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On Good Terms: Clarifying Reconciliation
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Introduction

My aim here is to address some of the deep confusion that still surrounds the term reconciliation, and its practice in post-violence peacebuilding. Despite its generally acknowledged importance, there remains great disagreement over what reconciliation actually means and, in particular, how it relates to other concepts and processes, such as justice, peacebuilding, democratisation and political development.\(^1\)

I will review some of the ongoing debates, from scholarship as well as policy and practice, which highlight the disputed nature of the term, and offer a modest framework for reducing the confusion to more manageable levels. I will also examine its complex relationship to two key concepts: justice, and forgiveness. I make the important distinction between interpersonally-based understandings of reconciliation, and what is now developing as a pragmatic approach of ‘political reconciliation’. The result might be a more robust and more practical base on which to develop policy and practice so as to place reconciliation more centrally in the overall post-violence reconstruction process in protracted or profound social conflict. However, at this stage I merely raise questions and possibilities about the nature of this base.


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1 I consciously use the more accurate term post-violence in preference to “sometimes the greatest oxymoron of them all, post-conflict” (Lederach, 2005, 43). Conflict issues do not disappear when the fighting ends, but rather the means of their management (violence) shifts to peaceful methods (negotiation, politics, etc.)

2 Earlier drafts of parts of this paper were presented at: “Dealing With the Past and Transitional Justice,” a conference co-hosted by the International Center for Transitional Justice and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Neuchatel, Switzerland, 24-25 October 2005; the second meeting of the International IDEA Reconciliation Experts’ Network, Stockholm, Sweden, 15-17 March 2006; and the International Symposium, “Strategies for Peace,” hosted by the Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung, 28-29 April 2006, Osnabrück, Germany. I am also very grateful for commentary and critique from Kate McGuinness, Wendy Lambourne, Luc Huyse, Mô Bleeker, Beatrix Schmelzle and Astrid Fischer.
1 Terminological Confusion

Reconciliation’s basic problem is that no-one agrees how to define it or do it. Ever since Donna Pankhurst (1999) drew attention to the confusion surrounding the term, it has become customary for almost every text on the subject to begin with an acknowledgement of the lack of consensual understanding, and use, of the term. Clearly, this paper is no different. Such comment does not dismiss the obvious value of much of the excellent academic work that has been done. Rather it simply notes the absence of any agreed use of the vocabulary. Even Johan Galtung admits defeat: “Reconciliation is a theme with deep psychological, sociological, theological, philosophical, and profoundly human roots – and nobody really knows how to successfully achieve it” (2001, 4). Nobody, it seems, really knows how to effectively define it, either.

Crucially, this absence of consensus is observable not only among scholars and their writings; it is also reflected in policy circles, within governments, donor agencies, INGOs, IGOs, and so on. Moreover, it also finds parallels among most actors in real post-violence contexts, too: victims, offenders, governments, individuals, politicians, community leaders, NGOs, religious and cultural organisations, and the like. As Susan Dwyer forcefully observes,

The notable lack of any clear account of what reconciliation is, and what it requires, justifiably alerts the cynics among us. Reconciliation is being urged upon people who have been bitter and murderous enemies, upon victims and perpetrators of terrible human rights abuses, upon groups and individuals whose very self-conceptions have been structured in terms of historical and often state-sanctioned relations of dominance and submission (2002, 92).

Dwyer’s words, and certainly Galtung’s, reflect the confused state of play: Is reconciliation a national, societal, even political, process? Is it an individual, psychological, even “theological”, process? Is it a process at all, or does it describe a state of relationships at the end of a process? I would agree, in the spirit of Dwyer’s cynicism, that it can be all these and more; but that it is critical to try to separate at least some of these complex strands, if only for the very pragmatic reason that different types, levels and facets of reconciliation demand very different approaches, mechanisms and contexts. Reconciliation is currently a grossly over-packed term, and my aim here is to tease out and clarify some of its important themes.
Paradoxically, while the confusion remains largely unresolved, the term gains steadily in usage and importance. It is now on the lips, if not also the agendas, of all branches of the international community. Donors support it. IGOs demand it. INGOs increasingly incorporate it into their portfolios, new organisations are formed specifically to promote and implement aspects of it. Nationally, too, in conflict situations, sections of society or of government demand reconciliation initiatives as part of an agreement, or as part of the post-agreement reform process. (But, we must not forget, other significant groups in these societies often also vigorously reject the concept.) Dan Smith’s *Utstein Study* (2004), in reviewing the peacebuilding sector of development co-operation policy in a range of key Western donor countries, reported that ‘reconciliation’ is now one of the four main categories of initiatives that receive donor support. Reconciliation ranks third in volume of support, behind political development and socio-economic assistance, and before security (Smith 2004, 42). So its significance is established. And yet, there is still no clearly agreed definition of what that term encompasses, what it excludes, where it links with other post-conflict initiatives, how or if it functions, or what its goal is.

For many people, especially since the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 1995-2003 – certainly not the first of its kind, but definitely the most high-profile of all – the term is closely related to ‘truth’ and ‘forgiveness’, even if those also both remain disputed terms in themselves. In the academic literature, the mis-match of terminology persists not for the want of eminent scholars trying to address it, many of whom have worked hard to develop definitions and understandings of the dynamics involved (e.g., Lederach 1997, Kriesberg 2001, Bar-Simon-Tov 2004, Rigby 2001, to select just a handful among many). But such efforts, while producing interesting, important and useful results, have not at the same time brought clarity to the debate. Perhaps we should not expect such perfection of understanding: we are dealing with an area of human activity – violent conflict and its aftermath – which has by its nature a degree of confused, emotional and apparently non-rational thinking and behaviour in its workings. We are also working in a contemporary context with an inherent multiplicity of ideas and practice as interpreted from a post-modern perspective. The positive side of this multiplicity means that we can generate distinct and multidimensional versions of practice that better suit specific contexts, without the need to produce definitive, universal models. The downside, however, is that we must learn to live with a degree of flexibility and self-conscious contradiction in our processes of definition.
2 Reconciliation as Both Process and Outcome

Nonetheless, even for purely practical reasons – in order to “do something” – it is worth some small effort to try to increase clarity. Some scholars, as noted already, have tried hard to do so. Together with Luc Huyse and Teresa Barnes, for example, I laboured to some degree at this task with the International IDEA Handbook, *Reconciliation After Violent Conflict* (Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse, 2003). More policy-oriented than academic or conceptual, we based our arguments largely on practice and tried to present them from a pragmatic, rather than any moral or ethical, or particularly scholarly, standpoint. The gist of the approach bears a brief review, as a basis for some further speculation.

We observed that one clear cause of the confusion around the term is due to the conflicting definitions of reconciliation as a *process*, and as an end-state or *goal*. The Handbook focused exclusively on the process. This emphasis is supported by other thinkers. John Paul Lederach, for example, understands reconciliation to be “dynamic, adaptive processes aimed at building and healing” (2001, 842), and “a process of change and redefinition of relationships,” (ibid. 847). For Audrey Chapman, “national reconciliation can best be understood as a multi-dimensional and long-term process” (2002, 1), and Erin McCandless notes that, “the idea that reconciliation is a *process* of building or changing relationships is growing,” (2001, 213). The IDEA Handbook was presented, and fairly well received, as a pragmatic, policy-oriented tool. This entailed a conscious and exclusive focus on reconciliation as a *process*, and no real attention to it as a *goal*, an end-state of harmony. I suspect that this was not only because we aimed to offer policy advice to those struggling with process, but because we also had some level of suspicion of the end-state definition as rather idealistic. Good pragmatism avoids ideals. Still, in common usage, the end-state definition is a significant factor in the definitional debate. And even though pragmatists might characterise it thus as idealistic (which society lives in perfect harmony?) and unattainable in an imperfect world, yet it is a motivating ideal for some of the key actors, and therefore of some significance. Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma Bennink, while acknowledging it as a process, albeit a strictly psychological one (2004, 26-27, 37), also see it as an outcome, an end-state which:

...consists of mutual recognition and acceptance, invested interests and goals in developing peaceful relations, mutual trust, positive attitudes, as well as sensitivity and consideration for the other party’s needs and interests (2004, 15).
Their words do not sound so idealistic, rather perhaps no more than a slightly optimistic description of many peaceful societies and relationships. However, despite its growing popularity in international circles, the term reconciliation continues to engender resistance, especially among victim groups. And there is some substance to the suggestion that this is specifically because people do not differentiate between the two possible definitions: that they are suspicious of a process because of their suspicions about an end-state. In other words, they rightly suspect a process that might compel them into an end-state which they do not necessarily, or for now, want. They may be forced to make compromises and, in particular, to ‘forgive’ perpetrators without having first gained sufficient justice for their suffering. These objections usually relate to the idea of this end-state being one where all is harmony, where all are equals, and, in particular, where all is forgiven. It is to this last element that most resistance is mustered. When informed of a forthcoming reconciliation process, victims often jump to the conclusion, and on good grounds, that this will mean they must give up some claims, or accept imperfect justice, or be forced unilaterally to forgive those who made them suffer. Here is the confusion of process and end-state. (I will return in Section 8 to the troublesome role of forgiveness.)

3 Reconciliation as Relationship-building

The IDEA Handbook defined reconciliation as “a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future,” (Bloomfield 2003a, 12) and, more usefully, as “a process that redesigns the relationship” (ibid.):

While democratic compromise produces solutions regarding issues in conflict, reconciliation addresses the relationships between those who will have to implement those solutions (ibid.).

Moreover, in this very practice-oriented definition, this process of change is long, deep and broad:

- Unfortunately it is a long-term process. There is no quick fix to reconciliation. It takes time...
- It is also a deep process... which demands changes in our aspirations, our emotions and feelings, perhaps even our beliefs...
It is also a very broad process. It applies to everyone. It is not just a process for those who suffered directly and those who inflicted the suffering, central though those people are… There is also a community-wide element that demands a questioning of the attitudes, prejudices and negative stereotypes that we all develop about ‘the enemy’… Even those who have suffered or benefited little from the past absorb the beliefs of their community and their culture, and those beliefs can effectively block the reconciliation process if they are left unaddressed (ibid., 13).

Again, this relationship-oriented definition also resonates with other thinkers. For Lederach, “Reconciliation is first and last about people and their relationships,” (2001, 842). For Chapman, reconciliation, “establishes the framework for new types of relationships,” (2002, 1), in particular for “social and political relationships” (ibid., 3). Brandon Hamber and Grainne Kelly, “see reconciliation as moving from the premise that relationships require attention to build peace. Reconciliation is the process of addressing conflictual and fractured relationships,” (2004, 3). And for McCandless, it is “a relationship-building process,” the goal of which is “a more cooperative relationship,” rather than to do with “structures and procedures needed for establishing peace,” (2001, 213). Even for the psychologically-oriented Bar-Tal and Bennink, “the essence of reconciliation is the construction of lasting peaceful relations,” (2004, 37). Louis Kriesberg defines the term as, “the processes by which parties that have experienced an oppressive relationship or a destructive conflict with each other move to attain or restore a relationship that they believe to be minimally acceptable,” (2001, 48). Others agree (e.g., Estrada-Hollenbeck, 2001, Babbitt, 2003, etc.).

4 Reconciliation and Politics

So far, so good. But the IDEA Handbook also made some claims about reconciliation, which have been robustly and rightly challenged by scholars, notably David Mendeloff (2004) and Pablo de Greiff (2006). In particular, given its pragmatic style, and its policy-orientation, it ventured to make one rather extraordinary claim about reconciliation after violence: reconciliation is “a necessary requirement for the
long-term survival of democracy” (Bloomfield, 2003a, 15); unreconciled relationships, “those built on distrust, suspicion, fear, accusation... will effectively and eventually destroy any political system based on respect for human rights and democratic structures” (Bloomfield 2003b, 168). In short, lack of attention to the legacy of past violence will undermine even the best democracy. There are reflections of this thinking elsewhere. Robert Rothstein, for example, warns that, “total failure at reconciliation will guarantee a very cold peace and perhaps a return to violence,” (1999, 238). Michelle Parlevliet draws similar conclusions from her study of Namibia, where the government, “embarked on a policy of reconciliation that rejected any analysis of the past” (2000, 100). “Despite all efforts from the Namibian government to ignore it, the violations of the past and the related call for accountability have surfaced again and again” (ibid., 104). She concludes, “The Namibian case demonstrates that the past will not necessarily disappear when it is ignored,” (ibid., 110).

But some critics then offered the example of Spain to refute this claim. A reflective process on the Civil War and the Franco era, that has recently begun to gather pace within Spanish society, indeed suggests that the legacy of violence and oppression does not go away unless it is dealt with. But there is no evidence whatsoever that in thirty years Spanish democracy has been under any direct threat from untreated wounds related specifically to the civil war or the dictatorship. Spain, however, remains something of an exception. Couched securely within western Europe and – crucially – in the stabilising context of the European Union, its democratisation was always protected and underpinned by that regional stability. In unfortunate contrast, most other post-violence contexts are located far from such centres of security and prosperity. On the contrary, they tend to feature very fragile new regimes, under-resourced and devastated by the violence, located in regions of poverty, underdevelopment and abiding insecurity. The key point can still be made with reasonable force: unreconciled issues from past violence never disappear simply by default, and the potential threat to stability and security suggests a need to ensure they are dealt with. Moreover, bringing justice to bear on past misdeeds is one of the most effective means to build a guarantee against future violence.

The IDEA Handbook was trying to look at reconciliation processes as they relate to the political arena, specifically to democracy-building. This is a crucial point to which I will return: part of the disservice done to the concept is its dismissal as some fuzzy, interpersonal, feel-good process far removed from the hard-nosed realities of politics and politicians. On the contrary, I hold the firm conviction that reconciliation is an essential (and essentially political) ingredient in peacebuilding, just as central and just as necessary as economic reconstruction, legal reform and all other post-violence reconstructive and preventative measures.
From a huge range of different contexts, people promote reconciliation processes, even as they fail to agree or clearly define what those are. Another source of this confusion stems from that contextual variance. Like a lot of conflict transformation analysis and thinking, which emerged from the fields of psychology and social psychology, much of the received wisdom on reconciliation initially stemmed from the interpersonal context. Much of the thinking, vocabulary, and approach has been drawn from an initially individual context and then applied more broadly at the community, or even national, level. This is not necessarily a bad thing, and useful ideas and concepts have developed in the process. But one result is that we still often use individual or interpersonal psychological ingredients (concerning hurt, pain, trauma, acknowledgement, reparation, punishment, revenge, healing, forgiveness, apology, and so on) to discuss the very different context that applies in a post-violence society emerging from a sustained war or an oppressive regime.

In some cases, this is a useful borrowing of terms. But in others, it is far from helpful. Interpersonal reconciliation is a powerful and significant process that deserves serious and sustained attention. But how closely does it mirror wider-scale social or political practices? Can a nation, for example, really “heal itself” in anything more than the most metaphorical sense? Moreover, it is at the interpersonal level that reconciliation as an end-state takes on real significance. In that context it is more achievable and less idealistic. But we should be very careful in extrapolating too directly from interpersonal to national.

The pragmatists among us prioritise the social and political needs of a post-violence society: what needs to happen for the new society-wide structures and processes to bed down and function effectively? Individual processes of contriteness, forgiveness, and so on, and that ideal end-state of harmony (which is heavily emphasised in the interpersonal sphere) seem too personal, perhaps too religious, indeed too private – and above all too ambitious – to serve as the basis for redesigning functional working relations between communities and their representatives after violence. Commentators including David A. Crocker, Charles Villa-Vicencio, Mô Bleeker and others, who take as their focus the broad-brush issue of rebuilding politics after violence, increasingly concentrate on the political sphere and what realistically (pragmatically) can and must be done to build a working future. Villa-Vicencio makes the distinction clear: “Political reconciliation is not dependent on the kind of intimacy that religions and some forms of individual reconciliation may demand. Rather, statecraft and politics require peaceful coexistence... Forgiveness may come later, after the creation of confidence and the building of trust” (2004, 6).

One of the problems with promoting reconciliation (especially to victims) is the huge challenge implied in the word. Participants may very well be unwilling, or
unable, to contemplate a state of reconciliation from where they are now in the post-violence confusion. They can thus reject it as unfair or implausible. Dwyer warns:

Reconciliation should not be touted as aiming at the happy and harmonious coexistence of former enemies. It’s one thing to achieve some measure of narrative coherence in the face of atrocity; it’s quite another to come to love one’s torturer (2003, 108).

The implication of Dwyer’s words is that reconciliation should in contrast be “touted” as something less ambitious, less threatening and more prosaic. Political reconciliation, then, appears to be something less deep, less personal, and more pragmatic, than the individual form. Moreover, it requires no such grandiose elements as forgiveness or harmonious end-states, but rather, in Villa-Vicencio’s words, “peaceful coexistence”.

5 Reconciliation as an Umbrella Term

Most original, perhaps, in the IDEA Handbook, was the promotion of reconciliation as an umbrella term for the “over-arching process which includes the search for truth, justice, forgiveness, healing and so on” (Bloomfield 2003a, 12). This proposal, with considerable theoretical and practical implications, was perhaps slightly under-emphasised, given the Handbook’s policy focus. But it has a real conceptual significance. It renders the various instruments of reconciliation not as competing or antagonistic between each other or, in particular, as elements outside of, and potentially antagonistic to, reconciliation. Instead, they are complementary and interdependent instruments of the overall relationship-building process of reconciliation. Thus reconciliation is not one instrument among several, including justice, healing, truth-telling and reparations. Rather, it is the overall relationship-oriented process within which these diverse instruments are the constitutive parts. This proposal also has the significant conceptual virtue of reorienting these instruments so that they have the potential to move in parallel co-ordination in the same direction. This is useful: so often these components are seen, especially in the case of reconciliation and justice, or of truth and justice, as occasionally and fundamentally antagonistic.
Reconciliation then, according to the Handbook, is a process of gradually (re)building broad social relationships between communities alienated by sustained and widespread violence, so that over time they can negotiate the realities and compromises of a new, shared socio-political reality. It has four main instruments:

- A justice process that punishes past violence and deters future repetition; and justice reform that is built on human rights principles, democratic practice, and international legal norms, and that promises fairness in the future
- A process of acknowledging experiences, uncovering unknown events, giving voice to the previously unheard, and addressing interpretations of history: often referred to as truth-seeking or truth-telling
- A process of healing, whereby victims repair their lives by coming to terms with their suffering (something more straightforward to understand at the individual level, but very unclear, despite Brandon Hamber’s best efforts (2003), at communal and national levels)
- A process of reparation, through real and/or symbolic compensation for loss

Further, these four elements are all tightly interlinked, cross-cutting and interdependent: “Healing initiatives need to be part of socio-economic and cultural reconstruction,” says Hamber (2003, 81). “It is essential to understand the political implications of [victim-offender reconciliation] work, and the political context in which it takes place,” says Ian White (2003, 90). There is much overlap and cross-referencing between the instruments. And they all contribute to the encompassing process of reconciliation. (We might also add a fifth instrument: development. Right across the literature and practice of the field, the argument is continually and forcefully made that none of these components, nor indeed the overall process, can succeed without the direct underpinning of economic development.)

This again finds a strong parallel in the work of Lederach, the reflective practitioner par excellence. Where he finds his own, slightly different, four ingredients of reconciliation (for him, they are peace, justice, truth and mercy), he too sees them as necessarily interrelated within a framework of reconciliation:

My conviction is this. The single greatest challenge of all conflicts, particularly those with a long history of violence and suffering is to create the social space where it is possible to hold together and interdependent, not separate and isolated, the impulses of these four social energies. Where they meet, are connected, and relate, we create the pathway leading toward reconciliation. Where they are ignored, isolated from one another, or chosen one over the other, we often are unable to create sustainable peace processes (2001, 848).
In any event, I can end this review of one particular presentation of the subject-matter with a summary that reconciliation after violent social conflict is the long, broad and deep intercommunal relationship-building process, whose constituent instruments include justice, truth, healing and reparations. These instruments (1) are reconciliation's main constituent parts; (2) thus have the potential to work in parallel co-ordination in the same direction; (3) depend fundamentally on each other, and complement each other; and (4) contribute together to the over-arching relationship-building process that is essential for progress towards the (perhaps idealistic) goal of a reconciled society. We did not present this framework as the ultimate definition of, or sole correct approach to, reconciliation. Rather, as I do here, we offered it as one way to think more clearly about the concept and its constituent parts, in order to move into action to address the pragmatic needs of post-violence peacebuilding.

6 Reconciliation and Coexistence

One particular term, coexistence, is gathering popularity as an alternative to reconciliation. It seems a less contentious term. Indeed, it is in some ways an empty term, until filled with meaning by its user(s), and no less useful for that. Coexistence was recognised in the IDEA Handbook as the first of three stages in the process towards a state of reconciliation. (The second, in an interesting parallel of Villa-Vicencio's words above, was 'building confidence and trust', and the third, 'moving towards empathy' (Huyse, 2003, 19-21)). But recently, broader meanings have been written in to coexistence. Some of these came notably from the 'Imagine Coexistence' projects operated in post-war ex-Yugoslavia and post-genocide Rwanda, managed by UNHCR and partners, which addressed the basic, initial phase of post-war living and relationship-building (see especially Antonia Chayes and Martha Minow, 2003).

Coexistence is a less loaded term: it is more mundane. It carries none of the religious overtones, or peace-building implications of reconciliation; it lends itself less easily than reconciliation to a pejorative use. It may cover a wide range of possibilities, from simply grudging acceptance of the need to exist in the same space, to some much more positive and complex set of activities to mend
relationships, co-operate and develop actively harmonious living. Coexistence, as Kriesberg (2001) has pointed out, better suits the basic premise of compromise that underpins democratic politics – coexistence as accommodation – without the interpersonal, subjective overtones of emotion and emotional change that cling to reconciliation. Chapman speaks realistically on this: “It is not necessary to like members of other groups in order to develop a strong sense of national identity, the affirmation of ties based on a common citizenship, and/or a shared commitment to the legitimacy of political institutions” (2002, 5).

Coexistence also has a usefully more modest ring to it. To ask victims to coexist with their former enemies carries far fewer negative implications for them than asking them to reconcile with them. Connotations of forgiveness and integration are absent. It remains for the victims to fill in these blanks. It minimally suggests acknowledging each other's right to inhabit the same space without violence. Two communities could conceivably coexist along purely parallel lines within that space, without interaction. But perhaps this extreme state is unlikely. Even at the minimal level, we can wonder if there are not at least some basic shared assumptions between the communities. If not shared values, then perhaps at least some shared standards of acceptable behaviour would surely, if slowly, evolve, and in time might coax out some shared values.

We might usefully adapt the familiar positive-negative dichotomy to coexistence that has been fruitful for peace. As negative peace is the absence of violence (Galtung 1969, O'Connell, 1978), so negative coexistence can also be construed as little more than the absence of violence. But as positive peace is the presence of social or structural justice and of positive relationships (ibid.), so positive coexistence would be the presence of something more dynamic: shared values, positive relationships, interaction and interdependence, respect, trust and co-operation.

Coexistence as an end-state simply means an accommodation, a much more achievable goal than reconciliation as an end-state. It also better suits the idea of pragmatic compromise, without overtones of the more demandingly interactive term of reconciliation. Thus, for example, for Kriesberg, “Coexistence generally refers to an accommodation between members of different communities or separate countries who live together without one collectivity trying to destroy or severely harm the other,” (2002, 48). This is a suitably negative definition of the term. But he then goes on to add: “Coexistence, however, is also understood to go beyond this minimal level, to include a sense of mutual tolerance and even respect,” (ibid.). Here we approach a more positive accommodation, and the possibility of developing shared values. In the context of a relationship-building perspective on reconciliation, McCandless asks:
What type of relationship are people desiring and capable of following violent conflict? Minimalists argue for “coexistence” – sharing space or tolerating each other in a way that appeals to self-interest while affirming the right of the other to life (2001, 213-4).

Here, again, is the “minimalist”, negative coexistence. She goes on, like Villa-Vicencio, to utilise the concept of political reconciliation as a more positive version of the accommodation which “encompasses notions of equality, trust, acceptance of cultural and political differences, partnership, active friendship, and mutual or joint interests,” (ibid.).

For Crocker, the first is the “thin” definition of reconciliation, which he terms “non-lethal coexistence,” while the second corresponds to “democratic reciprocity,” where the protagonists “are reconciled insofar as they respect each other as fellow citizens. Further, all parties play a role in deliberations concerning the past, present and future of their country,” (2000, 7, and see also Gutmann and Thompson, 2000).

Useful insights on coexistence are also available from those who debated these issues from within the “Imagine Coexistence” framework itself. Aneelah Afzali and Laura Colleton, for example, speak of “differing degrees of intensity” of coexistence:

While the most ambitious connotations [positive coexistence] envision completely integrated societies in which members of different ethnic, racial or religious groups live in harmony with one another, the minimum [negative] concept of coexistence asks only that members of such groups live together without killing each other (2003, 3).

Carlos Sluzki follows their chapter in Chayes and Minow by locating such definitions on a continuum, as steps on a process from conflict, through negative or minimal coexistence, and eventually to integration (2003, 23). Indeed, this group of scholars and practitioners take an understandably practical, on-the-ground, intervention-related approach to understanding their concepts. Arising from their Rwandan experience, Cynthia Burns et al. define coexistence as the means to realise the goal of reconciliation: “Coexistence is the process whereby reconciliation is achieved” (2003, 95). Reviewing the Rwandan coexistence projects, Mark Sommers and Elizabeth McClintock comment that, “Most of them are considered programs of reconciliation” (2003, 45). Avoiding the painful complexities of reconciliation, however, they say, “The less demanding concept of coexistence connotes a spirit of getting on with life” (ibid.). Such minimal definitions, therefore, may be more feasible and much less threatening, especially in the early post-violence phase, where even a separate approach of “parallelism” (Guth, 2003, 311), prior to any interaction, might be appropriate. But the expectation is still there that such
negative coexistence will, with time and effort, “thicken” into a more positive form. However, within the same group, Diana Chigas and Brian Ganson counsel realism about the limits of coexistence: “Even where people increasingly believe in the right of the ‘other’ to exist and secure a livelihood, they may feel deeply divided by issues of political identity and power,” (2003, 77). This begs the question: what comes after coexistence is established, and how does it then develop into official state structures to manage politics and power? The term falls short at this point, not only in providing no clear (even if ideal) end-state to be aimed at, but in failing to offer political paths for future progress beyond non-aggression, and in reducing the importance of building positive relationships.

It might be tempting to adopt the term coexistence, and its positive and negative sub-categories, as the label for our subject matter, as more amenable, and less loaded, than reconciliation, a term that problematically is still used both to represent the overall peace-building process as well as one constituent part of it. It would certainly help to clarify the terminological terrain. But what is most needed is greater clarity among existing concepts, rather than the addition of ever more new terms to cloud an already busy field. Coexistence can, however, serve to clarify some of the stages of reconciliation. I would argue that we should stay with our troublesome R-word, not least because, amidst the confusion, it still retains much greater future potential to build or maintain the momentum that moves us beyond coexistence and into something more effective and more positive. The basic problematic of peacebuilding is deeply complex and demands a more complex approach than coexistence, whether negative or positive, can supply.

7  Reconciliation and Justice

When we start to unpack the dense concepts of justice, truth, reconciliation, human rights and peace in a post-violence context, we need a holistic view that places these and other complex concepts as interlinked and interdependent in a broader peacebuilding framework, a meaningful framework within which we can then devise effective strategies for the successful transformation of a society after violent conflict towards a more peaceful, inclusive, democratic one. I am proposing the use of reconciliation as the “umbrella” term for such a framework.
Where many of the arguments concerning terminology in reconciliation move from the simply semantic to the crucially important is in its relation to justice. All commentators agree on the centrality of justice to reconciliation (except, perhaps, those that still see the two as antagonistic – but the umbrella-term approach, locating justice as a key instrument within the reconciliation framework, goes some way to addressing this debate). And indeed some make strong arguments for its pre-eminence, such as Joseph Montville, who sees justice as “the most fundamental element of peace,” since: “In its most general sense, justice implies order and morality... the basic rules governing right and wrong behaviour,” (2001, 129). McCandless, too, sees the primacy of justice within such a framework:

Our working justice-reconciliation conceptual framework is one that prioritises justice concerns (of means, ends, and relational) in a process of constructive intergroup relationship building. It recognizes that the two share a dynamic interdependent relationship, mutually informing and benefiting each other (2001, 214).

Similarly, Hizkias Assefa comments that, “Reconciliation necessitates the transformation of unjust relationships to more just ones,” (2001, 181). Wendy Lambourne concisely observes: “Reconciliation... values the justice which restores community, rather than the justice which destroys it” (2004, 24).

We have made conceptual and practical progress in the last ten years or so. Transitional justice is now squarely on the post-violence agenda, and this must be acknowledged as a major step forward. There is now far more focus on exploring the nature and dynamics of transitional justice after violent conflict – among scholars certainly, but also among practitioners, victims, politicians and community leaders, and also, significantly, among many of the key international actors. We learn at a much faster rate than before. And the concept of transitional justice, by turning the spotlight of enquiry on issues of truth-seeking, legal reform, reparations, etc., has contributed to the development of a richer framework within which to position our efforts at peacebuilding. At the same time, it has acknowledged the role of justice as a primary ingredient in so many aspects of peacebuilding. All this is to be welcomed.

But there have been problems, too. Just a few years ago, Pankhurst could still comment accurately: “No common understanding has yet emerged of the political conditions under which efforts at reconciliation should be restrained and justice promoted, or vice versa, in order to achieve the ‘best’ peace” (1999, 240). Clearly implicit in this remark – note the vice versa – is the assumption that there is a trade-off between one instrument and its opposing other. And it is fair to speculate that this may have a lot to do with the process of truth-telling, especially in examples where truth (and, by implication, reconciliation) has been achieved at the price of
amnesty, or negotiated compromises have been reached at the expense of accountability for past misdeeds. As another example, one excellent text on the subject was Robert Rothberg and Dennis Thompson’s book, whose title was telling: “Truth v. Justice.” The antagonism thus established between the two processes – truth versus justice – was persistent.

To talk of the ‘justice versus peace’ tension is to simplify a complex debate, but also to acknowledge that some of that debate has run along over-simple lines. Some of this crystallised around the proceedings of the South African TRC. Much argument – some of it academic, but some of it also painful and difficult thinking by victims and practitioners – ranged around the offer of amnesty to offenders in return for their public acknowledgement of guilt and full disclosure. If an offender thus escaped the legal implications of his/her actions, it was argued, this clearly meant that justice (in the sense of punishing the wrongdoer) was compromised in the interests of peacebuilding. Thus there is an opposition between justice and peace in this context, and a trade-off between them. On the one hand, a rigorous pursuit of justice, condemnation and punishment will prevent the vital compromises that may be required to rebuild social relations between formerly opposed communities: refusal of amnesty would have greatly reduced the effect of the TRC. On the other hand, the wider reconciliation work required to establish a peaceful society now and in the future may well require compromises in carrying out full-fledged justice against wrongdoers. In order to manage an effective TRC in South Africa – in order, indeed, to have perpetrators engage with the TRC process at all – justice had to be contradicted by amnesty. (Similar arguments surrounded the early stages of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia: bringing war-crimes charges against key players in the conflict, some argued, would problematise the compromises required to build lasting peace.)

To make matters worse, the difference in perspectives of insiders within a post-violence context and of international experts and actors, especially when it involved international lawyers versus national reconcilers, added more tension. Pankhurst again: “There is a much greater potential role for outsiders with regard to justice”, while “reconciliation is generally a more domestic affair” (1999, 239, 255). This was never more true than in post-genocide Rwanda, where even a rather simplistic summary of that complex situation can make the point. Faced with vast numbers of prisoners requiring legal process, and a demolished legal infrastructure completely incapable of providing it, the new Rwandan government devised the modernised gacaca process as an attempt to combine elements of justice and of reconciliation (see Peter Uvin, 2003). But when it initially announced its plan, it was met with howls of complaint from the international community, not least from some human rights and international law experts. Prisoners, they insisted, had universal
human rights to due process of law, etc., which would be completely denied by *gacaca*. Rwanda retorted that, given the impossible scale of the challenge (it would take at least a century to process each of the hundred thousand-plus prisoners through a classical court of law) a compromise was better than nothing, given the urgency of reconciliation. The debate was heated. Some development co-operation agencies found that, for human rights reasons, they could not support the *gacaca* process. The Rwandan government felt that, again, it was being ignored or obstructed by the same international community that had averted its eyes to the events of 1994. Over the years since, the heat has eased somewhat, (and, indeed, the Rwandan situation has shifted in many, less than positive, ways) but the widespread international sense of antagonism between reconciliation and justice has not completely disappeared.

Some of this tension may well be healthy. Conflict contexts themselves are complex, contradictory, confused and confusing. But some is very counter-productive, and only serves to make a difficult situation worse. I would suggest that at least a part of it stems from the narrow, retributive definition of justice which is employed in such contexts. (Another part of it, perhaps most relevant to situations like Rwanda, stems from the international community’s inability to acknowledge and understand the values and processes of peacebuilding mechanisms that fall outside its Western-dominated cultural understanding.)

Classical justice contributes to a system that reassures its society that, ‘Those who do wrong are punished.’ Minimally, this might deter a potential offender through fear of punishment: that is, simply a behavioural change, rather than any fundamental attitudinal or moral change. But a reconciliatory justice system aims to do more than deter. It aims to provide a systematised definition of social right and wrong, from which grows an underlying shared value: that the justice system applies to all of us, that it acts fairly, that we can trust it. This is much more than grudging coexistence (which may depend solely on behavioural change: we used to kill you, now we have to tolerate you), and approaches positive coexistence.

Such an aspiration for this form of justice is invaluable in non-conflict contexts. In post-violence contexts, however, this becomes problematised. Indeed, there is an assumption among many who work in such contexts that victims actually *want* such positive coexistence, that their demand for “justice” is a demand for a fair system that all can share. Is that the case? Surely some victims care less about such broad equality, and far more about a more partial need to see perpetrators punished: victims might well be interested primarily in revenge, retribution, accountability, punishment and protection. Far from wanting to share any of their needs or satisfiers with the opposition, they simply want to see their own needs met. In this case, justice remains simply a system of crime and punishment. To truly
reconcile and develop positive social relations, there must be among victims a desire for that shared value of trust in the system. But is it fair to demand or expect that from those who have suffered? It seems a heavy burden for victims to carry.

Bearing this in mind, I'm wondering what happens if we actively redefine justice in a broader, multi-dimensional way. And what happens if we also deepen, perhaps even sub-divide, the definition of reconciliation, too: Yes, reconciliation is at base relationship-building. And at the interpersonal level, this entails profound transitions of personal interaction which centre on emotion, acknowledgement, apology, forgiveness, healing and the forging of shared personal bonds. But at the national or societal level specifically it is being redefined more modestly by some as something variously “thin” or “thick” depending on the context and the requirements; as a process of “weaving anew the social fabric” (Bleeker, 2006, 160). As noted earlier, recent commentators are beginning to focus on terms such as political reconciliation, or “civic trust,” (de Greiff, 2006) or “democratic reciprocity” (Crocker, 2003). These refer to a subset of the broader process which focuses down on political coexistence: the development not of deep sharing, but of workable political co-operation between representatives surrounded by a minimal tolerance and trust in the political process among the wider communities. That is a long way from the end-state of reconciliation, a long way from “peace and harmony”, and certainly a long way from forgiveness. But it is a realistic aim of a realistic process that demands urgent beginnings to establish democracy and build sustainable peace. Such a focus, then, offers a more pragmatic definition of reconciliation (building working relations) which relates to the reconstruction of democratic politics.

But equally important is the definition of justice which we use. I want to suggest a broader definition than that which is generally employed. I do so not as any kind of expert on law or justice (as will become clear), but simply as one who has increasingly, in the study and practice of reconciliation processes, sensed a mismatch between the clarity of external, technical definitions of justice and the complexity of internal perspectives expressed by people within post-violence peacebuilding processes. All too often, in such a context, our definition of justice is the too-narrow one of retributive justice. Justice here concentrates on the classical process of calling the guilty to account, and punishing them for their wrong-doing. I don't wish to diminish the importance of retributive justice. It clearly has a central role not only in rebalancing the scales of society, but also in establishing precedents to discourage future wrong-doing. Victims understandably gain a sense of satisfaction when they see their perpetrators punished in the name of the whole society. In this view, the full weight of the law must fall upon offenders, accepted standards of legal process must be adhered to, and the guilty must be punished.
This is a key part, not only of doing justice after violence, but of setting the limits of acceptable behaviour for the future and, in so doing, establishing a more “just” or fair society.

But a fair society depends not only on the legal process. There are other definitions of justice – not contradictory to the retributive one, but complementary to it, and essential for reconciliation and peace-building. *Restorative justice*, of course, is one: where the focus falls more on the victim and the hurt, than on the offender and the crime; where ways to “restore,” or compensate for, the hurt are sought; where, crucially, priority is given to the subsequent restoring of relationships between victim and offender communities. (See, among many others, the excellent work of Howard Zehr, e.g. 2004, and of Luc Huyse, 2003.) This, of necessity, moves outside the narrow confines of crime-and-punishment.

Then there is also what we might call, for want of a better term, *regulatory justice*. This concerns not so much the management of wrong-doing, but the broader issue of setting fair rules for all social behavior. Not only is this the business of producing a society where ‘those who do wrong are punished’. Regulatory justice aims to do more than deter. It aims to provide a systematised definition of social right and wrong, from which grows an underlying shared value: that the system applies its rules to all of us, that it acts fairly, that we can trust it. It aims to foster the understanding among all of society, but especially those who were the victim communities, that everyone is subject to the same rules that maintain fairness. Thus, not only are all equal in the eyes of the law, but society itself operates on principles of fairness for all. For trust to develop between former antagonistic communities, they must first be able to develop trust in their social and political institutions and processes.

And then there is *social justice* (including distributive and economic justice). This is the vital element of a fair society which ensures that all the “goods” of a society (economic, political and social) are shared in a fair way. If such justice is not inscribed after violence or oppression, how is it possible to build widespread and cross-community confidence in any kind of shared future?

Together, the combination of these forms of justice could contribute to a wider or thicker *multi-dimensional* concept of justice that relates directly to, and complements, reconciliation and peacebuilding work. None of this is to devalue the importance of punishment, of retributive justice. But it is to warn against too tight a grasp of the sanctity of legal principles in a situation where compromise and imperfection are all too necessary. It is this multi-dimensional definition of retributive, restorative, regulatory, and social justice which forms, in Lambourne’s words, the “justice which restores community,” in distinction from a sole focus on retributive justice which, when used alone, could indeed threaten, if not to destroy,
then at least to impede and undermine, community-building, peace-building – and relationship-building.

As justice gives us the underpinning of fairness in society – the rule of law, and so on – so it is often held as non-negotiable, a set of principles – or even morals – which cannot be compromised, even in the murky impossibilities of post-genocide Rwanda. Moreover, this argument for the primacy of law is often made most strongly on behalf of victims: they deserve justice without compromise. Any compromise, especially at the behest of strengthening a reconciliation process at the expense of justice, will thus treat the victims unfairly.

But consider the words of a representative of victims’ groups in Algeria, following the ratification in October 2005 of a Charter on Peace and National Reconciliation, which incorporated wide-spread amnesty provisions:

We want the courts to deal with those who ordered and those who carried out acts of violence, even if [President] Bouteflika later pardons them (Economist, 8 October, 2005.)

At first glance, the statement seems absurd from the victim’s viewpoint. It suggests holding up perpetrators to the full justice process – trial, verdict and sentence – and then cancelling their punishment. But it is not absurd. In this instance, what seems more important to the victims than the punishment is that offenders accept responsibility for their wrong-doing, and that society acknowledges victims’ experience and offenders' guilt and responsibility: regulatory justice, even in symbolic or partial form. Perhaps something similar was at work in the South African TRC.

Clearly, victims can think through these issues for themselves, and can do so conscious of all the complexities, compromises and imperfections involved in real life. Perhaps they can, and already do, calculate the compromises necessary between the processes of justice, the requirements of peace, and their own needs. Perhaps such a trade-off between dimensions of justice can work for them and for society. Perhaps, rather than looking for the trade-off between peace and justice, the compromises can be created between the components of this broader justice. What the Algerian speaker enunciates is an imperfect (indeed, almost contradictory) justice: and yet it works for these victims. Perhaps we need to listen more to such voices of experience. Often, especially at the international level, we insist on speaking on their behalf, or devaluing their point of view as somehow partial or emotional. We develop processes and models, into which we try to fit such people. But we would do well to recall one of the basic axioms of reconciliation, and one of the few over which there is little argument (at least in the rhetoric): it cannot be imposed from outside, but must be devised and driven from within. If we gave the ‘insiders’ proper acknowledgement, and made our processes fit the people, rather
than the reverse, we might move beyond increasingly sterile debates about reconciliation versus justice, or justice versus peacebuilding, and focus more on pragmatic steps to address the past, agree rules for the future, and begin to implement that future.

8 Reconciliation and Forgiveness

Whatever the arguments about the terminology, the level of acceptance of the term reconciliation into the vocabulary of international and national communities has become significant. Consensus, at least in the rhetoric, asserts it as a necessity. But, as noted before, consensus then immediately breaks down. One core point of breakdown is over the concept of forgiveness.

I have referred already to the South African TRC. I have no wish to overstate its importance, or to overly criticise the weaknesses among its undoubted strengths, but it is used (internationally) as the exemplar of a reconciliation process, just as the ending of apartheid is used as an exemplar of peaceful conflict transformation. I simply want to note one crucial aspect, which has significantly shaped current understanding of the term reconciliation: the emphasis on forgiveness. This arises from a clearly Christian philosophy, and the South African TRC was a commission designed and managed predominantly by Christian ministers. However, as Chapman pointed out, even they ultimately expressed some doubts about this aspect of their process, admitting to, “the potentially dangerous confusion between a religious, indeed Christian, understanding of reconciliation, more typically applied to interpersonal relationships, and the more limited notions of reconciliation applicable to a democratic society” (TRC, 1998, 440).

Nevertheless, the South African experience raised forgiveness to a central position which, I would argue, causes real problems. Certainly in the early stages of a reconciliation process, few victims are keen to forgive. Furthermore, they often perceive, rightly or wrongly, a pressure on them to offer forgiveness. This seems rather back-to-front. Forgiveness is something (often one of few things) that remains in the power of victims to give or withhold. A reconciliation process aims to make that forgiveness possible. But a fair reconciliation process should not achieve the bestowing of forgiveness through pressure on the victims. Reconciliation as a
process works towards the (idealistic) goal of an end-state of reconciliation where forgiveness may happen at the discretion of victims; if it happens earlier during the process, that is a prerogative of the unpressurised victim. Rather, the focus here should surely be on the offenders: forgiveness is something offenders should earn, not something that victims should give away (Rigby, 2001). And, moreover, forgiveness must be a later-stage component of reconciliation that may come at a victim-defined point where coexistence is shifting towards a more positive emanation.

Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the TRC’s Chair, tried to promote the centrality of forgiveness to his view of reconciliation by titling his key volume, *No Future Without Forgiveness* (1999). It is an appropriate title for a work which argues, as he does, from a religious (and specifically Christian) perspective. But the very phrase summarises the huge problems many victims have with the whole concept of reconciliation: their suspicion that their forgiveness of perpetrators will be a basic prerequisite for a peaceful future, demanded at a time that suits the process, not their own needs and development. Dwyer worries about such “obligatoriness of reconciliation,” (2003, 95), arguing rather that, “Reconciliation... is conceptually independent of forgiveness. This is a good thing, for it means that reconciliation might be psychologically possible where forgiveness is not,” (ibid., 106). This seems to parallel earlier arguments that some meaningful forms of coexistence can be devised that do not depend on “loving one’s torturer,” (Dwyer), or on “liking one’s enemies” (Chapman). Indeed, on this topic, Dwyer is quite forthright:

> It seems to me that any conception of reconciliation – at either the micro- or macro- level – that makes reconciliation dependent on forgiveness, or that emphasises interpersonal harmony and positive fellow-feeling, will fail to be a realistic model of reconciliation for most creatures like us. If we care about reconciliation, let us advocate it in terms that make it credible to the relevant parties (2003, 108).

Crocker makes a robust critique of Tutu’s claim about forgiveness, not only because it is “unrealistic, but also that it pays insufficient attention to individual freedom, including the freedom to withhold forgiveness,” (2000, 7). This assertion of the individual right not to forgive, or indeed (in a phrase I first heard from a staff member of the East Timor Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation) the right not to reconcile, is a key issue in understanding some of the resistance victims feel to reconciliation, and one often forgotten by international actors as they blithely design post-conflict reconciliation processes in the abstract. Montville quotes one dissenting black South African’s discomfort, indeed anger, with Tutu and the TRC:
What really makes me angry about the TRC and Tutu is that they are putting pressure on us to forgive... I don't know if I will ever be ready to forgive... they are trying to dictate my forgiveness (2001, 135).

This South African characterisation of forgiveness as necessary to reconciliation has not been helpful for those who move beyond the tightly-defined individual or interpersonal context into the broader political realm. But in any case let me add one more victim-voice to the debate. Colin Parry is a British man whose 11-year-old son was killed by an IRA bomb in England in 1994. His response was to establish an NGO dedicated to British-Irish reconciliation. I asked him recently where forgiveness fitted in his view. “I will never forgive the people who killed my son,” he told me. “But I am completely committed to the process of reconciliation.” Interestingly, he seems to be asserting the right not to forgive, something apparently distinct from the right not to reconcile. Perhaps the former assertion represents a pragmatic compromise over the latter.

If we can detach forgiveness from reconciliation, we can begin to define a much more realistic process of reconciliation that does not depend on peace and love, or on forgiving: immediately, we remove some of victims’ most serious objections to it. But we also move towards a much more pragmatic description of reconciliation as rebuilding the minimal working relations – social, political, economic, etc. – that will permit a divided society to take the first steps towards a shared sustainable future. And we have a definition of reconciliation that relates much more directly to peacebuilding and political reconstruction.

9 Reconciliation from the Top-down and from the Bottom-up

The high-profile reconciliation initiatives with which we are familiar tend to be national-level, top-down approaches: truth commissions, legal processes and reform, national reparation programmes, public apologies, etc. These initiatives can only take place once there is a recognised state-wide system of governance with sufficiently broad legitimacy that such initiatives can be carried out under its auspices. In contrast, community-level initiatives, whether cross-community
relationship-building, or individual healing work, are bottom-up, and can occur outside, or in the absence of, such state-wide legitimacy. (This, incidentally, raises the vital issue of timing: given this difference, bottom-up initiatives can start – as they did and do in Northern Ireland, South Africa, Palestine/Israel, etc., during violence and without waiting for the agreed national institutions that emerge from a settlement.) But again, these two approaches are too often seen as antagonistic, or at best unrelated. Indeed, for example, Chapman asserts the primacy of the top-down approach in a process of “national reconciliation,” reasoning that, “without the national framework none of these bottom-up processes are likely to be effective and sustainable,” (2002, 4). However, it may be less a matter of assigning primacy to one or the other, than addressing the interaction between the two, and in fact a strong argument can be made for seeing them as complementary, mutually related and mutually supporting (Bloomfield, 1997). Bar-Tal and Bennink, from their psychological viewpoint, certainly assert the need for both:

It is important to recognise that although the reconciliation process may begin either with the leaders or the grass roots, to be effective it must always proceed top-down and bottom-up simultaneously... In the long process of reconciliation, both phenomena usually take place (2004, 27).

But how do we move such an assertion beyond the merely rhetorical? Public, as well as expert, opinion still tends to see “reconciliation” as less muscular, less manageable, and perhaps less clear than truth or justice processes. One reason for this may be that justice and truth processes, as usually practiced, are very structural: they involve structural reform, and formal dealings with official state processes. They also take highly visible and public forms which thus better satisfy the public perception that something is being done. For the international community, they also appear satisfyingly packagable and replicable, and amenable to evaluation. Reconciliation, on the other hand, if it is about relationship-building, is only amenable to such approaches in limited ways that can produce behavioural change (through threats, rewards, sanctions, rules, etc.). And behavioural change produces only negative co-existence, not the more positive interactions demanded of a state of reconciliation. How does one legislate for relationships? One cannot, beyond the limits of behavioural rules. (Marriage and family law, indeed democracy itself, are systems of legislation for regulating relationships. But they cannot address affective or attitudinal dimensions, which are clearly key elements in the transformational process of interpersonal reconciliation.) In contrast to high-profile, national events or institutions furthering justice and truth, the relation-building work of reconciliation is generally assumed to be quieter and much less visible or quantifiable. But there is another reason why reconciliation may be seen as less
muscular: precisely because, for reasons set out in earlier sections, it is still defined confusedly in terms of end-state, forgiveness, and interpersonal dynamics. A crucial part of my overall argument is that there could be a pragmatic form of reconciliation, the political form, which could be every bit as structure-based, as visible and tangible, as publicly replicable, as legal processes or truth commissions.

I once utilised the dichotomy of structure and culture to differentiate between official negotiation processes and unofficial relationship-building processes in peacemaking:

Structural initiatives are those that aim at achieving progress through structural and/or institutional change. Innovations or alterations in systems of governance and societal structures... are the tools of the structural approach. They are generally devised, negotiated and implemented in the political arena. (Bloomfield, 1997, 24)

Cultural initiatives are those that operate at a broad community level, aiming to further resolution [of the conflict] by a process of reconciliation between two or more distinct communal or cultural groups... involving mostly members of society who do not wield significant official political power (ibid. 50).

There, I clearly located reconciliation on the cultural side. My working concept of reconciliation at the time was referring to the grass-roots, community-level, interpersonal or inter-(small)group, encounter-based type of initiatives. (No doubt I made my own small contribution to sustaining the sense of reconciliation as fuzzy and feel-good.) On reflection, however, and having offered here the argument that there is also another, much more pragmatic and wide-scale, form of reconciliation, I would prefer now to locate political reconciliation – the construction of socio-political working relations – on the structural side, and very firmly in the political arena, and interpersonal (or small group) reconciliation as a key complement to that on the cultural side of the equation.

And at this point, the top-down versus bottom-up dichotomy also lends credence to this re-orientation. Simultaneously, with this idea, we can address the confusion I noted earlier about the intertwining of the interpersonal and the political elements of reconciliation. Interpersonal reconciliation – the cultural approach – operates necessarily and by definition at the bottom-up, individual or small group level, where reconciliation involves personal interaction directly between people who have fed each others' grievances and who need such interaction to help them define the terms of their future coexistence. The other, top-down approach is exactly the realm where the pragmatists, the political thinkers, and, in Dwyer’s words, the “realists” try to see what needs done to build civic trust, to achieve political
reconciliation, democratic reciprocity, and so on – the pragmatic requirements of politics where the goal is less to achieve deep understanding and more to build adequate working relations as free of, and protected against, subjective engagement as possible.

This gives us a neat dichotomy of two complementary forms: top-down political reconciliation on the grand scale, and bottom-up interpersonal reconciliation. But their very complementarity would suggest that their interaction is vital, and while valuing the worth of both, with their different arenas and different approaches, perhaps we should also challenge the neatness of the separation. The bottom-up work we can obviously locate within civil society, but increasingly civil society, it seems to me, should also be the interface where the two meet and could be co-ordinated and interwoven in a conscious interaction between the structural and cultural.

10 A Pragmatic Beginning

What then have I been saying about bringing more clarity to the conceptual basis of reconciliation, and what consequent implications might there be for how we develop policy and practice?

First, regarding clarification, I can offer the following working hypotheses:

The main emphasis of reconciliation is as a process of relationship-building. Such de-emphasis of reconciliation as an end-state of harmonious existence (although it remains important as a motivating ideal for some, and has particular salience at the interpersonal level), avoids the risks of raising unreal expectations of harmony and perfect peace, and of putting pressure, especially on victims, to forgive for the sake of peace.

At the interpersonal level, a fuller and deeper process of reconciliation is possible, which involves emotional interaction, and which may indeed lead to a meaningful end-state of a wholly reconciled and harmonious relationship. If this involves forgiveness, it is bestowed as the unforced gift of a victim, earned by the offender, and its timing is in the control of the victim.
At the broader societal or political level, what is required is a more pragmatic, and less ambitious, process involving the development of effective working relations: “political reconciliation.” This does not require forgiveness or mutual love. It begins as grudging coexistence and, by gradually nurturing basic respect both for new institutions and for former enemies, aims to develop the habits of operating the shared processes and institutions of society and of politics.

Reconciliation and justice are not oppositional. Rather, justice is a core – perhaps, even the core – dimension of reconciliation, along with truth-seeking, healing, reparations and development. If justice is defined multidimensionally, to include not only crime-and-punishment but also the restoration of broken relationships and the underpinning of equality of treatment, of fairness of access, of the rule of consensual law – in short, as the basis of a fair society – then it is possible to relocate the so-called trade-off between reconciliation and justice as a less problematic calculus between different (and complementary) aspects of justice.

Bottom-up, “cultural” reconciliation processes operate at the small-scale interpersonal and/or grass-roots level, and have a complementary relationship to top-down, “structural” processes which take place within, and based on, the legitimacy of state-wide institutions. The complementarity between the two is important, and suggests that their interaction, rather than their merely parallel existence, might enhance the strength of both. Their interface could only be located in civil society.

Some tentative proposals might be drawn from this clarification of terms, to indicate how we might devise the basis for developing policy options and advice both for the design of more effective and coherent reconciliation processes and, perhaps even more important, for the incorporation of realistic, pragmatic dimensions of reconciliation aimed at developing effective working relations in the political, social and economic structures, institutions and reform processes of post-violence societies.

First, I am suggesting that we have to distinguish the kind of processes needed for reconciliation at the individual or interpersonal level (bottom-up, subjective, psychological approaches) from the equally vital but altogether more pragmatic processes of building working political and social relations within a post-violence society. By distinguishing the latter as a process rather than a goal, and separating reconciliation from the interpersonal realm of forgiveness, we move closer to combining what victim communities need with what post-violence politics needs. We approach a less subjective, more muscular, more compromise-based and socially applicable (and achievable) way to re-start political and social processes on new and agreed terms.
Second, we must devote far more attention to devising and defining a process of political reconciliation as a vital ingredient of the peacebuilding or reconstruction process. It may seem less definable, less structural, and less substantive than, say, infrastructure reconstruction, economic reform, constitutional reform, etc. But it is a crucial plank in the stabilisation of new structures and processes and the prevention of recurrence of violent conflict. Thus it underpins and must be centrally linked to all the other instruments of peacebuilding. For this, we have to rework previous ideas so that we approach reconciliation as a pragmatic, political process and approach justice as a much broader, multi-dimensional concept centrally linked to, rather than outside of and opposed to, reconciliation.

Third, this means that in the political practice of rebuilding post-war structures, peacebuilding and democracy-building will benefit significantly in their efficacy from paying more overt attention to the nature of the relations that are built during these processes. In developing, in the broadest but most important sense, a “fair” society after violence, political institutions must be designed so that not only do they further fairness, representation, accountability, inclusiveness, etc., and the ability to manage difference without recourse to violence, but that they also pay conscious and ongoing attention to the relations contained and developed by and within them. So some more conscious process is required for devising, developing, monitoring and maintaining working relations between politicians. But, well beyond that vital elite, this is also where, potentially, civil society could take on a key interactive role with politics.

So often these days, especially in the policy realm, ‘civil society’ simply comes to mean the amorphous arena where any and all ‘non-political’ tasks and activities are dumped. But Gordon White offers a much more dynamic and multi-layered definition which includes the crucial role of intermediary, or “(two-way) transmission belt between state and society” (White, 1996, 184). Here is the potential to truly join up the top and bottom of the reconciliation process. There are various strata of civil society, each important in this context of building relations and relationships. Could the higher, broader levels of civil society become the transmission belt between, on the one hand, grass-roots initiatives, victim advocacy, interpersonal interactions, encounter and dialogue work, documentation and human-rights work, and, on the other, the national, society-wide processes of legal and constitutional reform, truth commissions, national reparation schemes, development policy, political power-sharing, and so on? The potential is exciting, if as yet unclear. But the next step of thinking this through should be to examine the already extensive and diverse range of initiatives at both top and bottom, to more clearly assess and identify their interface and its potential for managing dynamic interaction and complementarity between all levels.
This is not yet a basis for policy-design. But the process of answering its questions and considering its challenges could provide such a basis. That perhaps is the next major challenge: using the foundation of clarified terms to generate effective action.
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