientated, as opposed to being based on ability and experience. In such cases, vetting and lustration procedures in the judicial sector can help restore an institution’s credibility. Finally, quick-fix judicial mechanisms might not only lack quality and hence credibility, but in fragile security situations they might also expose witnesses and judicial personnel to physical danger as they reveal and pursue past abuses.

### How holistic can we be: traditional, social and gender justice?

While there must be some benchmarks for protecting justice from total relativism, former combatants have highlighted the way that the ‘legal arrogance’ of a ‘one size fits all’ approach to implementing transitional justice mechanisms in countries emerging from war falls short of reflecting the diverse understandings and modes of implementation of transitional justice around the world. The divide between ‘traditional/local’ and ‘Western/(inter)national’ judicial procedures were highlighted in the case of Southern Sudan, where the majority of the population is used to settling legal disputes in traditional courts, usually through chiefs and councils of elders. Another area of debate is the claim for more gender-just transition processes, including a greater participation of women in negotiation processes, curtailing impunity for sexual and gender-based violence, and ensuring women’s equal access to post-war political decision-making. A holistic interpretation of justice should thus be sought, which connects to the concept of human security and includes social justice through structural reform that ensures equal rights and opportunities for all. It must therefore be clear that TJ is a transitional mechanism that should not be overloaded with immediate expectations but rather be linked effectively with long-term institutional reforms and policies.

### 6.4.2 Lessons learnt from the field: no justice without security, no security without justice

The current justice vs. security debate focuses excessively on how short-term security in the sense of stopping violence and re-establishing stability is favoured over justice. This somewhat unidirectional debate fails to reflect the truly interdependent character of security and justice. While justice is a pre-condition for long-term security, personal safety and institutional stability in turn constitute necessary pre-conditions for the implementation of justice. The challenges outlined above point to the need for a justice-sensitive approach to security transition processes, balancing the need for judicial normalisation of former combatants with accountability for human rights violations committed by all sides of the conflict.

### Accountability and mutual responsibility: conditional amnesties and truth commissions

Although the UN Secretary-General’s report on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies clearly establishes that amnesties “can never be permitted to excuse genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity or gross violations of human rights”, it also encourages “carefully crafted amnesties” to facilitate the return and reintegration of both displaced civilians and former fighters (UN Secretary General 2004: 11). In the context of war-to-peace transition processes of RLMs, judicial amnesties can be made conditional upon collaboration with truth-seeking efforts, thereby providing incentives for demobilisation while simultaneously contributing to the establishment of a conflict’s history.
In South Africa, the legislation establishing the TRC acknowledged that all parties had carried out some form of armed actions that may have been regarded as gross violations of human rights. Instead of granting a blanket amnesty, the TRC’s Amnesty Committee reviewed applications for amnesty by perpetrators of illegal acts. Applicants had to make a full disclosure of their armed actions and prove that these were politically sanctioned, either by a political leadership of the state or a political party. On this basis, several apartheid operatives were refused amnesty as they either did not make a full disclosure or they were unable to show that the actions they carried out were politically motivated and sanctioned.

Balancing compensation schemes for war veterans and war victims

In order to tackle the challenge of unfair reintegration schemes benefiting former fighters at the expense of other population groups affected by the conflict (see section 6.3.1 above), in some countries inclusive programmes have been designed to provide financial and technical assistance (or compensation) to combatants as well as war victims.

In Aceh, the reintegration committee’s ‘economic facilitation’ schemes targeted several groups of beneficiaries, including 3,000 registered ex-combatants, 3,500 ex-political detainees, 6,200 GAM non-combatant members, 6,500 militia members, 62,000 civilian victims of the conflict (with priority set for single mothers, widows and the handicapped), and 30,000 immediate family members of civilian victims (‘death compensation’). These financial schemes were complemented by some non-cash support measures, such as 16,000 scholarships for school-aged orphans of the conflict, 70 university scholarships for ex-combatants’ children, and medical treatment for those still suffering from war injuries.

In Nepal, in November 2011 the main political parties signed a seven-point agreement reiterating their commitment to implementing some of the remaining provisions of the 2006 peace accords which are still pending, including the delivery of relief packages for “the kin of those killed and disappeared, maimed, displaced and those whose properties were damaged in the armed conflict”.

Inclusive vetting processes: a key to security sector transformation

“From a justice perspective SSR should aim to build the integrity of the security system, promote its legitimacy, as well as empower citizens, in order to transform an overall abusive system into one that both respects and promotes human rights” (Patel 2010: 278). One major method of ensuring the integrity and legitimacy of the security system and restoring public confidence is a lustration process, whereby those responsible for war crimes or human rights violations are barred from positions within the military or the police. A key lesson learnt from past cases is that all forces should take part equally in these screening processes, overviewed by independent commissions, in order to redress past human rights violations and war crimes (including sexual violence), to increase public confidence in the new security apparatus, and to foster cohesion among former enemy armies now bound to work alongside one another.

In El Salvador, an Ad-Hoc Commission, consisting of three national commissioners and two army officers as observers, was set up to investigate serious acts of violence during the war years. This led to the removal or transfer of 103 high-ranking army officers. Such exclusion was of highly symbolic significance against the backdrop of the long history of military impunity. One year later, an internationally-staffed UN Truth Commission released a report leading to the ‘retirement’ of approximately 100 additional members.
of the military’s high command. The significance of these measures was somewhat overshadowed by
rumours of a military coup which pressured the legislature to pass a general amnesty law covering all
crimes related to the civil war.

This example demonstrates the danger of provoking violent resistance by public officials and members of
the security forces. In these situations soft approaches, like transfers, early retirement or the appointment
of new officials to strategic posts, should be considered to ensure that unreliable officials are replaced

== Dealing with the past from below: former combatants in local justice
initiatives ==

Former combatants are not only subjected to transitional justice mechanisms; they are also active
implementers of and participants in such initiatives. In some instances, their personal experience as war
participants confers them a particularly strong authority for tackling peacebuilding issues.

In **Northern Ireland**, in the absence of a formal institution tasked with a holistic examination of the past,
ex-combatants (i.e. former prisoners) have contributed to bottom-up processes of restorative justice and
dealing with the past, including relationship-building with other ex-combatant groups and community
leaders on either side of the divide in order to calm sectarian tensions at interface areas or during
contentious marches. Former combatants have been considered as credible authorities for delivering a
peacemaking message precisely because of their past experience with violence.

In **Southern Sudan**, the SPLA has suggested setting up a Truth and Reconciliation Service within its
cantonment camps in order to increase trust within the local population and engage in memorialisation
efforts by recording fighters’ testimonies to preserve public memory of past abuses.

== Long-term approaches from the law of force to the rule of justice ==

As seen above, given the lack of security and institutional capacity in post-war contexts, international
interveners should be careful to assess realistically what performance and outcomes can be expected
from quick-fix TJ mechanisms. Setting longer-term orientated timeframes for judicial processes might
strengthen the likelihood of TJ processes being respected and implemented by capable institutions on the
basis of participatory consultation with relevant civil society groups. In some of the cases under scrutiny
here, justice has indeed proven to have long stamina.

In **Northern Ireland**, while the 1998 Agreement did not include a formal TJ mechanism for dealing with
the past, campaigns by families of those killed and injured during ‘The Troubles’ led to the opening of a
second inquiry of the 1972 Bloody Sunday events by the so-called “Saville Inquiry”. Published in 2010
after 12 years of work, 38 years after the violent confrontation, the conclusions of the Saville Report led
British Prime Minister David Cameron to acknowledge that paratroopers had fired on fleeing unarmed
civilians, and to apologise on behalf of the British Government.
In Colombia, twenty years after the “Palace of Justice” tragedy, an investigation opened by the Public Prosecutor’s Office has led to judicial processes against three high-ranking members of the military. One of them, retired Colonel Alfonso Plazas Vega, was punished with 30 years of imprisonment for his role in forced disappearances after the siege.

Finally, the promotion of ‘peace with justice’ is not only about individual accountabilities but also about critically screening and reforming the institutions and policies responsible for justice implementation. While post-war scenarios are often characterised by a low institutional capacity or willingness to respect and implement the rule of law, the law itself might be one of the root causes for conflict. Individual accountability must therefore go hand in hand with reforming institutions and changing unjust laws and policies on the macro-level, as will be outlined in more detail in section 7.

### 6.4.3 Recommendations

**Mediators should:**

- Ensure that local understandings of ‘justice’ are taken into account before importing TJ experiences from elsewhere;

- Make amnesties conditional upon collaboration with justice mechanisms, e.g. disclosure of truth and apologies;

- Suggest the introduction of relevant provisions and mechanisms acknowledging all conflict stakeholders’ mutual responsibility for past abuses.

**Peacebuilding agencies should:**

- Provide technical advice for the introduction of appropriate human rights vetting and lustration mechanisms (discharge, transfers or early retirement) to restore trust in justice and security institutions, and offer international supervision of such proceedings upon request;

- Support former combatants engaged in dealing with the past, reconciliation or other TJ projects through capacity building and financial support.

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9 On 6 November 1985, 35 members of the M-19 overtook the Palace of Justice to protest against the government’s non-compliance with a previous negotiated agreement. The attack however turned into an enormous tragedy as the state’s armed forces conducted a counter-siege and set fire to the Palace, causing the death of almost 100 people.
7 Building effective and legitimate political and security systems of governance

The emergence of armed struggle is explained and self-justified by RLM members as a response to state institutions having abused their authority and having failed to address the problems of poverty, injustice, exclusion and discrimination. This section thus turns to the structural conditions guaranteeing the political will of RLMs to restore the state’s monopoly of force and to undergo DDR and TJ processes, namely, the transformation of state institutions in order to address the root causes of violence.

A critical literature has emerged in the past decade that questions the basic assumptions underpinning the Western ‘liberal’ state-building agenda in post-war countries. It highlights the tendency for ‘outside experts’ to “follow technocratic blueprints informed by normative assumptions about what the [new] state should be” without consulting local actors about the dynamics at play in the host country (Mehler 2009: 59). It also questions whether the state is the most appropriate referent for enhancing security in the aftermath of violent protracted conflicts (Colletta and Muggah 2009, Sedra 2010). In this section, we present an inside-out perspective, focusing on local stakeholders who have carried out structural reform processes primarily through their own agencies, while we also suggest forms of external financial and technical assistance that promote and support, rather than impede, the national ownership of political and security transitions.

While stressing the importance of contextual factors and the need for tailored programmes, we also identify common principles of structural transformation, centred on the redistribution of power in political and security governance through democratisation and power-sharing, and on the enhancement of capacity, efficiency and accountability within national institutions. This section reviews some lessons learnt with regards to the political and security components of state reform, before addressing the need for implementation guarantees.10

7.1 Political transformation: power redistribution and capacity-building

State reform or state formation lies at the heart of the political agendas which are pursued by RLMs during their armed struggle and which are eventually brought to the negotiation table. Their participation in more democratic governance structures, and their transformation into inclusive, accountable and non-violent organisations are the twin components of the ‘demilitarisation of politics’ (Lyons 2009).

10 The third sector of state reform, socio-economic transformation and development, is not treated here, since it was not addressed extensively enough in the empirical research. In fact, in most cases it seems to have received relatively little attention at the negotiation table as well. This reflects an interesting paradox: although issues of poverty, economic inequality and social injustice were usually high on RLMs’ revolutionary or separatist agenda, the peace processes largely failed to address them, instead focusing principally on political participation and security sector transformation.
7.1.1 Democratisation of the political system

In the context of pro-democracy struggles, one major element of peace agreements concerns the restructuring of the political regime to establish or strengthen multi-party democracy. These reforms might include both transitional power-sharing mechanisms and longer-term constitutional change.

- **Transitional power-sharing arrangements**

Power-sharing has become a major area of policy and academic interest in recent years, and is now often proposed by external mediators as a blueprint for ending inter-party violence during peace processes, although scholars offer ambivalent assessments of their effectiveness in terms of supporting stabilisation, democratisation and transitional justice (Hoddie and Hartzel 2007, Sriram 2008). In the countries under scrutiny, however, transitional and long-term power-sharing mechanisms were assessed very positively, as they enabled the opening up of governance systems to previously excluded political forces.

In cases such as South Africa, Nepal, Burundi and Sudan, interim ‘national unity’ governments were put in place in the immediate aftermath of the peace accords in order to manage the state until the organisation of democratic elections or the entry into force of a new constitution. Such mechanisms provided a first opportunity for representatives from both former state rulers and their challengers to test their ability to work together in rebuilding and running the country. The latter, in particular, were able to face for the first time the realities of political governance, and attempt to overcome existing technical imbalances with their political opponents by building some capacity and experience for upcoming electoral campaigns.

- **Institutional reform**

In addition to temporary power-sharing mechanisms, more permanent measures might be enforced to enhance multi-party democracy. For instance, in all nine cases at stake, procedural reforms were introduced to facilitate open and transparent electoral processes.

In El Salvador, one of the political demands of the FMLN was the promotion of more democratic and transparent elections. The peace accord thus spelt out procedural reform provisions abolishing the use of state resources for electoral campaigns, introducing public funding for all parties in proportion to their electoral success, and changing the composition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (to be comprised by representatives from all parties).

The most dramatic example of democratisation brought about by a peace accord was the enforcement of regime change from a monarchy to a republic in Nepal. In other countries, inclusive democracy was also institutionalised at the executive level through a permanent power-sharing system. For instance, all major parties are required to be represented in the Northern Irish Executive, while in Burundi a quota system guarantees both multi-ethnic and multi-party representation in the government, assembly and local administrations.

- **Self-rule and state formation**

In separatist or irredentist struggles, political reforms are more concerned with redistributing power and resources from the (former) centre to the periphery. Self-determination has been achieved to various
degrees in Aceh, Northern Ireland, Southern Sudan and Kosovo, ranging from extended autonomy and power devolution within the national framework of a united country, to outright independence.

In Aceh, the liberation movement GAM gave up its demand for a separate state in exchange for ‘self-government’ through the devolution of various competencies to the provincial level. Aceh has gained significant power in dealing with political governance, economy and human rights, while Jakarta retains authority in the areas of defence, fiscal and monetary policy, foreign relations, justice, and freedom of religion.

In the newly-independent states of Kosovo and Southern Sudan, institutions had to be built from scratch, which has induced the new national leaders into relying more heavily on external capacity-building support in all areas of state-building. This will be explored in more detail further below in the domain of security sector development.

7.1.2 Consolidation of civilian entities pursuing the ‘struggle’ by nonviolent means

RLMs’ conversion from ‘bullets to ballots’ represents another area of recent scholarly interest. Political scientists have sought to identify the factors that affect these new post-war parties’ democratic performance and their effectiveness in conventional politics (e.g. Söderberg Kovacs 2007, Manning 2008, De Zeeuw 2008).

Most movements under scrutiny have in fact achieved remarkable long-term or recent success in their post-war conversion from insurgency to the electoral battleground (see Table 1 in section 3), from the outstanding performance of the ANC in South Africa, which gained 63% of the votes in 1994 and has been re-elected to power in all subsequent elections, to the unexpected Maoist victory in the 2008 constituent assembly elections in Nepal. Success was not always immediate; in El Salvador, the FMLN remained in opposition for several years before becoming the strongest faction in the National Assembly in 2000, eventually winning the presidential election in 2009.

Success in the electoral arena is an important factor influencing the development of trust in the peace process among former state challengers and their constituencies; it helps to convince them that social change can be pursued effectively through democratic politics. In turn, effective organisational transitions from underground to conventional politics are conditioned by a number of influencing factors, three of which are explored below.

= Institutional conditions

According to the proponents of ‘institutionalisation before liberalisation’ (Paris 2004), in highly polarised conflict-affected societies, peace agreements or post-war constitutions should include provisions that institutionalise the role of former combatant organisations within state structures prior to beginning competitive electoral processes. In the cases of El Salvador, Aceh, Nepal and Colombia, the peace accords explicitly mentioned the right for RLMs to form political parties and enter the local and national political arenas.

In Colombia, the M-19 was named after the date of a rigged election on 19 April 1970, and thus for its members, the right to participate in open democratic elections had a powerful ideological and symbolic significance. Given their inexperience in legal political processes and their technical imbalance with existing political parties, however, M-19 negotiators requested the introduction of a special clause reserving some seats in the Assembly for demobilised guerrillas in the first post-war elections.
Although this measure was rejected by the Congress and failed to materialise, the popular enthusiasm generated by the peace process was very favourable to the new party created by the former guerrillas, the Democratic Alliance-M19 (AD-M19), which obtained 27.3 per cent of the votes in the Constituent Assembly election. According to M-19 veterans, this episode taught them that democratic openness in itself can be more effective than positive discrimination.

Building on past political experience

The institutionalisation of cohesive and effective political structures represents a major organisational challenge for armed opposition movements that aspire to participate in post-war state-building and democratic transitions, especially after decades of illegal existence, exile or underground operations. In this regard, another lesson emerging from the research concerns the relations between military and political structures within RLMs. Unsurprisingly, we found that movements with a pre-war history as a political party or a distinct political branch throughout the conflict can more easily build on this experience in the post-war environment. By contrast, all three cases of guerrilla groups organised as ‘political-military organisations’ with a combined structure of command, and where military leaderships took political decisions and/or led the negotiation teams (M-19, KLA and FMLN), faced difficulties in establishing a cohesive party in the wake of the peace process.

In El Salvador, only a few members of the newly-formed FMLN party had prior experience with political activism (e.g. within the Communist Party before 1980). From its inception, it became affected by internal ideological and power struggles leading to major splits, although these eventually helped to unify the remaining members of the party around a cohesive leadership and coherent programme.

In Colombia, the AD-M19 achieved remarkable results in the immediate post-agreement phase (see above), but it steadily lost its initial electoral support and was eventually dissolved. This failure to consolidate an effective party can be partly explained by the combatants’ lack of experience in the electoral process and institutional arena. Some M-19 veterans, however, have joined other political parties or civil society organisations, through which they are successfully influencing local and national politics.

Readiness for change

Another challenge concerns the risk of political dispersion entailed by the loss of unified purpose in pro-democracy, revolutionary or self-determination struggles. Political institutionalisation indeed requires adopting a new political culture, formulating a new programme and building the capacity to govern. Success in the electoral arena is also conditioned by the ability of the new political formations to broaden their support base beyond their initial constituency, and to recruit new party cadres who were not involved in the armed struggle.

In Burundi, the CNDD-FDD successfully transformed from a Hutu-dominated rebel movement into a multi-ethnic party including many Tutsi members. This was in part due to a leadership change but was also encouraged by the stipulation in the new national electoral law that not more than three quarters of a political party’s decision-making body should belong to the same ethnic group.
Finally, political parties emerging from wartime formations should be ready to adapt their leadership structure to peacetime priorities and agendas. Although rebel movements tend to be hierarchically organised with a clear top-down chain of command, which is effective for military operations, political parties require more horizontal structures, in which power is less concentrated and more democratically diffused throughout the organisation.

Such challenges call for locally-tailored capacity-building support in democratic politics by international experts, such as political foundations or NGOs, through technical or financial assistance in organisational development, legal financing, parliamentary tasks, election campaigning, administrative skills or good governance.

In Aceh, GAM’s transformation into a cohesive party (Partai Aceh) met with outstanding political achievements, taking in 2009 the majority of seats in the local legislature. However, the effective transformation of rebels into political leaders remains a crucial test, as high popular expectations for delivery and change clash with a low level of experience in running local administrations. Unfortunately, there is little assistance available for enhancing the governing skills of former combatants, as peacebuilding and development agencies operating in Aceh after the 2004 tsunami have been very reluctant to support political capacity-building, preferring to focus on short-term relief work and socio-economic facilitation, and thus perpetuating the ‘compensatory’ phase of reintegration.

Political capacity-building can, however, be severely impeded by persisting ‘terrorist’ labels and related sanctions against former insurgency movements who have become conventional parties, as is illustrated in section 5 with the Maoist party in Nepal.

### 7.2 Security sector transformation and development

The transformation of national defence, security and justice institutions in the aftermath of violent conflicts represent essential means of ensuring that the re-established state monopoly of force is exercised in a democratic and legitimate manner, and that security institutions are truly protecting and representing the whole nation rather than strictly serving those in power. These processes are thus intrinsically linked with the DDR processes reviewed earlier, as they help to build and sustain combatants’ trust in making the shift from being state challengers to state-building agents.

The term security sector transformation (SST) – or security sector development, in the contexts of state formation (Kosovo, Southern Sudan) – is employed here in place of the more conventional notion of post-war SSR. It encompasses the process of ‘repairing’ functioning, accountable and transparent security and judiciary institutions, along with civilian oversight by legislative and executive branches of government. In addition, it also implies the integration of former fighting forces into a new cohesive security apparatus, with all the re-skilling, harmonising and doctrinal shifts that are entailed.

This sub-section reviews the various components of SST, which include demilitarisation measures, the merging of statutory and irregular forces, and the democratisation and professionalisation of the security and justice sector in order to enhance its accountability, inclusivity, efficiency and impartiality.
7.2.1 Demilitarisation and ‘right-sizing’

Demilitarisation represents a primary element of SST. In the context of territorial conflicts (Kosovo, Southern Sudan, Aceh and Northern Ireland), it mainly consists in the withdrawal of occupation (i.e. non-indigenous) armed forces. But demilitarisation also more generally refers to the process of downsizing or ‘rationalising’ the security apparatus, often bloated during the war or following integration processes, by removing unnecessary personnel in compliance with new strategic assessments.

In South Africa, military downsizing was largely enforced progressively through ‘natural attrition’ and on a voluntary basis, for instance through ‘sunset clauses’ allowing the personnel of the old army to retire with generous pensions.

In El Salvador, a drastic reduction of the oversized army by 50% was imposed by the peace accord, based on a compromise between the FMLN’s original demand to completely dissolve the armed forces and the government’s concerns over defence and security. The elite counterinsurgency battalions were further demobilised and all existing police forces were formally dismantled, while the UN mission supervised an interim police force during the transition period, until the full deployment of the new national police service.

7.2.2 Democratisation of the security system

The integration of non-statutory and regular army/police forces into a transformed national defence and security apparatus often represents a primary means for former combatants to take part in democratic state-building, as well as a powerful security guarantee for all parties (Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008). But the democratisation of the security sector also encompasses broader measures to open up army or police forces to social groups that were previously excluded or under-represented.

= Transitional power-sharing arrangements

Similar to the political arena, early security power-sharing mechanisms can provide a positive impetus for longer-term integration processes. Such mechanisms help to create space for dialogue, and foster an enabling environment for more comprehensive reform and consolidation measures. They also represent a first test for the readiness of former enemies to cohabit and work together within a single institution. For instance, the joint technical committees that were established to negotiate the details of SST mechanisms in South Africa and Nepal represented a powerful symbolic first act of military integration from the top (although in Nepal its effectiveness was hampered by recurrent inter-party disputes over its composition and mandate). Mixed security bodies comprised by statutory and rebel troops in equal proportions might also be set up as ‘interim stabilisation measures’ in a transition period or as a prelude to more comprehensive rebel–military integration processes.

In South Africa, the first experiment in the conduct of joint security activities took place through the temporary establishment of a transitional ‘home-grown’ peacekeeping force during the peace process, comprised of personnel from the various constituent forces. This structure was set up in the context of ‘fifth column’ criminal attacks on the civilian population (especially in the townships), aimed at derailing the negotiation process. The peacekeeping force, however, was inadequately supported by the army and came under fire from unknown elements (later shown to have been the work of recalcitrant elements within the apartheid army and intelligence services) and ultimately had to be disbanded.
In **Sudan**, as stipulated in the 2005 peace agreement, selected members of the SPLA and national army were recruited into Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) and deployed to specific regions across the country. Numbering approximately 40,000, the JIUs were conceived as an experimental mechanism to fill post-war security vacuums in areas where the reach of the state was limited. Further, they were to serve as a means of building confidence between the former warring parties, with the prospect of building a potential (future) integrated army. However, since Southern Sudanese people made the choice of secession, the JIUs were dissolved, and their members have gone back to their formations of origin and are likely to undergo demobilisation.

### ‘1+1=3’: formula for rebel–military/police integration

The formula ‘1+1=3’ was proposed by the Maoist leadership in Nepal as a model for merging state and rebel armies into an altogether new force, in contrast to the absorption of individual combatants into unreformed statutory structures. The inspiration came partly from the South African and Burundi transitions, which saw the formation of cohesive national defence forces that integrated members of all of the main conflicting parties, with the exception of paramilitaries and militias. Moreover, in Burundi, Southern Sudan, El Salvador and Kosovo, a new national police service was established, bringing together elements of the liberation armies (representing between 20% and 33% of the overall personnel), the ‘old’ security sector and new recruits.

Once recruitment and selection modalities are established, the first step of army/police integration usually consists of re-training schemes that aim to harmonise the various profiles, experiences and technical skills gained during the conflict and to ensure that the appropriate professional standards are met. This is a particularly sensitive issue, as political or army leaders often oppose rebel–military integration on the grounds that power contenders have untrained combatants who are unfit for conventional warfare. Insurgency troops are indeed largely volunteer-fed and typically trained for guerrilla combat, although this does not mean that they cannot be trained to professional norms and standards; nor does it imply that wartime army and police personnel, often ill-trained or indoctrinated by years of repressive counter-insurgency warfare, should be exempt from such re-skilling processes. Given the contentions and sensitivities surrounding integration processes, external assistance is often welcome by all sides to provide ‘objective’ standards and benchmarks.

In **South Africa**, where all conflicting parties were opposed to international involvement during the peace process, the only form of foreign peacebuilding support that was expressly requested was the advice and assistance provided by the British Military Advisory and Training Team, to arbitrate the ranking process according to international standards of operations prior to the formal integration of all armed forces.

### Enhancing inclusivity

Beyond army or police integration measures that primarily benefit former combatants, other mechanisms should be put in place to enhance the inclusivity and representativeness of the security sector with respect to the social or ethnic makeup of society.

In **Burundi**, ethnic quotas were imposed after the peace accords, whereby no ethnic group is allowed to represent more than 50% of the army and police.
In Northern Ireland, the new police service was established in 2001 with 50% quotas for Catholics in order to better reflect the makeup of the community. This was only set up as a temporary measure in order to correct imbalances in the composition of the police service, to be revoked once satisfactory representation was reached. It was discontinued after the devolution of the policing and justice sectors in 2010.

In the case of newly independent countries where rebel armies were transformed (or integrated) into national military, police and intelligence services, the main challenge is to open up the new security sector (internally and/or publicly perceived as a direct successor of the liberation army) to new recruits from other social and security forces.

In Southern Sudan, the transition of the SPLA from a guerrilla to a professional army is facing several technical challenges, including the daunting task of integrating members from Other Armed Groups (a label used for smaller militias and other irregular armed forces besides the two main contending armies), which, according to the peace accord, should be absorbed either into the Sudanese Armed Forces or the SPLA.

In Kosovo, where the Yugoslav security forces were replaced by Kosovar Albanian institutions, the biggest challenge is to recruit Serbs and other minorities into the new security sector, amidst the pressure exerted from Belgrade and the lack of affinity felt by most Serbs (who represent 5% of the Kosovar population) towards the new army, which they perceive to be a successor of the KLA. Despite these obstacles, the Kosovo security force is making good progress in becoming truly multi-ethnic: it is currently comprised of 8.2% minorities.

With regards gender representation, however, women remain marginal in most security institutions, with South Africa being the exception, as women constitute 29% of the country’s armed forces, including many in combat units and command positions. In contrast, women represent only 3% of the Kosovo military and Burundi police.

7.2.3 Building accountable, impartial and professional security and justice institutions

SST also includes the provision of democratic oversight mechanisms and the regulation of civil–military relations, correlated with the norm of the non-partisanship of the security sector. It also requires a change of mindset and the reframing of former allegiances and ideologies formed during the war. In the aftermath of violent conflicts, there is indeed a need to redefine the purpose and role of security forces, and to broaden the concept of national security to take into account the various needs of different social (e.g. ethnic, gender) groups in a given society.

• Non-partisanship and civilian oversight

A necessary correlate to the demilitarisation of politics (see above 6.1) is the parallel process of the depoliticisation of security. This requires a change of philosophy within the security sector from serving the government to serving the nation and protecting all citizens. In fact, the merging of enemy forces into new security organs can play a major role in building nationhood and a new, multi-cultural and/or democratic national identity.
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In South Africa, the new national army’s Code of Conduct had a strict rule of non-interference in politics. This does not mean that soldiers should be a-political; according to the Bill of Rights, which stresses the freedom of association, every individual is allowed to be member of a political party. However, to prevent conflicts of interest, members of the armed forces should not exhibit their political preferences in their military duties, nor can they occupy a public position in a political party.

In Nepal, the national army leadership has been strongly rejecting the integration of ‘ideologically-indoctrinated combatants’ into its ranks, fearing that other soldiers could get ‘contaminated’ by the Maoist ideology cultivated by the PLA. For their part, the Maoists have been progressively separating their political and military entities, as requested by their political opponents, but they have always rejected the idea of de-politicising their armed force on the grounds that every citizen, including soldiers, should be allowed to have political thoughts, and that the state’s army was in fact also ideologically trained to serve the monarchy.

With regards justice sector reform, negotiators in El Salvador have also introduced new election modalities for the members of the Supreme Court, in order to improve the independence of the judicial branch.

The norm of non-partisanship of the security sector, however, does not imply that the political leadership should have no say in security matters. In all of the case studies, government and RLM leaders were centrally involved in decision-making over SST, and the norms of civilian control and oversight over the security, defence and intelligence functions were promoted in most peace accords and implemented through new ministries, civilian secretariats and parliamentary committees.

Reassessing national security policies and upholding the rule of law

Armed conflicts often lead to a blurring of boundaries between the functions of external defence and public security, through a twin process of involvement of the military in counter-insurgency operations, and militarisation of police services functioning as combat and intelligence units. SST thus involves the formulation of a new national security strategy which redefines and restricts the respective roles and functions of the police, external defence, intelligence services and judicial institutions, in line with international standards and a reassessment of threats and national interests.

In El Salvador, the structure of security institutions during the conflict was shaped by the National Security doctrine adopted in 1963, with assistance from the US, calling on the military to detect and fight against anybody considered a communist or ‘internal enemy’. The formulation of a new security doctrine after the peace accords included the restriction of the military’s role to responding to external threats, while leaving the monopoly over public security to a new civilian police service independent of the armed forces.

External assistance might be required for training members of the new security and justice sector according to international standards and codes of conduct. In El Salvador, the curriculum of the new national police academy was designed by a technical team of international experts, and training sessions were supported by instructors from Chile, Spain, the USA, Norway and Sweden. In Burundi, financial and technical assistance were provided by France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and the UN integrated mission BINUB, for harmonisation of training for the reformed army, police and intelligence services. Moreover, there is a growing awareness among peacebuilding agencies of the critical role to be played by functioning judicial and penal sectors in upholding the rule of law and protecting human rights. Projects to strengthen the capacities and professional training of legal personnel and prison services were offered by the EU, UN and international NGOs in Burundi, and by the World Bank in Southern Sudan. Despite these efforts,
however, opinion polls in these three countries reveal that police and judicial personnel suffer from a relatively low level of trust among the general public, due to their politicisation and relatively poor human rights record in the post-war period, combined with the persistence of high levels of impunity, corruption and criminality.

Finally, we should also mention cases where no SST has taken place as of yet, either because of a situation of ongoing armed conflict or due to the sub-national character of the conflict at stake. In Colombia, the peace process with the M-19 missed an opportunity to transform the statutory security sector, which has remained engaged in counter-insurgency operations against other guerrillas, and the government did not comply with its commitment to dismantle paramilitary self-defence groups. For their part, the processes of local demilitarisation and police reform in Northern Ireland and Aceh failed to be complemented by a parallel national reform of the military.

7.3 Implementation guarantees

Successful peace and state-building do not depend only on the design of comprehensive security and political reforms, but also on the effective implementation by all parties of their respective commitments. Reciprocity can serve as a powerful guarantee for maintaining parity, mutual trust and the political will to pursue necessary reforms, as well as power-sharing arrangements. Indeed, when the former conflict parties have access to power, it increases their leverage and confidence that peace agreements will be implemented. In most contexts, additional institutional guarantees and oversight mechanisms were put in place, for instance by enshrining the peace accord provisions in the legal system, or by establishing national, international or mixed monitoring bodies comprised of all relevant political stakeholders.

7.3.1 Institutional guarantees: enshrining peace provisions in national legislation

The political and security provisions of peace accords should be integrated into a legal framework that both legitimises and endows them with a compulsory character. New constitutions were promulgated in South Africa, Colombia, Kosovo, Burundi and Southern Sudan, while in Nepal a constitution-writing process is on-going. In all cases, these constitutional frameworks spell out the features of a democratic and cohesive state as well as principles of security sector governance that guarantee justice and security for all citizens.

In Kosovo, the Declaration of Independence on 17 February 2008 was followed by a new Constitution, which entered into force on 15 June 2008, establishing the Republic of Kosovo as an independent, sovereign, democratic, unique and indivisible state. The new state was granted full authority over law enforcement, security, justice, public safety, intelligence, civil emergency response and border control within its territory.

In Aceh, the far-reaching self-government competencies negotiated by GAM and the Indonesian government were formally codified in the Law on the Governing of Aceh (LoGA), enacted by the Indonesian parliament on 11 July 2006. However, former GAM negotiators raised complaints about its delayed promulgation and its inconsistency with the Helsinki peace accord, in particular with respect to the extent of the devolution of powers assigned to local government structures.
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7.3.2 National and international oversight

In addition to legal provisions, the institutional framework for peace- and state-building implementation and verification includes national monitoring and verification commissions, which are comprised of all relevant political stakeholders. These are sometimes complemented by representatives of foreign agencies, in order to avoid the peacebuilding processes being jeopardised by likely blockages and hindrances in the domestic political arena.

In Burundi, an Implementation Monitoring Commission was created to control, supervise and coordinate the implementation of the 2000 Arusha Agreement. Although it had no authority to constrain disputing parties, the very nature of its composition served as a guarantor, as it was made up of six Burundis and one representative each from the United Nations, the African Union and the Regional Peace Initiative.

Despite their positive achievements, most verification commissions seem to have been primarily concerned with the oversight of DDR mechanisms, at the expense of monitoring the implementation of state reform. For this reason, international actors have a critical role to play in helping to monitor the process of structural transformation. In El Salvador, for instance, the UN’s role progressively evolved from being a witness of good will, to a mediator, and finally to being a guarantor of the parties’ compliance with the peace accords.

With regards to RLMs’ assessment of the performance of foreign monitors, one can observe an interesting paradox. On the one hand, international oversight support is assessed very positively in most cases at stake, with complaints being limited to a premature pull-out or overly restricted mandates, as shown in the following examples:

In Nepal, the Maoists were strongly in support of maintaining the UN monitoring mission (UNMIN) until the process of army integration and restructuring was completed, as they perceived the international presence as a guarantee against the intervention of ‘expansionist’ foreign forces such as the US and India. Amidst heavy opposition from other political parties and the Nepali army, who criticised UNMIN for allegedly taking a partial (pro-Maoist) stance, the mission’s mandate was extended several times, until its termination in January 2011.

In Aceh, an international monitoring mission (AMM) was set up by the EU and ASEAN with a broad mandate to monitor the whole peace implementation process. In practice, however, the AMM chose to play a minimal role in order to maximise the chances of achieving success, by narrowing down its objective to only monitoring and supporting the DDR process. The AMM ended its mandate in December 2006, after announcing that it had successfully assisted the disarmament and demobilisation processes, but with no clear assurance that the other provisions of the Helsinki peace agreement would be implemented, including the release of remaining political prisoners, SSR, political reform and a comprehensive reintegration scheme for all GAM members.

On the other hand, in contexts where peace implementation was heavily driven by international agencies, national actors (including former RLMs) push for a timely national appropriation of oversight functions by their own reformed or newly-established institutions.

In Kosovo, in the absence of a functioning state in the immediate post-war context, a UN mission (UNMIK) took over the administration of the territory during the transition period until the determination of Kosovo’s final status. However, the stringent vertical control exerted by the UN over the function of internal security severely impeded local ownership of its development and impeded democratic oversight by local civilian institutions.
7.4 Recommendations for light-handed but sustainable state-building support

Mediators should:

- Facilitate fair and balanced agreements addressing RLMs’ claims to security sector transformation, democratisation or socio-economic reform, by ensuring that structural reform provisions are included in peace accords and designed according to the specificities of the conflict context and parties’ respective priorities.

Peacebuilding agencies and NGOs should:

- Support the transformation of underground structures into effective political parties, through training and facilitation of peer-advice in conventional politics and good governance.

National or multinational security experts (e.g. NATO, EU CSDP missions or bilateral assistance) should:

- Guarantee international legal and technical standards for military/police integration, vetting and re-ranking;

- If required locally, offer training for the new defence and security forces in conventional warfare and international codes of conduct;

- Offer technical assistance in drafting security-related national strategic assessments, laws and regulations.

International monitors of peace implementation (members of verification and oversight bodies run by the UN, regional organisations or other international actors) should:

- Interpret their mission mandates extensively, and accompany the implementation of peace accord provisions that go beyond immediate security stabilisation measures;

- Involve local (state and non-state) actors in oversight and monitoring activities, and plan for a timely transfer of these competencies to inclusive national bodies.
8 Annexes

8.1 Abbreviations

AD-M19  
*Alianza Democrática-M19* (Democratic Alliance-M19)

AGAM  
*Angkatan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (Army of the Free Aceh Movement)

AMM  
Aceh Monitoring Mission

ANC  
African National Congress

ASEAN  
Association of Southeast Asian Nations

AU  
African Union

BINUB  
United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi

CNDD-FDD  
*Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces de Défense de la Démocratie*  

CPN-M  
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)

CSDP  
Common Security and Defence Policy (of the EU)

DAC  
Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)

DDR  
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

EU  
European Union

FMLN  
*Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional*  
(Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front)

GAM  
*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (Free Aceh Movement)

IMC  
Independent Monitoring Commission

IOM  
International Organization for Migration

IRA  
Irish Republican Army

JIU  
Joint Integrated Unit

KLA (also UÇK)  
Kosovo Liberation Army (*Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës*)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>KPA</td>
<td>Komite Peralihan Aceh (Aceh Transition Committee)</td>
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<td>KPC</td>
<td>Kosovo Protection Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>LINA</td>
<td>Liga Inong Aceh (Aceh Women’s League)</td>
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<td>LoGA</td>
<td>Law on Governing Aceh (Undang-Undang Pemerintah Aceh)</td>
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<td>M19</td>
<td>Movimiento 19 de Abril (19th of April Movement)</td>
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<td>MK</td>
<td>Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People's Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>RLM</td>
<td>Resistance/Liberation Movement</td>
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<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>SST</td>
<td>Security Sector Transformation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TJ</td>
<td>Transitional Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIDDRS</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNMIN</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Nepal</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAAF</td>
<td>Women Associated with Armed Forces</td>
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</table>
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8.3 Further reading


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